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Abstract
This thesis argues that to better understand global coal 
trade, the conventional economic model of trade needs to be 
replaced with a more comprehensive international political 
economy model of trade. The rapid growth of global coal 
trade during the 1970s and 1980s is disaggregated by coal 
type, source and destination. The extent and adequacy of 
various data sets are assessed and contract data are 
selected as the source of greatest information. The 
limitations of the conventional least cost trade model are 
then evaluated using detailed Japanese and European trade 
data. The global coal trade is found not to conform with a 
uniform commodity market model, but to be fragmented.
A new international political economy model is then 
developed to explain and evaluate the structures which 
create a fragmented coal trade. The importance of security, 
production, financial and information structures are each 
examined in turn. The security structure identifies the 
policies and decisions of the state and their importance in 
shaping trade. Important state initiatives include the 
protection of domestic industry and the promotion of diverse 
supply sources. Governments also enter bilateral trade and 
investment agreements and form international entities like 
the International Energy Agency which affect coal trade.
Most studies of the coal trade concentrate on the production 
structure where investment in mines creates the productive 
capacity of the industry. Particular attention is paid to 
investment where mines are integrated either horizontally or 
vertically into large productive units which may effect 
bargaining power in the trade. The financial structure grew 
in importance in the 1970s and 1980s. Coal mines are 
increasingly financed on an independent project basis. 
However, loan finance is not necessarily independent of 
traditional investors. Linkages among loans to established 
joint venture partners or parent corporations and long term 
contracts are shown to be strong.
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The information structure is rarely studied, but essential 
to the trade process. Specialised information institutions 
have evolved to facilitate the reliable and coordinated 
control over trade flows. Japanese trading houses, sogo 
shosha, are shown to have an especially strong role in 
global coal trade. This pattern is contrasted with the 
declining and specialised role of European coal traders. The 
comparison of Japanese and European trade patterns and the 
attitudes of regional consumers offers a better 
understanding of global trade patterns than that offered by 
simple competitive models. The result is not only more 
detailed insight into trade patterns, but a better 
understanding of the resource trade process.
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Global Coal Trade:
An International Political Economy Approach
Chapter 1 : Introduction
1.1 Global coal trade
'(T)here is no other subject besides trade on which 
theories diverge more widely, or in which most theories 
diverge further from the facts... This is why, in order 
to get some overall grasp of the structure of trade, it 
is best to begin with the facts, so far as they are 
known, and then proceed to the conflicting theories' 
(Strange 1988:161).
Global coal trade expanded threefold between 1978 and 1988 to
account for 11 per cent of all global seaborne traded The
seaborne trade of 300 million tonnes (mt) across large
distances in 1988 stands in marked contrast to the 46mt
shipped largely across the Atlantic Ocean in 1960. At that
time coal was rapidly being replaced by oil as the preferred
energy source in many applications. The rapid demise of coal
was expected, but did not arise for two reasons. First, the
growing needs of the steel industry increased demand for
coking coal and second, coal remained a low cost source of
energy for large scale applications where its bulk and cost
of handling was accommodated by large scale technology. Global
consumption (mostly steam coal) grew from 2 billion tonnes in
1960 to 2.2 billion tonnes in 1970 and seaborne trade (mostly
coking coal) reached lOlmt in 1970 (Gordon 1987).
The expected demise of coal in the 1960s was converted into 
an expected bonanza in the 1970s when the rise in oil prices 
enhanced the position of competing fuels. Once again the 
overly enthusiastic claims of short term expectations were 
not realised. Coal trade grew rapidly, but it could not 
challenge the position of oil trade. The fears of oil threats 
to political security and claims of permanent shifts in 
economic advantage proved exaggerated. Simple causal models of 
change overlooked the rigidities and underlying structures of 
the international system. Forecasts were revised, but there 
remained a need to re-examine their underlying basis.
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Many new suppliers and consumers joined the global coal trade. 
Over 50 countries traded coal volumes greater than 100,000 
tonnes per annum in the late 1980s. Despite this growth, their 
experience was neither uniform nor as predicted by the models 
constructed only a few years earlier. Both countries and 
companies faced uncertainty.
This thesis argues that to understand the coal trade, the 
conventional economic model of a commodity market needs to be 
replaced with a more comprehensive model of trade which 
recognises the financial, production, security and information 
structures that dominate the international political economy. 
Trade is one of the most important forms of international 
interaction. It is shaped by the above structures and any 
attempt to understand trade must recognise their influence. 
The coal trade thus illustrates the complex reality which 
shapes most types of trade, especially trade in natural 
resources.
1.2 The complexity of coal
The failure of conventional models to adequately explain trade 
patterns has given rise to a call for new studies to analyse 
the 'dynamic interdependence between international 
transactions and different international institutions' 
(Vosgerau 1989). This study accepts the challenge by combining 
the investigation of detailed trade transactions with the 
study of the influence of specific trade institutions like 
contractual and ownership arrangements and the general 
international security, production, financial and information 
structures.
Coal embodies the complexity of natural resources in both its 
physical attributes and its trade patterns. Coal chemistry is 
complicated with the utility of the dominant carbon influenced 
by many other constituents like sulphur, moisture, ash, 
volatile hydrocarbons and heavy trace elements. Its trade is 
similarly shaped by many factors. Economic efficiency is one 
aim of trade, but idealised models of demand and supply fail
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to accurately predict trade patterns because they ignore the 
other structures and strategies that also influence trade.
Demand for coal is dominated by its use as a fuel to release
energy and as a reducing agent in the manufacture of iron.
These two uses and the resulting markets were generally 
considered to be independent, but now interact because
technology has changed to enable many types of coal to be used
for either purpose. The two prevalent models of resource trade 
overlap in a similar fashion. Global markets (like gold) and 
transfers within integrated firms (like bauxite/aluminium) 
offer distinct models of trade behaviour. To understand coal 
trade, elements of both models need to be used. The resulting 
political economy of trade is a dynamic process which 
recognises the forces of change and measures the influence of 
important structures or strategies.
Coal is a widely distributed natural resource, yet the centres 
of production and consumption may be separated by thousands of 
miles. The high value of specialised coking coals (relative to 
steam coal) and the higher value placed on energy resources in 
the late 1970s and 1980s combined with lower transport costs 
to enable coal trade to increase across long distances. 
National boundaries were crossed and international coal trade 
(including continental trade) expanded to 370mt in 1988. This 
growth in coal trade is forecast to continue in the 1990s, yet 
our understanding of the process is incomplete.
Many studies have been undertaken to estimate the cost of coal 
production in various countries and to construct components of 
the international supply curve based on estimated or average 
production costs. Other studies have focused on demand 
forecasts by estimating the demand for coal in electricity, 
steel and general industrial markets. In each case, coal faces 
competition from other sources of energy or alternative 
technologies. Rather than duplicate such studies, this thesis 
concentrates on the trading function which links the supplier 
to the consumer.
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To better understand the resource trade function, elements of 
economic (least cost) and political (security) models are
combined with a transaction based model of trade. The result 
follows recent developments in international political economy 
which explain trade flows as a product of structures built to 
meet economic and strategic objectives. The constraints on 
economic objectives are not only the well documented
interventions of government, but also the strategic 
considerations and structures of the consumer.
To investigate this problem, the study begins its 
investigation of the international coal trade from the
position of the consumer. The buyer is assumed to hold a set 
of objectives (least cost supplies, price stability/certainty, 
stable volumes, flexible volumes, reliable suppliers,
diversity of supply, etc.) which can be identified. To achieve 
these objectives, alternative trade arrangements can be 
implemented. The arrangements frequently found in the coal 
trade include direct investment in production (majority or 
minority interests), spot or term contracts, financial support 
(loans or sale guarantees) to suppliers, control over 
transportation and the use of intermediary trading houses. 
These alternatives create many possible combinations for 
consumers to use to acquire their resource inputs. Many 
different trade networks result.
To evaluate what structures are considered important to the 
coal trade, a survey of coal buyers was conducted. The survey 
asked questions about buyer's investment in coal production 
facilities, the types of contracts used, the importance of 
different purchasing objectives and coal qualities, the basis 
for selection of suppliers, preferred limits to market share 
and number of suppliers, and whether special arrangements were 
suitable to establish new suppliers. Three time periods (1980, 
1987 and 1995) were used to indicate past and anticipated 
changes (Appendix D). The results of this survey are used to 
develop a more complete coal trade model based on consumer 
attitudes towards coal quality, diversity of supply and 
specialised 'quasi-integration' arrangements.
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The objectives of suppliers are not examined in equal detail 
because of the proliferation of more than 200 suppliers 
scattered among a dozen countries and their more restricted 
options (Appendix A). Admittedly, the largest suppliers have 
prominent roles in national industries and the transnational 
oil companies in particular have extensive international 
supply networks incorporating many corporate entities. The 
extent of horizontal and vertical integration is measured and 
the concentration is considered low enough for the supply 
industry to be competitive and responsive to consumer demands. 
Given this competition, why do some producers expand more 
rapidly or trade for longer periods than others? This question 
will be considered by investigating the relationship between 
various trade structures and the mines and consumers which are 
linked by the structures.
Detailed international trade networks are investigated using 
transaction data to gain greater insight into trade patterns 
and to assess the success of different strategies or 
combinations of consumer objectives. The use of transaction 
data is considered essential to overcome the limitations of 
aggregate trade data used in most studies. Possible changes in 
consumer objectives are also considered for their likely 
effect on future coal trade patterns.
Before starting the detailed analysis of particular coal trade 
patterns, chapter 2 locates the study within the broad expanse 
of existing international political economy ideologies and 
related trade models. The evolution of steel industry (hence 
coking coal trade) locational models is reviewed to identify 
the shift from simple production and transport cost models to 
recent corporate behaviour and political economy models. Trade 
models are often detailed compilations of the simple data sets 
incorporated in old industrial location models. The most 
popular approach to modelling commodity trade is to construct 
an economic model of the production function for identified 
supply regions, the demand function for consuming regions, the 
transport function for linking supply and demand regions and 
a linear programme to derive the least cost allocation of
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production to meet demand. These models generally make simple 
assumptions about international market structure. The 
conventional definitions and types of market structures are 
summarised and a more comprehensive framework proposed.
A more detailed look at the perfect competition model and its 
limits is provided in chapter 3. First, the conditions 
necessary for a competitive market are identified. The growth 
and extension of global coal trade to over 50 countries is 
assessed as evidence of competitive conditions being met. 
However, prices were found to vary both at the regional and 
national level. This challenge to the expectations of the 
conventional coal trade model created the need for more 
detailed investigation. The European spot market for steam 
coal is used as the case study where many consumers and 
suppliers have combined to form a growing spot market. The 
demand for flexible supplies of low cost energy is assumed to 
dominate longer term security interests. However, detailed 
examination reveals the inadequacies of this model to explain 
trade patterns and prices. The problem of data inadequacy (to 
accurately test the hypothesis) is considered, but the more 
general explanation for the failure of trade to conform to 
the perfect competition model is that the market is fragmented 
by the procurement strategies of various buyers.
Variations in international coal prices are explained in
chapter 4 by the recognition of security or diversity of
supply objectives held by most consumers. The results of a 
survey of consumers (conducted as part of this study) are used 
to support a detailed analysis of coal quality and security 
of supply variables as predictors of coal price. The largest 
and best established international market for coal, the 
Japanese coking coal market is used for the initial analysis. 
The steam coal market in Japan and Europe are then examined in 
the same manner. The conclusion is a call for a more complex
model of global coal trade.
Chapter 5 provides the detailed introduction to the structural 
IPE model of coal trade by investigating the security
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structure created by major government and corporate actors. 
Government policies and security initiatives to protect or 
enhance the position of national importers and energy 
interests are reviewed. Government intervention in coal trade 
through boycotts, subsidies and selected purchases are 
identified as part of national security objectives. Links are 
then established between the security and other structures to 
reinforce shared objectives.
The production structure is investigated as a measure of the 
degree of vertical and horizontal integration operating in the 
global coal trade (chapter 6) . Backward integration is a 
repeated practice by some consumers to secure part of their 
imports. The Japanese 'develop and import* policy is reviewed 
and the related investment by industry studied. Various groups 
of investors are identified and the implications for trade 
discussed.
The financial basis of the coal industry changed in the 1970s 
and 1980s with the investment in new projects largely drawn 
from project loans based on a future cash flow secured by long 
term contracts. The financial arrangements and contractual 
basis of this practice is studied in chapter 7 to determine 
the importance of the financial structure in the global coal 
trade. In some cases, loans provide a form of quasi­
integration which reinforces direct investment patterns. In 
other cases, loan provisions are independent and based solely 
on the banking sector's assessment of project risk.
The information structure provides important linkages with 
the other three structures and assumes a central position in 
the trade process. The importance of transaction costs is 
reviewed and the ability of specialised trading companies, the 
Japanese sogo shosha in particular, to reduce the cost of 
information and facilitate trading partner selection and 
contract negotiation is assessed. Detailed transaction data 
from the Japanese and European coal trade are evaluated to 
gain new insights into the importance of information 
structures in arranging trade.
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Each of the four structures is shown to contribute to the 
pattern and practices prevailing in the global coal trade. 
Important linkages are made between the structures, but their 
ability to enhance the power of related structures can also 
create conflicts. The result of these distinct structures 
operating simultaneously in the coal trade is the 
fragmentation of the trade into the diverse components active 
around the globe.
The insights gained in these analyses are summarised in 
chapter 9. The implications for models of the international 
coal trade, other commodity trades and global environmental 
issues are discussed. Areas in need of further investigation 
are identified and questions posed for further consideration. 
In short, international coal trade is shown to be more complex 
than suggested by simple models of either competitive markets 
(independent units), monopsonist control (Japan Inc.) or 
administrative transfers (vertical integration). The 
structural model provides explanatory power to understand the 
variation identified and to propose the means to make changes.
Endnote:
1. as measured by seaborne tonne kilometres of freight 
(Economist 28.1.1989).
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Chapter 2 
Trade theory and structural models
2.1 Introduction
The three dominant ideologies of international political 
economy and their associated trade theories are reviewed 
briefly in this chapter. The review serves three purposes. 
First it locates this study within the broad expanse of trade 
literature. Second, it serves as a reminder of some of the 
models and concepts which will be developed in more detail in 
later chapters. Third, it provides an opportunity to note the 
limitations of the assumptions underlying the standard models. 
The review is then completed with a formulation of the 
structural model of trade using the transaction as the basic 
unit of analysis.
2.2 Ideology and trade theories
Trade theories are best understood by studying them in the 
context of the ideology underlying their associated school of 
thought. The three dominant schools of thought in 
International Political Economy (IPE) are economic liberalism 
or neo-classical economics, Marxism or radical economics and 
neo-mercantilism or economic nationalism. Liberalism is based 
on the individual. Each individual is assumed to be rational 
and utility maximising through the use of markets where trade­
offs are made among alternative goods and services. By 
contrast, the basic unit of analysis in Marxism is class. Each 
class (labour or capital) is rational and utility maximising, 
but capitalism enables capital to exploit labour through the 
accumulation of surplus value from the sale of products. 
Finally, neo-mercantilists believe that nation-states are the 
dominant actors. States are rational and seek to maximise 
their relative power through military or economic means 
(Frieden and Lake 1987). Each school of thought concentrates 
on explaining trade and other international relations through 
the study of its dominant actors; these varying explanations 
will be explored further in the next section. Before
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considering these in detail it is important to note the 
difficulty of deriving trade theories (or indeed most other 
types of comprehensive theory) based on the ideology of 
dominance of a single type of actor (Sayer 1984).
Gilpin (1987) emphasised the distinction between theory and 
ideology because of the fundamentally different view which 
each group has of the relationships among society, state and 
market. An ideology is the set of 'ideas at the basis of some 
economic or political theory' (Concise Oxford 1964:601). It 
entails an entire belief system or Kuhnian paradigm. As a 
result, the intellectual commitment to the ideology is held so 
tenaciously that logic or evidence are rarely able to displace 
it (Gilpin 1987). Theories or 'supposition(s) explaining 
something based on principles independent of the phenomena to 
be explained' (Concise Oxford 1964:1344) are constructed and 
facts are selectively recognised or interpreted so as to 
reinforce or 'prove' the theory derived from such an ideology 
(Strange 1988).
This inability to independently prove the validity of economic 
theories was demonstrated by Hamminga in his study of the neo­
classical theory of trade:
'The study of the Ohlin-Samuelson programme (neo­
classical theory of international trade) above is an 
example of such a study, showing that empirical, 
statistical investigations and refutability have 
absolutely nothing to do with the complicated, but 
clearly describable methods of theory development in neo­
classical economics.' (Hamminga 1983:151)
The central problem is that each ideology and its associated
theories claim to provide verified positive explanations of
how the world does work, while also presenting normative
positions on how the world should work (Gilpin 1987:26). The
assumed objectivity is lost (Sayer 1984). To break this
tautological underpinning of most studies, it is necessary to
depart from the three dominant schools explaining trade in
terms of either market, class or state relations. Instead,
trade models should be constructed from the complex base of
verifiable trade data and the associated international trading
structures.
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2.2.1 Mercantilism and economic nationalism^
Mercantilism is the forerunner of economic realist ideology 
or economic nationalism (Barry Jones 1986). It is based on the 
experience of the 16th-18th century when trade grew under the 
control of competing colonial powers. It explains trade as a 
product of the state and its security objectives. Security was 
based not only on military strength, but also on industrial 
self-sufficiency and the wealth and security of citizens. 
Policies were defined in nationalistic terms with the dual 
objectives to increase national power and wealth.
Trade was designed to create an excess of exports to 
facilitate the accumulation of wealth (historically in the 
form of precious metals) . To achieve this end, domestic 
industry was promoted and imports restricted by tariffs and 
other measures (Viner 1958) . Industry was regarded as superior 
to agriculture and self-sufficiency in industry was essential 
for independence. This industrial protection argument was 
articulated and promoted by Hamilton [1791] and List [1841]. 
The German Historic School was strongly influenced by List and 
argued for the protection of * infant' German industry from 
cheap UK imports. The military importance of major domestic 
industries was also recognised as an important reason for 
their protection (Sen 1983).
The influence of mercantilism extended beyond the 16th - 18th 
centuries. Neo-mercantilism draws directly from mercantilist 
ideas of state action to control commerce, but many other 
terms have also been used to describe aspects of this body of 
thought. Economic nationalism, statism, protectionism, neo­
mercantilism, new protectionism have all been used to describe 
state-based action to gain advantage through trade. States are 
the central actors in this ideology and employ a range of 
protective tolls, tariffs, subsidies, licenses, and 
regulations of access to promote their position. These 
policies have been shown by economic historians to have 
dominated the trading relations among nations throughout
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history. Rivalry among Greek city states and Mediterranean 
centres were followed by northern European rivalries (Lovett 
1988) . In each case a series of policies were used to enhance 
the revenue or trading position of each state.
The primary objective of each state was to increase its wealth 
and power relative to that of other states. Policies which 
reduce the total gains of free trade to both parties are thus 
justified by the criterion of relative gain to the state 
implementing the policy. This quest for relational power 
implies that trade is a zero-sum game with the gains of one 
party being achieved at the expense of the other. The result 
of such a system is conflict.
The incentive to implement neo-mercantilist trade policies is 
an uneven outcome from unrestricted free trade or liberalism. 
The assumption that all parties are equal in a market is 
rejected on the basis that wealth tends to become more 
concentrated in particular areas and with selected groups. 
Monopoly rents, economies of scale and other distortions 
enable these unequal outcomes to arise. Dependency or power 
relations develop between weak and strong economies. Given 
this unequal division of the benefits of increased trade, 
states may intervene to promote their position. The resulting 
economic nationalism can be defensive, aggressive, or 
somewhere between these two extremes. A defensive position or 
•benign mercantilism* is the minimum level of state action 
required to preserve the security and survival of the state. 
At the other extreme aggressive or 'malevolent mercantilism* 
regards the international economy as an arena for expansion 
and national aggrandisement as in the case of Nazi Germany 
(Gilpin 1987:33).
The range of economic nationalist policies used to support 
domestic industries received renewed attention in the 1980s 
among the world's largest trading countries; USA, Japan and 
Europe. Although tariffs had been reduced through series of 
multilateral negotiating rounds under the GATT, the use of 
non-tariff barriers to trade increased. These interventionist
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policies follow the pattern of old mercantilism and indicate 
the revival of older models of gaining national advantage from 
trade. Lovett (1988) and Gilpin (1987) illustrate many of the 
protective trade policies in use. These trade instruments will 
be illustrated by the industrial policies advocated by the 
Japanese bureaucracy and implemented by industry (chapter 5) . 
They provide a prime example of neo-mercantilist policies in 
action.
The growing attention paid to the role of the state in 
promoting or limiting trade is demonstrated by the 1989 start 
to negotiations for the Structural Impediments Initiative 
aimed at reducing the $50 billion annual trade deficit between 
the USA and Japan (Economist 1989.9.9). This illustrates that:
'states seek to protect themselves and limit the costs to 
themselves and their citizens. The struggle among groups 
and states over the distribution of benefits and costs 
(of trade) has become a major feature of international 
relations in the modern world.' (Gilpin 1987:24)
2.2.2 Liberalism, free trade and factor endowment
Liberalism, or economic liberalism, forms the basis of 
mainstream economics and includes the classical and modern 
theory of international trade. This body of literature is 
sometimes called neo-classical economics to recognise the 
developments since classical free trade theory was 
established. Like mercantilism, it is an ideology which has 
been developed over time. Liberalism began as a reaction by 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo to the prevailing mercantile 
system. Rather than have an international economic system 
distorted by state objectives, they advocated a free market 
based on economic efficiency. Smith [1776] explained that 
everyone would benefit from a market where 'the invisible 
hand' established a market price at the equilibrium created by 
balancing supply and demand. Individuals were able to make 
efficient trade-offs in choosing between goods by using the 
price mechanism. In this way, they maximised their individual 
utility or well-being. Improvements in efficiency increased 
total wealth and everyone was better off. The gains made in
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local markets applied equally at the international level as 
unrestricted markets were proposed as the best means to govern 
trade.
Ricardo added a new dimension to the free trade theory by 
demonstrating that the benefits of trade came not only from 
absolute advantages, but also from 'comparative advantage* 
within national economies. Each country should specialise in 
the production of goods which it is most efficient in 
producing, even if another country has an absolute advantage 
in producing those goods. The benefits of trade are shared 
because factors of production in both countries are used more 
efficiently than if no trade took place. An equilibrium is 
established between the countries based on the concept of 
reciprocal demand as explained by Mill [1848]. This result 
predicts harmonious relations among trading states in contrast 
to the rivalry predicted by economic nationalism^.
The classical theory of international trade was extended in 
the 20th century to become the modern or neo-classical theory 
of international trade by linking comparative advantage to 
domestic factor endowments. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory of 
trade recognises differences in national factor endowments and 
predicts that countries will export goods which are relatively 
intensive in their abundant factor (eg. labour or capital). 
Heckscher (1949 translation [1919]) proposed the factor- 
endowments theory and Ohlin [1933] further developed and 
elaborated the theory. The theory is based on the comparative 
advantage of countries being derived from their factor 
endowments. In short, countries with abundant labour will 
specialise in labour intensive industry while those with 
abundant natural resources will specialise in resource 
industries. Changes in these endowments over time (ie. 
international labour mobility, skill acquisition, and capital 
accumulation) and the resulting change in trade patterns have 
been studied through the construction of general equilibrium 
models (Haaland, Norman, Rutherford and Wergeland 1988)^.
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2.2.3 Marxism and dependencia
The writings and ideas of Karl Marx have given rise to a wide 
range of theories and literature generally called Marxism or 
radicalism. The distinctive feature of Marxism is its use of 
class as the basic unit of analysis. Capitalism is seen as an 
economic system where one class owns the means of production 
(capital) and another (labour) provides the work to produce 
goods^. The value of a good was precisely equal to the labour 
time necessary for its production (labour value). Since the 
subsistence value of labour (that necessary for his/her 
maintenance) was less than the price the product was sold for, 
the capitalist was able to extract the difference, or surplus 
value of the good, as profit. This enables capital 
accumulation to take place. The conflict between classes 
arises from the capitalist accumulation of wealth (surplus 
value) from goods created by the work of labour.
The capitalist system is no longer the neutral provider of 
benefits to all as portrayed by liberalism. Instead, it 
creates conflict among classes within an economy and this 
conflict is extended into the international community by 
trade. Trade thus becomes a means to extend domestic 
capitalism and further the unequal allocation of wealth. In 
isolation, a capitalist economy suffered from the over­
production of goods (because labour was not paid enough to 
afford to buy them) and a falling rate of profit (because the 
most profitable investments were made first) (Marx [1867]). 
Both of these problems are overcome by capitalist economies 
becoming colonial powers.
The colonies offered new markets for the sale of excess goods, 
sources of cheap raw materials and opportunities for 
profitable capital investments. This expansion of capitalism 
is based on unequal relations among classes and countries. 
Lenin (1933) termed this process, imperialism. 
Underdevelopment is created where the economic structures of 
capitalism cause the terms of trade for developing countries 
to deteriorate or remain unequal (Amin 1976). This model of
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development has been termed dependencia and is strongly 
supported by many Latin American scholars (Gunder Frank 1978) . 
The result of the expansion of the capitalist system and 
international trade is uneven development and conflict among 
countries and classes.
The great contribution of Marx's analysis was not the labour 
theory of value which was shared by other classical economists 
like Ricardo. Instead, it was his exposition of the process of 
capitalist accumulation and use of surplus value. These 
structural insights formed the basis of much subsequent 
research and radical theory.
2.2.4 Intra-industry trade and transnational corporations
'There is a pressing need to integrate the study of 
international economics with the study of international 
politics to deepen our comprehension of the forces at 
work in the world.' (Gilpin 1987:3)
Each of the three ideologies outlined above failed to predict 
the major changes in the international trading system 
experienced during the post war expansion in trade. Two of the 
most important changes were the rise in intra-industry trade 
among developed economies and the rapid growth of 
transnational corporations. The dominant ideology governing 
trade during this period was an extension of the liberalism 
described above. Global trade was to move toward the free 
market ideal via an international system of rules to govern 
conduct and reduce tariffs (the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, GATT). The dominant neo-classical theory of trade 
is thus taken as the reference point from which new trade 
theories are developed.
Instead of experiencing increased specialisation and inter­
industry trade as predicted by comparative advantage theory, 
the rapid expansion of trade in the 1960s-1980s was based on 
the simultaneous increase in exports from most industries 
(Balassa 1967; Grubel and Lloyd 1975). Cars, computers, 
components and machinery were exchanged among developed
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countries. The gaining of economies of scale (increasing 
returns to scale) and product differentiation provided an 
independent basis for trade from comparative advantage. The 
mobility of factors, especially capital, proved complementary 
to intra-industry trade.
The existence of scale economies, product differentiation and 
imperfect competition usually leads to trade studies based on 
partial equilibrium rather than general equilibrium. These 
models calculate a new equilibrium for the industry under 
study, in isolation from changes in the rest of the economy. 
The trade literature thus features industry specific models 
constructed in accordance with existing trade patterns rather 
than the abstract concepts of comparative advantage (Haarland 
et al 1988, Helpman 1984). This partial approach to trade 
studies by concentrating on a single industry will be 
explained in further detail when coal trade models are 
reviewed later in this chapter.
The intra-industry trade (IIT) model explains the divergence 
between the neo-classical model and post World War II 
experience in the trade of manufactured products (MacCharles
1987) . It also has implications for resource trade because of 
the increased research into the role of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in international trade^. The behaviour of 
firms is recognised as being of direct importance to the model 
and the advantages conferred in international marketshare by 
'first mover decisions' are shown to be a significant 
determinant of success. The IIT model introduces firm-
specific advantages to explain the role of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) as prominent international traders. Each 
company is a single entity which owns and manages economic 
units in more than one country. Definitions and the structure 
of these companies vary, but control is generally exercised 
from a central headquarters in the 'home' country over the 
branches in 'host' countries.
A substantial proportion of intra-industry trade thus takes 
place among the international branches of transnational
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corporations (MacCharles 1987) . This intra-firm trade has lead 
to the recognition of new determinants of trade like the 
corporate promotion of brand names, marketing of 
differentiated products to maintain marketshares and the 
creation of barriers to restrict the entry of new producers. 
The role of large international producers is recognised as an 
important feature of international trade. The accurate measure 
of the amount of intra-industry trade which is conducted 
internally within transnational corporations is difficult 
because of limited reporting by firms. Despite the limitations 
of data, intra-firm trade in the 1970s was estimated to 
account for 70% of USA exports and 75% of UK exports (Strange 
1988:173; Meyer 1978). Other studies suggested that 25% of 
global trade in manufactured goods was among international 
branches of integrated companies (Watts 1987). Transnational 
corporations are thus major actors in inter-industry trade 
where resources, goods and services are exchanged across 
national borders, yet within the same company (Taylor and 
Thrift 1982). Under these circumstances, trade becomes a 
function of transfers within vertically integrated companies 
and only follows the pattern of integrated specialisation 
predicted by neo-classical economics to the extent that the 
companies' assets follow the same pattern.
The importance of transnational corporations is well 
established by their prominent position in trade. However, the 
explanation of this phenomena is different for each of the 
three ideologies described above. Economic nationalists see 
TNCs as extensions of the interests of the state in other 
countries (despite conflicts between companies and home 
government policy) and are a measure of the power of the home 
state (Gilpin 1975). Liberal economists did not predict the 
emergence of large TNCs because the standard market model is 
based on the participation of many suppliers and consumers. 
Given that TNCs play such an important role in trade an 
explanation for their emergence was based on the 
identification of firm-specific advantages like brand names or 
market familiarity and control over technology or information. 
In contrast, Marxists often point to the role of TNCs in
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extending the conflict between capital and labour into the 
international arena.
Rather than examine these companies from one of the three 
ideological positions outlined above, this study argues that 
TNCs are better understood in terms of their relation to the 
four primary structures of international political economy 
(security, production, finance and information). The 
contribution of TNCs to the international production structure 
has received wide recognition and study. However, TNCs also 
have important implications for the political and economic 
security of both host and home countries. They have a major 
impact on international finance as diversified and often low 
risk borrowers from international financial institutions. The 
fourth structure, information, is also central to the role of 
TNCs as they are able to control market information, 
technology and other specialised information to use to their 
advantage in various national settings. The complementary 
study of these four structures thus provides a more complete 
understanding of TNCs and their role in the international 
economy than the focus on any one dimension alone. A similar 
four-sided approach is outlined below to study the 
international political economy of the global coal trade.
2.3 International political economy and primary structures
'The parallel existence and mutual interaction of "state" 
and "market" in the modern world create "political 
economy"... The relationship of state and market, and 
especially the differences between these two organising 
principles of social life, is a recurrent theme in 
scholarly discourse... For the state, territorial 
boundaries are a necessary basis of national autonomy and 
political unity. For the market, the elimination of all 
political and other obstacles to the operation of the 
price mechanism is imperative. The tension between these 
two fundamentally different ways of ordering human 
relationships has profoundly shaped the course of modern 
history and constitutes the crucial problem in the study 
of political economy.' (Gilpin 1987:9-11)
This study argues that the analysis of the international
political economy of trade should contribute to the knowledge
33
of scholars from any of the major schools of thought, despite 
its lack of conformity with a single ideology. The relative 
importance ascribed to markets, state objectives or class 
conflict can each be better informed by a detailed evaluation 
of trade patterns and processes. To organise such a study it 
is necessary to have a meaningful framework which relates the 
structures and processes in society to the trade patterns 
observed. Most political economy models are based on the 
tension between economic and political forces as represented 
by markets and government. Rather than restrict this study to 
such a two dimensional model, the complexity of trade is 
presented through a four dimensional framework. The structural 
approach is adopted to investigate the importance of the 
security, production, financial and information structures 
(Strange 1985, 1988). These four 'primary structures' are
selected because of their dominant role in determining 
international political economy in general and trade in 
particular.
There is a need to merge the ideas and methods of individual 
disciplines. The state focus of international relations, the 
market focus of economics, the spatial focus of geography and 
contractual/regulatory focus of trade law each need to be 
broadened and integrated (Rees and Odell 1987). To achieve 
this integration. Strange proposed that the central feature to 
incorporate in I PE research is the study of structural power.
Structural power is the ability (unevenly distributed 
throughout the system) to shape the basic structures of 
production, security, finance and information (Strange 1988). 
Its study is absent from most IPE work, with the exception of 
Marxist studies which largely confined their research to 
structural power in the production structure. Strange (1988) 
extended this argument and declared that trade is dependent 
upon each of the four primary structures. Rather than regard 
trade as the outcome of unimpeded supply and demand, a complex 
and interlocking network is recognised. Political bargaining 
over access to markets, corporate decisions regarding secure
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as well as profitable sources of supply, and unequal access to 
finance and information all affect trade patterns.
The bargaining power exerted over trade through these 
structures is argued to be more important than the 
international trading regimes and international organisations 
normally studied. The current regime thus reflects 'the 
interests and bargaining power of the most powerful states on 
the conduct of the most effective traders' (Strange 1988:162). 
To gain a better understanding of trade, the security, 
production, financial and information structures each need to 
be studied to determine its individual effect and their 
combined impact on trade. The result of such studies should be 
an improved explanation of the uneven experience of trade 
participants.
2.3.1 The security structure
The security structure includes the military alliances and 
conflicts which promote or prevent trade flows. In the case of 
coal, the trade flows among the traditional blocks of 
countries in Eastern and Western Europe are comprised largely 
of exports from the east to the west. These exports are 
stimulated by the need for western currency, but are limited 
by the growing level of demand within the planned economies. 
Trade flows are also prevented by political decisions. Taiwan 
cannot import coal directly from the Peoples Republic of China 
so shipments need to be arranged through third countries like 
Hong Kong. Similarly, South African coal is prohibited from 
being imported by several European countries (SOMO 1989a).
The trade impacts of security objectives also arise from the 
promotion of military related industry in every industrial 
power (Sen 1983). Both domestic and secure international 
resources are integrated into a trading system to support 
military objectives. As part of this security system, priority 
is given to domestic industry and sources of fuel. The coal 
industries of Germany, UK, Japan, Belgium and other countries
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have been protected from international competition for decades 
as part of this arrangement (lEA 1988) .
Security structures also extend to the security of the 
economic welfare of citizens. The state plays the dominant 
role in defining these security objectives and trade is 
influenced both indirectly and directly. In the 1970s, 
security issues were redefined in the USA and other countries 
to include energy security. Concern over oil supplies lead to 
the promotion of nuclear energy in the 1970s. The second oil 
shock stimulated an emphasis on coal as 'the bridge to the 
future' when new fuels were to come on stream (Ezra 1979,1980; 
Landsberg 1979; Wilson 1980a,b). In the 1990s issues of 
environmental security are assured a higher profile and 
studies of energy systems, including coal combustion, will 
need to investigate the sustainability of their impact on the 
environment.
Other examples of the importance of energy to security include 
historic disputes over access to coalfields in Europe and the 
1987 initiatives to protect oil supplies by reflagging Kuwaiti 
tankers to ensure military protection by consuming countries 
(Strange 1988:186-190). The varied and complex interaction 
among importing states, exporting states and oil companies was 
demonstrated with the oil embargoes, expropriations, and 
oscillations in production and trading relations in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Odell 1986). Coal was included by the world's 
political leaders as an essential component of secure energy 
supplies in the 1980s (lEA 1982) . Predictably, it has been 
included as part of the energy portfolio of most major oil 
companies. This raises the question of links between the 
security and production structures.
2.3.2 The production structure
The production structure is the primary structure which 
creates wealth and includes all of the arrangements that 
enable production to take place. It provides the base of all 
political economy and is the most extensively studied of the
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four primary structures. Conventional economists and Marxists 
alike have focused their attention on production. In the first 
case, the emphasis is on markets for the exchange of products 
and the promotion of economic efficiency and competition 
through the division of labour and promotion of 
specialisation. The Marxist studies concentrate on the 
production structure as the means by which the capital class 
systematically extracts surplus value or profit from the work 
of the labour class. This process has simply been extended 
from the national to the international scale. The studies of 
TNCs and intra-industry trade described earlier are also 
concerned mainly with the production structure. The result of 
all this investigation is a very large literature from a 
variety of perspectives. Valuable insights have been gained, 
but it is argued in this thesis that a more complete 
understanding of trade can only be achieved by recognising the 
role of other structures as well.
The current production structure has been shaped by the 
emergence of capitalism in North West Europe and its dynamic 
spread over most of the world. Even the centrally planned 
economies (CPE) are connected to the structure through their 
participation in international trade and their integration may 
accelerate in the 1990s. The structure has been reshaped 
through the internationalisation of production from its 
earlier national base. The rise of transnational corporations 
is only one expression of this change in the production 
structure whereby international structures have been 
constructed to replace independent national production 
structures in importance (Strange 1988:62-65).
2.3.3 The financial structure
The financial structure has two important elements. First it 
comprises the ability to create credit where power is shared 
between the state and banks. Second, it includes the 
establishment of exchange rates for currency exchange where 
power is shared by the state and markets. The capital markets 
of the world are closely integrated and provide strong
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connections between national elements of the financial 
structure.
The ability to create credit is a primary source of power in 
the international arena because it frees new investment in the 
production structure from the accumulation of past surplus 
value or profits. This is an important development which 
relaxed the tight linkage between production and financial 
structures when most investment was made by companies 
investing their profit in new ventures or using corporate 
loans to extend their production. In the coal industry, the 
shift from production to finance based structures as the 
source of new investment is well demonstrated. The old pattern 
of steel mills and electricity companies investing in mines to 
supply their coal needs (as part of a vertically integrated 
production structure) changed to the new pattern of project 
development where several parties take equity interests, but 
most of the investment is raised from project loans (financial 
structure) rather than equity capital.
The ability to create credit also creates discretionary power 
so that finance is made available to some actors in larger 
amounts and on better terms than to others. Developed 
countries and large corporations are likely to have better 
access than developing countries and small companies. Risk 
assessment is important and a preference may be made for 
capital intensive, low risk projects, like Alaskan/North Sea 
oil facilities or northern Canadian coal mines, over low cost, 
high risk investments in other countries (Strange 1988:88- 
91). Risks of changes in exchange rates also need to be taken 
into account. The denomination of loans in yen, dollars or 
other currencies can have a major impact on the allocation of 
exchange rate risk for repayments in the future. If loans are 
valued in yen, coal prices set in dollars and production costs 
based in a third currency, the viability of a project can vary 
markedly with exchange rate fluctuations.
The financial structure thus provides a related, yet distinct 
structure to the well recognised security and production
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structures described above. A growing literature has emerged 
to recognise the importance of this structure and its central 
role in the international political economy.
2.3.4 The information structure
The fourth primary structure is that of knowledge and 
information. It has received far less academic inquiry, yet is 
argued in this study to be equally as important as the first 
three structures. The knowledge structure can be divided into 
three levels: beliefs, knowledge/information and the channels 
of communication. As in the case of the financial structure, 
power in the knowledge structure is important in both the 
negative and positive direction. The decision to withhold or 
restrict information and knowledge is just as important as the 
positive decision to provide information (Strange 1988:115). 
The use of this structure is more difficult to quantify than 
the extension of credit or the approval rate for loan 
applications. For example, the supply and transfer of 
technology is one important measure of the knowledge structure 
in action. Even in conventional open cut coal mines, computer 
based systems can increase the productivity of workers and 
equipment.
The three tiered knowledge structure can undergo four types of 
associated change. First, the perceptions and beliefs which 
underlie value judgements and political/economic decision 
making can change (at the belief level). Second, the type of 
use of information channels, like language or annual reports, 
can change (at the information level). Third, the provision of 
and control over information can change (at the information 
level), and finally the channel itself can be changed in terms 
of technology or access (at the information channel level). 
The final two types of change are considered independently 
because they operate at different levels of the knowledge 
structure and are each important in the study of trade 
information^.
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The change in information channels has received the greatest 
amount of attention of the four changes identified. The 
increase in satellite communication and the exponential growth 
of computer based information systems and information storage 
are well known. However, information systems and channels also 
include trading houses and these play a central role in the 
distribution of trade information. The control over the 
information transferred has been given much less attention and 
this study will argue that the private control of information 
is one of the more important types of power in determining 
trade patterns.
Although information is rarely priced, the acquisition of 
information and its treatment as a private rather than a 
public good is important. Indeed, information may be 
transferred from private to public hands, but still hold 
significant value for the short, yet critical period when 
trade agreements are reached. The role of information is thus 
considered by this study to be of central importance to the 
determination of trade patterns. This hypothesis stands in 
contrast to the classical economic assumption of perfect 
information.
Given the relatively small amount of attention paid to the 
role of information in trade formation, this study offers a 
significant contribution by making a detailed evaluation of 
the role of trading houses as information channels. The 
importance of information is shown in its applied role rather 
than as an aggregate indicator of a new * information era '. 
Information is not studied or valued in isolation. Instead it 
generates value by being integrated with the other three 
primary structures of security, production and finance. A more 
complete understanding of trade is thus generated by 
highlighting the role of information and its linkages to other 
international structures.
In addition to verifiable information and its communication 
channel, changes in beliefs can also be important for trade. 
Expectations about the future can change, not only on the
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basis of a known trend, but also as the fulfilment of dominant 
expectations. The role of forecasting and reliability of 
beliefs can also be examined as part of the knowledge 
structure.
Each of the four primary structures described above interact 
with the others. The measure of relative importance may be 
difficult because of these interactions. However, changes in 
the relative power of actors using these structures may be 
less difficult to identify because of reinforcing connections 
among the structures. Equally important will be conflicting 
changes where a positive change in one structure is offset by 
a negative change in another. Such comparisons should provide 
a more detailed insight into the influence of structural power 
on trade patterns than the single minded emphasis of any of 
the three ideologies outlined at the start of this chapter.
The pyramid of interaction illustrates how the four structures 
interact with each other to shape the international political 
economy (Figure 2.1). For example, the role of the information 
structure can be seen as linked to the other three structures. 
Each interaction will be considered in the chapters which 
follow. This identification of the primary international 
structures provides a broad framework on which to build a new 
analysis of international coal trade. However, these broad 
structures need to be complemented with a detailed 
understanding of the trade process if strength is to be added 
to the above model. This study provides internal strength 
through the provision of micro-level transaction data to fill 
in between the structures outlined above. Like the combination 
of concrete and steel in construction projects the result will 
be a better building than either would provide alone.
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Figure 2.1 : The IPE model of four primary structures
FA. Balance
S
B. Pyramid
trade
structures - S = security
P = production 
F = financial 
I = information
balance - S = state 
M = market
Source: adapted from Strange 1988: 27
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2.4 Conventional market structure studies
2.4.1 Definitions
The term 'structure* is used frequently in this text and the 
literature to which it relates. Indeed, the term is used so 
frequently, that it is rarely defined. To avoid confusion over 
terms this section contrasts the above definitions of the four 
primary structures (security, production, finance and 
information) with the definition and study of conventional 
market structures.
Studies in market structure generally equate structure with 
the number of firms active in a particular market and then 
consider what influences this number (eg. barriers to entry) 
and what behaviour is representative for a particular market 
structure (Stiglitz 1986) . The common meaning of the term is 
worth noting to contrast the simple definition of market 
structure with the more extensive description of the four 
primary structures of international political economy 
presented earlier. Structure means the 'supporting framework 
or whole of the essential parts of something' (Concise Oxford 
1964:1279). The 'whole of the essential parts' extends beyond 
the simple number of firms participating in a market, hence 
the need for detailed investigation into the components of the 
security, production, financial and information structures 
which influence trade. This section will explore this 
extension by briefly reviewing some of the literature relating 
to conventional market structures and their associated 
behaviour.
2.4.2 Competitive structure
The conventional structure of markets assumed by most trade 
models is that there are many producers and many consumers. 
Each actor has no influence over the price and acts as a 
price-taker. The price at which the market clears is 
determined by the marginal cost of supply equalling the
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marginal value of demand. Variations in price are caused by 
short term imbalances between demand and supply.
However, the functions of supply and demand represented in 
trade models are not necessarily independent as assumed in the 
competitive model. The characteristics of a competitive 
commodity market are examined in more detail in chapter 3 to 
enable a comparison to be made between the actual 
international coal trade pattern with its prevailing prices 
and that predicted by a perfectly competitive market.
To measure the degree of competition in a market, measures of 
industry concentration are usually made in terms of the 
marketshare controlled by the largest 4 or 8 firms. While 
these measures identify changes in industry composition over 
time or between markets, they are inadequate predictors of 
market behaviour. A range of models have been put forward to 
explain market behaviour under different levels of 
concentration.
2.4.3 Monopoly and monopsony
*(T)he economists*s interest in imperfect competition on
resource markets is based on real world evidence.*
(Withagen 1985:29)
The failure of international markets to perform as predicted 
by free trade theory led to the study of monopoly and 
oligopoly theory. In contrast to the many small firms 
operating in a competitive market, a monopoly consists of only 
one supplier. To maximise their profit, monopolists restrict 
supply (relative to a competitive market) until their marginal 
cost equals marginal revenue from the industry demand curve. 
A higher price for the good results and the monopolist gains 
the monopoly rent from this market structure. However, where 
other products act as substitutes for the good in question or 
other special conditions are met, the optimal pattern for the 
monopolist can approach that of a competitive market structure 
(Stiglitz 1986).
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Unlike markets dominated by a monopolistic supplier (which 
have received detailed attention as indicated above), those 
with monopsonistic characteristics (a single buyer) have been 
given little attention. Anderson (1987) suggests that this 
lack of attention to monopsony is due to the bias that the 
consumer should benefit from market transactions. This bias 
has not been accepted by those interested in producer groups. 
Robinson (1987) articulates the economic concerns about 
monopsony in her study of commodity exports from less 
developed countries which are controlled by a single, or small 
group of, importers or processors based in the developed 
countries. The result is a transfer of the benefits of trade 
to developed countries and a continued decline in the terms of 
trade for less developed countries.
2.4.4 Horizontal integration and oligopolies
Given that the exercise of market power where numbers of 
suppliers are small can influence trade volume and price, the 
options for oligopolistic behaviour need to be considered. The 
number of suppliers may be small because of horizontal 
integration which combines many production units within a 
single corporate entity or because of factors like economies 
of scale or specialised technology which promote large scale 
operations and restrict entry. The behaviour of firms in such 
imperfect markets has been modelled with the Nash equilibrium 
being one of the best known solutions to cartel formation. In 
this case, it is assumed that the gains to each member are 
maximised and no side-payments are made. However, this 
solution is not unique and if other strategies are adopted, 
then a different solution will result. The range of options 
can be limited by cooperative cartel action, but no single 
behaviour strategy can be predicted.
Alternatively, oligopolies may act in non-cooperative ways 
where individual actors seek to maximise a particular 
objective. In the Cournot model, oligopolists decide their 
level of output based on the assumed output levels of their 
opponents. A Nash equilibrium can be calculated for such a
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model and is known as the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. By 
examining prices instead of output Bertrand suggested a 
similar model. The assumption that other producers had fixed 
levels of output was relaxed by Stackelberg who showed how 
other producers might react to oligopolists*decisions. These 
reactions were considered to form a reaction function by 
Bresnahan (1981).
Many insights into the theoretical performance of these market 
structures and alternative behaviour patterns were developed 
in relation to resource trade questions following the OPEC 
cartel's success in raising the price of oil in the 1970s. 
Simplified models were constructed where a cartel and fringe 
suppliers interact in a resource market. Questions about the 
effect of market structure on price, the order of exploitation 
of resources and the distribution of benefits among producers 
were addressed.
Initial oil industry studies (Salant 1976; Pindyck 1978) 
assumed a Nash-Cournot behaviour pattern where the behaviour 
of each participant was not affected by the behaviour of 
others. In this case, the cartel takes the supply from the 
fringe as given and sets the price to maximise its discounted 
profits. The result is simultaneous production by both groups 
of producers until the fringe exhausts its resources and the 
cartel then becomes the sole producer. Prices start higher 
than under a competitive market structure and the producers 
gain more benefits from the trade (at the expense of 
consumers). However, the derivation of the Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium is based on many assumptions. When the assumed 
identical revenue and cost structures of the two groups of 
producers are changed, the sequence of exploitation also 
changes (Ulph and Folie 1977, 1980).
Behavioural assumptions can also be changed. The Stackelberg 
equilibrium was considered a better model because it permitted 
strategic behaviour where the cartel could take into account 
the reaction of the fringe to its announced production 
schedule (Gilbert 1978). In this model the fringe is assumed
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to recognise the market power of the cartel and takes its 
supply schedule as given. A supply schedule is again derived 
and price paths assessed. A problem arises however, because 
'dynamic inconsistency* creates an incentive to change from 
initial production schedules (Newberry 1981). If binding 
contracts were not made to ensure compliance with production 
schedules, the cartel will be tempted to change production 
levels when the fringe is depleted to maximise its discounted 
flow of profits (Ulph and Folie 1977, 1980). Unique solutions 
can be derived from either the Nash-Cournot or Stackelberg 
models. However, they are defined by strict assumptions and 
the relaxation of these assumptions or the introduction of 
uncertainty makes the model indeterminate with more than one 
outcome possible. Coal market studies considering such 
oligopolistic behaviour are reviewed later in this chapter.
2.4.5 Vertical integration
An alternative market structure is the vertical integration 
model where the production and consumption functions are 
contained within a single enterprise. Perry (1987) defines a 
vertically integrated transaction as one where either the 
entire output of a firm is used by a single firm or the entire 
input of a particular good is acquired from a single firm. In 
addition, these transactions are internalised by a single 
company owning or controlling the neighbouring stages of 
production or distribution. Other studies relax Perry's first 
assumption and consider a vertically integrated transaction to 
be one which takes place between two units of the same 
corporate entity. Some measure of control or coordination is 
assumed although the measure (i.e. 50% ownership) varies from 
study to study.
Transactions within the vertically integrated company replace 
market or contractual transactions and are administered by an 
internal hierarchy as explained by Williamson (1975, 1986,
1988) in the transaction cost literature. The objective of the 
vertically integrated enterprise is assumed to be the 
maximisation of profit (and reduction of risk) over the whole
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operation rather than rely on the profits from a single 
function^. This may be achieved through the reduction of 
transaction costs or improved efficiency from the coordination 
of both operations. Coal consumers like the mills, electric 
power companies and even cement companies in Japan have 
invested in overseas coal mines. This type of integration 
reshapes the production structure of the coal industry and 
will be examined in chapter 6.
2.4.6 Quasi-integration
In addition to the complete integration of two or more units 
within a single corporation, various forms of quasi­
integration are possible. Vertical * quasi-intégrâtion' was 
defined by Bloise (1977) to recognise special trading 
relationships between firms in neighbouring stages of 
production or distribution where all of the product of one 
firm is supplied to or consumed by the other. Equity 
investments, loans or loan guarantees, leases or real estate, 
long term contracts and capital or inventory credits have all 
been used as forms of quasi-intégrâtion. In the study of the 
Japanese coking coal trade, D'Cruz (1979) identified four 
forms of quasi-integration (partial equity linkages, long term 
loans, long term contracts and logistical linkages) for 
investigation!
'These linkages result in a closer than arm's-length 
relationship between the parties, a relationship 
intermediate between that which exists among independent 
buyers and sellers and that among divisions in a 
vertically integrated firm.' (D'Cruz 1979:1)
The detailed investigation of these various forms of quasi­
integration as part of the structures which shape coal trade 
will be presented and evaluated in later chapters. Existing 
coal trade models based on simple market structure assumptions 
are examined first.
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2.5 Coal trade models
2.5.1 Comparative advantage and resource endowment
'The most obvious factors that explain a good deal of 
international trade are 'natural resources' - land of 
different quality, mineral deposits, etc. ... While it is 
easy to explain why Kuwait has a 'comparative advantage' 
in oil, Bolivia in tin, (Australia in coal), etc., the 
existence of natural resources presents the economist 
with certain theoretical complications' (Haberler 1977:4)
The appealing simplicity of comparative advantage in natural 
resources as the model to explain resource trade has been 
proposed and refuted. While early descriptive trade studies 
and locational models followed this approach, later studies 
became more sophisticated. The evolution of these studies is 
illustrated by starting with the classic work of Jevons (1965 
[1865]) and Chisholm (1980 [1889]). Jevons was concerned about 
the exponential growth in coal consumption and coal trade 
following the introduction of free trade laws in the 1840s. 
Given a finite endowment of coal, he calculated how long 
economic growth could continue before coal became 
prohibitively expensive because of the depths from which it 
had to be mined. Discoveries of new deposits, changes in 
technology and competition from other fuels have changed the 
actual pattern of trade and consumption from that calculated.
In contrast to the classic resource problem posed by Jevons, 
Chisholm presented a simpler description of global commerce 
which was revised 20 times over the next century (see also 
Stamp 1947). His 'Handbook' included substantial sections on 
resource (including coal) production and trade. The pattern of 
trade flows from production at scattered resource deposits to 
consumption in centres of population and industry provided 
useful overviews of global trade. These descriptions of trade 
patterns implicitly adopted a comparative advantage and factor 
endowment view of trade.
To improve these studies, the complexity of natural resources 
themselves needed to be recognised. Natural resources are much
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less homogeneous than labour and capital because of their 
chemical complexity, geographic location, depth of deposit, 
and other characteristics (Haberler 1977; Rees 1985). 
Production functions can not be assumed to be the same, or 
even homogeneous (constant returns to scale). The production 
of the same resource may be capital intensive in one country 
and labour intensive in another. Technologies vary in both 
distribution and suitability.
Brookfield (1977) responded to the comparative advantage 
explanation of resource trade by claiming that even if it 
explained the international pattern of the extraction 
industry, it certainly failed to explain the pattern of the 
processing industry. These were a product of the 
interdependent, yet uneven development process (Brookfield 
1976). Resource endowment simply creates the opportunity to 
participate in resource trade, it does not imply the ability 
to mobilise other factors (ie. capital, technology, 
infrastructure, and specialised skills) required to achieve 
the opportunity (Radetzki 1990; Rees 1985). The simple 
economic model overlooks the need for all four primary 
structures to be coordinated to enable trade to happen.
One of the first groups of models used to explain the coal 
trade is the locational models. These models were first 
suggested as the basis of a unifying trade theory. However, 
their simplifying assumptions soon led to models conflicting 
with reality and the need for more complex models was 
recognised. In these location models, coal was incorporated as 
one of the inputs into the steel industry - the typical 
subject for this type of study. The increased complexity and 
sophistication of locational models provides a parallel for 
the changes required in coal trade models. Simple cost 
(extraction plus transport) based models need to incorporate 
the complex reality of international political economy to 
accurately depict actual trade flows. Trade is not created by 
abundant resource endowments alone.
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2.5.2 Locational models - coal as an input to industry
'the theory of international trade is only part of
a general localization theory* (Ohlin 1933)
' one can view trade theory and the general theory of
location and space economy as synonymous' (Isard 1956:53)
Location theory and space-economy models recognise the 
geographic distribution of inputs to and outputs from 
production as well as the geographic variation in costs and 
prices. This complex system is usually restricted to special 
cases. For example, the general equilibrium theory is based on 
assumptions of zero transport costs and perfectly mobile 
inputs and outputs. Similarly, classical trade theory is a 
special case of location theory drawing broad generalisations 
from a restrictive set of assumptions in the two country by 
two commodity by two factor model. Rather than focus on such 
restrictive assumptions, location theory has extended the 
range of factors included in its models to explain the 
observed locational pattern.
This increasing sophistication is demonstrated by steel 
industry studies. The theoretical basis of most of the steel 
industry studies was the general theory of industrial location 
based on Weber's work on the transport of localised raw 
materials (Weber [1911] translated by Friedrich 1929). Weber 
pointed out that classical trade theory ignored transport 
costs. To overcome this deficiency he introduced a material 
index (based on the weight-losing properties of raw materials 
in the production of finished products) to enable optimal 
locations to be calculated on the basis of transport costs and 
the change in weight during processing. This cost 
minimisation model would then yield an optimal location based 
on transport and factor costs.
At the national level, steel industries symbolised 
industrialisation and were the subject of many descriptive and 
analytical studies (White 1929; Hartshorne 1929; Erselcuk 
1946; and Brush 1952). Fewer studies developed general 
hypotheses of the role of material transport (coal and ore
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from mine to mill and steel from mill to market) as an 
explanation of plant location (Hartshorne 1928). Trade was 
included as a simple extension whereby Canadian or Brazilian 
iron ore was transported as an input to the American industry.
Changes in technology, markets and material reserves were 
recognised as important influences on steel industry location 
(Isard 1948), but the inertia of sunk capital and limited 
mobility of skilled workers were shown to reduce the incentive 
to change location (Rodgers 1952). Location studies became 
more sophisticated as Isard (1956) considered transport costs 
to be just one of many inputs and Smith (1966) recognised the 
importance of economies of scale and technology. Many other 
factors like access to information, plant extensions and 
government policy also became incorporated into models 
attempting to explain the location of industry and the 
resulting trade of products (Markusen 1986).
An important technological feature underlying this evolution 
in location theories away from transport-based models was the 
decreased relative cost of transport. By the 1960s proximity 
to resources was virtually disregarded as a locational factor 
for steel mills. Instead, the priority was to have large 
scale, low cost processing at a coastal centre where resources 
could be imported cheaply from distant mines by large bulk 
carriers (Warren 1985). The Japanese, South Korean and Italian 
steel industries demonstrate this shift. The evolution in 
location studies illustrates a path which resource trade 
studies need to follow. Initial descriptions and emphasis on 
a single feature are recognised as inadequate. The structural 
approach which links four primary structures as the basis of 
international trade provides a way forward.
2.5.3 Coal and transport costs
The cost of transport remains important to coal trade because 
of the weight of this bulky commodity. Although coal was being 
shipped from Newcastle in the early 1600s, the cost of 
transport was such that even in the early 19 th century.
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industry was often located next to the bulky fuel which was 
consumed by the steam engines in the mills.
'Coal being bulky and heavy, the raw materials of 
manufacture were at first carried as near as might be to 
the pit mouths and the workers were gathered into towns 
round the collieries. Cotton could be brought to the coal 
with much greater ease than coal could be taken to the 
cotton' (Mackinder 1902).
The development of canals and steam locomotives reduced the 
cost of transport and coal was soon being transported to 
industrial sites in ever greater quantities. This pattern of 
coal transport was not restricted to the national economy. 
The British coal trade grew quickly in the late 19th century 
with annual exports rising from 8.5 million tonnes (mt) in 
1861-65 to an average of 88mt in 1909-13 (Jevons 1915; ILO 
1938) . By 1900 coal was considered 'the one great ballast 
cargo which Britain sen(t) to the outer world in return for 
such massive imports as wheat, timber and iron ore'(Mackinder 
1902:329). Coal was thus not only the fuel which powered the 
industrial revolution, ocean transport and the spread of 
industrialisation, it was also one of the principle 
commodities of international trade. The advantage of carrying 
coal in one direction and other commodities, like timber, in 
the other is that it reduces transport costs.
Transport costs remain a central issue in the coal trade with 
half of the value of delivered coal in Europe used to cover 
its cost of land and ocean transport in most cases. The long 
haul of Australian coal to Europe and South African or east 
coast American coal to Asia illustrate this pattern. The 
abundant supply of bulk carriers in the late 1970s and early 
1980s helped to keep freight rates low and promote long 
distance transport.
2.5.4 The least cost model
'There is sufficient free competition in and between the 
four major exporting countries (Australia, Canada, South 
Africa and United States) for the price of coal to tend 
toward long run marginal cost.' (lEACR 1981)
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The most common coal trade models are constructed to predict 
the pattern of trade based on the least cost or economic 
efficiency criterion. They provide specific examples of the 
approach advocated by the liberal or mainstream school of 
economics described earlier. Individual countries are chosen 
as a unit of analysis for international studies or individual 
mines for national studies. Most of these models consist of 
four main components: a supply model, a demand model, a
transport model and a linear programming system to connect the 
other three models (Zimmerman 1981; US DOE 1982; Soyster, 
Gordon, Enscori and We 1985; Steenblik 1985). Variations 
arise in the definition and aggregation of coal supply and 
demand regions. Typically the model may consist of 10 supply 
regions and 20 consuming regions. Normally each supply country 
forms a unit with only the largest suppliers, like Australia 
or USA, divided into 2 or 3 parts in some models. On the 
demand side, countries importing over 3mtpa usually form 
individual regions in the model while countries with a smaller 
role in the coal trade are aggregated into regional units. The 
reason these larger regions are used is to simplify the model 
and to reduce computational time in calculating trade flows 
among all of the actual exporters and importers. The 
availability of data may also influence the level of 
aggregation adopted in a particular model.
One of the more prominent international coal trade models is 
that developed by Kolstad and Abbey (1984) . It is used by 
various industry groups including the lEACR (International 
Energy Agency, Coal Research). lEACR has sponsored a series of 
coal studies to better specify the export supply curve of 
several countries (USA by Barnett 1985a; Colombia by Jamieson 
1985; Canada by Jamieson 1986; South Africa by Long 1986; 
China by Doyle 1987; and Australia by Long 1987). These 
studies were complemented with studies of the major demand 
sectors (residential by Macadam 1983; industry steam raising 
by Holcomb and Prior 1985). Finally, the structure of the 
market was evaluated by Gaskin (1981, 1983a, 1983b, 1986) in 
a series of surveys. The model is then run under different 
sets of assumptions to see what pattern of coal trade results.
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The model operates on the basis of the assumptions built into 
it. For example, the linear programme linking supply, demand 
and transport modules is usually set to derive a price which 
results in the consumer surplus being equal to the producer 
surplus. In this way both groups share the gains of trade 
equally. Coal trade is calculated for the least cost option 
which maximises the surplus and creates the most efficient 
allocation. Forecasts of optimal market allocations have been 
made using these models. They represent an equilibrium which 
stimulates discussion and represents the long run expectation. 
However, such studies are often not published because of the 
variation between the results and actual trade patterns. For 
example, the cost of production and transport costs 
virtually excludes Australian coal from the European market 
under the least cost assumption. At the same time as such 
models were being constructed in the late 1980s the Australian 
share of coal imports jumped. In reality, trade is not based 
on cost minimisation alone. Other factors need to be 
considered and are discussed in the next section.
2.5.5 Composite national models
'(S)uch prominent studies as Steam Coal: Prospects to
2 000, prepared by the lEA and the WOCOL study, probably 
represent a state-of-the-art approach to the noble art of 
economic forecasting, even though a number of the 
conclusions drawn by these studies are patently invalid.* 
(Banks 1985:91)
Given the difficulties in matching a least cost model to 
actual trade patterns, most coal trade studies and forecasts 
have adopted a different approach. Most studies base their 
forecasts on the present and use individual countries as their 
basic unit of analysis. This country based approach implicitly 
follows the economic nationalist approach described earlier 
although this link is rarely acknowledged. The objective is to 
construct an international model of trade, but the method is 
based on individual states and either implicitly or explicitly 
recognises the effect of national policies on coal trade.
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International surveys are conducted to determine expected 
levels of exports and imports (lEA 1978a,1982a,1989a).
One of the most famous of these studies was the WOCOL report 
published in 1980. Surveys were made to gather national 
forecasts together and compile an aggregate trend for global 
coal trade. Steam coal imports were expected to increase five­
fold from 60mt in 1977 to 300mt in 2000 (or 680mt in the case 
of limited oil supplies and delays to nuclear power) (Wilson 
1980a:20). Imports of metallurgical coal were expected to 
double from 130mt in 1977 to 260 in 2000 (or 300mt in the high 
demand case).
Composite studies are very common, but suffer from problems of 
variations in the underlying economic circumstances or 
assumptions of the different national forecasts. This lack of 
internal consistency and the possibility of double counting 
where more than one country expects to supply a particular 
market point to some of the difficulties in these studies. 
However, they also offer some strengths. This lies in their 
ability to incorporate a variety of objectives which each 
country may seek to meet in its trade. For example, if a 
decision is made to pursue an objective other than least cost, 
like diversifying supply or reducing transaction costs by 
buying from the previous year's trading partner, then the 
results of a least cost model only match the actual trade 
pattern to the extent that the trade flows meet more than one 
objective. In the composite national models each nation can 
set its range of objectives implicitly or explicitly.
Objectives may be set by a government when a country like 
Poland or China determines its export levels on the basis of 
desired foreign currency earnings or countertrade obligations. 
Similarly, exports from less developed countries like Colombia 
or Indonesia may assume the 'social metal' pattern of 
producers maintaining output levels despite low prices to 
protect employment, government revenue and export earnings. 
Such decisions are not predicted by a least cost model. To 
incorporate these national objectives into a least cost model.
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they must be introduced explicitly as part of the linear 
programme or parameter definitions. Limits can be assigned to 
marketshares or trade capacities to reflect known objectives. 
The incorporation of these objectives in an international 
model can also be approximated by simply using accurate 
national models in a composite international model. However, 
problems may remain in the lack of consistency among the 
national components.
To overcome the limitations of these initial approaches to 
international coal trade modelling, the assumption of a 
competitive market structure was relaxed and the behaviour of 
an oligopoly or oligopoly/monopsony considered.
2.5.6 Oligopoly/monopsony models
'On the supply side. South Africa clearly has the 
appearance of an oligopolist enjoying very low production 
costs, a tight domestic producer cartel, and government 
export licenses and quotas. Poland, with low transport 
costs to western Europe and a state trading monopoly, 
also represents a supplier with potential market power. 
Even with the possibility of foreign investment, the 
Australian steam coal export industry is relatively 
concentrated. Mechanisms such as the federal export 
permit system, state ownership of railways, and labour 
union power bolster the opportunities for Australia to 
exercise market power.' (Abbey and Kolstad 1983:881)
Although concluding that 'the international steam coal market 
does not appear to be perfectly competitive' Abbey and Kolstad 
(1983:891), did not specify the actual market structure. 
Instead they pointed to South Africa, Poland and Australia as 
having the potential to exercise market power on the supply 
side and Japan and the European Community (if it acted 
collectively) as having the potential to exercise market power 
on the demand side. Their review of market structure and 
behaviour was inconclusive as to the best model to represent 
the market. To answer the question of model applicability for 
the international steam coal market, they called for further 
research.
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In their next paper, Kolstad and Abbey (1984) pointed to the 
low extraction costs in South Africa and Australia and their 
large resource endowment. If international markets were 
perfectly competitive, there would be no need for high cost 
North American exports. To explain North American 
participation in the coal trade, models usually constrain the 
export capacity (esp. port) of South Africa and Australia (ICF 
1981; US DOE 1982) . Export constraints may be valid in the 
short term, but have little justification in the long run. 
Instead of repeating this approach, Kolstad and Abbey propose 
an oligopolistic model of coal supply to explain continued USA 
participation in the market.
Kolstad and Abbey (1984) compared the results of four assumed 
market structures: competitive; South Africa as a monopolist; 
South Africa and Australia as duopolists; and South Africa and 
Australia as duopolists with Japan as a monopsonist. The 
models were tested by comparison with actual 1980 trade data 
and 1990 forecast trade data. The competitive model had the 
greatest variation from the actual data because of the larger 
predicted role of South Africa and Australia (67% of exports 
predicted, 39% actual). The duopoly models successfully 
increased exports from other suppliers and were judged to 
predict trade patterns reasonably well (Kolstad 1988). 
Finally, the duopoly/monopsony model ensured that the 
duopolists were unable to extract any rent from Japan. This 
model of non-cooperative duopoly/monopsony assumes Cournot- 
Nash behaviour with South Africa and Australia independently 
and strategically raising export coal prices. The export 
patterns of other producers are thus taken as given with no 
reaction made to the strategies adopted by South Africa, 
Australia and Japan.
The results show that trade patterns predicted by the model 
which assumed that South Africa and Australia act as non- 
cooperative duopolists and Japan as a monopsonist are similar 
to actual trade data (Kolstad and Abbey 1984) . However, the 
authors recognise that 1980 data is not representative of a 
market equilibrium because of the recent emergence and rapid
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growth of seaborne steam coal trade in 1980. Equal concern 
should be voiced about selecting a model on the basis of its 
ability to match predictions with the DOE 1990 forecasts. The 
DOE model incorporated parameters which constrained non-USA 
exports. The Kolstad and Abbey model simply provides a reason 
for such constraints - duopolistic behaviour. More detailed 
research is clearly required to explain the pattern of 
international coal trade.
2.5.7 Bilateral monopolies
The opposite extreme to perfect competition among many actors 
is a monopoly. In its simplest case a market may consist of a 
bilateral monopoly where there is only one buyer and one 
seller. Smith (1977) constructed a simple model where there is 
one seller, Australia, and one buyer, Japan, for a particular 
mineral. However, neither party has a monopoly in the global 
market. Instead, the monopoly is restricted to their bilateral 
trade. The bilateral monopoly arises from the bilateral trade 
offering some benefits over trade with others. This benefit is 
represented by reduced transport costs between the two parties 
(in comparison to the transport costs to alternative trade 
partners), but could be caused by a range of factors termed 
•trade resistances*.
Smith (1977) identified a range of trade resistances 
including: rigidities and imperfections like internal
transfers within TNCs and commitments under long term 
contracts which restrict short-term market options; market 
stabilisation arrangements like long term contracts and buffer 
stocks; the market search costs of finding other trade 
partners; institutional arrangements where facilities and 
staff have specialised benefits for the bilateral trade and 
resist change; and the transport cost differentials where 
trade with alternative partners, in the Atlantic for example, 
involves higher transport costs. The result of these 
resistances is to create 'additional gains from bilateral 
trade • .
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The conventional model of monopoly behaviour involves a 
reduction in the volume of trade to enable the monopolist to 
gain the monopoly rent from this market structure. However, 
Smith follows the Spindler argument that a monopolist or 
monopsonist facing a single trade partner will behave 
differently than when facing a competitive industry. Instead, 
the standard economic model can be used to consider the 
relative bargaining strengths of the two sides. The volume of 
the trade is not restricted and the bargaining is over the 
appropriate price. The conclusion from the analysis of various 
price offers available to each side is that a price should be 
reached which divides the benefits of bilateral trade equally. 
This optimal long term arrangement assumes that the use of 
short term advantages is restricted in the interest of 
maintaining the trade.
The formation of cartels to achieve this balance in bargaining 
power and distribution of benefits was reviewed critically 
(Smith 1977). Certainly the Australian coal export industry 
would have great difficulty forming such a cartel given its 
different cost structures and the difficulties in being able 
to discriminate in prices allocated to different members. The 
problems of oligopoly models discussed previously appear 
again. The results of the Smith study extend the general 
imperfect or monopolistic competition models initiated by 
Robinson and Chamberlin into a resource trade, bilateral 
monopoly context. Further studies can extend this work to 
evaluate the structures which enhance bilateral monopolies and 
effectively insulate trade partners from outside competition.
2.5.8 Structural power and coal trade
The difficulty in matching market structure to market 
behaviour was illustrated above. The conventional measure of 
market structure is based on the number of parties active in 
the trade. The international coal trade has approximately 200 
sellers and 200 buyers active in the 1980s (Appendix A & B). 
This number of participants clearly indicates that the market 
should be competitive as expected by lEACR. However, actual
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trade patterns were better approximated by oligopolistic or 
monopsonistic models (Kolstad and Abbey 1984). Despite the 
similarity between modelled and actual trade flows, the 
authors were careful not to argue proof of causality in the 
coal trade, only that the patterns were similar. The 
inconclusive and tentative findings reached by such studies 
implies that a new approach is required. Each of the four 
primary structures is argued to create opportunities to shift 
(distort) trade patterns from that predicted by the least cost 
model.
The security structure enables the state to improve its own 
interest and power through the promotion of collective 
purchasing by consumers, or extra taxes, railway charges or 
export quotas on suppliers. In each case the objective is to 
benefit the parties in a particular country. The result may be 
a significant reduction in the effective number of actors 
participating in the trade and changes in the size of trade 
flows.
The financial structure provides finance to coal projects. The 
uneven nature of this structure is demonstrated by the special 
interest rates and repayment terms gained by some projects. 
Special financial terms may be made available from government 
sources. In this case, the financial structure may be used to 
reinforce initiatives from the security structure. Currency 
denomination and exchange rates can also have a significant 
effect when repayments are made in different currencies from 
those which coal is priced in (eg. yen versus dollar) . The 
hypothesis that these structures have an effect on trade will 
be tested by comparing transaction data for projects with and 
without special finance.
Production structures have received the most attention in 
other coal trade studies and will be treated selectively in 
this study. Market power and behaviour is considered a product 
of the concentration of production units in conventional 
studies. Integration of the production structure in both
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vertical and horizontal directions will be identified and 
measured to determine what its effects are on trade.
The knowledge structure is studied at two levels. First the 
detailed transaction level is examined to determine the role 
of specialised institutions like the general Japanese trading 
houses, sogo shosha, at providing detailed project data and 
continuous relational information. This is argued to reduce 
the transaction costs of trade and improve the position of 
small consumers. At another level, the beliefs of future trade 
size are argued to be a product of public forecasts. Both the 
detailed transaction information and general beliefs about 
market expectations are argued to be important determinants of 
trade.
2.6 Conclusion
The three ideologies of liberalism, mercantilism and Marxism 
were shown to have been the basis for different theories of 
trade. While each theory was able to explain trade in terms of 
the assumptions drawn from the associated ideology, the 
theories were inadequate to construct models representing the 
diversity encountered in global trade.
Rather than restrict this study to the assumptions of any one 
of the traditional trade models, a structural international 
political economy model of trade is proposed. This structural 
model draws on many of the insights gained from previous 
studies and integrates them by recognising the importance of 
four primary structures (security, production, financial and 
information) in determining global trade flows. The dominance 
of a single group of actors is replaced by the recognition of 
different groups being active through different structures 
and thus able to exert their influence on trade.
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The conventional view of political economy as a contest for 
supremacy between market and state forces is replaced with a 
more powerful four-dimensional tool for the analysis of 
international political economy. Before developing this 
structural model in detail, the need for it must be proven. A 
rigorous investigation of the strengths and limitations of 
conventional coal trade models is made by comparing the models 
to the actual pattern observed in global coal trade.
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Endnotes:
1. The following sections are based on the prevailing 
terminology used in studies of international political 
economy. The same terms may have different meanings for other 
groups of researchers. For example the economic realist school 
of thought described in this section is based on neo­
mercantilist principles where the state introduces policies 
or laws which direct or limit market activity. This definition 
of realism is distinct from that found in other branches of 
the social sciences. In particular, Sayer (1984, 1985) 
articulated a realist approach for the social sciences where 
no single theory is regarded as fully describing reality. 
Instead, abstractions can be made from reality to identify a 
particular structure. The abstract structure is not considered 
to be a full representation of reality. However, several such 
abstractions can be made and compared for a more complete 
model. This 'realist approach* enables empirical research to 
be undertaken without claiming to provide complete 
explanations or theories of reality.
2. Despite the intellectual appeal of liberalism and free 
trade, the UK only adopted this policy in the 1840s after it 
had gained a clear international supremacy over its rival 
colonial power, France.
3. An interesting debate over the importance of factor 
endowments arose when Leontief [1953] presented his paradox of 
the USA trade pattern. The USA economy is relatively capital 
abundant and according to the factor endowments theory should 
export capital intensive goods. However, imported goods were 
found to be more capital abundant than exports. Vanek (1959) 
suggested that the capital intensive goods being imported were 
also resource intensive and that the Leontif Paradox was 
explained by the increasing relative scarcity of resources in 
the USA. Other explanations tried to identify reasons for a 
factor intensity reversal or demand reversal.
4. Marx used the term 'commodities' in his analysis of 
manufactured goods, but the term 'goods' is used here to avoid 
confusion with the more common meaning of commodities - 
primary products.
5. The term transnational corporation (TNG) is used here to 
conform with United Nations terminology. Other terms in common 
usage which define similar organisations include multinational 
enterprise (MNE) and multinational corporation (MNC).
6. This creates a small departure from their combined 
treatment proposed by Strange (1988:116).
7. In addition to the complete vertical integration described 
by Perry (1987), there are numerous intermediate positions 
between anonymous spot market exchange and vertical 
integration. For example, vertical controls can be used to 
transfer control over some aspects of production or 
distribution between firms (ie. resale price maintenance, 
exclusive territories).
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Chapter 3
Coal trade models: unity or fragments?
3.1 Introduction
(I)t would be pleasant to say that this chapter will 
develop an efficient general equilibrium or econometric 
model for the forecast of international trade flows in 
steam coal, but instead I must begin this presentation 
by making the uncomfortable statement that no such model 
can be constructed at the present time, despite the fact 
that such models do exist and are used for forecasting, 
and the energy-related literature is unfortunately filled 
with references to them. ' (Banks 1985:91)
'In short, all coal production forecasts must be built 
on highly imperfect information on all the key 
determinants.' (Gordon 1981:288)
Warnings by some analysts need to be compared to the 
achievements of others to provide a balanced evaluation of 
conventional coal trade models. To determine whether or not 
the international coal market follows the efficient commodity 
market model, the most important conditions for the operation 
of such a market are identified:
1. There will be multiple suppliers and multiple users of the 
commodity with no effective monopoly of either buyers or 
sellers.
2. The commodity will be widely traded and easily transported 
with the costs of movement between different markets easily 
calculated.
3. The commodity can be stored.
4. The commodity can be provided at a uniform quality and the
product can be regarded as homogeneous or different qualities 
of the commodity can be related easily to a standard quality. 
(Berrie and Hoyle 1985)
Given these conditions, a single price can be determined to 
balance demand and supply for the commodity at any single
point in time. Many analysts believe that an integrated
international coal market has developed (lEA annual; Schulz 
1988; Shell 1985).
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'All in all, a vast supply of cheap coal is coining onto 
a world market whose potential for growth is now viewed 
with much less optimism than in the past. The world coal 
market is wide open at the supply end. There are no 
restrictions on access. The long term price trend on such 
a market is determined by the trend in costs.' (Schulz 
1988:35)
The increase in the quantities of coal traded internationally 
in the 1970s and 1980s was accompanied by an increase in the 
number of countries making significant imports (section 3.2). 
As was seen earlier, over 200 suppliers from several export 
countries sold coal to over 200 buyers in 50 import countries 
(Appendix A and B) . This large number of actors implies a 
competitive market structure and enables market behaviour and 
characteristics to be predicted.
The magnitude of seaborne trade has grown especially rapidly 
(from 46mt in 1960 to lOlmt in 1970, 188mt in 1980 and 272mt 
in 1985). Bulk carriers transport the coal across long 
distances and the cost of single voyages is well known because 
shipping rates are widely quoted in industry journals (CWI; 
ICR ; Lloyds Weekly). The increase in the number of coal 
producers and consumers combines with the availability of 
transport to meet the first two conditions for an efficient 
commodity market.
The third condition is satisfied by coal being able to be 
stored in stockpiles. The practical length of storage is not 
infinite because coal will oxidise and become less valuable 
if left exposed to air and moisture for a long period of time. 
However, this storage restriction does not change the ability 
of coal storage to overcome short term demand/supply 
imbalances. It is readily bought one day for resale or 
consumption several months later and thus meets the third 
commodity market condition.
The fourth characteristic required for a commodity market, 
the homogeneous or uniform quality of the commodity, is less 
apparent in coal because of its variation in inherent quality 
and inclusion of impurities. In particular, coal sold for
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coking purposes has many more attributes of importance than 
coal sold for steam raising (see chapter 4). In steam raising 
the calorific value of coal is most important and can be used 
as a standard for quality comparisons. Indeed, the conversion 
of various types of coal or even other fuels to a standard 
unit (tonnes coal equivalent or tee) is achieved by the use of 
a calorific definition: 1 tee = 7 million kilocalories or
7,000 kcal/kg or 29.3 million Joules (lEA 1988a:115)^. Prices 
for different quality coals can thus be compared directly. The 
adoption of calorific standards for coal comparisons should be 
qualified by other characteristics like ash and sulphur 
content because of differential impacts on boilers and 
emission levels. In practice, the standards imposed on coal 
quality restrict the range of coal types traded 
internationally to a narrow set of impurity characteristics, 
thereby eliminating many of the wide variations in quality.
Assuming that coal, especially steam coal, can be treated as 
a uniform commodity, the four conditions for a commodity 
market are satisfied. The operation of the international coal 
market can thus be studied to determine whether or not it 
conforms to this conventional market model. As international 
trade grows, competition should increase and any existing 
price variations caused by market imperfections are expected 
to decline.
International trade data is examined to measure price 
uniformity for coal. Given that transport costs can cause 
variations in price, it is expected that prices will become 
more uniform as one moves from comparisons of intercontinental 
to regional and then national markets. The examination of 
smaller markets should reduce the impact of geographic and 
quality variation. Similarly, steam coal with its smaller 
range of important quality characteristics is expected to have 
more uniform prices than coking coal. Each of these 
expectations is tested in this chapter.
67
3.2 Trade expansion and the least cost model
3.2.1 The expansion of global coal trade
Coal trade in the 1960s-80s underwent a period of growth which 
exceeded its previous period of rapid growth in the 1860s- 
90s (Jevons 1915) . The recent growth differed from that of one 
century earlier because it was no longer centred in Europe 
(Asteris 1981). Instead, coal became a global commodity with 
371mt traded in 1988 among over 50 countries (market and 
planned economies alike). Shifts in the global focus of the 
trade occurred as Asian imports exceeded those of Europe 
(Figure 3.1)^. New markets emerged in Latin America, North 
Africa and the Middle East. The pattern of trade among 
centrally planned economies grew only slowly and North 
American imports were roughly stable. The overall trend was 
one of stability or decline in overland trade routes in North 
America and Europe and rapid growth in the seaborne sector.
Asia and western Europe were by far the largest markets 
importing 120-160mtpa in the late 1980s. Growth occurred in 
both regions, but the pattern was not the same. European 
imports were steady at 60mtpa in the 1960s and then rose 
sharply in the late 1970s to llOmtpa in 1980. The recession 
of the early 1980s was followed by an increased import level 
of 12 0mtpa in the late 1980s. In contrast, Asian imports 
achieved a higher rate of growth over the entire period, 
rising from 18mt in 1965 to 63mt in 1975, 131mt in 1985 and 
162mt in 1988 (UN 1988; lEA 1989a).
This regional pattern is better understood by examining its 
national components. Japan dominated the Asian market and 
provided most of the region's growth in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Figure 3.2). Japan was the largest single importer in 1965 
with imports of 17mt, but by 1985 imports had grown by more 
than fivefold to reach 93mt or over four times the size of the 
next largest importer (Italy with 21mt of imports) . In 1986 
South Korea surpassed Italy to became the second largest 
importer of coal. This was achieved by a rapid rise in
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Figure 3.1: Coal imports by region
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imports from less than Imt in 1975 to 21mt in 1986 and 24mt in 
1988. Japan, not surprisingly, retained its dominant position 
with imports of lOlmt in 1988.
The rapid growth in Asian imports is contrasted with the mixed 
European experience. French coal imports grew in the late 
1970s to reduce reliance upon oil in power stations and 
reached nearly 30mt in 1980. These imports subsequently 
declined when many nuclear power stations were brought into 
operation. By 1988 France imported only 12mt of coal. As a 
result, France was replaced by Italy as the largest European 
importer of coal (from 1985 onward). Italy had imported a 
similar amount of coal as France in the 1960s (10-12 mtpa) and 
its increase in coal imports was delayed until the late 1970s 
when coal started to replace oil as a fuel in power stations.
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Figure 3.2: Top five coal importers in 1985
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Canada is the fifth largest importer of coal. Its pattern is 
the opposite of that of most other large importers. Rather 
than increase imports substantially, the pattern is one of 
cyclical variation from a base level of 15mt in 1965. In 1984 
imports rose to 19mt because of increased steam coal demand by 
Ontario Hydro, but recessions in the steel industry also 
contributed to low import levels of 12mt in 1974 and 13mt in 
1986. This comparison of national import levels can be 
extended from the five largest importers (Figure 3.2) to the 
50 largest importers (Table 3.1).
Another example of rapid Asian growth in coal imports is 
Taiwan. Imports rose rapidly from Imt in 1977 to lOmt in 1985 
and almost 18mt in 1988. In a 1988 listing of the top five 
importing countries, Taiwan would replace France from the 1985 
group and give Asia three of the five top positions in global 
coal trade. The ranking and importance of markets was changing 
rapidly.
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Table 3.1: Global coal trade ranked by imports in 1985
importer 65 70 75 78 80 83 85 88
Japan 17.1 50.2 62.1 52.2 68.2 74.7 93.0 101.2
Italy 10.3 11.7 12.3 11.7 16.5 15.8 20.8 19.7
S.Korea 0.1 0.0 0.7 2.4 7.3 11.0 19.8 24.0
France 11.9 14.2 17.3 23.5 29.8 19.7 18.5 12.1
Canada 15.1 17.0 15.3 13.2 16.0 14.7 15.0 17.4
UK 0.0 0.1 5.1 2.3 7.3 4.5 12.7 12.0
Denmark 3.4 3.4 4.1 6.1 9.9 8.5 12.7 9.7
Netherlands 7.1 4.8 4.1 5.0 7.2 7.7 11.5 13.7
Taiwan 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.4 4.1 6.5 10.4 17.6
USSR na na na na 6.7 11.6 10.3 na
Germany FR 7.2 8.8 6.2 6.6 9.1 9.1 9.9 7.5
Belgium/Lux 6.9 7.7 6.8 7.6 10.6 8.0 9.5 11.3
Spain 1.7 3.5 4.0 3.4 5.7 5.9 8.4 8.8
Brazil 1.0 2.0 2.8 3.6 4.5 6.3 8.3 10.3
Bulgaria na na 5.7 na 6.1 6.4 7.4 na
Romania na na 4.7 na 6.6 6.9 6.6 na
Hong Kong 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 5.5 8.9
Germany DR na na na na 6.8 4.2 5.1 na
Finland 2.5 3.2 3.8 4.8 4.7 4.4 5.1 5.5
Sweden 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 2.2 3.1 4.8 3.8
Czech na na na na 5.1 4.9 4.6 na
Yugoslavia 2.2 1.8 2.1 1.7 3.6 4.0 4.3 4.5
Austria 3.6 3.5 2.5 2.3 2.9 3.0 3.6 3.9
Hungary na na 2.7 na 3.3 2.6 3.5 na
N.Africa 0.1 0.5 1.3 1.1 1.3 3.1 3.5 na
Israel 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 3.3 3.4
N.Korea na na na na 0.5 2.0 2.5 na
China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.1 2.3 na
Turkey 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.9 2.1 4.5
Ireland 1.3 1.2 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.9 3.5
USA 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.7 1.1 1.2 1.8 1.9
Greece 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.7
Portugal 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.5 3.0
Philippines 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.2 na
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.3 1.1 na
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 na
Norway 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.8
Pakistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.8 na
Argentina 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.8 na
Switzerland 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.4
Malaysia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 na
Chile 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 na
Thailand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 na
Albania 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 na
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 na
Pacific Is 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 na
oth S Amer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 na
Peru 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 na
oth SE Asia 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 na
Iceland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Indonesia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 na
oth Africa 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 na
Sri Lanka 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 na
India 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 na
S.Africa 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 na
Total (mt) 98 139 171 158 257 267 340 371
Sources: UN 1988; lEÀ 1989a; lEÀ 1988
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When the global coal trade grew from 98mt in 1965 to 17Imt in 
1975, the number of countries (excluding centrally planned 
economies) which imported over lOmtpa remained at four and the 
number of countries which imported l-9mtpa remained at 15. 
This period of expansion was thus narrowly based with the same 
group of countries increasing their demand for imports 
(largely of coking coal).
In contrast, the decade 1975-85 witnessed the doubling of 
trade volumes (17 Imt in 1975 to 340mt in 1985) and the 
increase in the number of countries importing over lOmtpa from 
4 to 9 (excluding the USSR). The number of countries importing 
l-9mtpa rose from 15 to 26 and in 1985 over 40 countries were 
importing over O.lmt of coal^. Markets for coal were both 
growing and increasing in number. The result should be an 
increase in competition with the trade becoming more like that 
of a commodity market and less influenced by the imperfections 
known to affect energy markets.
3.2.2 Coal trade partners
•The coal buyer, in contrast (to the gas buyer) , can dial 
himself a cargo from any of over 100 suppliers all of 
which at any one time will be able to give him a quoted 
price and time of delivery.' (FTEE 1988:21)
Having identified the growing international markets for coal, 
the level of supply competition can be measured by comparing 
the number of countries supplying each of the markets. The 
largest importing countries (over lOmtpa in the mid 1980s) are 
listed in Table 3.2 along with the number of significant 
suppliers they had at five yearly intervals between 1965 and 
1985\
The number of supply countries is highest for markets in 
Europe as a result of the geographic proximity to coal in 
other countries. Germany, France and Belgium exchange coal 
among themselves and also import it from Eastern Europe 
(especially Poland and the USSR), the major seaborne suppliers 
(Australia, USA, South Africa and Canada) and new suppliers
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like Colombia. In contrast, Canada and the USSR each have one 
dominant source for their imports. In between these extremes, 
lie the Asian importers of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. 
Japan has the most diverse supply network in the Pacific while 
South Korea and Taiwan imported coal from the four major 
seaborne exporters (Australia, USA, South Africa and Canada) 
to fuel their rapid growth in the 1980s. These trading 
patterns demonstrate that a more diverse supply network is 
emerging for mbst markets. The pattern of diverse supplies 
implies that competition has increased as predicted by the 
conventional coal trade model.
Table 3.2 Number of supply countries for major coal 
importers, 1965-85
year 65 70 75 80 85
importer number of countries supplying over 50,000 t
Japan 6 7 9 7 7
Italy 5 8 5 9 11
S.Korea 0 0 2 4 4
France 8 8 9 10 10
Canada 1 1 1 1 1
UK 0 1 4 7 10
Denmark 3 2 4 8 8
Netherlands 7 8 6 8 7
Taiwan 0 1 1 4 4
USSR na 1 1 1 1
Germany,FR 7 8 11 12 11
Brazil 1 2 3 4 5
source: UN 1988; TEA 1989a
3.2.3 Competitive trade and production costs
'The world coal market is an open market with free 
access. The price on such a market cannot remain above 
the level of the total costs of the lowest offer price 
over the long term. This is why the world market price 
for coal is expected to be dominated by the long-term 
cost trend.' (Schulz 1988:39)
The Schulz (1988) study, prepared for the European Commission, 
illustrates the expectations and predictions of cost-based 
coal studies (see also Barnett 1984, 1985b; Calarco 1987;
Drewry 1988; Moody 1989; CSC 1989; and Yuasa 1988). The cost 
of coal production in major exporting countries is compared 
and the capacity for future expansion assessed. Schulz
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concluded that South Africa, Australia, Colombia, China and 
other new suppliers will provide most of the coal for the 
growth in trade in the last decade of this century and beyond. 
Established suppliers like Canada, Poland and the United 
States will achieve only slight growth with the USA playing a 
special role as the high cost * swing supplier*. To understand 
how these conclusions were reached, the analysis is reviewed.
The cost of producing and transporting steam coal for sale in 
Europe is compared for the three largest suppliers USA, South 
Africa and Australia (Table 3.3). The very large reserves of 
the countries (400,000; 57; and 33 billion tonnes,
respectively) are presented as an indication of their ability 
to expand output. The costs of production are presented for 
both the actual 1985 experience and that projected for 2000.
Table 3.3: Coal production and transport costs, 1985
S.Africa Australia USAcountry
region Qld NSW EC Gulf
cost item (unit)
1985$ 1987$
Schulz Calarco
operating cost
capital cost
FOR 7-14
rail
port
FOB 16-23
freight (frgt) 10 
CIF ARA 26-33
sales revenue 
FOB price^ 31.22 
FOB for Europe^
apparent frgt 10.52 
apparent frgt
CIF price 
CIF Europe^ 
CIF Neth^
8
5
13
11
2
26
41.74
41.79 32.77
45.82 30.41
1985$ 1987$ 1985$ 1987$
Schulz Calarco Schulz Calarco
7
9
16
9
3
28
14-35
7-14
28-42
12
40—54
Aus
32.28
32.50 26.18
16
8
24
7
4
35
19.85
17.13
52.13
49.63
52.99
15.14
41.32
42.03
27-49
11-22
43-65
8
51-73
48.10
46.06
9.37
9.30
57.47
55.36
59.39
25
7
32
20
6
26
15 8
2 2
49 36
USA
43.35
8.44
51.79
44.80
note:
source:
ARA = Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp 
Schulz presents cost range data,
Calardo presents typical costs 
l=Schulz 1988; Calarco 1987; 2=IEA 1989a
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To consider future developments in the market, Schulz first 
looked at the lowest cost producer, South Africa^. Steam coal 
exports in 1985 were 46mt and the export capacity could be 
raised to 3-4 times this level with a cost increase of only 
50%. The cost to cover this expansion is shown in the 
calculations for the year 2000 (Table 3,4). Indeed, Schulz 
indicates that South African exports could be increased 
sixfold to over 250mtpa with production costs remaining under 
$3Opt. Despite the appeal of expanding this low cost source of 
coal, Calarco (1987) considers 75mtpa to be the maximum likely 
to be exported from South Africa by 2000. Political factors 
restrict the economic least cost objective.
Table 3.4: Coal production and transport costs, 2000
country S.Africa Australia USA
cost item costs in year 2000 (1985$)
FOR 18-22 39-42 50-54
rail 9 10 15
FOB 27-31 49-52 65-69
freight 13-15 15-18 10-12
CIF ARA^ 40—4 6 64-70 75-81
CIF ARA^ 44-62 49-65 50-63
ARA tonnage^ 11-19 6-1 8-31
note: ARA = Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp
freight range has a 25-50% increase from 1985 levels 
source: l=Schulz 1988; 2=British Coal 1988
Australian coal exports received similar attention^. Production 
levels were considered able to expand to ISOmtpa with no 
further increase in costs (Schulz 1988) . The prices indicated 
in the projection for 2000 thus reflect those capable of 
supporting a very large industry (>150mtpa). Rail rates, which 
are controlled by state governments, are assumed to be 
moderate. As in the case of South Africa, the low cost of
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Australian coal production creates the incentive for a large 
expansion in exports (Schulz 1988).
In contrast to the above suppliers, production in the USA 
involved higher production costs, but benefitted from lower 
ocean freight costs. USA production costs in Appalachia were 
estimated at four times those in South Africa (Schulz 1988). 
A lower cost view was presented by Calarco (1987) who pointed 
to the lower production and transport costs of some mines 
which can use barges down the Mississippi and then ship from 
the Gulf region. Production costs were forecast to remain 
constant in northern and southern Appalachia while costs in 
central Appalachia rise by 20% by 2000 (Schulz 1988). Despite 
moderate rail rates, USA coal would remain relatively high 
cost in Europe. As a result, they are expected to be the swing 
supplier which meets short term surges in demand from the 
industry's very large production capacity.
Transport costs are identified as over half of the cost of 
delivering coal in northern Europe from Australia or South 
Africa (Table 3.3). In the mid 1980s ocean freight rates were 
lower than the cost required to replace the fleet. Freight 
rates for the year 2000 were thus increased by 25% to meet the 
capital costs of replacement and by 50% to combine replacement 
costs with high oil prices (Schulz 1988). The effect of these 
increases is most pronounced on the long voyage from Australia 
to Europe where the delivered cost approaches that of USA 
coals.
The inclusion of actual price data for 1985 and 1987 indicates 
that not all mines were covering their costs during this 
period. Predictably, some of the high cost mines closed and 
coal prices rose in 1988 and 1989 in response to growing 
demand and the reduction in old supply capacity. Schulz 
estimated that future prices in Europe would need to be $10- 
15 above 1986 levels ($45pt) to meet the costs of future 
increases in production ($55-60pt).
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The upper limit to coal prices was also identified. An oil 
price of $30 per barrel in 2000 would set a price ceiling for 
coal at $115ptce (per tonne coal equivalent)^. This high limit 
for the price of coal is based on the oil price and does not 
imply that prices would reach such levels. For example, in the 
1970s the price of coal rose much more slowly than that for 
oil.
The selection of an oil price of $30 per barrel in 2000 
reflects the expectations of many energy studies®. Despite the 
widespread assumption of high future oil prices, it should be 
noted that the implied wide gap in the competitive position of 
coal in the energy market is not so secure if oil prices are 
low, as occurred in the mid 1980s. For example, if oil prices 
are $15 rather than $30 per barrel, the ceiling price for coal 
falls from $115 to $45ptce. At this price, the prospects for 
coal * s competitive future in Europe are restricted to the 
lowest cost mines.
An alternative view of future coal prices was provided by 
British Coal who also used a least cost model of international 
coal trade. However, they differed with Schulz on their 
assessment of production costs and European prices. The 
contrast between the two studies is striking. Whereas South 
African coal remains profitable for the entire projected price 
range, most Australian suppliers would be forced to leave the 
European market at prevailing prices of $50-55pt in 2000 and 
the USA would become the largest supplier to northern Europe 
(British Coal 1988). In contrast, the Schulz estimates of USA 
production costs are well above the British Coal price 
projection and USA suppliers would have only a limited 
position in the market.
The differences in the two views of the USA as a coal supplier 
are explained by the Schulz study requiring all production 
costs to be met. In contrast, other studies (British Coal 
1988; Lee 1988; Mehliss 1988) consider USA coal as 'marginal 
coal'. Because of the size of the domestic USA coal market, 
most coal is sold within the country. Mines which choose to
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sell additional coal to the export market have their capital 
costs covered by sales in the domestic market. This enables 
them to accept lower prices for export sales which only cover 
their operating costs. This 'marginal coal* is priced on the 
basis of marginal production costs rather than the full cost 
of the mine. In this way, the USA is able to remain a 
significant exporter despite low prices, as in the mid 1980s.
Many studies consider the price of coal to be determined by 
the cost of production in the USA. Given a lower cost of 
production in other countries, the USA acts as the swing 
supplier which exports sufficient coal to balance global 
supply and demand. This role is especially important for short 
term adjustments. Over the longer term, coal must provide a 
return on the investment in mines (otherwise there is no 
incentive to make the investment). The Financial Times Energy 
Economist (FTEE 1988) thus argues that future coal prices are 
determined not by the USA, but by the Australian industry.
'Australia is not only the dominant influence on price 
levels, but this dominance will grow with at least three 
(more) major mines slated for development in 
Queensland.'(FTEE 1988:22)
To enable this Australian expansion to go ahead, the costs of 
production will need to be met. The estimated marginal cost of 
this production is $50pt (including a 15% return on capital) 
while the average cost is $41pt (A$50pt) (Barnett cited in 
FTEE 1988). Given a rise in freight rates from $11.50 to 
$17.00 to cover capital costs, the associated cif price in 
Europe is $58pt (within the Schulz range).
The emphasis placed by Schulz on production costs as the chief 
determinant of coal prices is correct as a first principle. 
However, production costs can vary unexpectedly. The emphasis 
on large scale open cut production has reduced unit costs and 
the low prices of the mid 1980s have stimulated substantial 
improvements in labour and equipment productivity. Both 
improved technology and work practices have contributed to 
these gains. Even the structure of the industry has changed 
with the Australian industry undergoing a substantial
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realignment with firms merging to reduce administrative and 
managerial costs (chapter 6) . The result is a lowering of 
costs which enables mines to remain economically viable under 
lower prices than previously considered.
The main assumption underlying the conventional) model of the 
coal trade, as outlined above, is that it has a competitive 
international structure’. The result is that a single clearing 
price will be determined for the competing South African, 
Australian, American and other suppliers. The next section 
examines coal trade data to find the prevailing price of coal.
3.3 International coal prices
3.3.1 Coal price deflators and trends
As Japan is by far the largest importer of coal, it provides 
an important starting point in the examination of 
international coal prices. Coal is a form of energy and its 
price underwent substantial changes in the 1970s and 1980s 
just like other forms of energy. However, coal prices are less 
volatile than oil or gas prices and a more subdued pattern 
emerged. When oil prices quadrupled in the 1970s, coal prices 
doubled. In current or nominal terms, coal prices continued to 
rise until they reached a peak in 1982 of $73 per tonne 
(average cif value delivered in Japan, UN 1988). However, a 
more meaningful measure is to compare deflated or real prices 
over time.
Various deflators have been used to standardise prices. Coal 
is usually priced in US dollars, but using a US price deflator 
like the wholesale price series would be using a domestic 
economic measure to adjust international prices. A more 
meaningful procedure would be to adjust the price in terms of 
its purchasing power (Radetski 1985). To do this. World Bank 
officials have constructed a long term deflator series from 
United Nations trade statistics of the unit values for exports 
of manufactures (Grilli and Yang 1988). The result is a price
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series for the manufactured products exported by mature 
developed economies. Given that coal exports generate foreign 
exchange which is often used to purchase manufactures, the 
best deflator for coal prices is the manufactures unit value 
(MUV) series compiled by Grilli and Yang (1988) and extended 
by incorporating recent trade values (UNCTAD 1989).
The comparison of current and deflated prices is provided in 
Figure 3.3. The apparent fivefold increase in Japanese cif 
coal prices from $15-16 per tonne in the late 1960s to $73 in 
1982 is reduced to a twofold increase when the prices are 
deflated. Two deflators are used to compare their effects on 
the price pattern. A US manufactures price index (USMPI) was 
compiled by Grilli and Yang (1988) from the wholesale price 
index. This domestic index is compared with the MUV index 
derived from UNCTAD data. Both series indicate that the price 
of coal in the late 1960s and early 1970s was $40-50 per tonne 
in 1985$ terms.
The US index (US MPI) indicates a very rapid price rise in 
the mid 1970s and a gradual decline which accelerated in the 
1980s (Figure 3.3). The preferred MUV deflated values clearly 
illustrate the two peaks in average coal values corresponding 
with the two peaks in oil prices. The deflated price series 
also demonstrates that coal values in the late 1980s had 
fallen in real terms below the level of the 1960s. Even the $2 
average price rise in 1988 failed to generate a real gain in 
purchasing power because the unit values of manufactured 
exports rose even faster (UNCTAD 1989)^ °.
The Japanese cif price series can then be compared to other 
coal import prices. The largest importing country on each of 
four continents (Asia, Europe, North America and South 
America) are selected for comparison (Figure 3.4). Each 
country had imports of over lOmtpa in the 1980s. The prices 
in all four countries followed a similar pattern although 
their relative position changed gradually. Italian coal 
imports had cif values $5-10 per tonne below the Japanese 
price in the 1960s, but were effectively equal in the 1980s.
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Figure 3.3: Average coal prices in Japan
- current and deflated cif unit values
100
80
40
20
1965 1970
source : Gr i l  
c u r re n t  $
& Yang 1988; IEA 1989a; UN 1988 
*_ 1985$ MUV _^1985$ USMPI
In contrast, Brazilian cif values (mostly coking coal) climbed 
$10 above the Japanese and Italian average in the 1970s. Each 
of these three countries had a similar pattern with coal 
prices doubling in the mid 1970s and then falling in 1986 back 
to their level in the 1960s. Only in the case of Canada, where 
almost all imports came overland from the USA, did average 
values remain substantially (50%) above the 1960s level.
Given, the increased size of international coal trade and the 
investment in new mines to meet this demand, it is not 
surprising that prices could not continue to fall, yet support 
a viable industry. Company losses and mine closures occurred 
even in the low cost export countries of Australia and South 
Africa in the late 1980s (ACA 1988; JCB 1988; INCR 1989). In 
1988 current coal prices rose by $2-5 on average and further 
increases were predicted. Despite these changes in price over 
time, a competitive market is expected to have uniform prices 
at any point in time. The analysis thus shifts from following 
price trends to measuring the degree of price uniformity.
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F i g u r e  3.4. C o a l  p r i c e s  on four c o n t i n e n t s
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3.3.2 International coal price uniformity
International price uniformity, that is an international price 
which is uniform when adjusted for differences like transport 
costs, is measured in this section as an indication of an 
efficient international coal market in operation. The general 
observation of similar price trends (Figure 3.4) can be 
examined more rigorously by measuring the variation in coal 
prices among different groups of countries. Coal prices are 
again measured as the average cif unit value of imports 
derived from trade statistics. The standard deviation is the 
most common measure of statistical variation in values and 
thus is used in this analysis . The variation or uniformity of 
international coal prices is first examined at the 
intercontinental level.
The largest importer on each of the four main coal importing 
continents (Japan in Asia, Italy in Europe, Canada in North 
America and Brazil in South America) are compared. The average
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import cif values for each country were standardised by 
calculating price ratios using a weighted world coal price 
(wwcp) as the denominator^. The variation in prices was 
measured in terms of standard deviations. A clear trend 
emerged with the standard deviation rising sharply in the 
early 1970s and then declining over time (Figure 3.5a). This 
demonstrates that prices on the four continents gradually 
converged during the 1965-86 period. A simple least-square 
regression line indicates that the declining trend accounts 
for 41% (R-squared value of line Rl) of the variation in 
standard deviation values. The rate of decline was more 
pronounced and consistent in the last decade (1977-86) where 
69% (R-squared value of line R2) of the variation is accounted 
for by the trend. This finding supports the hypothesis of the 
emergence of an integrated global coal market with uniform 
prices.
Figure 3,5a: Variation in coal prices
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However, the identified trend could also be caused by other 
factors. While the trend can be interpreted as increased 
competition bringing prices toward a uniform global level, 
especially if the 1960s data is ignored, an alternative 
explanation is that the pattern was caused by higher Canadian 
import prices in the 1980s or the rise in freight rates in the 
early 1970s and their subsequent decline". To overcome the 
effects of such variations in transport costs, a better
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measure of price uniformity should be found when comparing 
prices on a single continent.
Table 3.5: Analysis of the standard deviation of coal price 
ratios by groups of import countries
group period mean standard adjusted
regression equation error R-squared
4 continents (4 largest importers)
1965-86 0.209 0.045
line Rl = 9.531 - 0.0047 * T 0.036 # 0.41
1977-86 0.176 0.029
line R2 = 17.25 - 0.0086 * T 0.017 # 0.69
East Asia (3 largest importers)
1968-86 0.082 0.043
line Rl = 11.43 - 0.0057 * T 0.032 # 0.49
1977-86 0.046 0.006 #
line R2 = no significant correlation with time
Europe (7 largest importers)
1965-86 0.191 0.062
line Rl = 13.55 - 0.00676 * T 0.048 # 0.44
1977-86 0.145 0.046 #
line R2 = no significant correlation with time
note: # indicates best description of standard deviation for 
group
the standard error is of the mean and of the y-estimate 
on the regression line, respectively 
T = year (1965-1986)
The first group of countries on one continent to be examined 
is in East Asia where Japan, South Korea and Taiwan each 
import over lOmtpa using similar seaborne transport systems 
(Figure 3.5b). The wide price variations identified in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s are caused by the low volumes and 
recent formation of coal import markets in South Korea and 
Taiwan. These wide variations were replaced by very uniform 
average prices among the three countries in the late 1970s 
and 1980s. A competitive market with similar prices is 
expected in Asia as a result.
Statistical analysis shows that the East Asian pattern is 
different from the intercontinental coal price ratios where
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Figure 3.5D: Variation in coal prices
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the standard deviation tended to decline with time during both 
reference periods, 1965-86 and 1977-86. Instead, the East 
Asian price ratios had a standard deviation which was stable 
throughout the last decade of data. It is best described by a 
simple mean rather than a trend line. Over this period, the 
standard deviation among the three East Asian import prices 
equalled 5% of the weighted world coal price.
The European market provides a contrast to the small variation 
found in East Asia. Seven European countries imported over 
lOmt of coal during two or more years in the 1980s. The large 
size of these individual markets should promote competition 
and uniform prices. The average cif unit values for each of 
the seven large importers (Italy, France, Denmark, West 
Germany, Netherlands, Belgium/Luxembourg and the UK since 1971 
when it became a major importer) were used for comparison 
(Figure 3.5c). Variations in price increased in the late 
1960s, declined sharply and rose slowly in the 1970s and then 
fell and rose again in the 1980s. The result of these 
fluctuations is that price variations in the late 1980s were 
at the same level as in the mid 1970s.
Statistical analysis reveals an overall pattern similar to 
that in East Asia (Table 3.5). The standard deviation among 
European price ratios declined over the period 1965-86, but
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Figure 3.5c: Variation in coal prices
- standard deviation of price ratios
0)u
Q.
0.25
(0
ou
b  0.15
+J
SZp
i  0 Q5
source: UN 1988
.Europe i ne Rl average
is best represented by a simple mean over the last decade. 
Prices varied less (were uniformly high) during the high price 
period 1980-82, but then returned to their earlier pattern of 
substantial variation (15% of the weighted world coal price) 
among the average coal prices for the seven importers. These 
variations have a systematic appearance and invite further 
investigation to identify causal structures or processes.
In conclusion, large variations in coal prices were found in 
the early 1970s, but these are probably related to disruptions 
in the oil market and its spill-over effects on the coal 
market. The trend of a convergence of coal prices on four 
continents toward a single global price was not necessarily 
caused by increased competition and the emergence of a single 
coal market. Higher prices for USA coal in Canada and lower 
ocean freight rates in the 1980s also contributed to this 
pattern. Still, the seaborne trade is expected to have become 
more competitive with many more suppliers competing in 
individual markets. These national markets will be examined 
next, but first the prices in regional markets offered an 
interesting insight.
Price variations within the East Asian and European markets 
were roughly stable throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. This 
indicates that price variations represent stable features of
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the market rather than changing trends. Although differences 
in average prices were consistent in each region, variation 
among average European prices was three times as large as the 
variation in East Asian prices.
3.3.3 National coal price uniformity
The largest national markets for coal imports are evaluated 
to avoid the complications caused by different transport costs 
in the international markets considered above. The number of 
major suppliers (>50,000 tonnes) to the largest coal importing 
countries was shown in Table 3.2. The variation in prices 
among these supply countries is examined in this section as an 
indicator of the competitive nature of the coal market.
The results of the previous section are reinforced with a 
clear difference emerging between European and East Asian 
patterns (Figure 3.6). These differences are well demonstrated 
by contrasting the coal import prices of Japan and France. In 
both cases a simple mean provides the better estimate of the 
standard deviation of price ratios for major suppliers during 
the 1965-86 period (in comparison to a regression line) (Table 
3.6). The difference emerged with the average measure of 
variations in French import prices being higher than the 
Japanese value (26% rather than 19% of the weighted world coal 
price). In addition to this long term difference, the two 
values diverged further in the 1980s. Price variations among 
Japanese suppliers became less while those among French 
suppliers became greater during the 1977-86 decade (Figure 
3.6a,b).
The pattern of greater variation in prices among the European 
countries is thus repeated for the import prices in France. 
Asian prices were more uniform both among the major importers 
and among the suppliers to Japan. To determine whether this 
pattern is unique to the two countries chosen, the second 
largest importers in each region in the 1980s are also 
compared.
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Table 3.6: Analysis of the standard deviation of coal import 
price ratios for selected countries
country period mean standard adjusted
regression equation error R-squared
Japan suppliers <50000tpa
1965-86 0.193 0.087 #
line Rl = no significant correlations with time
1977-86 0.175 0.077
line R2 = 35.35 - 0.00178 * T 0.065 # 0.37
France
1968-86 0.262 0.100 #
line Rl = no significant correlations with time
1977-86 0.300 0.104
line R2 = -52.08 + 0.0264 * T 0.080 # 0.47
Italy
1965-86 0.262 0.108
line Rl = -24.91 + 0.0127 * T 0.076 # 0.53
1977-86 0.360 0.068 #
line R2 = no significant correlations with time
South Korea
1973-86 0.165 0.140
line Rl = 46.06 - 0.0232 * T 0.106 # 0.43
1977-86 0.099 0.039 #
line R2 = no significant correlations with time
note: # indicates best description of standard deviation for 
group
the standard error is of the mean and of the y-estimate 
on the regression line, respectively 
T = year (1965-1986)
Italy and South Korea repeat the differences found in European 
and Asian coal markets. The standard deviation in cif values 
for Italian coal suppliers increased over time while that for 
South Korean suppliers declined (Figure 3.6c). During the last 
decade the standard deviation for Italian import prices was 
36% of the weighted world coal price while the value among 
South Korean suppliers was 10%. This consistent difference 
between European and Asian coal markets will be explored 
further.
One explanation is that importing countries in the two regions 
rely upon different groups of suppliers and that the 
differences in price variation are caused by differences in
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the price of coal from different exporters. For example, 
European imports from adjacent countries like West Germany 
and the UK provide high cost supplies (often $70pt) in 
comparison to South African cif values (typically $40pt). 
These European suppliers are excluded from the Asian market 
with the exception of the high price period in the 1970s.
Another important finding of this section is that the 
variation in coal prices is much larger (typically by a factor 
of two to three) among the suppliers to a national market than 
among the average cif prices of different countries in a 
region. Rather than finding greater price uniformity at the 
national level, there was less.
A possible explanation for the differences in coal prices 
being larger at the national level is differences in coal 
quality. Coking coal is typically more expensive than steam 
coal. If countries in Europe are more specialised in taking 
only one type of coal per supply country, then large price 
variations could arise within a competitive market structure. 
An analysis of the import prices of these two general types of 
coal is required.
3.3.4 Analysis of coking and steam coal prices
Most sources of trade statistics do not differentiate between 
types of coal (UN 1988). Others provide the separate volumes 
of coking and steam coal traded, but not the values (Fisher, 
Rogers and Cox 1989). The lEA (annual) provides a welcome 
improvement to this trade data by providing separate data for 
coking and steam coal import volumes and values by export 
country. Initial presentations of the data set included 
questionable price data, but the 1989 revision of earlier data 
is a substantial improvement^.
A comparison was made between UN and lEA coal price data. 
Despite many differences in particular values, the pattern of 
variation among the average import values was very similar for 
the two data sets (Figure 3.7). The variation among prices
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increased in the early 1980s as shown in Figure 3.5 and 
continued into the late 1980s. Over the 1980-88 period, the 
average price of coal imported into each of the seven largest 
European coal markets had a standard deviation equal to 10% of 
the weighted world coal price. This standard deviation 
increased during the 1980s. However, it should be remembered 
that the increase in the late 1980s (Figure 3.5) and the 
overall pattern of the late 1970s - late 1980s shows no
significant trend. The standard deviation simply equals 10% of 
the wwcp.
Figure 3,7: UN and lEA coal price ratios in Europe 
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The variation in European import prices for coal could be 
caused by differences in the prices and import levels of steam 
and coking coal. This hypothesis is tested by separating coal 
imports into coking and steam coal components and analysing 
the prices separately.
Average coking coal prices in Europe showed little variation 
in the 1980s with a standard deviation of just 6% of the 
weighted world coal price. There was no consistent trend in 
coking coal price variations over time (Figure 3.8). Instead, 
the variation was more pronounced among steam coal prices 
(1980-88 standard deviation averaged 12% of the weighted world 
coal price - Table 3.7). The conclusion from this comparison
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is that steam coal prices, rather than being more uniform, 
were more varied than coking coal prices.
Figure 3.8: European coking and steam coal price ratios 
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Table 3.7: Analysis of coking and steam coal price ratios in 
Europe
coal type period
regression equation
mean standard adjusted 
error R-squared
standard deviation of average cif values among 7 largest 
importers
hard coal
1980-88 0.099 0.030
line Rl = -16.335 + 0.00828 * T 0.024 # 0.44
coking coal
1980-88 0.064 0.038 #
line Rl = no significant correlation with time
steam coal
1980-88 0.121 0.041 #
line Rl = no significant correlation with time
note: # indicates best description of standard deviation for 
group
the standard error is of the mean and of the y-estimate 
on the regression line, respectively 
T = year (1980-1988)
Denmark is excluded from the group of major importers of 
coking coal because it only imported steam coal 
hard coal includes coking coal and steam coal
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Variations in steam coal prices in the 1980s tended to 
increase over time like those of hard coal prices, while the 
variation in coking coal prices remained more stable". The 
trend in steam coal prices is explained by the uniformly high 
steam coal prices of the early 1980s and the subsequent 
differentiated fall in absolute prices in the late 1980s. In 
comparison, coking coal prices in Europe declined more 
uniformly.
Given the high variation found in average steam coal prices, 
these coals should be looked at more closely. The high 
variation in import values may be caused by different contract 
types and coal quality. To avoid the effects of possible long 
term arrangements, the European spot market for steam coal is 
examined.
3.3.5 The European spot market for steam coal
'It is not necessary to examine many copies of 
publications like the Financial Times International Coal 
Report to see that there is considerable competition on 
the markets for coal... even so, this market is a far cry 
from being perfectly competitive.' (Banks 1989:347)
The European spot market for steam coal provides our best 
opportunity to examine a market where the persistent 
variations found earlier in average cif prices can be overcome 
by a competitive market structure. The spot market is 
generally defined as having contracts of less than one year in 
duration, but many of these purchases are for a shipment 
within a few weeks of the agreement (Gaskin 1981, 1986).
The spot market is based on the marginal needs of large 
consumers and the independent needs of small consumers. 
However, in the mid 1980s it grew in size as large consumers 
took a larger share of their total requirements under spot 
rather than long term arrangements. The port of Rotterdam is 
the most prominent centre of this trade. Coal is available in 
small or large allotments. Small lots of 5-10,000 tonnes can 
be dispatched by barge up the Rhine or large cargoes of
120,000 tonnes can be arranged for large consumers.
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Price information is widely available from coal industry 
newsletters like Coal Week International (CWI), International 
Coal Report (INCR) and Kings International Coal Trade (KICT) 
which always include recent quotes from the spot market. 
Prices for northern Europe are generally quoted in terms of 
US$ per tonne cif (customs, insurance and freight included) at 
ARA ports (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp). The coal for 
sale varies in quality with Australian and South African coals 
generally having less than 1% sulphur while that from the USA 
is 1-2% sulphur. On the other hand, USA coals usually have 
higher calorific values. A comparison of the price of three 
coal types typical of those from South Africa, Australia and 
the USA is presented in Figure 3.9a.
F i g u r e  3,9a: Spot ARA coal p r i c e s
for typical Aus, USA and SAfr coals
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The patterns reveal an interesting feature of the price 
formation process. The South African coal was almost always 
the first to decline in price. This pattern makes sense in 
terms of the energy content of the coal. Burning low energy 
coal involves the handling of more material and the disposal 
of more ash. A preference is thus expected for higher energy 
coals. When the demand slackens below available supply, the 
low energy coal would need to offer a price discount to retain
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its marketshare. Conversely, when prices began to rise in late 
1987, it was the higher quality Australian coals which were 
able to demand higher prices.
To clarify the role of coal quality in price determination, 
the three types of coal were standardised to uniform energy 
values (1 tee = 7000 kcal/kg) . The result in Figure 3.9b 
illustrates how the coal prices became almost perfectly 
uniform in 1985 and 1987. Prices for the USA coal were 
typically $1 below that for Australian coal, but this 
difference is to be expected because of the higher sulphur 
content in USA coals.
Figu re 3.9b: Spot ARA coal prices
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The variation in prices for USA, South African and Australian 
coal is again measured by the standard deviation of price 
ratios. For the spot prices recorded in the industry 
newsletters, the average standard deviation for the 1980-87 
period was 8% of the weighted world coal price (typically $4 
for a price of $50pt). However, when the prices were adjusted 
for differences in calorific values, the average standard 
deviation fell to 5% of the weighted world price.
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The price data reported in these industry sources demonstrates 
the uniform price pattern expected from a competitive industry 
structure and supports the hypothesis that a competitive steam 
coal market has developed in Europe. However, this conclusion 
is in direct conflict with the evidence found in the official 
trade statistics evaluated earlier in this chapter. How can 
these two opposing conclusions be reconciled? One option is to 
turn to another information source.
The European Commission also collects detailed coal trade data 
for both coking and steam coal (ECO annual b). The steam coal 
data is collected for all imports for power stations in the 
community from non-community sources. The information 
collected includes both the duration of the contract covering 
the coal shipment and the calorific value of the coal. The 
combination of calorific and contract data should enable an 
answer to be reached as to whether the government or industry 
data is correct.
The coal import price series from the Energy Directorate of 
the European Commission was selected for spot contract data 
and adjusted to a standard calorific value. The result was a 
stable level of variation measured by a standard deviation 
equal to 11% of the weighted world coal price. Despite the 
adjustments for calorific value and contract duration the two 
price series were conflicting. Industry sources indicated 
greater price uniformity (standard deviation = 5%) while the 
variation found in ECO data (11%) supports other government 
measures of differences in price levels (standard deviation 
= 12% without adjustment for quality).
To explain the differences in results, differences in the 
statistical series need to be recognised. First, the ECO 
series is the average price for European Community imports in 
a particular sector, the power generation sector. The industry 
series was more restrictive in its geographic scope (the 
northern European region as represented by ARA port prices) 
but more extensive in its industry coverage. In particular, 
the cement industry makes substantial purchases from the ARA
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sources. Still, given the selection of coal from the same 
three countries (Australia, South Africa and USA) direct 
competition should have caused the reported prices to be 
similar in both sets of statistics.
The differences in these price series have been explained by 
government officials as a function of the selective reporting 
of the lowest prices by industry sources while the government 
statistics represent all imports. Conversely, it has been 
suggested that government data sources are biased. In 
particular, that the price reported on customs or official 
forms may be inflated. This controversy requires further 
elaboration if meaningful comparisons are to be undertaken. 
The solution adopted in this study is to go beyond government 
statistics and selected spot prices to compile extensive 
contract or transaction data wherever possible. This contract 
data set will be analysed in the next chapter.
3.4 Conclusion
* In these circumstances (price differentials and 
uncertainty), the search for a comprehensive theory of 
the international coal trade is best not begun, because 
if such a theory were discovered, someone might make the 
mistake of believing it.' (Banks 1985:94)
While agreeing with Banks (1985, 1989) that the international 
coal trade is 'inconsistent with simple competitive market 
theory' this study does not argue to stop the investigation 
for an explanation of coal trade. Instead, it uses the 
inconsistencies between competitive market theory and coal 
trade practice as proof of the need for an alternative 
explanation of trade. The standard conditions for a commodity 
market to operate were shown to be a necessary, but not 
sufficient basis to form a competitive international coal 
trade.
The analysis of international coal prices produced unexpected 
results. The competitive coal trade model predicts uniform 
coal prices within national markets (competitive equilibrium)
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and varied prices in different countries (because of 
differences in transport costs). However, trade data revealed 
the opposite. Average import coal prices (cif unit values) 
were more varied in national markets than within the regional 
markets of either Europe or East Asia. In addition, the 
pattern of regional prices was one of persistent variation in 
the late 1970s to late 1980s. The conclusion from this 
evidence is that international coal markets are fragmented.
Conflicting evidence was found from industry trade journals 
where competitive prices were quoted for steam coal on the 
European spot market. However, official European Community 
data of the spot steam coal purchases for power stations 
revealed the same price variations as indicated by lEA and UN 
data. The data sets used are not entirely compatible, yet a 
persistent story of widely varying rather than uniform pricing 
emerged. The persistence of this variation in prices indicates 
that it is caused by stable influences on the market and these 
need to be examined.
One explanation for the persistent price variations is the 
fragmentation of competition by trade structures. The 
domination of price negotiations by a monopsonist is an 
extreme structural configuration of the market. The evidence 
for and against the monopolist explanation of price variations 
is explored next.
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Endnotes:
1. This calorific definition is analogous to the definition of 
one tonne oil equivalent (toe) as containing 10,000 kcal/kg or 
10 million kcal (lEA 1988:115).
2. The data used in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 is compiled from 
several sources. The United Nations Trade Statistics (1988) 
were used as the base for most 1965-86 national data. Coal 
trade statistics were collected from importing country data 
sets for SITC (standard international trade classification) 
item number 3214. The units used are metric tonnes (not 
adjusted for quality) and US$ for values. Obvious errors like 
the duplication of values for more than one trading partner 
were checked and eliminated. Revisions may be made to the data 
set in subsequent years, especially for 1986 data. To reduce 
the likelihood of major revisions, comparisons were made with 
other sources. Though comprehensive, the data set was also 
incomplete. lEA (1989a) Coal Information was used for import 
tonnages for Denmark (1979-88), Israel (1982-88) and Taiwan 
(1984-88) and the major coal trading partners in 1987-88. lEA 
(1988) World Energy Statistics and Balances 1971/87 was used 
for aggregate import tonnages for India (1982-86) and the 
centrally planned economies (1971-86). These tonnages were 
adjusted to standard 7 million kilocalorie units (tee or tonne 
coal equivalent) and thus may vary from those reported in 
other sources. NEDO (1989) Coal in Asia-Pacific was used for 
import tonnages' for Malaysia (1985-86).
3. An interesting feature of the market is that even the 
largest producers and exporters often import coal. Canada and 
the USSR each import over lOmtpa while the USA, Poland and 
China each import over Imtpa. The reasons for this pattern are 
both geographic and quality based. Large countries export coal 
in one region and import it in another. Canada exports coal 
from the west coast and imports it from the USA at the Great 
Lakes. China exports from the north and imports into the south 
(as required by winter shortages). USA imports coal into the 
south, especially from Colombia. The Soviet Union imports coal 
from Poland. Geographic proximity is important in continental 
coal trade with the result that coal is often cheapest across 
an adjacent border rather than paying to transport it over a 
large country. Comparisons of coal prices thus need to be 
included as an integral part of the overview of international 
coal trade.
4. Only countries which supplied over 50,000 tonnes in the 
year are considered. This threshold level was selected because 
it represents the size of a standard Panamax vessel, commonly 
used in the trade. Smaller shipments usually involve extra 
costs for transhipment or represent specialised needs.
5. The 1985 production costs of 15-30 rand equalled $7-14 per 
tonne.
6. Production costs of A$20-50pt were converted to US$14-35pt 
(Schulz 1988) and the differences between Queensland and New 
South Wales noted (Calarco 1987).
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7. Above this price, users would switch to oil for their 
energy requirements. This calculation was based on heavy fuel 
oil (which competes with coal for fuel uses) having a price of 
90% of the crude oil price. At $30 per barrel this equals 
$140ptce. Given the extra costs of handling and using coal, a 
further penalty of $25pt is introduced. The result is a 
maximum coal price of $115ptce (Schulz 1988).
8. For example the 1988 US Department of Energy (DOE) study of 
long range energy projections constructed a reference case 
with an oil price of $33 per barrel in 2000. The various 
scenarios had oil prices in the range $29-37 per barrel (US 
DOE 1988) .
9. Despite the appeal and rational basis of such long term 
models, they will be shown to fail when compared to the 
complex reality of the coal trade. The reason is easily 
illustrated with the example of South Africa. While Schulz 
estimated that production for exports could be increased 3- 
6 times, the reality of international politics dictated that 
South African exports stagnate in the late 1980s despite 
growing global demand and trade. Major European importers like 
France and the Scandinavian countries refused to sign new 
contracts and ceased imports because of the internal political 
situation in South Africa and their domestic opposition to 
apartheid. Boycotts to South African coal have been proposed 
for the entire European Community (SOMO 1989a) and even Japan 
decided in 1988 not to increase imports from this source.
10. Note that the average unit values of manufactures exported 
does not take into account the improvement in quality of 
manufactures over the period (Grilli and Yang 1988).
11. The use of the standard deviation measure does not imply 
that coal prices are normally distributed. Instead, it is used 
as a standard measure of the variation (deviation from 
expected values) in prices. (The standard deviation equals 
the square root of the variance which is the sum of the 
squared deviations from the mean divided by the number in the 
sample.)
12. The weighted world coal price was calculated as the 
average cif unit value (in US$pt) for the 18 market economies 
(weighted by volume of annual imports) which were the largest 
importers of coal in 1985.
13. A prominent route for coal shipments is from Hampton Roads 
on the US east coast to Japan. The freight rates on this route 
were very high in 1973-74 and 1979-81 with low values in 1975- 
78 and slowly declining values in the 1980s. This pattern is 
similar to that noted for intercontinental coal prices and 
further examination of price variations is called for (NYK 
Monthly Report cited in Coal Manual; CWI; ICR; Lloyds Weekly).
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14. For example, the UK average cif unit value of coking coal 
from Australia in 1982 was revised upward by over 100% from 
$33.26 in the 1988 series to $67.91 in the 1989 series. A 
comparison of the two series is shown below:
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
series coking coal imported from Australia ($US/t)
1988 62.45 - 33.26 38.49 - 43.83 - 56.47
1989 62.45 66.37 67.91 59.37 58.50 60.48 55.32 53.10 50.27
series steam coal imported from Australia ($US/t)
1988 62.94 - 42.04 48.41 66.45 43.32 - 62.59
1989 62.94 63.63 69.31 70.63 67.63 60.24 59.33 58.75 68.13
source: lEA 1988a,1989a.
Despite the improvements in the series, some numbers remained 
suspicious. For example, the $18 drop in average German coking 
coal import prices from $58.60 in 1983 to $40.60 in 1984 and 
1985 (before rising to $51.80 in 1986) implies that imports 
from * other OECD* suppliers like France or the Netherlands had 
a price cut from $57.20 in 1983 to $34.92 and $30.54 in 1984 
and 1985 respectively. This is based on the assumption that 
the values for other suppliers (Australia, UK, USA, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and USSR which supply over 80% total 
imports) are accurate. Rather than assume that such a price 
cut occurred among European suppliers, the average value for 
the six known suppliers was used as the average German import 
price.
15. The correlation coefficients comparing the standard 
deviations in European coal prices with the years 1980-88 are: 
0.71 for hard coal, 0.58 for steam coal; and 0.02 for coking 
coal.
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Chapter 4
Linking competitive and security interests: 
Coal prices, quality and sources
4.1 Introduction
Evidence supporting the monopsonistic and competitive models 
of coal trade is evaluated and found to be inadequate to 
explain diverse trade patterns. The allegation that Japan 
exercises strong bargaining power and discriminatory pricing 
practices is examined in detail. To find out whether Japanese 
bargaining power is a function of a supply/demand imbalance in 
the market (relational power) or a function of underlying 
trade structure (structural power), the Japanese coal trade is 
examined for changes in contractual pricing patterns from the 
high price situation of 1976 to those of the low price context 
of 1987.
To explain the variations found in coal prices, the initial 
analysis of coal quality variables is extended by introducing 
security of supply variables. These security variables are 
based on the objectives of coal consumers which are assessed 
directly by means of a coal trade survey. The results are 
compared to actual trade practice. Two detailed sets of data; 
the consumer survey and coal contracts thus provide new 
insights into the coal trade process to resolve the debates 
over the most appropriate type of trade model to use and the 
importance of relational and structural power in the trade.
4.2 Coal trade models and data requirements
The 'Japan Inc.' model is introduced as an alternative to the 
commodity market model examined in chapter 3. Detailed 
transaction data are then used to evaluate the controversy 
over the relative merits of simple economic or political 
models to explain the largest coal trade in the world, the 
Japanese import of coking coals.
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4.2.1 Japan Inc.; the monopsony model
The establishment of an extensive and integrated Japanese 
coking coal procurement structure is widely recognised (D'Cruz 
1979; Anderson 1987). The combination of guiding government 
policies and interlocking corporate structures has given rise 
to the claim that Japanese companies and government agencies 
act in a manner which benefits the aggregate interests of 
Japan rather than those of the individual company. This model 
of Japanese political economy is often called *Japan Inc. 
Although the consuming industry does not consist of a single 
company, industry coordination is achieved by the use of 
government policies and collective action to create an 
effective monopsony (Szabo 1985).
A monopsony model of trade involves a single purchaser and 
numerous sellers^. Given the absence of alternative purchasers 
of their product, the sellers have limited bargaining power 
and any rent which is generated by the trade is captured by 
the purchaser. This asymmetry in the distribution of the 
benefits of trade can raise acute concerns where one side 
feels penalised. Three possible outcomes of a monopsony 
purchasing arrangement are evaluated in this study. First, 
price discrimination could be used to achieve objectives like 
security of supply and result in variations from competitive 
pricing based on coal quality. Second, enhanced buyer 
bargaining power could be used to impose uniform price changes 
on suppliers whereby all suppliers are forced to accept the 
price change agreed by the first company to 'break rank'. 
Third the pricing criteria (coal classifications) may be 
changed unilaterally by the purchaser and imposed on the 
suppliers. Each of these results have been alleged to occur 
and this chapter will examine the data to test the validity of 
the claims.
The alleged use of discriminatory power in the coal trade has 
prompted the construction of a conspiracy theory in which 
Japanese government and industry combine to outwit their
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trading partners. The coal conspiracy theory became a common 
topic of concern during the recession of the early 1980s 
(Byrnes 1982:43) . Japanese government forecasts of high future 
demand were reinforced by new corporate contracts to establish 
new mines in Australia and Canada and intergovernmental 
agreements to finance new mines and infrastructure in the USSR 
and China (Barlow 1982). The new production capacity created 
by this investment combined with the capacity of existing 
mines to produce an oversupply situation for the duration of 
the 1980s. Prices fell and the debate over causes has 
continued (Anderson 1987).
4.2.2 Data adequacy and model assessment
One of the problems encountered in evaluating any trade theory 
is data availability. As was seen in the last chapter, the 
assessment of the competitive global coal market model was 
limited by data aggregation. To overcome this problem, prices 
need to be evaluated for particular coal transactions where 
the characteristics of the coal can be compared directly to 
the price. This shift to the analysis of particular coal 
brands is also required to compare the alternative models of 
trade considered in this thesis (Figure 4.1).
The conventional competitive model is based on an equilibrium 
being formed to balance the supply and demand functions. A 
trade flow results with exports from the producing country 
being imported by the consuming country at a price where the 
marginal cost of production equals the marginal benefit of 
consumption. The production structure associated with this 
model is one of many independent producers and suppliers.
In contrast, the monopsonist model presented by the *Japan 
Inc. ' school has an integrated or single consumer importing 
coal from many producers. This production structure enables 
monopoly power to be exercised and can result in 
discriminatory prices or other trade conditions being imposed 
upon producers.
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Figure 4.1: Alternative trade models 
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This thesis offers an alternative to both of these models and 
their emphasis on the production structure (competitive or 
monopsonistic) as the determining feature which explains 
trade. Instead, a structural model is developed which argues 
that the production structure is joined by the financial, 
security and information structures as the primary 
determinants of trade (Figure 4.1c).
4.3 Price discrimination
4.3.1 Aggregate and transaction price differences
The differences between aggregate and detailed transaction 
analysis are readily shown by extending the analysis in 
chapter 3 with a detailed transaction based analysis here. 
Average coking coal import prices vary among supply countries 
and Figure 4.2 provides a summary of the pattern for Japanese 
imports over the last 30 years. American prices have been 
universally high compared to other major countries. In JFY74 
the cif price for American coking coal ($74.45) rose to over 
double the cif prices of Australian and Canadian coal ($32.87 
and $35.20 respectively). Before and after this peak, American 
coal prices were 15-30% higher than average import prices. 
Australia provided a lower cost source of coking coal for the 
Japanese steel mills and Australian imports exceeded American 
imports in 1969, 1972, 1973 and continually from 1976.
Australian prices were typically 10-30% below average import 
prices. Canadian prices were generally below US prices, but 
above Australian prices. Only in the late 1980s did Canadian 
prices exceed American prices as a result of the introduction 
of high cost coal from north east British Columbia.
Given the high cost of USA coal, new sources in Australia and 
Canada were desired to both lower import costs and provide 
diversity of supply. Furthermore, if the Japanese buyers 
arranged coal supplies on a cost plus basis then price 
differentiation would be expected (Anderson 1987).
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Figure 4,2: JSM coking coal price ratios
0»u
La
-HLO
CL
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
1970 19001950 19BD
1955
.Austra I i a Canada .USA
In contrast, if a single commodity market existed, then a 
single price would be expected. An intermediate position 
between cost plus pricing and single market pricing is 
possible where the market is fragmented. Firms may be 
competitive within each fragment, yet the price remains at 
separate levels.
Before commenting further on coal prices, adjustments need to 
be made for quality variations in the coal. Coking coal is 
difficult to standardise for quality for several reasons. Not 
only does the coal vary on several important characteristics, 
it is also used for three distinct purposes which place value 
on different attributes. Coking coal provides the support for 
the molten mixture in the blast furnace and therefore must 
have good swelling or coking qualities. It is also the 
reducing agent and thus needs to provide a readily available 
source of carbon. Coal is also used as the fuel to supply the 
heat in the blast furnace and rQ-subsi/fuicé oil for this purpose in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Finally, impurities in the
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coal can affect the quality of pig iron produced and the types 
and quantities of impurities need to be limited.
The number of coals which meet all of these requirements is 
limited and premium prices have traditionally been attached to 
such fuels. However, rather than rely on a single coal with 
the desired combination of characteristics (like low volatile 
Appalachian coal from the USA), most Japanese steel mills 
blend a variety of coals to produce the required balance. This 
enables lower cost coals to be included in the coking coal 
blend, including coals previously considered to be only 
suitable for steam coal. By the late 1980s, 10-15% of the coal 
used in Japanese blast furnaces was termed semi-soft coking 
coal. These coals were poorly suited for coking purposes on 
their own, but were acceptable when pulverised and injected in 
a coal blend.
Average national coking coal prices thus fail to provide much 
information about reasons for price differentiation. Price 
differences may simply reflect variations in quality or they 
may represent positive policies to ensure diversity of supply 
or security objectives. By shifting the analysis from the 
national level to that of particular coal brands, prices can 
be adjusted for coal quality and the reason for price 
variation tested.
4.3.2 Coking coal characteristics and price
Coal characteristics are generally assumed to be important in 
determining the utility of coal for coking and hence its 
price. The characteristics of coal were studied by first 
asking the purchasers, Japanese steel mills, what 
characteristics are important and then analysing the contract 
data to measure the observed relationship between price and 
quality.
The attributes most commonly specified in Japanese coking coal 
contracts, and thus assumed to be of greatest importance, are: 
total moisture (less moisture, higher value); ash (less ash.
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higher value); volatile matter (less volatile matter, higher 
value); total sulphur (less sulphur, higher value); CSN or 
crucible swelling number (higher CSN, higher value); and 
fluidity (higher fluidity, higher value). Maximum particle 
size is also specified in contracts, but tends to have a 
standard range (30-50mm maximum)^.
The relative importance of these characteristics in deciding 
on coal purchases was assessed in the survey of coal consumers 
introduced in chapter 1^ . The survey compared buyer objectives 
in 1980 with those in 1987. In both cases, ash and sulphur 
were identified as the most important coal characteristics and 
penalty clauses are included in contracts to ensure compliance 
with agreed levels. The ranking of other attributes changed 
between 1980 and 1987. In 1980 the proportion of volatile 
matter, the CSN and fluidity were also considered as having 
above average importance. In contrast, the total moisture was 
ranked as being of less than average importance. By 1987 the 
CSN was demoted to below average importance while the moisture 
content increased in relative importance. Fluidity was also 
considered to be of increased importance in 1987.
Table 4.1 Ranking of coal qualities by buyer and contract
attribute survey contract price data
1980 1987 1976 1984 1987
ash (%) 1 1 4
sulphur (%) 1 1
volatile matter (%) 3 4 3 2
CSN 4 6 1 1 1
moisture (%) 6 5 2
fluidity 5 3
source: Appendix D; initial equations for all Japanese 
import contracts for coking coals
Studies of the effects of coal quality on prices have been 
undertaken before, but the conclusion is disputed. D'Cruz
(1979) argued that coal quality was not an adequate 
explanation of price and that the JSM discriminated on the 
basis of country of origin and quasi-integration linkages. The 
opposite conclusion was reached by Kittredge and Siverston
(1980) who incorporated several coal attributes in their
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analysis of coking coal prices and concluded that the prices 
received for Canadian coal was equal to those of USA and other 
coals under competitive pricing conditions when adjustments 
were made for coal quality. Anderson (1987) suggested that the 
discriminatory finding by D'Cruz could be accounted for by his 
use of a simple fixed carbon index to adjust for coal quality 
and his lack of attention to other important attributes. This 
debate over the importance of coal quality in determining 
price is extended by the following analysis.
The JSM purchase several dozen brands of coking coal annually. 
By comparing the most important attributes (CSN, ash, volatile 
matter, total moisture and sulphur) to the price paid in JFY76^ 
for the 46 brands of coal contracted for supply during that 
financial year, a strong feature emerged^. The simple 
regression model of coal characteristics proved to be a very
good explanation of fob coking coal prices in 1976^. Four of
the coal qualities made a significant contribution to the 
equation for all imports while the fifth (sulphur) was 
significant in the equation excluding outliers. The proportion 
of the variation in prices explained by the equation (adjusted 
R-squared value) was .83®.
Equations for fob price of coking coals imported into Japan’ 
1987 price fob = 26.54 + 2.40 CSN
n=83 se=6.65 R2=.41
1984 price fob = 51.74 + 2.23 CSN - .49 VM
n=73 se=5.40 R2=.58
1976 price fob = 49.69 + 3.15 CSN - .90 M - .26 VM - .67 A
n=46 se=3.83 R2=.83
fob = price in US$ per metric tonne, (free on board) 
CSN = crucible swelling number 
A = % ash (air dried basis)
VM = % volatile matter (air dried basis)
M = % total moisture (gross as received basis)
S = % total sulphur (air dried basis)
se = standard error in estimate
R2 = R squared adjusted for number of cases
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In contrast to the strong correlation of coal characteristics 
and fob prices in 1976, the pattern in later years is much 
weaker. Only two of the attributes (CSN and volatile matter) 
had a significant correlation with price in 1984 and only one 
(CSN) in 1987. The proportion of price variation explained by 
the equation also fell from 83% in 1976 to 58% in 1984 and 41% 
in 1987.
In addition to the R-squared value, the standard error of the 
estimate is also informative about how well the equation fits 
the data. Whereas the standard error in price estimates in the 
1976 equation was less than $4pt, it increased to almost $7pt 
in the 1987 equation. This decline in the role of coal quality 
as a predictor of price would support the D'Cruz argument of 
price discrimination based on other criteria
Another striking feature of the equations is that the 
importance of the coal qualities is quite different from that 
indicated by the consumer survey (Table 4.1). One explanation 
for the differences between expressed and measured ranking of 
coal qualities is that the coal qualities identified as being 
most important by coal purchasers (ash and sulphur) may be so 
important as to restrict coals to the acceptable range and 
contracts are not even offered for coals with qualities beyond 
this range. Most contracts have specific penalty clauses with 
price penalties of $1.10 per 1% of ash above the contract 
specification and $0.55 per 0.1% sulphur (Coal Manual 
1985:212). The result could be a restriction of coals to the 
subset where ash and sulphur are at acceptable levels and 
other qualities then became more important in determining 
price.
These initial equations include all coking coal brands and may 
not meet statistical assumptions about the distribution of the 
data. To improve the accuracy of the equations one needs to 
look more closely at the data and the residuals which result 
from the specification of the equation^. Since cases are not 
likely to be more than three times the standard deviation away 
from the mean when a population is normally distributed, the
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appearance of any such outliers needs to be examined. These 
outlying cases may distort the analysis and have a
disproportionate effect on the equation.
When outliers appear several techniques can be used to
overcome their effect. The data can be transformed (usually
log transformations when the residuals are positively skewed 
and square transformations when the residuals are negatively 
skewed), alternative variables used or the cases removed if 
they belong to a different population because of another 
factor. In the case of the coking coal data it was decided not 
to distort the data (through numerical transformations) from 
the initial variables which provided a good explanation of 
coal prices in 1976. Instead, other variables associated with 
the structural model of coal trade will be introduced to
explain price variations in a later section.
The existence of outliers is first explored as an indication 
that not all coals receive fob prices on the same basis. The 
cases more than three standard deviations from the mean are 
excluded and considered individually while the equation for 
the remaining group of coals are compared to the initial 
equations. The revised equations show a much tighter 
statistical fit to the data and offer improved predictions of 
prices. For example, standard errors decline to $3-4pt and the 
adjusted R-squared value improved (from .41 to .75 in the 1987 
equation by the exclusion of 2 outliers). The new equations 
are as follows;
Revised equations for fob price of coking coal (excluding 
major outliers)
1987 price fob = 35.11 + 2.08 CSN - .89 A
n~81 se=3 .17 R2—. 75
1984 price fob = 47.20 + 2.87 CSN - .36 VM
n=70 se=3.45 R2=.74
1976 price fob = 60.66 +2.85 CSN -1.10 M -.28 VM -.99A -7.21S
n=45 se=3.04 R2=.89
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This evidence appears to support the Kittredge and Siverton
(1980) conclusion of quality-based competitive pricing, but it 
was only achieved by the exclusion of coals which had the 
strongest 'quasi-integration linkages' argued to be important 
by D'Cruz (1979). Rather than simply remove the outliers, one 
should consider why these cases were outliers in the first 
place. Yes the price prediction was improved, but what data 
was lost? Quintette and Bullmoose coals each received prices 
more than three standard deviations higher than that predicted 
by the 1987 and 1984 equations (along with the high fluidity 
coal, Sewanee, in 1984^ ^). These cases may reveal as much 
interesting information about coal prices as the group of more 
statistically consistent coals portrayed in the revised 
equations.
4.3.3 The Quintette and Bullmoose cases
The exclusion of the Quintette and Bullmoose coal brands from 
the 1984 and 1987 equations is significant because these coals 
are from the new mining region of north east British Columbia. 
In addition, the contract which set the Quintette price based 
on a series of escalators related to production costs was the 
subject of protracted arbitration in 1988-89. The Japanese 
steel mills called for a settlement at current world coal 
prices, while the mine operators wanted the original contract, 
including the price formula based on escalators, upheld^. 
Quintette coal was always high cost coal. Even when the 
contract was signed in 1981 the base price of C$75/t 
(referenced to 1 April 1980) was above the prevailing price of 
$C64/t for comparable south east BC coal. By 1 April 1987 the 
escalators in the contract had raised the price to C$103.78. 
Quintette Coal had accepted a price cut of C$8.50 from the 
contract price in the 1985 and 1986 negotiations with the 
Japanese steel mills under the inequity review clause (Coal 
Manual 1988:303). However, in 1987 the Japanese steel mills 
wanted a reduction to the price of comparable coals ($44/t). 
The dispute went to arbitration while the coal continued to be 
traded under the previous year's conditions.
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similar negotiations were held under the smaller Bullmoose 
contract (1.7mtpa compared to 5mtpa). The Bullmoose price had 
a slightly higher base (C$75.50 in 1 April 1980) but the 
company agreed in 1984 to a larger reduction from the 
escalated price (C$10/t in 1984-86) in return for an increase 
in tonnage (300,000t). Given the acceptance of the earlier 
price cut, the 1987 price was cut by C$11.26 to C$91.77/t 
(Coal Manual 1988:305).
The arbitration is an interesting case, because Quintette is 
the new mine with the highest JSM direct equity investment 
(chapter 6). If the coal contract is revised and prices are 
reduced to prevailing Australian or south east British 
Columbia levels, the owners will not be able to repay the 
loans (largely from Japanese banks) let alone profit from 
their investment. Indeed, the major Canadian investor, Denison 
Mines, wrote off its C$240 million investment in the project 
in 1985 to no longer value the mine as an asset (Mining 
Journal 1986; Mitchell 1986:13). The JSM may not value the 
mine as a direct asset either (in terms of profit and 
dividends paid to the steel mills) . Despite this lack of 
direct profit and dividends. Quintette offers the JSM indirect 
benefits. Its output maintained an abundant international 
supply position in the coking coal market of the mid 1980s 
which depressed the price for all other producers.
Ironically from the Canadian point of view, some of the mines 
hardest hit by Japanese price and tonnage cuts in the mid 
1980s were the older Canadian mines. The Balmer, Fording and 
Luscar mines, for example, had their original contract 
tonnages cut to 56% in 1985 and 50% in 1986 while the 1986 
Quintette tonnage was only reduced to 95%, as allowed in the 
contract (plus or minus 5%) (ICR 1986 139:2). Quintette and 
the neighbouring Bullmoose mine could thus be regarded as 
special cases in the Japanese coking coal pricing system. They 
can be removed and the data analysed again without such 
anomalies.
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Alternatively, the question can be asked as to why Quintette 
and Bullmoose are part of the coal trade at all? The answer 
has broader implications than may be expected. If the answer 
is to earn profit for the investing parties, then the 
conventional trade model can be maintained and a conclusion 
reached that the investors made a bad decision. On the other 
hand, if the mine is part of the international coal production 
structure promoted by the Japanese then a different model of 
trade is required. The 'Japan Inc' model offers one 
explanation of Japanese bargaining power being used to control 
prices and trade patterns. The evidence to support these 
allegations is evaluated next.
4.4 Bargaining power and trade discrimination
'Japan is endeavoring to transform herself from her early 
postwar position of a price taker (or a perfectly 
competitive buyer) in "open" world resource markets into 
that of a monopolistic buyer in "closed" resource markets 
so that she can acquire vital resource supplies " at the 
marginal cost to the system" (that is, retaining to 
herself decisions over output, if not decisions over 
prices).' (Ozawa 1979:236)
Price discrimination can be caused by many factors. The factor 
most important to this study would be a deliberate decision on 
the part of Japanese purchasers to discriminate on prices so 
as to pay higher prices to higher cost mines introduced to 
improve security of supply while maintaining lower prices to 
lower cost mines. This pricing arrangement was termed 'cost- 
plus' by Anderson (1987). Cost-plus pricing can be achieved by 
the exercise of bargaining power by Japanese buyers. Before 
considering the source of this power (relational power or 
structural power), discrimination needs to be demonstrated. 
Three types of discrimination will be considered, price 
discrimination, changes in coal classification and changes in 
contract tonnage.
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4.4.1 Uniform price changes
Uniform price changes are alleged to be imposed on suppliers 
by the JSM and represent a measure of their bargaining power. 
Negotiations are always held in Tokyo with the eight steel 
mills represented by a lead negotiator (Nippon Steel for 
Australia and Nippon Kokan for Canada). The lead JSM 
negotiator for each country meets with the various national 
coking coal exporters in turn. The Japanese trading house 
which imports the coal is also present and helps arrange these 
meetings. The consumer's objective is to gain the most 
advantageous price concession from a single producer. This 
price change will then be used by the Japanese negotiators as 
the standard price and imposed uniformly on the other 
producers.
The 1988 negotiations illustrate this practice where the 
Canadian suppliers Fording and Westar agreed to a price 
increase of $2.90 for their hard coal. The Japanese 
negotiators then used $2.90 as the standard increase in coal 
prices for JFY88. Most Australian and American suppliers 
accepted this increase within a month of the Canadian deal for 
fear of volume cuts if they were late signing their contracts 
(ICR 1988 195:1) .
The Canadian companies were in a particularly vulnerable 
financial position because of the severe cuts (50%) to their 
contract volumes received in previous years. The negotiation 
practice of selecting the weakest supplier first is well 
established and each year one company or another has a good 
reason for being the first to 'break rank'. Although there may 
be no apparent economic reason for a price change accepted by 
one company to be transferred to all others in the market 
(Gaskin 1983a) the practice is well established. This is 
argued by coal suppliers as an illustration of the bargaining 
power which the JSM exercise in the coking coal trade.
The influence of such practices is not restricted to the 
Japanese trade. The steel mills of South Korea and Taiwan wait
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until the Japanese have reached an agreement with their 
suppliers and then impose the same terms on suppliers to South 
Korea and Taiwan. Indeed, the Korean and Taiwanese negotiators 
attempt to prove that they are better than their Japanese 
counterparts by gaining further concessions of a few cents per 
tonne from the suppliers. An explicit link to JSM prices was 
also made by the Pakistan steel industry which signed long 
term contracts with suppliers and set the future price equal 
to that negotiated by the JSM (ICR 1989).
4.4.2 Coking coal classifications
Coal negotiations generally take place with certain coals 
classed as being of the same value. These classes change over 
time and these changes are argued to sometimes form part of 
the negotiation strategies rather than being an accurate 
reflection of coal qualities. For example, in the negotiations 
for JFY84 contracts, the steel mills realigned their hard 
coking coal classifications. The uniform coking coal price of 
$54/t in JFY83 was reduced to $52.50 for class A coking coals 
(Coal Cliff, South Bulli, Tahmoor) and $51.50 for class B 
coals (Moura and South Blackwater). Class C coals (Wollondilly 
and Blackwater after its ash content was lowered 0.5% to 7.8%) 
were priced lower at $51.00/t (Coal Manual 1985:188). Coal 
Cliff was used as a reference coal with other coals priced 
lower or higher depending on their quality. While class B and 
C coals were considered of less value, Gregory coal was priced 
at $54.50 to reflect its higher quality.
In the following year, JFY85, the NSW soft coking coal 
producers agreed to a Japanese request to review the division 
of their eight coal brands into two grades: grade A included 
Big Ben, Daiyon, Lemmington and Rathluba; grade B included 
Liddell and Hunter Valley. Four of the coal brands were 
expected to reduce their ash and sulphur levels with 
differences in quality taken into account in 1986 pricing 
negotiations (Coal Manual 1985:148). This attention to quality 
and classification can be interpreted as part of the Japanese 
desire to break the collective bargaining whereby the seven
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Newcastle soft coking coal producers negotiate as a group. The 
Coal Manual (1985:148) began its report on JFY85 negotiations 
by announcing the 'Possible Switchover to Contract-by-Contract 
Talks from Next Fiscal'. Despite the Japanese desire to 
divide the Hunter Valley producers, subsequent negotiations 
continued to be conducted through two joint negotiators 
representing the seven companies.
The changes in pricing criteria have direct effects on the 
financial position of particular mines. For example, 
Wollondilly coal was priced $1.70 below Coal Cliff in the 
early 1980s, then received the same price in 1983 and then was 
set $1.50 lower again in 1984 (Coal Manual 1985:188). These 
changes in the classification of Australian coals are repeated 
in other countries. One of the more dramatic classification 
changes was made with Canadian coals.
In the 1988 negotiations Westar and Fording were the first 
companies to reach agreement with the JSM. Not only did they 
receive increased contract tonnages of 600,000 and 500,000 t 
respectively, but the coal which they had sold in 1987 as 
semi-soft coking coal for $33/t was reclassified as hard 
coking coal and received a price of $46.90/t in 1988. The 
price of other Fording and Westar coals was also set at 
$46.90/t (ICR 1988 194:2). This represented an increase of 
just $2.90 from the $44.00/t received in JFY87 for hard coking 
coal and was used as the uniform price rise for other coals 
noted above.
The general price increase to the JSM suppliers was thus 
$2.90/t while the first companies to sign. Fording and Westar, 
received average price rises of $6.23/t and $5.86/t 
respectively, because of the new coal classification. This 
price rise combined with the increased tonnage to raise the 
value of JFY88 contracts to $94 and $150 million for Fording 
and Westar. In contrast the JFY87 value of the contracts was 
$61 and $107 million, respectively. This represents a 45% 
increase in cash flow for the two companies as a result of a 
reported 6.6% price rise ($44.00 to $46.90)^.
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Coal classification is thus an important element of price 
negotiations. The price differences paid to coals from 
different countries are often explained in terms of quality 
differences. These quality differences should be evaluated to 
measure whether or not the systematic price differences are 
based on the country of origin instead. One of the best means 
to classify a diverse set of items in accordance with several 
characteristics is by cluster analysis.
The coking coals imported into Japan were classified using 
cluster analysis to determine the similarity of coals from 
different countries. The result should either support or 
question the hypothesis that price discrimination is based on 
country of origin rather than simply on coal quality. If most 
of the clusters are based on coals from single countries then 
the price differences could reflect coal quality rather than 
national preferences^.
Seven clusters of coal brands were created by the complete 
(most distant) cluster analysis technique (which compares the 
most distant members of clusters to ensure the greatest 
internal consistency within groups). Five of the seven groups 
include coal brands from two or more countries. Similarly, the 
brands from each country are typically distributed among more 
than one group. Australia provides the most broad ranging 
example with its coals present in over half of the clusters. 
USA coals tended to be more isolated and divide into one or 
two groups (one group with low volatiles and both groups with 
the distinctive Appalachian attributes of high sulphur and low 
moisture levels). Canadian, Polish and USSR coals belonged to 
the same groups as USA coals. In general, most coals tended to 
have similar attributes to those from another country as well 
as their neighbouring brands drawn from an adjacent coal seem.
The implication of this extensive mixture of international 
coals on the basis of their physical attributes (moisture, 
ash, sulphur, CSN, volatiles) is that price discrimination on 
the basis of country of origin is not explained by national 
groups of coals having exclusive qualities.
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4.4.3 Annual negotiations - tonnage for price
The annual Japanese coking coal negotiations feature different 
companies being the first to agree each year. In the JFY85 
negotiations, agreement was reached several months earlier 
than usual when General Coal of the USA accepted the JSM offer 
in October 1984. They agreed to continue JFY84 prices for 
Sprague HV Blend coal in JFY85 in return for favourable 
tonnage consideration. The other American suppliers accepted 
the price freeze in November. The Canadian and Australian hard 
coal producers followed, but were not given specified 
tonnages. Luscar was the first of the Canadian mines to accept 
the price freeze because it hoped to avoid the 'unfair 
treatment' received in JFY84 when it was the last Canadian 
firm to sign its contract (Coal Manual 1985:299).
The Australian soft coking coal producers delayed acceptance 
of the JSM price freeze in JFY85 until February. They wanted 
a price rise of $2.50/t and an increase in tonnage to 3.5mt. 
In the end, they accepted the JSM offer of no price increase 
and a cut in the base tonnage to 3mt (H— 10%) from 3.4mt.
The pattern is repeated each year with better tonnage 
conditions extended to the first company to sign than those 
given to others who sign later. For example in December 1985 
Bellambi was the first company to sign its JFY86 contract. The 
price was cut by $4.50, but the volume remained at its 1985
level while other companies had their tonnage reduced (ICR
1985 138:2). Higher tonnage agreements are important for the 
cash flow position of a mine, especially where much of the 
cost is fixed or sunk as a capital investment and high volumes 
are required to make the project viable (Anderson 1987). The 
high fixed cost nature of coal mining and especially the new 
open cut mines, leads to the 'destructive competition' where 
individual suppliers accept a low price in return for improved 
tonnage despite the increased losses incurred by the rest of 
the industry. The net result is a transfer of benefits (low
cost coal) to the consumer.
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4.4.4 Structural or relational bargaining power
The evidence examined in the preceding sections demonstrated 
the use of discriminatory pricing, classification and tonnage 
practices by the Japanese steel mills. The mills clearly 
enjoyed superior bargaining power compared to the suppliers in 
the 1980s. The next question is whether this power is a 
relational power where one side is able to force its terms on 
the other because of its relative strength, or a structural 
power where one side has control over the trading structures 
through which the exchanges are made.
The model of relational power can be applied to the market 
where the equilibrium may be relatively advantageous to either 
side depending on the current supply/demand balance. According 
to this view, coal price changes are simply a product of the 
short term market configuration. Either side can benefit. 
Prices went up in 1988 after falling in 1987. The fact that 
prices were halved in real terms in the 1980s is simply an 
outcome of the surplus production capacity in the system. By 
the late 1980s many suppliers closed mines. This reduction in 
supply combined with an increase in demand to raise prices in 
1988 and 1989. Far more dramatic price rises occurred in the 
mid 1970s when acute shortages were perceived. The overall 
pattern is one of change based on relative bargaining power.
The model of structural power has a different basis. According 
to this model, Japanese companies are able to practise 
discriminatory pricing because of their control over the 
structures which govern the coal trade. Structural power does 
not eliminate relational power. Instead, it constrains the 
exercise of relational power. Rather than close all 
unprofitable mines when prices fall, trade structures may be 
used to keep select high cost mines in operation. The result 
is continued abundant supply despite falling prices. This 
thesis argues that structural power needs to be recognised in 
order to explain the failure of trade to conform to the 
pattern predicted by relative shifts in supply and demand 
alone.
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One way to compare the importance of relational and structural 
power is to consider 1976 and 1987 as the high and low 
extremes in coal prices. They represent the peaks of supplier 
and consumer power respectively. In 1976 Japanese coking coal 
prices were found to be highly correlated with coal quality. 
By 1987 coal quality was a poor predictor of price. In other 
words, suppliers were only able to raise their prices in 1976 
to a level where all coals were competing directly with each 
other on a quality basis. Further increases in price could 
support mines in any of several countries.
By 1987 prices had been discriminately reduced to effectively 
fragment the market into small supplier niches for particular 
groups of mines. Lower prices can be caused by the exercise of 
relational power, however, the discrimination identified above 
implies the exercise of a more pervasive power.
An extreme model of structural power is advocated in the
'Japan Inc.' model where Japanese interests are tightly 
integrated and act as a monopsonist. Evidence of trade 
discrimination were found, but this does not provide 
conclusive support for the model. Instead, the diversity of 
Japanese actors with an interest in the coal trade (many 
companies, industries, government agencies, etc.) is argued to 
be too complex for reduction to a single monopsonistic
structure. The better representation of the Japanese position
in the trade is to recognise the influence of multiple
structures. When they all cooperate the result equals the 
'Japan Inc.' model. However, conflicts can also arise among 
the different groups. This 'internal' conflict refutes the 
monopsonist model and supports the multiple structures model.
The IPE model of multiple structures is argued to be a better 
basis to understand power in the coal trade. The fragmentation 
of the coal trade was achieved to meet Japanese security of 
supply objectives through the construction and extension of 
its trade structures. This hypothesis can be tested by 
identifying consumer objectives and introducing security of 
supply variables into the price estimation equations.
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4.5 Japanese coking coal trade
The hypothesis that buyers discriminate not simply on the 
basis of coal quality, but also on the basis of country of 
origin (to ensure that security objectives are met) is 
explored in two ways. First coal buyers were asked what 
criterion they use to select coals for purchase. Second, 
contract data is re-analysed to measure the importance of 
security variables.
Several trade models and evaluation methods exist. Each 
competes for widespread acceptance of its view of reality. 
Analysts can differentiate between roles assumed by different 
actors by asking the participants directly what their 
objectives are. The answers are then evaluated in terms of 
accuracy of the information gained and how representative it 
is of similar actors. This self-reporting can be used 
independently or in association with specified models of 
behaviour among trading partners. The combined approach of 
integrating reported objectives with the definition and 
testing of price formation variables is adopted in this study.
4.5.1 Coal consumer survey
To understand changes in coal trade and price patterns, the 
first task is to compare the importance of coal purchasing 
objectives over time. In 1980 the Japanese steel mills 
considered reliability of supply and the ability to add new 
suppliers to be very important. This emphasis on security of 
resource supplies explains the high value assigned to long 
term contracts and joint ventures as the most suitable 
arrangements to establish new supplies. These values reflected 
the attitudes after the second oil shock and before the 
recession of the early 1980s. The cost and quality of coal was 
considered of above average importance, but not as important 
as reliability and security through diversity (Table 4.2, 
Appendix D).
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By 1987 the position had changed with the greatest importance 
attached to reducing the cost of coal and having flexible 
supplies in terms of both volume and price. Coal quality and 
supply reliability were still of above average importance as 
were diversity of supply and the limitation of marketshares. 
Predictably, the addition of new suppliers was only a low 
priority in 1987. This change was reflected in the opinion 
that no special arrangements should be offered to new 
suppliers, whereas in 1980 higher prices, long term contracts 
and joint ventures were considered appropriate (Appendix D) .
Table 4.2; JSM coal purchasing objectives 1980-95
objective 1980 1987 1995
least cost 2 1 1
diversity of supply 1.5 2.5 2.5
ability to add new suppliers 1 4.5 3.5
reliability of supply 1 2 4
volume flexibility 3.5 1 1
price flexibility 2.5 1 1
coal quality 2 2 2
limit marketshare of suppliers 1.5 2.5 2.5
bilateral investment agreement 4 4.5 4.5
bilateral trade relations 4.5 4 4
political boycott 4 3 3
1 = very important 
3 = average importance 
5 = not important 
source: Appendix D
2 = above average importance 
4 = below average importance
The required purchase of domestic coal and loans from 
consumers to producers were of average importance in 1980, but 
of less importance in 1987. Other factors like political 
boycotts, bilateral trade imbalances and bilateral trade 
agreements were considered of little importance in 1980 and 
only boycotts rose to average importance by 1987. The priority 
placed on low prices and supply flexibility in 1987 was 
expected to continue in 1995.
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This diverse set of objectives indicates that the coal trade 
is best viewed from more than one direction. The structural 
model identified four primary structures of importance and 
each of these needs to be considered. The production structure 
is of importance because the Japanese steel mills chose to 
invest directly in some coking coal mines while they used the 
financial structure to loan money to others. The role of the 
financial structure is extended when the signing of long term 
contracts (and the associated future revenue) is recognised as 
an essential part of project or joint venture funding. The 
consumers play a critical role in deciding which mines receive 
such contracts. Both of these financial elements were of less 
importance in 1987 than in 1980 when the steel mills wanted to 
establish new suppliers to avoid further price rises and the 
perceived coal scarcity of the 1970s.
The security structure was of particular importance in the 
late 1970s and 1980 when the steel mills were determined to 
ensure a reliable supply to avoid the problems and uncertainty 
of rapid price rises in 1974-76. As part of this emphasis on 
security, the marketshare of individual countries, ports and 
companies was to be restricted. The maximum desired 
marketshare for an individual country, port and company was 
48%, 10% and 10% respectively. To achieve the desired market 
structure, coking coal should be imported from 40-45 companies 
through 15 or more ports in 6-7 countries (Appendix D). If 
such objectives are to be achieved, then an accurate model of 
the trade needs to consider more than coal quality in 
identifying factors which affect price.
4.5.2 Coking coal prices, quality and sources
The earlier analysis of coking coal attributes as predictors 
of price is extended in this section by introducing variables 
for the geographic source of the coal. A simple dummy variable 
is created for each of the major supply countries and the new 
supply region, north east British Columbia. The new analysis 
of coking coal prices provides a much better description of 
prices than the initial quality-based analysis.
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Equations for all Japanese coking coal cases
1987 fob = 35.06 + 37.30 NEBC +2.08 CSN - .89 A
n—83 se—3.24 R2— .86
1984 fob = 45.47 + 2.32 CSN + 15.43 NEBC - .33 VM + 4.28 Can
n—73 se=4.28 R2— .73
1976 fob = 37.23 + 2.57 CSN +8.21 USA + 5.29 Can - .20 VM
n=46 se=3.37 R2=.87
A = % ash (air dry basis)
Aus = Australia 
Can = Canada 
Chi = China 
Col = Colombia
CSN = crucible swelling number
M = % moisture (gross as received basis)
n = number of cases
NEBC = Northeast British Columbia
R2 = R squared adjusted for number of cases
S = % sulphur (air dry basis)
SA = South Africa
se = standard error in estimate
USA == United States of America
USSR = United Soviet Socialist Republics
VM = % volatile matter (air dry basis)
Each of the above equations is an improvement on that based 
solely on coal characteristics. The 1987 equation demonstrated 
the greatest improvement, but even the 1976 equation 
incorporates two country of origin variables. The result is a 
better prediction of price than the earlier coal quality 
equations. This indicates that prices were largely competitive 
when quality and location are used to identify the most 
important divisions or fragments in the trade.
The special case of northeast British Columbia coal was noted 
before, but now the difference in price can be measured. The 
premium paid for these coals was $37 in 1987 and $15 in 1984. 
The highest premium paid in 1976 was for USA coal, but this 
premium in fob prices should have the premium paid in higher 
freight rates added to indicate the much larger cif prices 
paid for these coals. In short, coal prices demonstrated clear 
differences according to country or region of origin.
126
The diversity objective identified in the consumer survey was 
achieved through the paying of higher prices for coal from a 
particular supply country or region. This pattern is a product 
of the contracts and decisions made in the early 1980s as 
explained by the prevailing set of consumer objectives in 
1980. Despite changes in the objectives of consumers in the 
low price context of 1987, coal was not imported simply on the 
basis of least cost^ ®.
Price discrimination was demonstrated to be a persistent 
feature of trade. This indicates that Japanese coking coal 
prices were based on persistent diversity of supply objectives 
and structural power rather than on relational power alone. 
Certainly, when the coal supply exceeded demand, as in the mid 
1980s, the JSM enjoyed a strong bargaining position relative 
to their suppliers. However, they also exercised structural 
power over the supply system which enabled them to 
discriminate on prices not only in the 1980s, but even at the 
peak of the relational power of suppliers in 1976. Having 
demonstrated the importance of structural power in the 
Japanese coking coal trade, the immediate question is whether 
or not steam coal prices are subject to the same type of 
variations.
4.6 Japanese steam coal imports
The Japanese steam coal market developed rapidly in the early 
1980s. After two decades of phasing out the burning of 
domestic coal for electricity production, the electric 
utilities renewed their interest in coal. More dramatically, 
the cement industry responded to the second oil price rise 
with an industry-wide conversion of boilers to coal in 1980- 
81. The result was an increase in consumption of steam coal 
from 1.6mt in JFY79 to lO.lmt in JFY81 (Cement Association of 
Japan cited in Coal Manual 1988:398). Most of this demand was 
met by imports. This transformation of the fuel consumption 
pattern made the cement industry the largest coal importer in 
Japan in 1981. Subsequent consumption declined to 7.2mt in
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JFY86 because of declining cement production, but coal 
remained the dominant fuel for the industry.
The conversion to coal was much slower in the electricity 
industry with the government owned EPDC (Electric Power 
Development Company) being the largest coal consumer (lOmtpa 
in the mid 1980s). The nine regional electric power companies 
(EPCs) slowly expanded their coal burn with Hokaido EPC being 
the largest consumer (5mtpa of domestic imported coal) and 
Chugoku EPC being the largest coal importer (3mtpa). By the 
late 1980s the coal consumption of the nine private companies 
was slightly larger than that for EPDC (12.9 and 10.9mtpa 
respectively in JFY87; Coal Manual 1988:378). Future plans for 
electricity generating capacity include substantial 
investments in coal-fired plant (NEDO 1988), but the rate of 
implementing these plans is uncertain.
A third group of steam coal consumers are general industry 
boilers which are smaller in scale, yet important in terms of 
aggregate energy consumption. These general industry users are 
diverse and small in comparison to power stations or cement 
boilers, however, several industries need to be noted in 
particular. The pulp and paper industry continues to use coal 
as the fuel in several of its main plants. The chemicals and 
oil industry have also made conversions from oil to coal. 
These conversions represent two features of the trade. First 
fuel substitution and interfuel competition is important. 
Second, the Japanese oil industry has become a coal consumer 
as part of its strategy to become a coal supplier. The 
existing oil trading network is simply used as a basis for 
expansion into the coal trade.
Unlike the coking coal trade where there were two dominant 
groups of Japanese actors (the steel mills and the trading 
houses), the Japanese steam coal trade has five main groups of 
actors (electric power companies, cement companies, general 
industry, trading houses and oil companies). This diverse set 
of actors includes elements extended from the coking coal 
trade (trading houses with long term connections in the coal
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industry) as well as new groups. The task of this section is 
to assess whether the structural features of price variations 
in the coking coal trade extend to the steam coal trade. 
Perhaps the participation of more actors and newer nature of 
the trade reduce structural power. The analysis to answer 
these questions includes a survey of industry participants and 
an evaluation of contract data.
4.6.1 Japanese steam coal consumer survey
The responses to the coal consumer survey are divided between 
the electricity industry and other consumers. The two groups 
illustrate some interesting differences within the Japanese 
steam coal market as well as issues of agreed importance. For
example in 1987, both groups of consumers agreed that cost 
minimisation was very important in coal purchasing decisions. 
However, in 1980 the electric utilities considered the least 
cost objective to be only above average in importance while 
the other consumers ranked this objective as very important.
Table 4.3: Japanese steam coal consumer objectives 1980-95
objective 1980 1987 1995
consumer EPCs other EPCs other EPCs other
least cost 2 1 1 1 1.5 1
diversity of supply 2.5 3 2 2.5 1.5 2
ability to add new suppliers 3 3 3 3.5 3 3.5
reliability of ëupply
likelihood of strikes 2 1 2 1 2 1
accurate port deliveries 2 1.5 2 1.5 2 1.5
volume flexibility 2 4 1.5 3 1.5 2.5
price flexibility 2 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
coal quality 2 3 1.5 3 1.5 3
limit supplier's marketshare 3.5 3.5 2 3 1.5 2.5
bilateral investment agreemt 5 2 5 2 5 2
bilateral trade relations 4 3 4 3 4 3
political boycott 4.5 2 4.5 2 4.5 2
1 = very important 2 = above average importance
3 = average importance 4 = below average importance
5 = not important 
source: Appendix D
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Differences between the two groups also emerged when the 
question of supply reliability was asked (Table 4.3). The 
industrial consumers ranked the likelihood of strikes as very 
important or equal to cost as a purchasing consideration while 
the electricity industry ranked the risk of strikes as simply 
being of above average importance. The reliability of accurate 
port deliveries was also ranked more highly by the general 
industry than the electricity industry. This difference is 
understandable given the smaller scale of operation of most 
industrial boilers and their limited stockpiles or storage 
yards. Reliable deliveries are essential for their boiler 
operation. In contrast, the electricity industry has larger 
stockpiles and a mixture of other generating plants based on 
nuclear, gas, oil and geothermal energy sources.
Related to the concern about reliability and their smaller 
scale of operation, the industrial users placed less emphasis 
on supplier diversification and limiting the marketshare of 
suppliers than did the electricity industry. This opinion was 
reinforced by the desire of the electricity industry to have 
more suppliers (companies, regions and countries) than the 
other consumers. Both groups considered the diversification 
objective to have become more important over time (Appendix 
D) .
The coal quality characteristics were considered above average 
in importance by the electricity industry and only of average 
importance to the other industry consumers. Of the seven coal 
attributes listed, the industrial consumers ranked volatile 
matter as the most important quality (above average in 
importance) while other attributes were only average or less 
than average in importance. The importance of volatiles is 
attributed in part to their role in fuelling high temperature 
combustion and is especially important in vertical style 
boilers where coal replaces fuel oil as the source of energy.
The electricity industry ranked the energy content, ash, 
moisture and volatiles of equal importance (average in 1980
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and above average in 1987) while sulphur was only of average 
importance. This lower importance of sulphur in 1987 could be 
explained by the investment in flue gas desulphurisation 
equipment to meet emission standards.
4.6.2 Steam coal prices and coal quality
Steam coal only became a major component of the Japanese coal 
trade in the 1980s. Its recent growth results from the 
emphasis on energy security and a deliberate policy to 
diversify away from oil (Perkins 1985). The limited nature of 
earlier steam coal trade in Japan dictated that analysis begin 
with 1980 data when the trade first expanded rapidly. The 
three years selected for comparison are 1980, 1984 and 1987.
Steam coal trade has been portrayed as far more competitive 
than the coking coal trade. Most consumers are primarily 
interested in the cost of energy and are expected to choose 
the lowest cost per joule or kilocalorie. Other coal 
attributes affect emission levels (sulphur, ash) and burning 
characteristics (volatile matter, ash fusion temperature). 
Eight characteristics (energy content (kcal/kg), total 
moisture (%), ash (%), volatile matter (%), total sulphur (%), 
fixed carbon (%), ash fusion temperature, and Hardgrove 
grindability index) are commonly used to describe particular 
coal brands and all of these data are included in the 
analysis.
Previous studies have shown that moisture has a negative 
effect on combustion when increased above its desirable range 
of 5-10%. A 5% increase in moisture reduces boiler efficiency 
by 0.3% because the moisture absorbs heat which is then lost 
for generating steam for the turbines (TEA 1985:38). Still, a 
minimum level of moisture is desired to reduce dust in the 
handling of coal. A similar relationship is found with 
sulphur.
Although sulphur contributes to low temperature corrosion of 
boilers and increases slagging in some coals, if it is reduced
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to very low levels, the precipitators do not work very well. 
In addition, if the coal has high chlorine levels then a
higher sulphur/chlorine ratio reduces the high temperature 
corrosion and fouling associated with chlorine. Despite these 
benefits from small amounts of sulphur during combustion and 
ash collection, sulphur concentration was found to be
correlated with unplanned outage in Tennessee Valley Authority 
power stations (TEA 1985:37). Furthermore, gaseous sulphur 
emissions contribute to acid rain precursors, cause 
environmental damage and are restricted by law.
The ash content of coal is important for many reasons. Its
quality and the resulting complex combustion chemistry are
only partially understood, but considered of great importance 
to boiler efficiency and availability. Boilers can be designed 
to burn coals of varying ash content with little effect on 
boiler efficiency. However, where ash content is allowed to 
vary widely and exceed design specifications the result can be 
shortened life of the boilers and increased outage of plant 
caused by increased tube wear. The effective increased cost of 
burning high and variable ash coal can reach $10pt (as 
occurred in Australia in the early 1980s)^\ In addition to the 
increased cost of burning high ash coal, the increased cost of 
transporting the coal to the boiler, its increased damage to 
preparation plants and the cost of ash disposal all need to be 
considered.
In contrast to the negative value of moisture, sulphur and 
ash, volatile matter adds to the value of steam coal. The 
volatile matter is the first part of the coal to burn (during 
pyrolysis) and contributes heat for both steam generation and 
the combustion of carbon in the devolatised coal. The 
characteristics of the combustion can thus be predicted by 
using a fuel ratio of fixed carbon divided by volatile matter 
as is often calculated by Japanese utilities (lEA 1985)^®.
Price and quality data was compiled for 31 brands of steam 
coal imported into Japan in 1987 (27 brands in 1984 and 21
brands in 1980). Regression equations were constructed to
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calculate price on the basis of coal quality. However, 
complete data for all eight quality characteristics was only 
available for two thirds of the brands. It should be noted 
that the complete quality data is only available for 
Australian, Canadian, South African and USA coals. The 
following equations for fob prices thus exclude Chinese, 
Soviet and Indonesian coal brands^.
Equations for fob price of steam coals imported into Japan 
(based on eight coal qualities)
1987 price fob = 34.88 - 7.86 S
n=19 se=3.16 R2=.23
1984 price fob = -1.00 - 8.12 S + .022 AFT + .53 VM
n=16 se=2.96 R2=.71
1980 price fob = -106.21 + 0.209 Kcal
n=13 se=3.28 R2=.54
A = % ash (air dry basis)
AFT = ash fusion temperature
Aus = Australia
Can = Canada
Chi = China
Col = Colombia
FC = % fixed carbon
HGI = Hardgrove grindability index
Ind = Indonesia
M = % moisture (gross as received basis) 
n = number of cases
R2 = R squared adjusted for number of cases 
S = % sulphur (air dry basis)
SA = South Africa
se = standard error in estimate
USA = United States of America
USSR = United Soviet Socialist Republics
VM = % volatile matter (air dry basis)
The 1987 fob prices are notable because only one of the eight 
attributes of coal evaluated (sulphur) made a significant 
contribution to explaining price variation. The adjusted R- 
squared value was low (.23) and the standard error large 
($3.16). Similarly, only one variable was found to have a 
significant effect on the equation in 1980, but this time it 
was energy content (kcal/kg) and the adjusted R-squared value 
was .54. Between these two points of low prices in 1987 and 
the importance of sulphur in explaining price and the high 
prices of 1980 when energy content was most important, lies
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the evaluation of 1984 prices. In 1984, three of the coal 
quality variables were statistically important and the 
equation had a much better fit to contract fob prices^.
The coefficients for the three variables in the 1984 equation 
(sulphur, volatile matter and ash fusion temperature) are the 
expected sign and magnitude^. The coefficient is largest for 
sulphur because small changes in its value (for example, 0.5% 
to 1.0%,) greatly increase the SOg emissions of the boiler and 
have a large impact on the value of the coal. Conversely, the 
coefficient for volatile matter is smaller because this 
variable ranges from 25% to 47% for the many brands of coal 
and each change of 1% has a smaller effect on price.
The above analysis included coal attributes which had no 
apparent effect on price so a more restricted list of 
attributes was used for the next evaluation. Rather than use 
eight attributes, the five characteristics most frequently 
specified in coal contracts are examined (energy, moisture, 
ash, volatile matter and sulphur). A larger group of coal 
brands (21 in 1980, 27 in 1984 and 31 in 1987) had complete 
data for these attributes and the regression analysis was 
repeated.
Equations for fob price of steam coals imported into Japan 
(based on five coal qualities)
1987 price fob = 33.65 - 6.24 S
1984 price fob = 45.48 - 8.17 S
1980 price fob = 23.20 + .37 VM
n=31 se=3.74 R2=.13
n=27 se=5.07 R2=.16
n—21 se—4.00 R2—.22
The result was that only one of the five coal qualities had a 
significant correlation with price in each year. The 
importance of sulphur to price determination is explained by 
the requirement to meet strict emission standards in the 
1980s. However, the standard error for each equation was large 
($4-5pt) and the R-squared value low. Once again, coal quality 
provides an inadequate explanation of coal price.
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4.6.3 Coal prices, quality and source variables
Given the importance of country of origin variables to explain 
price differences among coking coals, the same analysis was 
repeated for steam coals. Variables were created to account 
for the country of origin to supplement the coal quality 
variables and the data re-analysed.
Equations for fob price of steam coals imported into Japan 
(based on quality and country of origin)
1987 price fob = -17.18 + 14.09 Can + .0076 Kcal - 5.87 S
n=31 se=2.95 R2=.46
1984 price fob = 46.78 - 7.87 SA - 7.15 USSR - 5.93 S
n—27 se—3 .64 R2—.57
1980 price fob = 26.14 - 9.92 SA + .29 VM
n—21 se—3 .46 R2—.42
All of the equations demonstrated a marked improvement over 
those for coal quality alone^. Each equation accounted for 
approximately half of the price variations. Source of supply 
variables were the most important and were introduced to the 
equation first. Once price differences based on supply country 
were established, then prices varied on the basis of coal 
quality. Overall, half of the variables explaining price 
variations among steam coals imported into Japan are not 
quality based, but security based. The structural model which 
incorporates quality and security variables is thus advocated 
as an explanation of the price pattern in the Japanese steam 
coal trade just as it was proposed as the best model of the 
coking coal trade.
The persistence of price variations in the Japanese coal trade 
was identified in chapter 3 and analysed above to discover 
that it was caused largely by supply diversity objectives 
rather than coal quality. Price variations were also found in 
the European trade, especially for steam coal. The analysis is 
extended to determine if these variations are caused by 
security objectives as well.
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4.7 European steam coal trade
4.7.1 European steam coal consumer survey
In Europe, the electricity industry is by far the largest 
consumer and importer of steam coal. The European steam coal 
trade is much older than its Japanese counterpart with 
millions of tonnes of coal traded annually since the 
industrial revolution. Despite the historic nature of the 
market, the pattern of trade has changed in recent years to 
reflect international changes. Many large electric utilities 
import coal from the same mines as their Japanese counterparts 
and the trade has achieved a degree of global integration.
The analysis of average import prices in chapter 3 illustrated 
persistent differences between European and East Asian coal 
trade price patterns. The European reliance upon a greater 
number of supply countries and its wider variation in prices 
were contrasted with the Asian and Japanese patterns. The 
opinions of major consumers were sought to help identify and 
explain these differences.
The European electric utilities shared some coal purchasing 
objectives with their Japanese counterparts, but differed on 
others. In 1987 both groups agreed that cost minimisation was 
the most important objective. However, the second most 
important objective for the Europeans was reliability of 
accurate port deliveries whereas the Japanese utilities were 
more concerned about volume and price flexibility on the part 
of suppliers. In 1980, the Europeans considered diversity of 
supply to be more important than cost minimisation while the 
Japanese consumers held the opposite view. By 1987 both groups 
considered price more important (Table 4.4).
The European utilities considered coal quality to be of above 
average importance, like their Japanese counterparts. However, 
while sulphur content was only of average importance to the 
Japanese it increased from above average importance to the
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Europeans in 1980 to become very important in 1987 and 1995. 
This increased attention to sulphur is based on the stricter 
environmental controls introduced to reduce SO2 emissions 
throughout Europe and thereby lessen the environmental damage 
caused by acid precipitation.
Table 4.4: European steam coal consumer objectives 1980-95
objectives 1980 1987 1995
European electric utilities North North South North Sout
least cost 2.5 1.5 1 1.5 2
diversity of supply 1.5 2 3 2 1.5
ability to add new suppliers 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.5
reliability of supply
likelihood of strikes 2 2.5 2 2.5 2
accurate port deliveries 2 3 1 3 1
volume flexibility 2.5 1 2 1 2
price flexibility 2 2 2 2 2
coal quality 2 2 2 2 2
limit suppliers' marketshare 3.5 3.5 3 3.5 3
bilateral investment agreement 5 5 5 5 5
bilateral trade relations 5 4 3.5 4.5 3
1 = very important 2 = above average importance
3 = average importance 4 = below average importance
5 = not important 
source: Appendix D
Although the Europeans considered limiting the marketshare of 
suppliers as being of less than average importance (in 
contrast to the above average importance assigned by the 
Japanese), their preferred maximum share of supplies drawn 
from any single company, port or country were very similar to 
the Japanese preferences. In general, the marketshare of a 
single company, port or country should be limited to 20%, 30% 
and 50% respectively. Similarly, the preferred number of 
supply companies is 5-10 with coal coming from 3-10 ports in 
3-7 countries. However, while the Japanese consumers expressed 
a willingness to pay a premium of 10% to establish a new 
supply company, port or country, the Europeans offered no 
premiums for companies and few would pay any premium for a new 
port or country supplier. Indeed, many Europeans indicated
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that a new supplier needed to offer price discounts in order 
to enter the market in 1987. The expectation is thus one of a 
European market where differences in price based on country of 
origin are less pronounced than in Japan (Appendix D) . This 
expectation conflicts with the findings of chapter 3 and will 
be evaluated in more detail in this chapter using contract 
data.
4.7.2 European steam coal attributes, prices and sources
Italy became the largest European importer of coal in the mid 
1980s and the national electricity utility, ENEL, was the 
principal cause of this growth. By the mid 1980s ENEL was 
importing over lOmtpa. Their coal supplies were obtained under 
a series of long and short term contracts with the prices set 
in annual negotiations. An evaluation of the prices reveals a 
familiar pattern.
The largest coal suppliers to ENEL are South Africa (4mtpa) 
and the USA (4mtpa) with smaller amounts imported from Poland, 
USSR and Australia throughout the 1980s. New supplies were 
introduced from China and Colombia 1987-88 (lEA 1989a) and 
Venezuela is also expected to join the list of suppliers. The 
pricing formula has two components to it. First prices are set 
for a particular country. At this level all prices are 
competitive with each coal priced according to its energy 
content and a standard price for coal of a specified quality. 
For example in 1987 the South African price was set at $23pt 
fob for 6200 kcal/kg coal (CWI 1988, ICR 1988) . Five different 
types of South African coal were imported, but each was valued 
according to the standard price. The 1987 fob price 
represented a fall of $6.75 from that received in 1984.
USA coals were priced in a similar manner. Several suppliers 
bid to supply ENEL with coal, but the result was a standard 
price based on the energy content of the coal. The 1987 price 
was $39pt for coal exported through Hampton Roads or other 
east coast ports. This was a $16pt premium over that paid for 
South African coal (fob). The magnitude of this premium
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illustrates why the very large variations were found in the 
analysis of European price data in the previous chapter^.
The competitive pricing of coals at the national level is 
contrasted with the different fob and cif prices paid for 
coals from different countries. In 1987 Polish coal was priced 
at $32 fob, Chinese coal at $34.40 cif and Colombian coal $33- 
37 cif (CWI 1987; ICR 1987). A clear diversity strategy was 
being implemented. USA coals received a premium which is not 
explained by coal quality. The perception of the USA as a 
secure supplier has been offered as an explanation for this 
premium. Other reasons include trade imbalances and strong 
personal contacts based on previous trade experience. Such 
reasons can be considered reasons for supporting security and 
information structures, but our first tasks is to investigate 
differences in coal prices based on country of origin.
Other major European buyers follow the same practice. For 
example, the Danish utility coal purchaser, Elkraft, was 
buying Australian coal for $31.50 cif ($23 fob) in 1987 while 
USA suppliers were being paid $42 fob (CWI 1987; KICT 1988). 
This premium of $19 fob or $16 cif almost equalled the price 
of Australian coal. The price difference is explained by the 
major supply contracts having higher prices than smaller spot 
purchases which were made at internationally competitive 
prices. Even USA coals were occasionally sold at spot prices 
of $30 cif (for high sulphur, high ash, fines) in 1987 (CWI 
1987; ICR 1987). This mixture of price differentiation on 
major contracts and price uniformity on spot contracts 
illustrates how a single buyer can use different contracting 
and sourcing configurations to meet its security of supply 
objectives.
In general, the observation of price differences and their 
continuation at both the contract and national level supports 
the need to add security objectives to the least cost 
objectives in a conventional trade model. Major consumers in 
Japan and Europe share these objectives, but exceptions can be 
found.
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4.7.3 Uniform European coal prices
Examples of international competition and uniform European 
coal import prices can also be found. Although the previous 
chapter and sections concentrated on price differences, some 
markets were found to comply with the least cost model.
The UK is a small importer of steam coal. The CEGB is a large 
coal consumer, but most of its coal is supplied by British 
Coal. The informal contract between them 'the joint 
understanding' is considered to be the largest coal contract 
in a market economy. The coal purchased from international 
sources is thus a marginal fuel for the CEGB and the lowest 
cost possible is sought. In 1987 spot contracts were signed 
for coal from China, Colombia and Australia. The cif price of 
the delivered coal was set at $34.50 for each supplier. This 
demonstrates the direct international competition for the 
sales. These sales were followed with three year contracts for 
the three suppliers but only the Australian coal received a 
$2pt price rise for 1988-90. The uncertainty associated with 
some low cost coal was illustrated by the Chinese coal being 
delayed in delivery and the designated brand (An Tai Bao) 
being substituted by another brand (Datong) in 1988 (ICR 
1988).
The European cement industry is another example where coal is 
purchased strictly on a competitive basis. The value of the 
coal is determined by its energy content so country of origin 
has little to do with price formation. The spot market in the 
northern European ports of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp 
exemplify this trade. These competitively priced segments of 
European steam coal trade demonstrate how the trade is 
fragmented into many components. Coal suppliers compete for 
sales in each niche of the market, but prices are not equal 
because the largest and more specialised consumers are willing 
to pay more for supply diversity or trade continuity (like 
regular small shipments of Polish coal to West German 
consumers).
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4.8 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a detailed evaluation of coal 
contract data and the relationship between coal quality, 
country of origin and price. Under competitive circumstances, 
price is expected to be determined by the quality of the coal. 
These competitive prices were found in particular segments of 
the market, especially among suppliers from a single country. 
However, coal quality failed to explain most of the variations 
in price in the largest international markets and security 
objectives were identified in consumer surveys and introduced 
into the numerical evaluation of prices. The result was that 
both security variables (country of origin) and coal quality 
variables were required to better explain coal prices.
The Japanese coking coal trade illustrates the importance of 
both economic and security objectives in establishing coal 
prices and trade patterns. The simple competitive and 
monopsonistic models of trade were each evaluated. Japanese 
consumers were shown to have more bargaining power than their 
coal suppliers and exercised discrimination as part of their 
negotiations. This imbalance was argued not to be a simple 
function of the relative power derived from an imbalance in 
supply and demand (although that is also important). Instead, 
consumers were able to fragment the market and negotiate 
different price levels for each group of suppliers. This 
market fragmentation and price differentiation is a function 
of the structural power held by consumers.
The variations in average coal prices found in chapter 3 are 
thus reinforced by the transaction level evaluation in this 
chapter. The explanation for these variations are the 
diversity of supply objectives identified by coal consumers. 
To avoid dependence upon a single supplier, consumers are 
willing to pay more for other suppliers to enter the market. 
However, consumers chose not to rely solely on price 
differentiation (as a monopsonist might chose) to ensure
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supply security. They identified several forms of quasi­
integration to achieve their supply objectives. The use of 
international trade structures thus needs to be examined.
Trade structures are argued to be a principal means to achieve 
supply diversity rather than rely on price differentials 
alone. The study of these structures is thus important to 
first identify how they are used to achieve supply diversity 
and market fragmentation and second to measure their direct 
impact on coal prices and trade flows. Price variation is 
accepted as a dominant feature of the international coal trade 
and a more elaborate model is required to explain its 
continued importance. The structural I PE model is developed in 
the next four chapters to provide such an explanation.
142
Endnotes:
1. The term *Japan Inc.* was introduced by James Abegglen in 
1970.
2. The existence of a monopsonistic structure has been argued 
to not be reason for concern in itself. A single firm may 
behave competitively and yield competitive prices and 
production decisions (Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1982). This 
theory of contestable markets has been challenged by both 
conventional analysts and the transaction cost school which 
emphasises the importance of the fixed costs that were assumed 
away in the contestible marked model.
3. Coal cleaning or bénéficiâtion improves the quality of the 
clean coal from that of the raw coal by removing some of the 
heavy impurities which create ash (for example Balmer coal has 
its ash content reduced from 17% to 9.5% after cleaning). As 
a result, the carbon-related characteristics also improve (for 
example the CSN increases from 5.5 to 6.5) (Coal Manual 
1985:322). The amount of beneficiation can be varied to meet 
the final product requirement. For example, coals from the 
Hunter Valley are often washed to meet either soft coking coal 
or steam coal specifications.
4. See appendix D for a copy of the questionnaire and detailed 
responses.
5. The Japanese financial year (JFY) begins on 1 April and 
ends on 31 March the following year.
6. Coal quality data was obtained from several sources. The 
Coal Manual (1976,1985,1988) summary tables of coal qualities 
was used as the primary reference and compared to the 
individual contract specifications provided in later sections. 
Coal News annual reports of the Japanese steelmills contract 
settlements were used to verify the Coal Manual data. Finally 
the coal qualities specified by producers were examined 
(NSWDMR 1985, 1987, 1989; QCB annual) and found to generally 
either present Japanese contract specifications exactly or 
else provide a wide range of qualities which are met by 
changing coal preparation requirments and includes the 
contract specifications. Obvious errors, like misplaced 
decimal points were corrected. Where differences among sources 
could not be resolved, a simple mean was calculated. The same 
procedure was followed for price data, but in this case more 
recent referrals to old prices were assumed to be more 
accurate than the initial report.
7. The equation for cif (cleared insurance and freight) import 
prices is similar. Only the fob equations are presented 
because the contracts are almost all set in fob terms (the 
exceptions are for some Soviet or Chinese coal where the 
shipping is provided by the supplier) . The fob prices are thus 
more accurate than the cif prices which are based on estimates 
of the cost of transport from various ports. Given the 
Japanese control over shipping and the dominant role of the 
Japanese merchant fleet in carrying coal, fob prices also
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reflect the cost of coal when it enters Japanese direct 
control. The cif value declared on import into the country 
depends on the freight rate charged by Japanese shippers 
(frequently affiliated to consumers) as well as the fob cost 
of the coal.
8. The linear regression equation was constructed using the 
stepwise method where the variable with the largest 
correlation with the dependent variable (price) is added 
first. Partial correlation coefficients are calculated for the 
remaining variables and the variable with the largest 
coefficient is added to the equation next. This procedure 
continues until all excluded variables fail to meet the 
requirement that the probability of it having no effect on the 
equation (a coefficient of 0) is greater than 95% (F value 
less than 0.05). In addition, included variables are checked 
to see that they contribute to the new equation (with a 
probability greater than .90 that their coefficient is not 
equal to 0).
The 1976 equation is especially good because all signs are in 
the right direction and the coefficients correspond to the 
levels expected from contract penalty clauses. The strength of 
the correlation between coal quality and price in 1976 
reinforces the findings of Kittredge and Siverston (1980) who 
used 1977 price data to conclude that prices were competitive 
for Canadian and other coking coals.
9. Other brands may have been imported, but the data on these 
brands is incomplete and the size of such transactions is 
generally small.
10. Another hypothesis to explain the reduced role of coal 
quality as a predictor of price in the 1980s is the increase
in the use of soft and semi-soft coking coal with poor coking
qualities. To evaluate this hypothesis, the group of hard 
coking coals was separated from the soft and semi-soft coking 
coal for analysis of price over time.
Equations for fob prices of hard coking coals
1987 price fob = no coal quality variables had a coefficient 
significantly (f value <5%) different from zero 
1984 price fob = 66.60 - .43 VM
2 outliers n=52 se=5.70 R2=.14
1976 price fob = 75.80 - 1.57 M - 1.21 A
0 outliers n=29 se=2.97 R2=.69
The hypothesis that the price pattern was distorted by soft 
and semi-soft coals is rejected because the price pattern for 
hard coking coals in the 1980s had virtually no correlation 
with coal quality. The 1987 data suggested no equation while 
the 1984 equation was an extremely poor predictor of price. In 
contrast, the 1976 hard coking coal prices were better 
correlated with coal qualities.
Soft coking coal has been used for the production of formed 
coke and inclusion in the blast furnace for many years, 
although its use increased in the 1970s and 1980s as part of
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the steelmills' programme to use lower cost raw materials. In 
the case of Japan, most soft coking coal is imported from 
South Africa and the Hunter Valley, Australia. Semi-soft 
coking coal was only introduced into the coking coal trade in 
the late 1980s. It includes a wide variety of coals not suited 
for coking until pulverised coal injection (pci) and coal 
blending techniques improved in the 1980s. Several steam coals 
are included in this group.
Equations for fob price of soft and semi-soft coking coals:
1987 price fob = 32.58 + .97 CSN - .82 A + .15 VM
n=43 se=1.80 R2=.56
1984 price fob = 35.03 + 1.84 CSN
n—21 se—1.57 R2— .78
1976 price fob = 42.94 + 1.53 CSN - 1.40 M
n=17 se=0.92 R2=.90
The soft and semi-soft coking coal equations are very 
interesting because they explain more of the variations in 
price than the equations for all coking coals. Rather than 
reduce the role of coal quality in price determination soft 
and semi-soft coals enhance the correlation between quality 
and price. However, the pattern of declining correlation 
between quality and price found among all coals is repeated by 
the soft and semi-soft coals. The R-squared value of .90 in 
1970 fell to .56 in 1987. The standard error for price 
prediction also rose over time (from $lpt to $2pt).
One of the surprises in the equations is the positive 
correlation between price and the percentage of volatile 
matter in 1987. In conventional coking coal, volatile matter 
is not wanted because it does not contribute to the coke which 
supports the molten mixture in the blast furnace. However, 
volatiles contribute energy and the role of semi-soft coal as 
a source of energy in the mixture presumably accounts for the 
change in sign of the coefficient. This change in the 
valuation of volatile matter may reduce the predictive power 
of this quality in price estimation in the 1980s, but it does 
not provide sufficient evidence to endorse the hypothesis that 
soft and semi-soft coals account for the decline in the 
correlation between coal quality and price. Instead, soft and 
semi-soft coals demonstrated a stronger affiliation between 
quality and price than the hard coking coals. The initial 
hypothesis is rejected.
11. The residual is the difference between the actual value of 
the dependent variable (fob price) and the estimate calculated 
by the equation.
12. Fluidity is considered an important coking coal quality 
because it measures the ability of the coal to become soft and 
viscous when heated. This characteristic is desired for some 
coals in the blend. However, when fluidity was included among 
the coal quality variables, its contribution to the regession 
equation was not significant. Certain coals are promoted as 
high fluidity coals and they may receive higher prices as a 
result, but the statistical basis of this assertion was not 
found.
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13. The escalation clauses can result in a price decrease as 
in the case of the cost of diesel oil which declined and 
resulted in an automatic price cut of C$1.89/t from 1 July 
1986 (Coal Manual 1988:303).
14. The semi-soft coking coal prices were set separately from 
the hard coking coals. Given the tighter supply conditions for 
steam coal in 1988 than 1987, a larger price rise was 
achieved. The Australian mines settled for an increase of 
$3.90 to $36.90/t for JFY88 (ICR 1988 208:8).
15. The cluster analysis was conducted using the complete 
linkage method whereby each item or group is compared to the 
most distant member of other groups. It is then merged with 
the group which it is closest to. This technique constructs 
groups so as to minimise internal variations. The result 
should be one of similar coals being grouped together. The 
groups are merged one after another so that the most similar 
coals are grouped first. The process continues until all the 
coal brands are in one group. Before all the coals combine 
into a single unit, it is useful to examine the contents of 
the groups. The two class, hard and soft coal division did not 
fit the cluster analysis results very closely, so a broader 
range of groups are considered. The geographic source of coal 
brands is used to summarise the membership of the cluster 
groups in Table 4.A.
Table 4.A: Cluster analysis of coking coal brands, 
group 1976
members
1984
members
1987
members
A 8 Hunter Valley 13 Hunter Valley 7 Hunter Valley
1 South Africa 3 South Africa 4 South Coast
2 China 4
5 
2
Queensland
Canada
China
B 2 Hunter Valley 2 Hunter Valley 13
1
3
1
Hunter Valley 
Queensland 
South Africa 
Colombia
C 2 Hunter Valley 7 Canada 2 Queensland
1 USA 1 Hunter Valley
2 South Coast 
1 USSR
2 China
D 1 Queensland 13 Queensland 8 Queensland
1 Hunter Valley 2 South Coast 2 South Coast
1 Canada 2 China 8 Canada
1 Canada 2
1
USSR
USA
E 3 Queensland 1 Canada 2 Queensland
1 New Zealand 1 Hunter Valley
F 3 Queensland 6 USA 2 Hunter Valley
3 South Coast 1 Canada
4 Canada
3 USSR
G 10 USA 12 USA 11 USA
1 Poland 1 Canada
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regional summary 1976 1984 1987
region # of groups # of groups # of groups
Australia 6 4 6
Hunter Valley 4 3 4
South Coast 1 2 2
Queensland 3 1 5
Canada 2 4 3
China 2 2
New Zealand 1
Poland 1
South Africa 1 1 1
USA 2 2 2
USSR 1 1 1
note: clusters formed by the complete (most distant) method
The clusters were constructed on the basis of the five coal 
qualities (CSN, total moisture, ash, volatile matter, total 
sulphur) . Each of the five characterisitics was given equal 
weighting so rather than use the actual numeric value of the 
characteristic (which would have made volatile matter far more 
important than sulphur) Z values were calculated to describe 
the distribution of each characteristic in standard units. 
These z values were then used to cluster the coals into seven 
groups of similar coals.
16. This finding can be evaluated at a more disaggregate level 
by also constructing new equations for hard and soft coking 
coal prices which incorporate geographic variables for the 
source of the coal.
Equations for hard coking coal price
1987 price fob = 45.36 + 34.68 NEBC - 1.28 M + 1.12 CSN
outliers=l n=40 se=2.97 R2=.87
1984 price fob = 74.79 + 16.37 NEBC - .49 VM - .89 A
outliers=l n=52 se=4.66 R2=.42
1976 price fob = 63.39 + 7.96 USA - .21 VM -.78 A + 3.58 Can 
outliers=0 n=29 se=2.49 R2=.78
The results are a striking contrast with the equations based
on coal qualities alone which explained virtually none of the 
price variations among hard coking coals in the 1980s. By 
adding variables for source of supply, much more of the price 
variation is explained. Similar equations were derived for the 
soft and semi-soft coking coals:
Equations for soft and semi-soft coking coal price
1987 fob = 33.63 +.79 CSN -.88 A -6.63 Col +.17 VM -2.17 SA 
outliers=0 n=43 se=1.44 R2=.72
1984 fob = 35.03 + 1.84 CSN
no source variables added n=21 se=1.57 R2=.78
1976 fob = 42.94 + 1.53 CSN - 1.40 M
no source variables added n=17 se=0.92 R2=.90
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prices for Colombian and South African coal in part reflect 
the higher shipping costs of going through the Panama Canal 
and the longer distance from Japan to South Africa than to 
Australia.
17. Studies by the Tennessee Valley Authority found that 
higher ash content reduced boiler efficiency and increased 
unplanned outage. For a 1% increase in ash above a normal 
level of 10%, boiler availability declined by 1.2-1.5% while 
efficiency was reduced by 0.3%. The estimated cost associated 
with these losses were $0.95 and $0.67 respectively, or 
$1.62pt in total (lEA 1985:43).
18. These predictions of combustion characteristics can be 
improved by differentiating between the three main types of 
volatile matter (vitrinite, exinite and inertinite macérais), 
but no contracts specify these divisions within volatile 
matter (Chambers, Knill and Ungarian 1987 summarised in AOCRT 
1989:8) .
19. Consumers are expected to compare coals on the basis of 
their cif prices since that is the cost of the energy to them. 
However, most contracts are written in fob terms (exceptions 
are some Soviet and Indonesian coals). The fob prices are thus 
more accurate. To convert fob prices into cif prices the 
transport cost is assumed to be the same for all coals from a 
particular country. In 1987 the assumed transport costs to 
ship coal to Japan were as follows: Australia $8; USA $13; 
Canada $10; USSR $5; China $5; South Africa $11; and Indonesia 
$7. Special transport costs and arrangements were overlooked.
20. An even higher R-squared value (.77) and lower standard 
error was produced by an equation which reversed the expected 
sign of the coefficient for moisture and energy. The 
explanation for this anomaly is found in examining the details 
of each coal brand. All of the coals in this analysis (n=16) 
had total moisture contents of 8-9% with the exception of 
Sufco (10%) and Blair Athol (16%). Blair Athol and Sufco are 
the two highest priced coals in the group ($46.26 and $44.00 
compared to the group average of 37.44) so a correlation was 
created between moisture and price. The conclusion that this 
relationship is causal is rejected. The high price paid for 
Blair Athol coal is explained not by its high moisture 
content, but by its long term contract and the use of 
escalation clauses to determine price. Similarly, the high 
Sufco price can be explained by the premium paid for USA coals 
to ensure diversity of supply. In both of these cases, non­
quality variables create anomalies in the analysis which must 
be addressed to better understand coal prices.
21. Cif prices are also examined to extend the evaluation of 
the relationship between the eight coal quality variables and 
price. Comparisons can also be made between the determinants 
of fob and cif prices for steam coals imported into Japan.
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1987 price cif = 47.63 - .65 A
H—19 se—3 . 01 R2—.23
1984 price cif = 40.30 + .76 M - 3.82 S + .25 VM - .35 A
n=16 se=1.31 R2=.84
1980 price cif = -62.77 + .17 Kcal
n=13 se=2.84 R2=.50
The 1984 cif prices were better explained by coal qualities
than the 1980 and 1987 prices, however the concern over the 
reversed role of total moisture in the equation is exactly the 
same as that discussed when looking at the fob price equation. 
The equation for cif coal prices in 1980 again included only 
one of the eight coal quality variables. Energy content 
(kcal/kg) accounted for half of the variations in price.
22. Similar improvements were made in the 1984 and 1987 cif 
equations by adding source of supply variables:
1987 price cif = -14.09 + 17.14 Can + .0077 Kcal
n=31 se=2.97 R2=.45
1984 price cif = 48.54 - 12.41 USSR - 4.52 SA -6.87 S +.24 VM
n=27 se=3.49 R2=.69
1980 price cif = no variables significant
n=21 se= R2=
23. In 1984 the price was $42pt for a fob premium of $12pt. 
However, import prices were closer because of the higher cost 
of freight for South African coal - $50pt cif from USA and 
$45pt cif from South Africa.
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Chapter 5 
The security structure: 
Government policy and supply security
5.1 Introduction
'Some will wish to hold to our adopted principles, and 
leave commerce and the consumption of coal unchecked even 
to the last; while others, subordinating commerce to 
purposes of a higher nature, will tend to the prohibition 
of coal exports, the restriction of trade, and the 
adoption of every means of sparing the fuel which makes 
our welfare and supports our influence upon the nations 
of the world.' Jevons 1865:13
The security structure is the first of four primary structures 
which alters global coal trade from that expected under the 
least cost model. The structure includes international 
(bilateral and multilateral) security and trade agreements as 
well as domestic policies and institutions designed to protect 
the interest of a particular country (Siebert 1989). Domestic 
security interests are represented by both government policies 
and private procurement strategies. The relative importance of 
these corporate, national and international components of the 
security structure changes over time and these changes will be 
investigated in this chapter.
Military and political alliances are rarely considered in 
studies of the coal trade, but need to be recognised both for 
their historic and future importance. Although coal is traded 
between the major military alliances in both eastern Europe 
and Asia (predominantly from centrally planned economies to 
market economies for hard currency or counter trade deals), 
the pattern and magnitude of this trade will change as 
alliances and trade barriers are altered. The explicit use of 
political decisions to shape coal trade was shown in the late 
1980s when several European countries stopped importing South 
African coal because of domestic opposition to apartheid.
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Security interests are usually associated with the state 
assertion of sovereignty over its territory, hence security 
objectives are often defined in government policies. Examples 
of these public security interests extending directly to coal 
trade are illustrated by the interest taken by most
governments in energy security during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Energy policies were devised to promote secure supplies of 
energy for national industry and consumers. Many governments 
value their domestic energy supplies as more secure than 
imports and have actively supported the domestic coal 
industry. Industrial policies, subsidies and preferred 
purchasing arrangements of various types have been used for 
support. These policies will be reviewed and the magnitude of 
subsidies studied.
Energy policies also relate to the actions of private 
corporations. Coal consumers create private security
structures both as part of the execution of state initiated
programmes and as a result of their own objectives. For
example, electricity utilities with responsibility to provide 
uninterrupted electricity must ensure that fuel supplies will 
not be interrupted by failures in the supply system (Gaskin
1986). Government finance may be used to support diverse 
international supplies for private consumers.
The security structure and its importance in the coal trade is 
best illustrated by the largest international coal trade - the 
import of coking coal by Japan. The details of the associated 
security structure will be identified and its evolution 
charted. The extension of this structure to the Japanese 
import of steam coal is then examined and comparisons are made 
with European imports. Finally, these national security 
structures are compared to the international structure 
constructed at the multilateral level which promotes efficient 
trade and conflicts with some national structures.
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5.2 Private sector and national security objectives
5.2.1 Private sector security objectives
Security is not only a military concern to government, but 
also a commercial concern to business. Coal consumers seek to 
ensure a secure supply of inputs to enable them to produce 
electricity, steel or heat without interruption. Indeed, 
security objectives provide one explanation for the fragmented 
coal market pattern identified earlier (chapters 3 and 4) . The 
security of coal supplies can be increased through a variety 
of means, including stockpiles, long term contracts, capacity 
to substitute fuels and diversity of supply. The arrangement 
of a diverse supply of coal is an extensive practice in 
international trade. The deliberate diversification of sources 
often implies raising prices so that higher cost mines from 
alternative sources can be active in the market (Anderson
1987). A trade-off. is thus established between the objective 
of gaining least cost inputs and ensuring diversity of supply.
The relative importance of least cost and diversity of supply 
objectives to various groups of consumers is presented in 
Table 5.1. The clearest preference between these objectives is 
shown by European cement companies which consider cost to be 
very important and diversity to be not important. Other 
consumers and traders also considered cost to be more 
important than diversity. However, they also ranked diversity 
of supply as having above average importance in most cases.
Although priority was given to least cost supplies in the mid 
1980s, many consumers (Japanese steam coal consumers, sogo 
shosha and southern European electricity companies) expect 
diversity objectives to become more important in the 1990s. 
This implies a continued or even enhanced role for security 
structures in the coal industry.
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Table 5.1: Importance of supply diversity and least cost
to coal purchases, 1980-95
respondent least cost diversity of supply
1980 1987 1995 1980 1987 1995
Japanese groups
steel mills 2 1 1 1.5 2.5 2.5
steam coal groups 2 1 2 3 3 2
electricity cos 2 1 1.5 2.5 2 1.5
general industry 1 1 1 2.5 2.5 2
mining companies 3.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2
oil companies 1.5 1 1.5 3 3 2.5
sogo shosha 3 1 3 3 4 1
European groups
electric utilities
northern Europe 
southern Europe
2.5 1.5
1
1.5
2
1.5 2
3
2
1.5
cement companies 1 1 1 5 5 5
trading companies 1 1 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
key: 1 = very important 2 = above average importance
3 = average importance 4 = below average importance 
5 = not important 
source: survey and interviews, Appendix D.
5.2.2 The importance of government objectives
To gain secure and diverse coal supplies, companies are not 
always left to implement their own purchasing strategy. 
Governments are also concerned about the security of coal 
supplies because of its importance to industrial production 
and energy supplies. As a result, governments often establish 
energy policies and create structures to assist the secure 
supply of coal to their industry. One of the most common 
government policies is the protection of their domestic coal 
industry by requiring consumers to purchase domestic coal. 
However, dependence upon domestic suppliers may prevent 
diversity in supply from being achieved and also raise costs. 
The importance of these support policies is thus declining in 
both Japan and Europe (Table 5.2; section 5.5). The 
development of these coal policies and the implications of 
their decline on the international security structure will be 
considered in detail in later sections of this chapter.
Another policy which alters coal trade is the boycott by 
various countries of the purchase of South African coal.
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Although most consumers consider this policy to be of less 
than average importance in deciding on coal supplies, it 
creates an absolute restriction for many Scandinavian and 
French consumers (unless the coal is imported under a 
different national label) (SOMO 1989a).
Table 5.2: Importance of required domestic purchases and 
political boycotts to coal purchases, 1980-95
respondent required domestic political boycotts
purchases
Japanese groups
1980 1987 1995 1980 1987 1995
steel mills 3 4 5 4 3 3
steam coal groups 3 4 5 4 3.5 4
electricity cos 2 2.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
general industry 5 5 5 2 2 2
mining companies 2.5 4 5 4.5 3.5 4
oil companies 3.5 3.5 5 4 3 3
sogo shosha 2 4 5 5 4 5
European groups
electric utilities
northern Europe 5 3 4
southern Europe 5 5 5 5 5 5
cement companies 3 4 5 5 5 5
trading companies 2 3 3
key: 1 = very important 2 = above average importance
3 = average importance 4 = below average importance 
5 = not important 
source: survey and interviews. Appendix D.
Other policy debates which influence coal trade include claims 
that American coal is purchased to help reduce bilateral trade 
imbalances with Japan, Italy, S. Korea and Taiwan. Most 
consumers surveyed did not consider this factor important in 
their trade decisions (Table 5.3). Similarly, the argument 
that groups like the Japanese steel mills purchased American 
coal to ensure access to the American market for the sale of 
their steel products was not verified by the survey. Japanese 
mining companies were concerned about market access to sell 
their skills and equipment from affiliated firms, but the 
issue was generally one of low importance. The priorities 
among purchasers were clearly cost and supply diversity.
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Table 5.3: Importance of trade balance and product market
access to coal purchases, 1980-95
respondent bilateral access to
trade balance product markets
1980 1987 1995 1980 1987 1995
Japanese groups
steel mills 5 4 4 4 5 5
steam coal groups 4 4 4 4 4 4
electricity cos 4 4 4 5 5 5
general industry 3 3 3 4 4 4
mining companies 4 4 4 3 2 3
oil companies 4 4 3 4 4 3
sogo shosha 5 4 5 5 4 5
European groups
electric utilities
northern Europe 5 4 5 5 4 4
southern Europe 4 4 3 4 4 4
key: 1 = very important 2 = above average importance
3 = average importance 4 = below average importance 
5 = not important 
source: survey and interviews. Appendix D.
Politicians frequently add their support to the negotiating 
position of their coal exporters or importers. In the case of 
the USA, leaders promote more coal exports to Europe and Asia:
'We can promote coal exports by taking a tough 
negotiating stance against foreign subsidies of coal, and 
by encouraging long-term contracts with US suppliers. 
This will reduce the trade deficit, increase the energy 
security of our allies, and provide more jobs for 
Americans.' (Bush 1988:16)
Coal trade received similar attention at the 1985 meeting 
between Prime Minister Nakasone of Japan and Prime Minister 
Hawke of Australia because of tension over declining prices 
and tonnages at the time. Prime Minister Nakasone was quoted 
as saying ' I would like to do my level best to see that the 
marketshares will be maintained' (APR 1985.1.16) This was 
interpreted by Australian advisors as proof that 'Japan had 
agreed to hold Australia's share in the markets for coal...' 
(AFR 1985.1.17). However, Nakasone refused to endorse this 
interpretation and instead said that 'He promised not to 
sacrifice Australia to third-country pressure - without naming
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the United States - but warned that Australia would hold its 
place only if it stayed competitive in price and stable in 
supply.' (AFR 1985.1.17) The reference to stability in supply 
pointed to a railway strike which resulted in 28 ships waiting 
outside of Newcastle for coal. Four months later, Japan was 
delaying ships which were to be sent to load Blair Athol coal 
as part of its bargaining strategy to have the price lowered 
(AFR 1985.4.4).
Political manoeuvring and the creation of policies and 
security structures to enhance the national position in global 
coal trade creates opportunities for conflict in the 
international trading system. Conflicts can arise between the 
interests of different countries or between national and 
international structures. Each of these tensions will be 
examined closely in the following sections.
5.3 Japanese security structure and coking coal
5.3.1 Government-industry relations
Japan is argued to have constructed a security structure based 
upon a cooperative government-industry relationship. This 
national structure was built to overcome the insecurity of 
supply caused by the purchase of standard American coal brands 
under short term contracts. Instead of accepting this standard 
practice of the international coal trade, special policies and 
corporate procurement strategies were adopted.
Japanese coal plans were only one element of the overall 
strategy to achieve economic growth. Johnson (1982) explains 
the Japanese economic success as a product of the 
developmental state. In this model, the government creates 
complementary policies and structures to promote economic 
growth. Government directives, financial allocations and 
corporate investment are expected to be closely coordinated to 
achieve shared objectives. These elements of the security, 
financial and production structures are introduced by first
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reviewing Japanese industrial policies and their effect on 
coal projects and coal imports.
Industrial policies are defined as the broad range of 
policies, other than macroeconomic policy, that increase the 
productivity of factor inputs and influence investment and 
disinvestment decisions of firms, industries, or sectors (Eads 
and Yamamura 1987:425). Tresize (1982, 1983) concluded that 
Japanese industrial policy had no substance because it lost 
significant economic instruments like direct subsidies and 
tariffs in the 1970s. However, this narrow definition of 
policy instruments overlooked many important features of the 
Japanese policy environment. Eads and Yamamura (1987:426) 
concluded that 'direct economic aid unarguably influenced the 
performance and behaviour of Japanese industries'. The narrow 
economic view of industrial policy was 'faulted for its 
ignoring past policy and its continuing effects on the 
Japanese economy since the oil crisis.' (Eads and Yamamura 
1987:426) In short, to understand current state-industry 
relations, the historical context of Japanese policies needs 
to be reviewed.
Coal is a resource of special significance to Japan because it 
is one of the few sources of fossil fuels available within the 
country. Japanese coal had been used extensively to fuel 
industrial development and was even exported to China in the 
early twentieth century (Tsurumi and Tsurumi 1984). As 
industrialisation expanded, so did the demand for energy. Coal 
imports became important and by 1943 38% of the coal used in 
the steel industry was imported from China and a few other 
sources (like Taiwan) (D'Cruz 1979:90). The arrangements 
governing both domestic and international sources of coal are 
a product of the interaction between government policy and 
industrial practice.
The Japanese response to the shortage of coal at the end of 
World War II is contrasted with the UK response. The 
fragmented and rundown UK industry was considered in need of 
investment and coordination so it was nationalised in 1949.
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Japanese bureaucrats proposed the same solution to their coal 
crisis, but direct government control was rejected in favour 
of a system of government guidance over corporate decisions. 
The government supported the coal industry in its first 
postwar industrial policy ('food for coal*) by increasing the 
food rations of coal miners^ Investment in the coal industry 
was then promoted under a 'priority production' system to 
concentrate assets in a few strategic sectors regardless of 
the effects on civilian consumption or inflation^.
The government also used its control over trade and finance to 
direct investment and industrial development. Several 
important bureaucratic reforms were made in 1949-50 to 
facilitate these changes. MITI, the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry, was formed by combining the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MCI) with the Board of Trade (EOT) and 
the Export Import Bank of Japan was formed to give the 
government a financial institution to promote trade (Ozawa 
1986). An emphasis was placed on international trade and coal 
trade was one of the recipients of detailed attention.
Imports for the steel industry were permitted to recommence in 
1947, but the Occupational Forces Administration specified 
that the industry had to look for new suppliers outside the 
old Japanese Empire (Mitsui 1954 cited in D'Cruz 1979:89). The 
Canadian and European steel mills had established a long term 
pattern of importing coking coal from the American coal 
industry of West Virginia, so Japan turned to the same source 
(D'Cruz 1979:92) . The USA became the largest supplier of 
coking coal to Japan throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.
The JSM demand for coking coal grew and new international 
supplies were added with Australia emerging as the most 
important new source in the 1960s and Canada being the largest 
new source in the 1970s (Figure 5.1). Domestic coal supplies 
grew slowly in the 1950s and 1960s, yet accounted for a 
declining share of JSM requirements. In the 1980s imports from 
South Africa, the USSR and China grew. International supplies 
were successfully diversified as domestic supplies declined^.
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Figure 5.1: JSM coking coal sources
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One of the most enduring features of the Japanese economic 
system was the conformity with which individual companies 
followed government (typically MITI) directions. In the 
absence of clear legal obligations, enterprises chose to 
follow MITI 'administrative guidance'.
'Administrative guidance differs from orders issued in 
accordance with, for example, the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Control Law in that it is not legally 
enforceable. Its power comes from government-business 
relationships established since the 1930s, respect for 
the bureaucracy, the minister's claim that they speak for 
the national interest, and various informal pressures 
that ministries can bring to bear.' (Johnson 1982:266)
Companies may prefer not to conform, but MITI generally had 
the power to persuade them to follow administrative guidance 
(Yamamura 1982)*. The relationship between industry and 
government ministries was thus a close one with few public 
breaks in their combined desire to promote economic growth and
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trade. This study looks beyond the government-industry 
relationship in domestic Japanese industry to examine the 
pattern for investment and coordination of overseas projects. 
In particular, it is argued that the decline of domestic coal 
supplies and the increased reliance upon imports caused the 
government to promote structures which would ensure the secure 
supply of coal for the steel industry.
5.3.2 Coal imports and the 'develop and import' policy
Japanese public and private interests complement their 
domestic cooperation with the combined application of public 
and private resources to gain secure supplies of imports. The 
approach was outlined in 1971 when the Japanese Committee on 
Coal Imports issued a report which advocated the establishment 
of a system to ensure a stable and economic supply of coal 
(Sakamoto 1982:359).
The report provided a series of recommendations to establish 
a coal supply system:
'1. Longer-term planning is required to develop a 
comprehensive and reliable coal chain.
2. Supply capacity should be substantially strengthened 
especially by developing overseas coal mines. In 
particular the following steps should be implemented: 
long-term contracts with coal exporters with minimum 
uptake clause; participation in or facilitation of 
financial support for the development of new mines in 
exporting countries, and assistance with the improvement 
of infrastructures in coal-exporting countries.
3. Diversification of Import Sources. Large dependence on 
a single country is not beneficial for either exporter or 
importer. Though currently Japan relies on Australia, for 
much of its coal there is a need not only to expand 
existing coal sources (New South Wales, Queensland, 
China, Canada, etc.), but also efforts should be made to 
develop new mines in the United States and other areas 
which may, however, require longer-term contracts and 
improvement of port and railroad facilities.
4. Improvement of Receival Facilities in Japan. There is 
a need to improve facilities to handle larger ships and 
establish coal centres in several areas.
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5. Development of New Techniques for Wider Coal Use. The 
development of new techniques such as COM, fluidised bed 
combustion method, coal liquefaction and gasification 
should be encouraged which will also create new demand in 
the future.
6. International Cooperation is Essential. The private 
sector can provide stable demand to exporters with 
longer-term contracts supported by a group of users and 
this may also facilitate the maintenance of price 
stability. The government can assist by providing 
financial support for the construction of coal centres, 
the adoption and development of new technology and the 
development of new mines abroad where private capital 
cannot provide enough finance.* (Sakamoto 1982:359)
Japanese private investment in and public finance of overseas 
mines is thus one means to achieve several objectives. It 
increases supply capacity, but it can also diversify supply 
sources. Furthermore, the provision of public finance to 
supplement private capital for coal mine development is 
regarded as a form of international cooperation. Investment in 
overseas mines can thus meet three Japanese policy objectives: 
to increase coal supplies, to diversify supply sources and to 
provide international cooperation. The 'develop and import* 
policy provided the specific mechanisms to meet the above 
objectives.
Although the develop and import (D&I) policy is often cited 
with reference to projects in developing countries, it 
identifies several of the general points important to Japanese 
policy makers when arranging the supply of raw materials 
(Anderson 1987; Kolenda 1985; Ozawa 1977; Walsh 1982). Long 
term loans and financial arrangements like soft loans (low 
interest, long repayment periods) were to be complemented with 
direct investment in joint ventures and will be studied in 
chapters 6 and 7. The projects should be large scale to 
benefit from economies of scale and dispersed in many regions 
to ensure diversity of supply.
Local infrastructure requirements were to be included in the 
project as far as practical, but given the cost that 
infrastructure adds to resource projects those with the lowest 
overall costs were generally selected. Indeed, mines like
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Gregg River in Canada were actively promoted by the JSM 
precisely because infrastructure costs were low. Facilities 
were in place to support existing mines and only small 
extensions to services were required to meet the needs of 
Gregg River.
The JSM used the general Japanese 'develop and import' project 
formula to gain access to resources. However, when host 
governments introduced laws to increase the local returns on 
mining projects, it was sometimes interpreted as a direct 
attack on the JSM 'develop and import' initiatives. For 
example in 1976 the Alberta government announced a new coal 
development policy which included higher royalties on open cut 
mining. The Coal Manual proclaimed the Japanese sensitivity to 
such changes:
'Thus, the imposition of high royalties on strip mining 
may well drastically undermine the international price 
competitiveness of Alberta coal in not-so-distant 
future. . .Alberta's tough coal development policy has also 
weakened the trust Japanese steel mills have in the 
province as a stable supplier of coal in the 
future...there seems to be sufficient ground to believe 
that the new coal development policy is aimed at the 
'develop-and-import' scheme by Japanese mills to a 
considerable extent.' (Coal Manual 1976:183-4).
The justification for this view was that Japan was the 
principal destination for Albertan coal exports and new 
projects involving the JSM (Gregg River mine in particular) 
were planned to start in the near future (Coal Manual 
1976:84,201). The Albertan government approved the Gregg River 
development in July 1976, but the actual development of the 
mine was delayed with exports to Japan commencing in 1983 
rather than 1976 as initially planned. Despite this delay, the 
ownership and financing of the mine conformed to the general 
'develop and import' model.
In addition to the project oriented 'develop and import' 
arrangements, the Japanese government also promoted secure 
coal supplies through a set of intergovernmental trade and 
investment agreements with centrally planned economies.
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5.3.3 Coal projects under bilateral trade agreements
Coal supplies were given central importance in the negotiation 
of several Japanese bilateral trade agreements. Although the 
conditions governing the trade have changed markedly, China 
and Japan share a long history of coal trade. Japanese 
domination during the interwar years has been replaced with 
broad bilateral trade agreements. The incentive to promote 
trade is recognised by governments on both sides.
'(The) image of China's natural resources fuelling 
Japan's modern economy with energy and raw materials, 
while Japan promoted China's modernisation, appealed to 
both governments' (Newby 1988:8).
Coal is considered poised to become the mainstay of Sino- 
Japanese energy trade because coal development is less costly 
and risky than oil exploration. By 1985, 46% of China's coal 
exports went to Japan (Newby 1988:26; Locatelli 1989:145). 
This trade was based on long term agreements.
In February 1978 the Long Term Trade Agreement between Japan 
and China was signed. Significantly, the leader of the 
Japanese negotiating team was Inayama Yoshihiro the President 
of Nippon Steel. A $20 billion trade flow was to be created in 
the first 5 year period, 1978-82, and coal was to play a 
central role. Japanese imports from China were to include 8- 
9mt of coal while China imported machinery, construction 
materials, plant and technology to facilitate coal mining, 
transport and steel production (Franks 1988). The agreement 
was revised in 1979 and the trade proposals increased. The 
1980 revision called for coal export levels to reach lOmtpa by 
1985. In 1982 the planned 1985 export level was reduced to 
8mtpa and in 1983 the target was cut to 4-5mtpa. The JSM 
welcomed these downward revisions because of the decline in 
steel production and because of the poor quality of the coal 
received (Newby 1988:24). The Chinese accepted the reductions, 
in part, because of inadequate transport infrastructure to 
meet export targets (Locatelli 1989).
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To facilitate the planned coal exports to Japan, the Export 
Import Bank of Japan agreed to loan $1 billion to develop 
seven new mines (Table 5,4)^. These loans totalled Y331 billion 
and carried an interest rate of 6.25%. The First Credit 
Agreement of 1979 was followed with a Second Credit Agreement 
in 1984 for Y479 billion. The interest rate was set at 7.125% 
and repayments were to be made within 15 years (Newby 
1988:42). In 1987 a special addition of YlOO billion was added 
to the Second Credit Agreement. This investment in new energy 
projects alone was not sufficient to increase China's role in 
international coal trade because of the limited transport 
infrastructure available. Infrastructure investment was 
required as well.
Table 5.4:Mines financed by the 1979 Export Import Bank Loan
mine
tract
location coal
type
production export 
raw clean date
Xiqu
Malan
Zhenchengdi 
Qianj iaying
Gujiao, Shanxi 
Gujiao, Shanxi 
Gujiao, Shanxi 
Kailuan, Hebei
coking
coking
coking
coking
3.0
4.0 
1.5
4.0
1.6
2.2
0.8
1.6
1984
1987
1986
1986
subtotal coking 12.5 6.2
Baodien 
J iangzhuang 
Sitaigou
Yanzhou, Shandong 
Zaozhuang, Jiangsu 
Datong, Shanxi
steam
steam
steam
3.0 
1.5
4.0
2.1
1.1
3.0
1984
1984
1988
subtotal steam 8.4 6.2
total 21.0 12.4
source: Coal Manual 1985:372
The limited capacity of China's infrastructure was recognised 
and special yen credits were arranged to improve railway and 
port facilities. Of the eight infrastructure projects proposed 
by the Chinese in 1979, the Japanese agreed to fund six for a 
total of $1.5 billion. Of the six projects, five were directly 
related to transport or port facilities for coal exports and 
the sixth was a hydro power station which indirectly freed 
coal for export because otherwise the coal would have to be 
burned to provide electricity for the Wuhan steel mill. In
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1984 a second set of government loans was arranged to finance 
railway lines, wharf construction and hydro power stations. 
Annual infrastructure loans to China are shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Japanese loans for Chinese infrastructure
year billion yen
1979 50
1980 56
1981 40
1982 60
1983 : 69
1984 71.5
1985 75.1
1986 80.6
note: the interest rate is 3.25%
repayments are to be made over 20 years 
after a 10 year period of grace 
source: Coal Manual 1988:351-353
In summary, the government played a leading role in creating 
the legal framework for bilateral coal trade and financing 
coal projects and the associated infrastructure to increase 
China's role as a supplier of coal to Japan.
The Japanese government also played a key role in financing 
new coal projects in the USSR. A bank loan was agreed in 1974 
to finance the development of the South Yakutsky coal basin. 
The Export Import Bank led a syndicate of 24 Japanese banks 
to loan YllO billion ($500 million) for the purchase of 
Japanese equipment and machinery for coalfield development. 
The interest rate was set at 6.375% and repayments were to be 
made from 1983 to 1990. In 1979 an additional loan of Y8.8 
billion ($40 million) was agreed to finance the construction 
of a coal washing plant (Coal Manual 1985:362; ICL 1989 19:5).
In addition to the finance of equipment purchases (largely 
form Japan), Y16.8 billion ($60 million) was loaned for the 
purchase of local supplies and consumables. This loan had a 
higher interest rate of 7.125% and was to be repaid more 
quickly, 1983-87 (Coal Manual 1985:362).
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In return for financing the South Yakutsky development Japan 
was to import Neliunga K coal starting in 1983 (3.2mtpa) with 
imports rising to 5.5mtpa for the 1985-98 period. This was in 
addition to the contracted import of Imtpa of Kusnetsky coal 
from 1979 to 1998. The new project thus added a significant 
new source of coal for the JSM^. The Siberian coalfields, the 
port of Nakhodka and the connecting 2500 km of railway became 
the newest JSM supply route (ICL 1989 19:5).
The result of these intergovernmental agreements and the 
associated Japanese finance of Chinese and Soviet coal mines 
was the planned increase in coking coal export capacity of 
approximately 6mtpa in each country. These additions to 
international coking coal supplies made significant 
contributions to the Japanese objective of diversifying their 
coal sources. In this way, security of supply would not be 
lost as domestic production declined.
In summary, industrial policy, government-industry
cooperation, long term develop and import projects and 
international trade agreements have been used by the Japanese 
government to create a secure structure for the supply of 
coking coal to its steel industry. Industry was involved in 
the process of design and implementation of these policies 
because both companies and the national economy benefited from 
a secure supply structure.
Bilateral European initiatives, similar to those of Japan, are 
also found in the European East-West coal trade. Austria 
agreed to finance the expansion of Upper Silesian mines in 
Poland ($300m in 1980) in return for a twenty year supply 
contract (up to 1.5mtpa) from 1984-2003. West Germany provided 
even larger credits (DM 1.2 billion) for investment in Polish 
mines (including investment in the Lublin coalfield) and 
imported l-2mtpa in return (James 1984:150). The same pattern 
applied when a 10 year contract to supply steam coal to PGEM 
in the Netherlands was agreed in return for an 
intergovernmental loan from the Netherlands to Poland (Gaskin 
1981:29). These examples illustrate the independent action of
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national governments to secure coal for domestic industry by 
using similar bilateral arrangements. National security 
interests may also be shared and implemented collectively as 
demonstrated by the formation of multilateral security 
structures.
5.4 Multilateral and national security structures
'Political economy studies how the processes described by 
economic theory are shaped by the institutions created by 
political processes. In this way, institutions are no 
longer seen as being culturally unique, but as means to 
institutionalise rules that are favorable to one group or 
another. Political preferences structure the way in which 
economic processes work.' (Johnson 1988)
5.4.1 The lEA and international energy security
The International Energy Agency (lEA) represents the increased 
attention paid to multilateral structures in the 1970s and 
1980s. However, conflicts can emerge between national and 
international security structures and this tension is well 
illustrated by coal policies in the 1980s. The oil shock of 
1973 renewed concerns among consuming countries about the 
security of energy and especially oil supplies. Many responses 
were undertaken at the national and international level. The 
most prominent international response was the 1974 decision by 
21 of the 24 members of the OECD to form a new international 
institution to concentrate on energy issues^.
The International Energy Agency (lEA) was established to 
promote:
1. cooperation among lEA Participating Countries to 
reduce excessive dependence on oil through energy 
conservation, development of alternative energy sources 
and energy research and development;
2. an information system on the international oil market 
as well as consultation with oil companies;
3. cooperation with oil producing and other oil consuming 
countries with a view to developing a stable 
international energy trade as well as the rational
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management and use of world energy resources in the 
interests of all counties;
4. a plan to prepare Participating Countries against the 
risk of a major disruption of oil supplies and to share 
available oil in the event of an emergency. (lEA 1988b:2)
The formation of the TEA has been interpreted as a Kissinger- 
promoted initiative to support American energy objectives and 
create an international forum aimed at reducing the price of 
oil and thereby offsetting OPEC's attempts to raise the price 
(Strange 1988:198). The lEA itself is a security structure to 
meet the energy objectives of the mature capitalist economies. 
The original Agreement on an International Energy Programme 
signed in Paris in 1974 included coal as one of the
alternative energy sources to be encouraged (Articles 41 and 
42). Following many meetings and negotiations, the Principles 
for lEA Action on Coal were adopted by the Governing Board in 
1979.
The common objectives adopted in the Principles for Coal 
Policy are to expand:
1. the use of coal as an alternative fuel;
2. the production of coal to meet this increased demand;
3. international trade in coal to meet increased demand.
All elements of the coal chain from mine face to waste
disposal were identified for attention. International trade 
was given special encouragement.
* lEA countries both as producers and consumers will
facilitate the expansion of international trade in coal 
and will do so on a basis which encourages the 
development of stable relations between consumers and 
producers, on fair, reasonable and competitive terms, 
especially by means of long-term contracts. They will 
ensure that an economic, fiscal and investment climate 
prevails which is conducive to development of coal
production, trade and utilisation as envisaged in these 
Principles for lEA Action on Coal.' (lEA 1988b:171-172)
The magnitude of the expected role of coal in the energy 
future of lEA countries was summarised by the 1978 forecast of 
consumption rising from 475mtoe (680mtce) in 1976 to 900mtoe
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(1300mtce) in 1990 and ISOOmtoe (2100mtce) in 2000 (lEA 1978) . 
The political support for the production of coal as a secure 
alternative to oil was symbolised by the 1980 Paris Summit 
where the leaders of the seven largest western economies 
called for the doubling of coal use and trebling of coal trade 
by the year 2000.
By 1988 the earlier forecasts of coal demand had been revised 
downwards to 1350mtce in 1990 and 1800mtce in 2000 (lEA 
1988b:26) . Despite these revisions the share of primary energy 
provided by coal increased from 20.4% in 1973 to 22.4% in 1980 
and 24.6% in 1986. By the year 2000 coal was expected to 
provide 28.7% of total primary energy. Total energy 
requirements had been revised downward, but coal increased in 
both absolute and relative importance. In addition, to this 
increased importance of coal to lEA countries, its role in 
other countries (China and Eastern Europe for example) was 
larger and expected to grow even faster (especially in China 
and other developing countries in Asia) (Fesharaki and Razava 
1989; JAPAC 1987) . Indeed, the promotion of coal trade in the 
Asia Pacific region is heralded as an example of multilateral 
Pacific cooperation (Desai and Phaloprakarn 1987; Drysdale 
1985; JANCPEC 1988; Takahashi 1987).
5.4.2 The lEA and national coal security
A direct conflict between international and national security 
structures emerged in the 1980s when the lEA promoted an open 
international coal trade which provided security through size 
and diversity. In contrast, most coal producing countries 
sought security through domestic supplies and provided 
financial support to their industry (Gordon 1970). The 
inconsistency of these two strategies was revealed in the 
periodic lEA reviews of national coal policies. Improvements 
in the coal chain (from mine to mill) were proposed, but 
implementation depended on national priorities. In 1988 the 
Governing Board recommended that member governments strengthen 
or develop new policies:
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'to reduce, with a view to eliminating, remaining trade 
barriers, including subsidies, norms or other government 
controls which impede coal trade. The political 
sensitivity of this proposal was recognised with the 
qualification that other policy considerations, including 
social and regional ones, may make it necessary to deal 
gradually with some of these barriers' (lEA 1988b:8).
The magnitude of national government support of domestic coal 
industries was measured by calculating the effective subsidy 
to the industry from special government grants like the annual 
payment of operating deficits in the industry or the required 
payment of higher prices for domestic coal. The lEA definition 
of 'producer subsidy equivalent' thus provides a good 
indicator of the extent to which governments supported their 
domestic coal industries rather than rely on the international 
trade (Table 5.6; lEA 1988b;61; Steenblik and Wigley 1990)®.
The estimates of producer subsidies are also shown in 
comparison to the value of total assistance to the coal 
industry. The subsidy is calculated on the basis of support 
for current production, while total support includes 
programmes to support or retrain miners who have been laid off 
or the costs associated with the closure of uneconomic mines 
and rehabilitation of mine sites. In general, total assistance 
to the coal industry was often twice the size of the subsidy 
to support current production.
By the late 1980s countries like Japan, Germany and Belgium 
were paying subsidies to the domestic coal industry ($40-90pt 
produced) which were up to twice the delivered price of 
imported coal. This meant that domestic consumers (typically 
electric power plants) were paying as much as twice the 
international price of coal to maintain the security of 
domestic supplies. In terms of absolute size, the coal 
industries of Germany, UK and Japan received the largest 
subsidies (over $1 billion per annum). Belgium and Spain also 
had large subsidy programmes costing $300-400 million in 1987. 
This short list of the five most subsidised industries is not 
exclusive as virtually all lEA countries with a domestic coal 
industry provided some support.
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Table 5.6: Coal industry support in selected lEA countries, 
1982-87
country 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Producer subsidy equivalent (million $)
Japan 295 543 605 806 1126 1330
Belgium 171 143 169 174 304 425
Germany 1703 2000 2346 1975 3463 5815
Spain na na na na na 367
United Kingdom 1025 1997 3193 583 1634 1995
Producer subsidy equivalent ($/t produced)
Japan 17 33 36 49 74 93
Belgium 26 23 27 28 54 96
Germany 19 24 30 24 43 71
Spain na na na na na 19
United Kingdom 9 19 75 6 16 26
Total coal industry assistance (millioni $)
Japan 677 1146 1033 1297 1806 2073
Belgium 874 964 910 896 na na
Germany na na 5159 4755 na na
Spain na na na na na na
United Kingdom 1376 2678 3677 2057 3415 na
note: Japan and UK years refer to financial years beginning 
1 April.
The 1987 UK price support was calculated using the lEA 
methodology: average CECB price less average European 
power station coal import price less $20ptce for inland 
transport.
na = no data available 
source: lEA 1988b:61,124-158. lEA 1989c:243; EEC 1988b
The Canadian government paid the annual deficit of the Cape 
Breton Development Corporation which mines coal in Nova Scotia 
($20 million for the current production of 2.6mt in 1986-87). 
The Italian government gave ENI a five year $380 million grant 
to support a new mine producing 1.7mtpa in Sardinia. The New 
Zealand government paid the annual deficit of Coalcorp until 
1987, supported higher coal prices for electricity production 
and gave special subsidies to one mine ($10-20 million pa). 
The Norwegian government supported mines on Spitzbergen ($10- 
2 0 million pa). The Portuguese government assisted one small 
mine (0.2mtpa) and the Turkish government introduced a $10pt 
import duty on steam coal imports in 1986 to protect domestic
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producers. Even the American government provided indirect 
support to its coal industry through the requirement that 
Department of Defense installations (including those in 
Europe) use American coal shipped on American ships (the cost 
of this mandatory coal purchasing programme was estimated to 
be $26 million in 1988) (lEA 1988b:163-166).
By 1987 the cost of subsidies for the production of 250mt of 
high cost coal was over $10 billion. This equals one-half of 
the value of global coal trade (even allowing for the 1986 UN 
estimate of $16 billion to be an underestimate of the value of 
global coal trade) and made average subsidies larger than the 
delivered prices of many coals in 1987.
Despite the widespread practice of domestic support for coal 
industries, the lEA promotes the elimination of barriers to 
trade (lEA 1988b) . The Energy Ministers of the member 
countries agreed in 1987 to reduce and eventually eliminate 
the financial support of their respective coal industries. 
Despite the popularity of the argument for domestic supplies 
as a source of energy security, the strength of this argument 
is weakened by the risk of disruptions to domestic sources (as 
illustrated by the 1984-85 UK miners strike). Alternative 
security strategies include stockpiling and fuel substitution 
capability (Gaskin 1986), but the lowest cost solution was 
generally to diversify international suppliers.
5.4.3 International coal trade security
The reduction of trade barriers and domestic industry support 
will cause international coal trade to grow. Both the 
efficiency and security of international supplies are expected 
to increase as a result (because of more numerous and diverse 
suppliers) . Fears of a COALPEC forming to raise prices like 
the OPEC induced rises in oil prices are refuted by the 
geographic and political diversity of coal suppliers. The two 
largest global suppliers (Australia and USA) and Canada are 
members of the lEA and signatories to agreements to honour 
supply contracts. Poland, the USSR and China also provide
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substantial coal supplies to lEA member countries. A third 
group of suppliers is emerging among third world countries and 
includes Colombia, Indonesia and Venezuela. A fourth 
significant source of coal exports is South Africa. The 
likelihood of these diverse countries acting collectively to 
form a cartel and raise coal prices is remote. In addition, 
the creation of an institution like the lEA, representing the 
interests of both producers and consumers, was designed to 
reduce such interference in energy trade.
One of the strongest advocates of removing coal trade barriers 
is Australia. More open coal markets would increase the 
opportunities to sell Australian coal and the argument for 
removing subsidies has been presented at many multilateral 
forums. The USA joined Australia in making submissions to the 
Natural Resource-Based Products Negotiation Group of the 
Uruguay round of GATT negotiations. They called for energy- 
related products to be added to the three existing categories 
under negotiation (forestry, fisheries and non-ferrous 
minerals and metals). Although the GATT had not traditionally 
dealt with energy issues, the USA noted that * trade problems 
in the energy sector had become more evident, particularly 
those related to market access and subsidies' (GATT Focus 
1989:64/4). The Australian submission proposed 'establishing 
disciplines to control government support in the coal 
industry' (GATT Focus 1989:64/4). The Australian perception of 
distortions shaping international coal trade was summarised by 
Crowley and Jones (1988) .
The removal of domestic support and the substitution of 
imports for domestic coal is expected to cause much of the 
growth in European coal imports in the 1990s (lEA 1988b). 
Institutional changes in Europe are stimulating this change. 
The formation of a single market in 1992 has stimulated calls 
for a common energy and coal policy among the member countries 
(even though coal policy was explicitly reserved for member 
states under Article 17 of the ECSC) (Maniatopoulos 1989). 
Deregulation, privatisation and direct competition will also 
promote change because electricity as well as primary fuels
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will be sold across borders at competitive prices. This 
increased competition will force electric utilities to 
reconsider the security value of domestic coal supplies when 
diverse imports offer significant savings on fuel costs.
In summary, multilateral and national institutions to promote 
coal security conflict with each other when international 
structures call for the removal of elements of national 
structures (including domestic industry support). National 
governments will need to balance the economic efficiency and 
energy benefits of reducing high cost domestic protection 
against the social and regional costs where mines are closed. 
Examples of these national policies and practices to promote 
secure coal supplies are examined next.
5.5 Japanese security structures and steam coal
5.5.1 Steam coal and energy security
Japanese concerhs about vulnerability to disruptions in energy 
imports were reinforced by the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. As 
a result, the core elements of Japanese energy policy were to 
secure stable oil supplies, to promote the development and 
introduction of alternative (non-oil) energy sources and to 
promote energy conservation. The major preoccupation was to 
overcome dependence on imported oil from the Middle East and 
especially the 37% of imports which came through the Strait of 
Hormuz (Perkins 1985; NEDO 1988; Nemetz et al 1984).
To coordinate government support for the development of 
alternative energy sources, NEDO (the New Energy Development 
Organisation, later renamed the New Energy and Industrial 
Technology Development Organisation) was established in 1980. 
Its objectives included encouraging the development of 
Japanese coal resources, promoting the development of overseas 
coal resources by Japanese companies, promoting Japanese 
geothermal resources and supporting research to commercialise 
new energy sources. By the mid 1980s advanced coal-based fuels
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were given the highest priority in the research programme 
(Perkins 1985).
Japanese support for the domestic coal industry promoted the 
continued production of both coking and steam coal under the 
Seventh Coal Policy. However, the Eighth Coal Policy (which 
runs for the five year period 1987-91) plans to cut production 
from the previous target level of 20mtpa to lOmtpa. Existing 
coal production was supported in part by direct grants to the 
industry ($160-180 million pa in JFY86-87) and more 
importantly by price supports ($1130-1330 million pa in JFY86- 
87) . The result is that the price of domestic coking and steam 
coal was three times that of imports in 1986-87 (lEA 
1988b:147) .
Given the further reduction in Japanese domestic production, 
attention turned to the Japanese participation in the 
development of overseas resources (through develop and import 
projects and bilateral investment agreements - section 5.3) 
and the investment in coal-related research and technology.
In 1988 NEDO announced the Coal Renaissance policy to 
reinforce earlier components of the National Energy Policy’. 
Its primary objective was to diversify energy sources and 
reduce the relative importance of Middle East oil. Coal was 
identified as the main alternative to oil, but rather than 
continue to focus on large consumers like power stations and 
cement industry boilers, attention was directed to smaller 
boilers where oil was the dominant fuel.
The electricity and cement industries made significant 
conversions from oil to coal combustion in the early 1980s and 
are the largest energy coal consumers in Japan (Table 5.7; 
Long 1983). The cement industry converted almost its entire 
boiler capacity from oil to coal following the 1979 rise in 
oil prices. Consumption jumped from 1.6mt in 1979 to 10.6mt in 
1981 before the level of cement production and coal 
consumption declined in the mid 1980s. In the electricity 
industry conversions and the commissioning of new coal-fired
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capacity has been more gradual, but the size of the industry 
ensures that it remains the largest consumer of steam coal. 
The rate of increase was illustrated by the trebling of coal
consumption from 7mt in 1979 to 23mt in 1987 (NEDO 1988) .
Table 5.7: Japanese coal demand by industry, 1973-2000
industry 1973 1979 1981 1987 2000
energy coal
million tonnes
electricity 7.6 7.0 12.9 22.9 43.0
cement 0.3 1.6 10.6 6.5 7.5
chemical 0.1 0.2 0.4 2.5 6.5
textiles 1.0 1.5
pulp & paper 0.2 0.2 0.5 2 . 0 6.0
oil 0.1 1.0
other 2.5 2.9 2.1 1.8 5.5
sub-total 10.7 11.8 26.4 36.8 71.0
coking coal
iron & steel 62.5 58.4 64.6 63.0 60.0
other 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.0 5.0
sub-total 68.5 64 .4 70.8 69.0 65.0
total 78.5 76.4 97.3 105.8 136.0
note: The lEA estimates Japanese coal consumption for
electricity generation to be 17.1, 15.5, 30.9 and 52.1mt 
in 1973, 1978, 1987, and 2000 respectively. These values 
include private electricity generation (TEA 1989b). 
source:NEDO 1988, 1989; MITI 1988; and Coal Manual 1988.
Fears were expressed that low oil prices would reverse the 
fuel substitution process away from coal. However, even the 
low oil prices of 1986-87 failed to cause significant 
switching among fuels. In general, energy coal prices of $30 
per tonne FOB are considered competitive with heavy fuel oil 
prices of $10-12 per barrel for existing coal-fired power 
stations. This difference includes allowance for variations in 
operating costs and plant life for the two fuels. Oil prices
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would thus need to fall to and be expected to remain at these 
prices to gain back the share of electricity generating 
capacity lost to coal (Ryan 1987).
In contrast to the large electricity and cement industry 
boilers, only 9% of the smaller boilers in other industries 
were coal-fired. The majority of general industry boilers (73% 
of total capacity) were oil-fired. In addition, only 12% of 
the boilers had been installed since 1974 so reinvestment is 
expected in the near future (NEDO 1988). The selection of the 
next generation of boilers is thus about to take place. To 
promote oil substitution a new strategy for clean, convenient 
coal use was required. However, for coal to contribute to 
energy security, it also must meet environmental security 
objectives (to not degrade the sustainability of environmental 
systems) if these are incorporated into the national security 
structure through government policy.
5.5.2 Coal, environmental security and technology
The combustion of coal causes many environmental problems. 
However, the problems caused by SO2, N0% and particulate 
emissions from coal combustion can be largely controlled 
(post-combustion) by electrostatic precipitators, bag filters, 
flue gas desulphurisation, and flue gas denitrification. 
Alternatively, control can be introduced at the preparation or 
combustion stage by coal cleaning and preparation, fluidised 
bed combustion, multi-stage combustion and low NO^ burners. 
Similarly, problems of ash disposal can be overcome by new 
techniques to use ash (ie. in cement production or road 
construction) and lower ash fuels. Finally, the scarcity and 
high cost of technical solutions to the problem of CO2 
emissions needs to be recognised as a major challenge to the 
environmental acceptability of coal combustion.
The use of selective membrane separation or absorber/stripper 
systems to extract CO2 from the flue gas is estimated to double 
both capital and operating costs of a conventional coal-fired 
plant (Thurlow 1990). Other environmental problems are solved
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more cheaply. Variations in coal quality can be overcome by 
the introduction of fluidised bed combustion boilers, coal- 
water mixture fuels (CWM) or the coal cartridge system (CCS) 
which delivers standard ten tonne capsules of pulverised coal 
and then removes the ash in the same capsule. The lack of 
delivery systems available for small users is overcome by 
creating regional coal centres. New delivery techniques (CCS 
or CWM) enable coal to be handled in a standardised unit or as 
a liquid and thereby avoid dust emissions (NEDO 1988).
The stage of development varies for each of the above 
technologies. The emission control technology is well 
developed and operating in hundreds of plants. Fluidised bed 
combustion is in operation at over 20 Japanese boiler sites. 
Ash is being disposed of by direct use in the cement industry 
and other uses are at the demonstration stage. Demonstration 
of the CCS system is complete, but it is yet to be put into 
commercial operation because of the higher handling costs than 
conventional systems. The COM (coal-oil mixture) technology 
has been put into operation by Tokyo Electric Power Company 
after overcoming initial slagging problems. Having 
successfully initiated COM operations, TEPCO is converting its 
COM facility to CWM operations (TEPCO 1988). Other companies 
and industry organisations are also conducting research into 
these technologies. The above technologies are those 
identified for the first Coal Renaissance in 1990^ °. They are 
available for use during the 1990s to enable medium and small 
sized boilers to burn coal directly (NEDO 1988). The 
technology is also for sale to consumers in other countries 
and is listed in Pacific Coal Flow Expansion Initiative 
documents (NEDO and lEE 1987; Parker 1990).
The result of the first Coal Renaissance is forecast to be an 
increase in energy coal consumption in Japan of 5mtpa or an 
extra 8% of energy coal demand by the year 2000. This compares 
with the forecast doubling of 1986 total consumption levels 
by the electricity industry burning 43mt and other industries 
consuming 28mt (including the impact of new technology) at the 
turn of the century (Table 5.7; NEDO 1988).
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The optimistic NEDO forecast of coal use by general industry 
was not repeated in the lEE energy forecast (Japanese 
Institute of Energy Economics), despite the total energy coal 
demand in the year 2000 being almost identical: 70mt and 71mt 
(Fujime 1989) . Instead, coal consumption by the electricity
industry was expected to grow more quickly than previously 
thought because of the increase in electricity demand and the 
reduction in the planned role of nuclear power stations. By 
the year 2 000, coal consumption for electricity generation was 
forecast to reach 51mt in the 1989 lEE study rather than the 
43mt predicted in the 1988 NEDO study and the 1987 long term 
outlook for energy supply and demand released by MITI. 
Conversely, coal consumption by general industry was expected 
to reach only 19mt rather than the NEDO forecast of 28mt at 
the end of the century. The difference can be explained by 
either the general structure of the lEE model failing to 
incorporate specific changes in future coal technology or a 
slower introduction of the new technology than that expected 
by NEDO.
While the extent and speed of the introduction of new 
technologies may be disputed, many of the new technologies 
promoted by MITI in the past were adopted with a consequent 
change in industrial patterns (Johnson 1982) . The 
collaborative link between government and industry in Japan 
was shown to have an important role in the postwar expansion 
of the economy. As in other industries, the success of MITI 
and NEDO policies promoting energy technology is determined by 
the extent to which they conform to market pressures or 
enhance Japan's position within the international market (Eads 
and Yamamura 1987). In addition, recognition of the cost of 
environmental damage associated with coal combustion, dictates 
that for coal to be politically acceptable and not threaten 
environmental security, prices need to incorporate these costs 
to promote conservation, substitution and technological change 
(Pearce, Markandya and Barbier 1989). Alternatively, better 
technology can be legally required as part of government 
security objectives. Changes in national security objectives 
are well illustrated by UK government energy policy.
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5.6 UK security structures and coal trade
Coal policies in the UK show a clear distinction between 
domestic security of supply and international economic 
efficiency objectives. This distinction is illustrated by the 
differences between the UK participation in coking and steam 
coal trade. In the coking coal sector, British Steel is the 
dominant purchaser. The nationalised steel industry was 
privatised in the mid 1980s and given strict commercial 
objectives prior to the privatisation. To promote its 
international competitive position, British Steel was allowed 
to purchase coal from the lowest cost international sources. 
The result was that in 1987 they were able to buy much of 
their coking coal needs from Canadian and Australian sources 
at only $36pt fob. The USA and Poland are also major 
suppliers.
In contrast, the steam coal market is dominated by the CEGB 
where imports are restricted. Steam coal imports doubled from 
2.Omt in 1979 to 4.9mt in 1980 so the government responded in 
February 1981 by restricting the CEGB's import of 3.2mt in 
1980-81 to 0.75mt in 1981-82^. Even long term contracts held 
by the CEGB with Australian suppliers were cut sharply (AFR 
1981.6.18; lEA 1989b; Turner 1984:1). These restrictions were 
later relaxed and the CEGB purchased small quantities of coal 
on the international market. British Coal (previously the 
National Coal Board) remained the main supplier to the CEGB 
and only demands beyond the basic British Coal contract 
(75mtpa in the mid 1980s) could be purchased from 
international sources.
The British coal industry was the largest in the world in the 
19th century, but production and employment both declined 
steadily after World War I. British energy policy was 
concerned with protecting the domestic coal industry from 
cheap foreign oil in the 1950s and 1960s. The oil price rise 
of 1973 enabled British Coal's Plan for Coal in 1974 and the 
Department of Energy's Green Paper on Energy Policy in 1978 to 
focus on how coal could regain lost markets from oil. The
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security of domestic energy supplies was promoted as a major 
objective and a 10 billion pound investment programme was 
undertaken by British Coal (Economist 1989.3.25:16; Manners 
1981) .
These policies overlooked the underlying problem of British 
Coal. The cost of production, especially in some coal 
districts, was high by international standards (MMC 1983). 
Annual operating deficits were met by the government despite 
the contract with the CEGB where the agreed price was equal to 
the average cost of production for a specified tonnage. The 
CEGB - British Coal contract was revised in 1986 to set coal 
prices for three tranches, or categories of coal. Most coal 
(50mt in 1986 declining to 42mt in 1991) was priced according 
to the average cost of production. The price of imported coal 
and fuel oil determined the price for the other two tranches 
(lOmtpa and 12mt in 1986 rising to 20mt in 1991, 
respectively). British Coal thus faced reduced revenue and a 
need to match international prices for some of its output. 
High cost mines were closed and average productivity increased 
by 75% in the late 1980s, but the effective producer support 
still rose to $2 billion in 1987 (Economist 1989.3.25; lEA 
1989b).
The CEGB and British Coal were both to be privatised by the 
Conservative government. However, the privatisation of the 
CEGB, planned for 1990, was to include coal contracts to 
protect British Coal from international competition. To 
privatise British Coal at a later date (possibly 1993), as 
proposed by the Energy Secretary in 1988, a secure market for 
coal is required and the CEGB is by far the dominant consumer. 
Continued protection from international suppliers is thus 
expected for a large, but declining proportion of CEGB demand. 
The three year contract agreed in 1990 reduced British Coal 
tonnage to 70mtpa and an expected 65mt in 1992-93 (KICT 
1990.3.22:11).
However, the desire of a newly privatised electricity supply 
industry to reduce costs and meet EEC environmental directives
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to reduce SOg emissions creates a strong incentive to rapidly 
increase imports (of low sulphur coal) and switch to gas as an 
alternative fuel. As a result, the new generating companies. 
National Power and Power Gen (created from CEGB), signed 
contracts for the import of over 6mt of coal in 1990-91^. The 
pressure is on British Coal to meet international coal prices 
for a larger share of its output.
Despite the large size of the support to British Coal, not all 
of its operations are uncompetitive. Many pits have production 
costs of less than $3/GJ and are competitive (Prior and 
McCloskey 1988; Prior 1989). Indeed, Robinson and Marshall 
(1981, 1985) called for the early privatisation of the British 
Coal and its division into many companies to ensure domestic 
competition in the industry. The competitive position of the 
industry is enhanced by the fixed investment and location of 
existing large power stations on inland coalfields. Transport 
costs thus offer domestic coal a layer of protection from 
direct competition. Few UK ports are able to handle the large 
bulk carriers which operate in the international coal trade. 
These ships must be unloaded in Rotterdam or an equivalent 
port and the coal transhipped on smaller vessels to the UK. 
Added transport and handling costs thus provide geographic 
protection to the coal industry. However, stations with access 
to larger ports (like the BSC ports) , or at sites served by 
new ports will not preserve such a strong transport cost 
advantage for British Coal. Imports will increase and 
pressures for internationally competitive pricing within the 
British industry will grow.
The result of these changes is a shift in UK coal policies 
away from the assumed security of domestic supply to greater 
reliance upon the international supply network. Long term 
supply contracts for domestic and imported coal are expected 
to be the preferred security arrangement used by newly 
privatised electricity generators (FTEE and ICR), although 
spot purchases are likely to increase to meet marginal demand. 
A security structure based on the protection of domestic 
industry is thus being replaced by one of greater reliance
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upon the international security structure represented by 
increased trade and the policies of multilateral forums like 
the lEA and GATT.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter investigated several elements of the security 
structure which alter international coal trade from that 
expected under the least cost model. Government objectives to 
enhance the security (military, economic and environmental) of 
their industry and citizens are shown to affect coal trade in 
several ways.
The newest security issue of the late 1980s and 1990s is 
environmental security. Global coal combustion of over 
3,000mtpa causes many problems. Although the environmental 
problems created by SO2, NO^ , particulates and ash can largely 
be controlled by existing technology, no viable solution 
exists to stop the large scale emission of CO2 and this will 
continue to be an urgent environmental issue facing the coal 
industry in the future.
Earlier government policies also shaped coal trade. For 
example, Japanese industrial policy had a direct impact on 
the import of coking coal. Domestic production was supported 
initially, but greater emphasis was then placed on selecting 
international projects to receive assistance and the 
negotiation of bilateral trade agreements with China and the 
USSR. This extensive national security structure was then 
contrasted with the international structure created by the TEA 
and multilateral trade agreements.
Conflicts emerged between international calls for the removal 
of trade barriers and national decisions to protect domestic 
production. Domestic coal industries were supported with 
policies based on national security objectives. However, the 
annual cost of supporting the production of high cost coal 
industries was estimated to be over $10 billion in the late
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1980s. The lEA, with its mandate to improve energy security 
through international structures, promoted expanded 
international trade and the removal of domestic barriers to 
trade like the identified subsidies for domestic coal.
Japan and the UK chose to reduce their old national security 
structure of domestic coal industry protection. Both countries 
placed greater importance on international trade and 
multilateral structures like the lEA and GATT. However, Japan 
also extended its national structures to include international 
coal projects. Government policies can thus extend the 
security structure to influence decisions regarding investment 
in coal production facilities and the finance of selected 
projects (see chapters 6 and 7 for details).
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Endnotes:
1. At the end of world war II, Chinese and Korean miners were 
repatriated and the Japanese coal industry collapsed 
(production fell from over 4.0 mt per month in 1944 to 0.55 mt 
in November 1945). The disrepair of mines, cessation of 
imports, purge of entrepreneurs, shortage of food, spiralling 
inflation and a radical labour movement all created problems 
for the industry (D'Cruz 1979:89). To address the problems of 
this essential industry, the government reformed its 
bureaucracy to facilitate the implementation of coal policies. 
The Ministry for Commerce and Industry (MCI, later to become 
MITI) transformed its old Fuel Bureau into the new Coal 
Agency. The Agency took action by arranging for miners to be 
transferred from metal mines to coal mines in return for 
larger food rations. Japan's first postwar industrial policy 
was thus called 'food for coal' (Johnson 1982:179-80).
2. In 1946 the Prime Minister formed a personal brains trust 
known as the Coal Committee to advise him on how to avoid the 
expected economic crisis caused in large part by an acute 
shortage of coal (Johnson 1982,182). The Coal Committee 
recommended that a system of 'priority production' be 
introduced. The coal industry was given first priority to 
receive reconstruction loans and finance. This concentration 
of scarce economic resources was justified on the basis that 
' a twofold increase in coal production leads to a fourfold 
increase in general manufacturing' (Economic White Paper 1947 
cited in Johnson 1982:185). The outcome of this concentrated 
effort was a 1947 production level of 29.3 mt or 97.7% of the 
targeted 30mt (Johnson 1982:183). Coal was not the only 
priority industry. The steel industry was selected as the 
second priority industry, in part, because it was important as 
both a supplier to the coal industry and as a consumer of 
coal.
3. JSM consumption of domestic coking coal fell from 9mt in 
JFY74 to 3mt in JFY84 and Imt in JFY87 (JISF 1988:17; Coal 
Manual 1988). The government and industry supported domestic 
production by many measures including compulsory purchases by 
the JSM and a separate pricing system to insulate domestic 
producers from international prices. The largest domestic 
coking coal producers in the 1980s were Mitsui Mining, 
Mitsubishi Mining and Cement, Hokkaido Collieries & Steamship 
and Matsushima (2.Imt, 1.4mt, 0.5mt, 0.5mt respectively in
JFY83). Despite producing coal for over a century, the high 
cost of these industries and their financial subsidies was 
well recognised (lEA 1988b). The Eighth Coal Policy (1987- 
91) proposed the slow wind down these coal mines.
4. In 1965 MITI recommended a 10% reduction in steel 
production to prevent a collapse in steel prices. All six of 
the major steelmills cut their production for the second 
quarter of JFY65. When MITI recommended a continuation of this 
cut in the third quarter of JFY65, Sumitomo refused. Sumitomo 
argued that it was the only company to have met its MITI- 
assigned export quota for the first half of the year and 
should not cut production. The Vice-Minister of MITI responded
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that if Sumitomo did not comply, then *he would use the Import 
Control Ordinance to restrict imports of coking coal for the 
company to precisely the amount necessary to produce its 
authorised quota and not a shovelful more* (Johnson 1982:270). 
Sumitomo complied, but later received an increase in its 
export quota so that both sides could claim victory.
5. A further $1 billion was for oil exploration projects.
6. The quality of the Kusnetsky coal was considered slightly 
below that of the standard Australian hard coal. Coal Cliff 
(Coal Manual 1985:362).
7. The 21 members of the lEA are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United 
States of America. Finland, France and Iceland are the OECD 
members who decided not to join.
8. Only special government items for assisting the coal 
industry are included. General measures which assist the coal 
and other industries like accelerated depreciation or taxation 
allowances are hot included.
9. NEDO initiatives included many types of energy projects, 
but these were coordinated under two major umbrella projects. 
The 'Sunshine* project was to obtain technological solutions 
to problems in new energy use (coal, solar, geothermal, 
hydrogen, ocean thermal and wind). The 'Moonshine* project 
promoted the development of energy conservation technology.
10. The second Coal Renaissance involves the introduction of 
new technologies for coal gasification combined-cycle power 
generation, coal liquefaction and coal gasification. Research 
and development work is underway, but the processes are not 
expected to be in commercial operation before the year 2000.
11. Imports by British Steel were also restricted from 2.6 mt 
in 1980-81 to 2.5 mt in 1981-82 (AFR 1981.6.18).
12. These 1990- 
purchaser
91 contracts include:
* tonnage (OOOt) producer trader
CEGB 360-400 Coal and Allied Shell
360-400 CNCIEC (China) SSM
National Power 1000 Carbocol
300 Westmoreland
300 Shell (Marrow Bone)
300 Peabody
300 BP
300 Ashland
Power Gen 1000 Carbocol
240 Massey
700 BP
500 Drummond
360 another US supplier
source: ICR 235:1
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Chapter 6 
The production structure: 
Investment and integration
6.1 Introduction
'There have been two very profound changes in the 
production structure in the last two centuries.... The 
first change was the change to a capitalist, market- 
oriented mode of production in the states of North-Western 
Europe... The second change has been the gradual, uneven 
but apparently inexorable supplanting of a production 
structure geared primarily to serve national markets to one 
geared primarily to serve a world market.' (Strange 
1988:62)
Changes in the production structure alter the power of states 
to implement the security objectives of the last chapter. The 
global dominance of the capitalist mode of production is not 
questioned. However, the relative importance of national and 
international elements within the production structure is 
central to this chapter. Structural power was argued to be the 
ability to create the structures which control trade. Changes 
in the production structure, like the investment in new mines, 
thus demonstrate the exercise of this power.
A contrast is made between two types of changes associated 
with two different models of global coal trade. The increased 
size of trade and number of active parties implies a greater 
use of the market and price stimuli as advocated by 
multilateral forums. The expected outcome is greater price 
uniformity and security through reliance upon a large and 
diverse production structure based on efficient, profit- 
maximising mines. These changes support the competitive market 
model presented and refuted in chapter 3.
An alternative type of change is the extension of national 
production structures to include international units within 
the national structures. The result is greater power for the 
investing country. Changes of this type were promoted by the 
Japanese policies identified in chapter 5 and stand in 
contrast to those promoted by the lEA and European countries.
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Many studies have been made of the production structure. In 
some, structural and market power is associated with the 
number of firms active in the trade and emphasis is placed on 
measures of industry concentration and the associated 
behaviour (McCalla 1981). In the coal industry, the debate 
over an optimal structure for the industry has arisen 
repeatedly as proponents of integration and nationalisation 
compete with proponents of privatisation and decentralisation 
(Gordon 1987; Robinson and Marshal 1985).
Units of production (mines) may be numerous and independent or 
integrated into a few large private or public enterprises. 
Horizontal integration is examined as a measure of market 
concentration and relative bargaining power. An important 
distinction is made between concentration at the national and 
international levels. The answer to questions of market power 
and concentration is argued to depend on the level of analysis 
and the segment of the trade being studied.
In other studies, structural power and international 
investment are argued to produce uneven development through 
the systematic extraction of profit (Gilpin 1975, Hyman 1972, 
Vernon 1966). Attention is directed to vertical integration in 
the coal production, trade and consumption industries. 
Structures can be based on either the production or 
consumption side of the market and convey an element of 
control or power over trade. Forward linkages from mine to 
consumer are rare. Far more evidence is found of backward 
integration from consumer to the mine.
The Japanese production structure receives particular 
attention because of its extensive international linkages. 
These investments are viewed as extensions of the domestic 
production structure based on affiliated corporate groups 
(keiretsu) and the general trading houses (sogo shosha). To 
explain this pattern the conventional American model of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) based on profit is contrasted 
with the Japanese model of investment to increase both 
economic efficiency and supply security throughout the system.
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6.2 Two models of foreign direct investment
Foreign direct investment (FDI) extends production structures 
across international borders. This investment practice is very 
common in the global coal industry and two models are examined 
to determine which better explains the observed patterns. The 
conventional model of foreign direct investment is based on 
profit, assumes economic efficiency and explains the 
experience of most American transnational corporations 
(Anderson 1983). This model is contrasted with the Japanese 
model of foreign direct investment which is based on combined 
security and system efficiency objectives (Vernon 1983; 
Edgington 1987).
6.2.1 The conventional profit based model of FDI
The conventional model of foreign direct investment explains 
how investment benefits both host and home (investor) 
countries because the host country suffers from a scarcity of 
capital relative to the potentially profitable investment 
opportunities (Folie 1982). This explanation for FDI is 
derived from the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade based upon 
specialisation in abundant factors. The mutual benefits of FDI 
are demonstrated by the Schmitz-Helmberger (1970) presentation 
of the complementary relationship between factor endowments in 
two countries. One country is assumed to have a large demand 
for a resource and is also a capital-surplus country. The 
other country has a more favourable resource endowment but 
limited capital and technology. FDI (the transfer of capital) 
thus creates a new trade in the extracted resource.
This complementary relationship fits the American model of 
FDI where a transnational corporation invests in low cost 
resource projects to sell its production on the global market. 
FDI is undertaken because it is profitable and the global 
production structure is extended. Corporate or strategic 
concerns about backward and forward linkages or supply 
security are not required to explain FDI under this model.
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6.2.2 The Japanese security based model of FDI
*Japan's primary goal in making overseas extractive 
investments is to stabilize her supplies of resources. 
Profitability of a specific extractive investment is rather 
a secondary consideration.' Ozawa 1979:185.
The second model of FDI is based on the Japanese emphasis on 
structural linkages among units of production (Ozawa 1979). 
FDI thus creates an element of control over the supply system. 
The lower priority given to project profitability was shown by 
an Export Import Bank of Japan survey of 485 overseas joint 
ventures in the early 1970s. Two-thirds of the firms had not 
paid any dividends to their investors and less than half 
showed any cumulative profits (Heller and Heller 1974 cited in 
Edgington 1988). Given this low level of profitability, other 
explanations need to be found to explain Japanese FDI.
Scarcity of domestic resources may generate fears among 
consumers of vulnerability to foreign supply disruptions. In 
this case the lack of domestic resources is reinforced by lack 
of control over foreign supplies and results in dependence 
upon foreign resources and foreign supply structures. Ozawa 
summarises this as the dominant Japanese view of investment in 
resource projects.
'The Japanese economy is engaged in a desperate search for 
a stable supply of overseas resources, having been trapped 
in an abnormal pattern of heavy resource consumption.' 
Ozawa 1979:230
'The Ad Hoc Committee on Australia-Japan Relations 
expressed a concern, sometimes reflected in Japanese 
comments, that Japan would be dependent upon resources, 
including coal, produced in mines controlled by her global, 
particularly United States and European, competitors.' 
Harris 1982:350
The structural interpretation of Japanese FDI has been 
promoted by Ozawa as an extension of the organisational 
explanation of FDI articulated by Galbraith (1967). In his 
review of FDI theories and how they relate to Japanese 
investment practice, Ozawa (1979:48) concluded that:
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'The much publicized concept of "Japan Inc." itself 
reflects the existence of a macroeconomic technostructure 
in the Japanese economy. The Galbraith organisational 
theory of technostructures has interesting implications 
for the analysis of Japan's multinationalism not only as 
a theory of the organisation of modern corporations but 
also as a theory of the structure of the economy. The 
sudden emergence of Japan's multinationalism is not so much 
a result of the development of technostructures in her 
individual corporations as a product of her entire economy, 
which strives to adapt itself to rapidly changing world 
economic environments, a dynamic adaptive process planned 
and implemented through close collaboration between 
industry and government.'
Ozawa (1979:75) identified three major components of the 
Japanese 'macro-technostructure': the collective economic
power of Japan's industrial groups or keiretsu; the global 
information networks of the sogo shosha; and the guidance and 
support which the Japanese government provides to industry. 
These three components are easily transformed into the four 
primary structures under investigation in this study. 
Government support and policy are regarded as part of the 
security structure and the sogo shosha form the basis of the 
information structure with their specialisation in trade 
information. Keiretsu are divided into banking and industrial 
components to form the financial and production structures.
The structural view of FDI has other implications. Even if a 
company does not profit from a given venture directly, it may 
profit indirectly through its transformation of the resource 
in manufacturing (in the case of a steel mill) , or through the 
sale of related products (in the case of a sogo shosha) , or 
through its equity holdings in other affiliated companies (in 
the same keiretsu) which benefit from the project. These 
affiliated companies may capitalise on profitable 
opportunities to supply equipment, machinery, plant, 
technical, financial or marketing assistance to the mine.
In general, the two models of FDI outlined above (profitable 
project and secure/integrated production system), are argued 
to represent the practice of American and Japanese firms.
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respectively (Edgington 1988). American firms typically invest 
overseas to supply the international coal market as part of 
the global production structure. In contrast, Japanese firms 
invest primarily as minority partners to increase the security 
of resource supplies for Japanese industry and improve their 
coordination of the supply system (Ozawa 1979, Vernon 1983). 
The extension of the global production structure is a 
secondary objective after national needs are met.
6.2.3 American and Japanese FDI compared directly
The contrast in FDI objectives is well illustrated by the 
export coal industry in which both Japanese and American 
companies invested in the 1960s. Japanese demand for coking 
coal was growing rapidly in the 1960s and the coal resources 
of Queensland were identified as a good potential source of 
supply. American and Japanese companies both responded to the 
opportunity and created the two largest Queensland coal export 
companies, CQCA and TPM. In the first case, Utah International 
(USA) joined Mitsubishi Corporation (Japan) in the Central 
Queensland Coal Associates (CQCA) joint venture on an 85:15 
basis. In the second case, Thiess Holdings (Aus), Peabody Coal 
(USA) and Mitsui & Co (Japan) formed the Thiess Peabody Mitsui 
(TPM) joint venture on a 22:58:20 basis (Figures 6.1 and 6.2; 
Appendix C) . These investments in the mid 1960s created an 
annual export capacity to supply Japan with over lOmt of high 
quality coking coal.
However, by the mid 1970s the Japanese steel mills had ceased 
to expand exponentially and their demand for raw materials 
became a stable rather than a growing market. In 1976 Peabody 
sold its 58% share of TPM to BHP and CQCA changed its 
ownership structure to increase Australian ownership to 20 per 
cent\ By the early 1980s the price of coal was falling from 
the high levels of 1980-82. Constrained Japanese demand 
combined with new international supply capacity to indicate 
that prices would remain depressed throughout the decade 
ahead. General Electric, the American owner of Utah 
International, decided to sell its majority interest in CQCA.
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Figure 6,1: American ownership of selected mines
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Figure 6,2: Japanese ownership of selected mines
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A similar pattern occurred in Canada where the largest export 
mine, Balmer, was established by Kaiser Resources, a 
subsidiary of Kaiser Steel (USA). Exports began in 1970, but 
by 1973 the mine was in financial difficulty and Japanese 
partners joined the project. The pattern of shared American 
and Japanese investment in an export coal project reached the 
same conclusion as in the Australian cases. In 1980 Canadian 
interests bought the American shares in the project.
The result was that by the mid 1980s, major export coal 
projects in Australia and Canada had seen the departure of 
their initial American partners while the Japanese partners 
retained their minority equity position (Figures 6.1 and 6.2) . 
The contrast between short term profit and long term security 
motives for buying and selling shares in export coal mines is 
well illustrated. American and Japanese investors faced the 
same investment and selling opportunities, but behaved 
differently. The American investors sold all of their shares 
while the Japanese companies retained their direct interest.
6.2.4 Japanese minority investment
In addition to the long term and stable nature of Japanese 
investment in coal projects, this investment is marked by an 
absence of wholly or majority owned projects. One explanation 
for this is that during the rapid growth period of the 1950s 
and 1960s, Japan did not have surplus capital and foreign 
investment was under strict control until 1971. Only limited 
forms of investment like joint ventures could be considered. 
However, limited investment may also restrict control over 
projects if ownership is the only structure of importance.
Limited FDI can also be an enforced condition if local rules 
restrict FDI. For example, Australia and Canada applied FDI 
restrictions to new coal mines in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Anderson 1983). Both countries aimed to have 50% domestic 
ownership, but Australia was considered more successful in 
achieving this objective. The sale of American interests in 
Australian and Canadian coal mines is only a partial
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reflection of this policy. The Japanese interests could also 
have been sold to reduce foreign ownership. Instead the two 
groups of investors behaved differently under identical 
conditions.
One advantage of direct investment is that the investor 
usually receives a position on the management board with the 
resulting full and prompt access to information (Anderson 
1987:52; Smith 1982). However, this benefit may be overstated 
in the coal trade case. The sogo shosha acquire extensive 
information on projects for assessment by the JSM, regardless 
of whether or not they have equity interests in the projects. 
In addition to the information benefit of FDI, the consumer 
may be able to influence managerial decisions to improve the 
producer-consumer relationship. This could result in lower 
transaction and coordination costs and thus lower input costs 
to the consumer (Williamson 1975).
6.2.5 FDI and integration
The examples of FDI studied above need to be set within the 
broader questions of the type of structure governing the 
international coal industry. Independent units can be 
integrated into larger structures in various ways. Horizontal 
integration occurs where multiple units of production in a 
single industry are owned by a single entity. The marketshare 
of these entities is increased through horizontal integration 
and economies of scale may be gained. The level of this type 
of concentration is generally measured by the proportion of 
production by the largest four, eight or ten firms. This 
analysis can be undertaken at either the national or 
international lèvel.
Another type of integration is vertical integration where 
units of production and consumption are integrated within a 
single entity. When a producing company acquires interests in 
a company which consumes its product, this is termed forward 
integration. When the consuming company acquires interests in 
the producing company, the process is called backward
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integration. Once again, this process occurs at the national 
and international level. A specialised case of vertical 
integration is found in Japan where the keiretsu are comprised 
of many companies in many industries. Product and service 
transfers are common within the group and major companies have 
significant interlocking shareholdings. The resulting 
corporate network will be studied, but first the general 
pattern of horizontal and vertical integration in the coal 
industry is investigated.
6.3 Horizontal integration
6.3.1 Horizontal integration in the coal industry
The optimal production structure for the coal industry has 
been the subject of industry, union and government debate for 
centuries (Gordon 1987). Existing structures are considered to 
give one group an advantage over others and opponents lobby 
for change. Proposals for changes to industry structure range 
from private mergers, cartels or monopolies and public 
monopolies on one hand, to privatisation, deregulation and 
removal of public barriers to entry on the other. Not only 
have views on the desired structure of the industry varied, 
but analysts of the actual structure of the industry have 
reached conflicting conclusions (Abbey and Kolstad 1983; NEDO 
1989; Solomon and Pyrdol 1986; Soyster, Gordon, Enscore and We 
1985).
The private operation of many mines raised questions about 
industry structure, competition and the need for horizontal 
integration back in the 1700s (ILO 1938). The UK industry was 
argued to have too many mine operators to operate efficiently, 
invest in new capital equipment and undertake research and 
development tasks. These issues were still being debated in 
the 1980s. In the late 18th century, Newcastle coal producers 
called for protection from the competition of mines at 
Sunderland by having the government introduce a selective coal 
tax. The operators subsequently formed a 'combination' or
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cartel to control output and regulate prices. This was known 
as the 'Limitation of the Vend' from 1771 to 1844 (ILO 
1938:1). A similar pattern emerged in Germany when the 'price 
wars' of 1873-1893 were resolved by the formation of the 
Rheinish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate. Given these precedents, 
the nationalisation or amalgamation of coal industries in 
several European countries, following World War II was not an 
unusual response to a politically important industry 
undergoing change.
Horizontal integration has thus been a question of recurrent 
interest to coal industry analysts (Gordon 1987). The 
horizontal 'disintegration' of the industry or the division 
of existing large producers into smaller units is also an 
important issue. It has been argued in the British context 
that the industry has too few mine owners to ensure adequate 
competition and provide the lowest cost supply of coal or its 
products to the public (Robinson 1987, 1989).
Private corporations can initiate mergers and take-overs to 
increase the size of their operations and gain the economies 
of scale and benefits of centralisation in management, 
negotiation and specialised services. Examples include the 
BHP takeover of Peabody's TPM interest in 1976 and Utah 
Development in 1984; the partial CRA/Howard Smith (part owner 
of RW Miller) take over of Coal & Allied in 1977-78 and the 
complete Coal and Allied takeover of RW Miller in 1989; and 
the many acquisitions by oil companies (Appendix C) . The 
resulting concentration of national and international coal 
industries has been partially described by several analysts 
(Abbey and Kolstad 1983; Banks 1985; Gordon 1987; James 1984; 
Parker 1986).
6.3.2 Horizontal concentration of national export industries
The assertion in chapter 1 that the international coal 
industry has a diverse and competitive supply is investigated 
further. The 200 companies actively supplying coal to the 
international market in the mid-1980s are not all independent.
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The links among.firms are examined to determine the aggregate 
size of the largest groups. The importance of horizontal 
integration is evaluated at the national and then the 
international level.
In South Africa the industry is dominated by the six large 
mining companies and finance houses (Anglo American, General 
Mining, Rand Mines, Johannesburg Consolidated, Lonhro SA and 
Gold Fields of SA) . In 1978 Anglo American and General Mining 
controlled 67% of the total South African production (James 
1984:169). Production for export was more diversified, but the 
six large mining houses all belong to the Transvaal Coal 
Owners Association (TCOA) which assigns production quotas and 
markets to each member. Together these companies produced over 
90% of South African coal in 1980 and received two thirds of 
the export allocations for the mid 1980s (Table 6.1). The 
remaining major exporters were three oil companies: Shell, BP 
and Total (Abbey and Kolstad 1983; James 1984).
Table 6.1: South African export allocations, 1987
Company exports (mt)
TCOA 10.0
Anglo American Coal 7.3
General Mining Union 6.0
BP Coal SA 5.5
Shell SA 5.5
Rand Mines ‘ 3.9
Total Exploration SA 2.5
Kangra Coal 1.7
Zululand Anthracite 1.5
Kangra Group 0.9
Duiker Exploration 0.6
Anglovaal 0.5
Rand London 0.4
D & H Coal 0.3
Sevmin Coal 0.3
Tseletis Mining 0.3
Bordex Nominees 0.2
Concor Construction 0.2
source: Coal Manual 1985:386
The American coal industry is much larger both in terms of 
the size of production and the number of companies producing 
and exporting coal. For example, 140 companies reported coal
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exports in 1986 (KICT 1987). Despite the large number of small 
companies mining and exporting coal, the concentration of the 
industry has grown. The largest 50 coal mining groups 
accounted for 76% of total production in 1987, an increase of 
10% from the share of the 50 largest groups in 1977 and 1967 
(65% and 66%, respectively) (Keystone News 1988.6.27).
The contrast between the large scale of the domestic producers 
and the smaller operating scale of exporters is demonstrated 
in Table 6.2. The largest coal producers had most of their 
output consumed in domestic power stations. The largest 
exporters were often specialists in coking coal. Only one 
company. Consolidation Coal, appeared on both the list of top 
ten producers and top ten exporters. Exports accounted for 
only 10% of the firm's output. In other cases exports usually 
accounted for 20-50% of production^. The development of 
dedicated export mines was far less common than in countries 
where the domestic coal market was smaller.
Table 6.2: Largest USA coal producers and exporters
Rank Producer 86 87 Exporter 85 86
(mt) (mt)
1 Peabody Group 60 71 Pittston Coal 7.1 6.0
2 Consol Coal 37 47 Consol Coal 4.5 4.0
3 AMAX Group 31 33 Island Creek 3.6 4.2
4 Texas Utilities 27 25 Jim Walters 3.4 3.1
5 Exxon Coal 22 24 US Steel 3.1 2.4
6 NERIC 21 22 Drummond 3.0 2.3
7 ARCO Coal 22 20 Massey, AT 2.8 2.4
8 Elk River 18 19 Ruhrkohle 1.7 1.4
9 North American 22 19 Thyssen Carb 1.6 1.2
10 Western Energy 15 17 Westmoreland 1.6 2.3
11 Arch Mineral 12 17
12 Island Creek 15 17
13 Massey, AT 21 16
14 Shell Mining 8 14
source: KICT 1987 584:2; Keystone News Bull 1988 6(6):14
The Australian coal industry is a larger exporter than the 
American industry, but it has some of the ownership 
characteristics of the South African industry. The largest 
coal exporter is the integrated steel company, BHP Ltd. BHP 
combined its own mines (Gregory, Saxonvale, Macquarie, etc)
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with those of CQCA and TDM to export over 20mtpa in the late 
1980s. It is the largest exporter in the international 
industry and accounts for one third of all Australian exports. 
Sales are arranged by the subsidiary BHP-Utah.
In contrast to the predominantly hard coking coal sales of 
BHP, the second largest Australian exporter. Coal and Allied, 
sells only steam and soft coking coal. The heavy metal mining 
companies MIM and CRA are also major coal exporters and have 
mines which supply coking coal (Newlands and KCC) and steam 
coal (Collinsville and Blair Athol). The oil companies, 
especially Shell and BP, entered the Australian industry in 
the 1970s and by the 1980s were among the top exporters.
The ownership structure prevailing among these companies can 
typically be divided between old mines which were often wholly 
owned and new mines established in the 1970s and 1980s when 
several companies combined to form joint ventures. Typically 
a national mining company, an international mining or oil 
company, a financial institution and an international trading 
house were combined in each joint venture (Parker 1986). The 
result was that by the 1980s the most active companies shared 
interests in many projects. CSR illustrated this process when 
it diversified into coal production in the 1970s. It acquired 
interests in several mining companies (Theiss 100%; Lemmington 
100%; Drayton 44%) and was identified by Banks (1985) as a 
company with market distorting potential. By 1988 the company 
had sold its major coal assets to BHP, Exxon and Shell and 
effectively withdrew from the industry.
The formation of joint ventures creates a separate management 
unit for each mine and often a separate marketing branch or 
company. The result is the appearance of a more diverse export 
structure. Given the prevalence of many joint ventures in the 
Australian industry two views on the production structure can 
be taken. In the first case each joint venture is viewed as an 
independent entity. The overall pattern is one of 20 companies 
exporting over l.Smtpa and another dozen smaller exporters. 
Alternatively, the joint ventures can be viewed as part of the
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company which holds the largest proportion of shares. In this 
case, larger units are identified on the basis of corporate 
integration through investment in joint ventures. The 20 
largest exporters are thus reduced in number to 13. The 
integrated companies have larger marketshares, and competition 
in the industry is considered reduced.
The changing structure of the Australian export industry is 
well illustrated by the restructuring of 1988-89 as prices 
revived from their low levels of 1986-87. BHP's increased 
ownership of TDM and CAID's purchase of RW Miller extended 
the position of the two largest firms. However, these changes 
reinforced previous corporate linkages. More dramatic changes 
in ownership arose when Elders Resources bought a series of 
Hunter Valley mines from Peko Wallsend and BHP (Saxonvale open 
cut and Macquarie collieries which included West Wallsend 
acquired from CAID in 1988). In addition. Elders Resources bid 
to gain control of Coalex in 1989. The result of these 
acquisitions is the formation of a new exporter equal in size 
to CAID and ranked second or third largest in Australia 
(Appendix C).
The Canadian export coal industry shares several features with 
the Australian and South African industries. It is dominated 
by a few major mining and oil companies. Westar is the largest 
exporter, followed by Quintette and Fording Coal. Each of 
these operations is export oriented. Gregg River is an export 
joint venture operated by Manalta who also operate several 
mines for power utilities in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Luscar 
also owns or operates mines for domestic power stations as 
well as operating the Cardinal River joint venture. The oil 
companies acquired interests in many exploration properties, 
while Line Creek owned by Shell Canada Resources, Bryon Creek 
owned by Esso Resources Canada and Obed Marsh owned by Union 
Oil are the major operating projects.
The overall pattern of concentration among the coal export 
industries of Australia, United States, South Africa and 
Canada are compared in the mid 1980s (Figure 6.3; Table 6.3).
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The level of concentration is lowest in the USA where many 
companies export coal as well as supply domestic markets. 
Australia has the next largest number of exporters, but the 
industry has a clear group of leaders with BHP dominating 
coking coal exports and CAID and Elders leading the thermal 
and soft coking coal sector. The four largest export groups 
account for over 60% of exports. Even if the groups are 
divided into individual companies, the largest four account 
for 49% of exports. The level of concentration is even higher 
in Canada and South Africa.
Figure 6,3: Concentration of national coal exports
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In each of the above countries, no single company monopolised 
the national coal industry, although BHP and Westar play major 
roles in their respective countries. The cartel formed in 
South Africa, however, was considered to have effective 
control of that industry through its export allocations.
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Government structures are also important and the Polish case 
of a single authority, Weglokoks, controlling exports gives it 
the ability to act to maximise its benefits from proximity to 
the European market. Soviet and Chinese authorities had 
similar power, although several companies sold Chinese coal in 
the late 1980s. The government of Australia also has power to 
control exports, but this power was not being exercised beyond 
a review role in the late 1980s. Colombia also emerged as a 
major exporter in the late 1980s with Carbocol (government) 
and Intercor (Exxon) each selling one half of the coal from
the El Cerrejon mine (Kline 1987).
The importance of these large national companies is diluted in 
the international coal market. High national levels of 
concentration are dramatically reduced because of
international competition. Given the diverse production
structure identified above. Abbey and Kolstad (1983) concluded 
that international steam coal suppliers were not capable of 
forming a cartel^. The result is a reinforcement of the earlier 
conclusion that the supply side of global coal trade is 
diverse in structure. Even assuming that companies with 
investment linkages are effectively integrated into single 
national units, the conclusion holds.
Table 6.3; Export concentration among national and global 
coal export industries, 1985-86
% of exports from groups of largest companies
top 4 top 8 top 10
Australia
individual companies 48 65 71
integrated companies 60 82 87
United States 21 35 39
South Africa 63 95 97
Canada 70 95 99
global
individual companies 21 34 39
integrated companies 30 44 49
source: Appendix C
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6.3.3 FDI and horizontal integration
The diverse appearance of the international coal exporters 
needs to be further evaluated by recognizing the role of FDI 
in creating horizontal integration across national boundaries. 
Despite the large scale of global production structures and 
implied reduction in national and corporate power, 
transnational corporations can grow, through FDI, to a 
position where they influence trade directly. In addition to 
the previously discussed Balmer, CQCA and TMP cases, other 
early examples of American investment in the coal export 
sector of other countries include, Ludwig*s 1962 investment in 
the Clutha mines of NSW and Consolidation Coal's 50% interest 
in Cardinal River. Alsarco also held indirect Australian 
interests through its dominant share of MIM. These investments 
enabled American firms to diversify away from existing US 
mines into new overseas projects with lower production costs 
(McKern 1976:69). In this way, the companies could participate 
in the growth of international trade independent from their 
national base. The global production structure is thus 
extended on the basis of efficiency and profit.
Australian mining companies with UK parent companies (CRA, or 
Conzinc Riotinto of Australia, and Consolidated Gold Fields of 
Australia) , also diversified their Australian mining interests 
by investing in coking coal mines (KCC and Bellambi) in the 
1960s. In the 1970s they invested in steam coal projects 
(Blair Athol and the Glendell proposal, respectively). The 
motivation for these investments was to profit by diversifying 
corporate experience gained in ore mining into the coal 
industry (McKern 1976:69).
After Australian mining companies grew in size they reversed 
the direction of FDI by also investing in coal projects in 
other countries. The BHP partial acquisition of Utah interests 
in Australia was complemented with its 100% ownership of Utah 
International Mines in the USA^. In South East Asia, BHP and 
CRA each invested in new coal projects in Indonesia. Finally, 
MIM holds a nominal interest in Teck Corp, operator of the
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Bullmoose mine in Canada. The reverse capital flow occurred 
when Brascan (Canada) invested in Austen and Butta (25% 
share). Gencor of South Africa followed the Canadian example 
of investing in Australian coal companies (20% of Oakbridge) , 
but both Brascan and Gencor later sold their interests. The 
overall pattern is one of diverse FDI with capital exporting 
countries like the USA and UK being joined by Australian, 
Canadian and South African mining companies as sources of 
investment.
The international investments of large mining companies have 
resulted in much less concentration in the global coal 
industry than in several other mineral sectors. The diverse 
international distribution of the coal endowment and its 
extraction with readily available technology may account for 
this. A more systematic investment in the international coal 
supply system awaited the arrival of the oil companies in the 
1970s. Following the rise of energy prices in the early 1970s, 
Shell and BP lead the wave of oil company investment in coal 
properties. Both companies acquired extensive portfolios of 
mines and leases in USA, Australia, Canada, South Africa and 
elsewhere (Appendix C; Parker 1986). Total, Arco, Caltex and 
Exxon also invested in coal projects. After deferring coal 
investments in the 1970s, Exxon moved decisively into the 
industry in the 1980s. Its huge investment ($3 billion) in El 
Cerrejon, Colombia (Kline 1987), its 1987 ranking as the fifth 
largest producer in the USA, a growing collection of 
Australian projects and Byron Creek in Canada ensured Exxon a 
prominent position in the coal industry. In the late 1980s 
Japanese oil companies (Nippon Oil and Idemitsu) also began to 
invest in overseas coal mines as part of their energy supply 
system (Idemitsu 1988, Appendix C).
Despite the magnitude of the coal projects acquired by oil 
companies, the integration of an elaborate international 
supply network can also be disbanded. The 1989 decision of BP 
to sell most of its international coal projects reinforced its 
earlier sales of Clutha mines in Australia and its interest in 
the Ermelo mine in South Africa (ICR: various issues).
205
Figure 6.4: Concentration of global coal exports
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The impact of oil companies on the international coal supply 
industry was illustrated by the rapid growth of Shell and BP 
to enter the list of top ten global exporters in the early 
1980s. The BP decision to leave the industry coincides with 
the arrival of Exxon as a major exporter. The oil companies 
achieved horizontal integration by linking mines from many 
parts of the world within a single corporate structure. 
However, even when the individual units are combined into 
integrated wholes, the global coal industry remains one with 
low marketshares. Competition is expected among the many 
companies and countries active in the global coal production 
structure (Figure 6.4).
6.3.4 Horizontal integration by Japanese and European coal 
companies
A special case of horizontal integration that extends national 
production structures is the investment by Japanese and 
European coal companies in new overseas projects. These 
investments can be considered as a clear example of horizontal
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integration where a firm establishes new mines to offset its 
declining domestic operation. Expertise gained in the domestic 
industry is applied to earn profits from international 
ventures. Alternatively, overseas investments by old coal 
companies may be part of their selling role to gain access to 
lower cost coal for established customers. The international 
investment pattern is reviewed to determine whether the 
production or selling explanation is stronger.
The traditional Japanese mining companies (Mitsui Mining Co., 
Mitsubishi Mining & Cement Co., and Sumitomo Coal) are taking 
action to sustain their corporate life by diversifying into 
mining consultancy, coal trading and even joint venture 
partnership in overseas mines. Each of these areas of activity 
is considered complementary to their established business of 
mining coal in Japan. Investing in overseas mines enables 
Japanese management techniques and technology to be 
implemented in mines where it might not otherwise be 
available. Mitsui Mining, for example, acquired an interest in 
the Quintette lease in 1976 and in the final allocation of 
equity interests in 1983 owned 12.5% of the mine (larger than 
the 10% interest of all JSM members together).
In several cases, the Japanese mining companies have invested 
in projects where their affiliated sogo shosha (from the same 
keiretsu) also invested. For example, Mitsubishi Mining & 
Cement acquired a 6% interest in the Warkworth joint venture 
where Mitsubishi Corp had a 19% interest. Mitsui Mining took 
a 3% share of the Drayton mine where Mitsui & Co owned 2% of 
the equity. Sumitomo Coal bought a 5% share in the Hermitage 
mine where Sumitomo Corp was investing in 1978. (Sumitomo Coal 
later sold its interest in the Hermitage mine and bought a 50% 
interest in the Wambo mine in the Hunter Valley.) The 
investment by these mining companies is small, but it provides 
an interesting parallel to sogo shosha investment and might 
grow as the companies attempt to extend their corporate 
position^.
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Some European coal companies made the same investment
decision. British Coal and Charbonnages de France (CdF) 
extended their coal supply system overseas in the late 1970s
when they invested in the German Creek (Capricorn Coal
Management) and Wambo mines, respectively (Table 6.4). In 
addition to these Australian projects. Charbonnages also 
invested in the* Quintette mine in Canada. The Dutch chemical 
firm DSM responded to the closure of its Dutch mines by
forming a joint venture, Holland Carbon Fuels, to invest in 
American coal mines. German companies like Rheinbraun, 
Saarbergerwerke and Ruhrkohle also invested in coal mines in 
the USA (Appendix C).
Table 6.4: European energy company participation in coal 
mines
year of investment % equity
British Coal
Capricorn Coal Mgmt 77 11
Charbonnages de France
Quintette I 81 12
Wambo Mining'! 77-88 25-17
DSM,Dutch chemicals
Holland Carbon Fuels
Scotts Branch mine 82 59
ENI
Agip Carbonne 8? 100
Enoxy 81 50
Boggabri 87 25
Collinsville 89 25
Ensham 8? 25
Gollin Wallsend 82-84 49-0
Newlands 89 25
United Collieries 81-88 25-30
International Coal 81 100
Carbozulia 
Hamburgicshe Elektricitatswerke
Veba International 81 50
Rheinbraun
Ensham 8? 5
Manor, Nineveh coalfield 81 24
Saarbergerwerke WG
Ashland Coal 81 25
SEP, Dutch electricity cooperative 
Holland Carbon Fuels
Scotts Branch mine 82 59
source: Appendix C
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The striking feature of these Japanese and European 
investments is their small nature. Shareholdings were 
generally in the order of 10-25%. This implies that management 
and control remained with the other partners. Rather than 
integrating these mines as new components controlled by the 
home headquarters, the investments were small. Where larger 
equity positions were taken in USA mines, the mines selected 
were generally small. The intent of this investment does not 
appear to be one of integrating large horizontal production 
structures, as in the case of oil company investments. 
Instead, small investments are made to gain access to lower 
cost coal and provide the company with viable coal sources to 
supply established customers.
6.4 Vertical integration in the coal industry
If horizontal integration in the global coal industry conforms 
to that of a competitive global production structure, the 
expected result is a loss of national power. However, vertical
integration challenges this conclusion by demonstrating the 
extension of national production structures to include 
significant sections of the global coal industry.
6.4.1 Vertical integration attitudes
Vertical integration is common in the coal industry at the 
national level. Significant sections of domestic coal 
industries are controlled by integrated public or private 
structures (Gordon 1987; Nancke 1972). Electric utilities and 
steel mills frequently own their own mines and sometimes the 
transport facilities to transfer the coal from mine to mill. 
This pattern is a specific example of two plants with 
transaction specific investments (Joskow 1985, 1987, 1988a). 
The mine or power plant share locational advantages from their 
proximity, low transport costs, routine coordination and often 
refined or specially tuned technology. Integration captures 
these benefits within a single enterprise.
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The model of vertical integration within countries is extended 
to the North American continental market where Canadian 
consumers invested in American coal companies and then 
imported coal from the associated mines under long term 
contracts. Examples of this pattern include the Ontario Hydro 
50% ownership of Cumberland mine, the Stelco holding in 
Mathies Coal and the Algoma ownership of Cannelton Industries 
(Appendix C).
In the international industry, coals are more frequently 
interchanged in standard boilers and the fuel-specific 
advantages of integration are reduced. Nonetheless, vertical 
integration does exist in the international coal trade and an 
assessment of its extent and the effect on the production 
structure is required in order to measure its importance.
The survey of major coal consumers and traders offers an 
indication of the existing and expected future prevalence of 
investment to achieve vertical integration between the coal 
producing and coal consuming industries. Japanese consumers 
are considered first (Table 6.5).
Table 6.5: Japanese attitudes toward investment in 
overseas coal mines
Japanese group St 0th Elec Min Oil Sogo
Mill Co. Co. Co. Shosha
% respondents who 100 0 100 100 100 100
invested in coal mines
% equity holding 2-10 0 3-7 3-25 20-45 5-49
% expecting to invest 50 50 0 100 100 100
in coal mines by 1995
% 1995 equity holding 10-20 10-20 0 10-20 10-75 10-40
Importance of forming joint ventures to establish new mines
1980 1.5 3.5 3 2.5 3 3
1987 3.5 3.5 4 3.5 2.5 4
1995 j 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 2.5 3
l=very important 2=above average importance
3=average importance 4=below average importance
5=not important
source: survey and interviews. Appendix D
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Japanese steel mills, electric power utilities, mining 
companies, oil companies and soga shosha have already invested 
in overseas coal mines. Most of these investments are small, 
but oil companies and soga shosa have taken equity positions 
of up to 49% in the project. Each of these groups of investors 
will be considered later in this chapter. First it should be 
noted that further investments are expected by the oil, mining 
and trading companies. Even some of the steel mills and 
general industry consumers believed that their companies would 
invest in overseas mines by 1995.
The correlation between attitiudes of respondents and actual 
investment is explored. In 1980 the steel mills thought that 
participation in a joint venture was very important to 
establish a new coal mine. (Their decisions to implement this 
view will be examined shortly.) Mining companies also 
considered the formation of joint ventures as being of above 
average importance in 1980. These views changed by 1987 when 
oil companies were the only group of Japanese companies to 
consider joint ventures of above average importance. This 
attitude explains oil company plans to invest in coal mines 
and correlates with the expected high level of equity 
participation by oil companies. In contrast, the coal 
consuming companies considered joint ventures to be of below 
average importance in 1987 and 1995.
The attitudes and practices of European consumers provide a 
striking contrast to their Japanese counterparts (Tables 6.5 
and 6.6). Carboex was one of the few traders to invest in 
overseas coal mines on behalf of its parent utility companies 
in the 1980s. The extensive Japanese intention to invest in 
mines was replaced by the European consumers' preference to 
not invest in backward integration. Instead oil (ENI, Total, 
Shell & BP) or coal mining companies (CdF & EC) invested in 
mines as part of their horizontal energy portfolio.
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Table 6.6: European attitudes toward investment in 
overseas coal mines
European group Electric utilities Traders
South North Cement 
Europe Europe ind
% of respondents who have 0 0 0 20
invested in coal mines
% equity holding 0 0 0 10
% expecting to invest in 0 0 0 0
coal mines by 1995
% equity holding expected 0 0 0 0
Importance of forming joint ventures to establish new mines
1980 5 5 5
1987 - 5 5 5
1995 5 5 3
l=very important 2=above average importance
3=average importance 4=below average importance 
5=not important
source: survey and interviews. Appendix D
Despite the limited interest among most European consumers to 
invest in overseas coal mines in the 1980s, several cases of 
integration remain from earlier investment decisions. Two 
southern European steel mills (Ensidesa and Italsider) decided 
to invest in the Oaky Creek mine in the 1970s. Similarly, 
Anker, Hooghovens, Ruhrkohle, Saarbergerwerke, VEBA and 
Thyssen from nortern Europe had invested in American or 
Australian coal projects. The small size of these investments 
and the small share of trade affected demonstrates the 
European preference for a competitive global production 
structure as indicated in the policy statements of chapter 5. 
A striking contrast is found with the dominant domestic 
production structure in Japan. The Japanese network of 
companies integrated within keiretsu and coordinated by sogo 
shosha extends internationally to include part of the coal 
industry.
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6.4.2 Keiretsu
Keiretsu are Japanese groups of affiliated companies and 
represent a special case of flexible vertical integration. If 
keiretsu are considered as single entities, they are the 
largest corporate entities in the world. Even when considered 
as many discrete units, the individual companies are among the 
world's largest (Tables 6.7 and 6.8)*.
Table 6.7: Selected members of the three largest keiretsu
sector Mitsubishi Mitsui Sumitomo
financial Mitsubishi Bank Mitsui Bank Sumitomo Bank
trading Mitsubishi Corp Mitsui & Co Sumitomo Shoji
steel Mitsubishi Nippon Seiko Sumitomo Metal
mining/cement Mitsubishi 
Mining & Cem 
Asahi Glass
Mitsui Mining 
Hokkaido C&S 
Onoda Cement
Sumitomo Coal 
Sumitomo Cem
chemicals Mitsubishi 
Chemical Ind
Mitsui Toatsu 
Chemicals
Sumitomo
Chemical
shipbuilding Mitsubishi 
Heavy Ind
Mitsui 
Shipbuilding 
& Engineering
Sumitomo 
Shipbuilding 
& Machinery
shipping NYK Mitsui OSK
insurance Tokyo Marine & 
Fire Ins
Taisho Marine 
& Fire Ins
Sumitomo 
Marine & Fire
source: Young 1979:39-41; various companies, annual reports
Keiretsu groupings are distinct from the pre-war corporate 
structures called zaibatsu. The zaibatsu were dissolved by 
occupational forces after the war and the keiretsu formed to 
take their place. Enterprises affiliated with the old zaibatsu 
began to re-organise their business groups after Japan 
regained its independence in 1952 and MITI provided financial 
incentives for the regrouping (Johnson 1982:205). Financial 
ties between industrial companies and affiliated financial 
institutions played the key integrating role that direct 
ownership ties created in the zaibatsu. Mutual stockholdings 
grew, but not to the dominant prewar levels^.
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Table 6.8: Selected members of three new keiretsu
group
category
Fuyo Daiichi 
Kangyo Bank
Sanwa
Bank
financial Fuji Bank Daiichi Kangyo Sanwa Bank
trading Marubeni Corp C. Itoh & Co 
Kanematsu Gosho
Nissho-Iwai
Nichimen
steel Nippon Kokan Kawasaki Steel Kobe Steel 
Nakayama Steel
mining/cement Nippon Cement Furukawa Mining Osaka Cem
chemicals Showa Denko Asahi Denka Ube Ind 
Tokuyama Soda 
Hitachi Chem
shipbuilding Kawasaki Heavy 
Industries
Hitachi 
Shipbdg & 
Engineering
shipping Showa Line Nippon Express 
Kawasaki Kisen
Nippon Exp 
Shimo Shin 
Nippon Shpg
insurance Yasuda Fire & 
Marine Ins
Taisei Fire & 
Marine Ins
source: Young 1979, 39-41; various companies, annual reports
The role of finance is critical for group expansion and the 
banks and trading companies occupy a central position in the 
keiretsu (Edgington 1988; Young 1979). The six largest 
Japanese city banks (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, 
Daiichi-Kangyo and Sanwa) are thus identified as the centre 
of the six most important keiretsu. Three of the groups are 
based on the old Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo zaibatsu and 
the other three groups are based on the Fuyo, Daiichi-Kangyo 
and Sanwa banks. Selected members of these keiretsu are shown 
in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. Each of these keiretsu can combine the 
industrial specialisations of member companies to provide a 
comprehensive support system for any desired trade. For 
example, arranging the finance, shipping and insurance of 
coking coal imports to the steel mill which provides steel to 
the automobile manufacturer or shipyard for production and 
subsequent product export. Keiretsu thus represent an all- 
encompassing system of vertical integration where many 
industries are represented within a single group of companies.
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The extensive keiretsu network of affiliated companies is a 
dominant feature of the Japanese production structure. 
However, the network also extends to investments in other 
countries.
'Although the keiretsu groups are known for their fierce 
competition with each other at home, their interests often 
converge in overseas investments, especially in large scale 
extractive investments.' (Ozawa 1979:187).
The investment strategy of the six largest steel mills will 
be investigated in the next section to determine its 
distinctive features. Do the firms act independently as 
competitors seeking exclusive access to the best mine or do 
they invest as a group? Are coal mines integrated into a 
particular keiretsu like many new Japanese joint ventures or 
are they examples of the cooperative extension of the Japanese 
production structure through international investment by all 
members of the industry? If the latter option is true, then 
Japan increases, its structural power by the extension of its 
national production structure to include elements of the 
global structure.
6.4.3 JSM joint ventures
The Japanese steel mills (JSM) are the largest importers of 
coking coal in the world and together account for 30-50% of 
the global trade. Their need for raw materials is large and 
persistent, thereby creating an opportunity to invest in mines 
and integrate suppliers into their corporate structure. 
However, the JSM generally decided not to invest in coal 
projects. The most frequent explanation for the Japanese steel 
mills not following the 'captive mine' example of their USA 
and European counterparts is the limited capital available 
during the postwar reconstruction and rapid industrialisation 
period. A better explanation may be that they were satisfied 
with the sogo shosha control over raw material supplies 
(section 6.4.4; chapter 8), did not consider further action 
necessary, and concentrated on improving their steel 
production process.
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An important exception to the JSM practice of not investing 
in coal mines is found in Canada. The first Canadian example 
of JSM direct investment, resulted not from an initial 
decision to take equity participation in a new mine, but from 
a decision to support a recently developed mine. When Kaiser 
Resources, the forerunner of Westar Mining, encountered 
financial difficulty at its Balmer mine in the early 1970s, 
the project was saved by Japanese consumers converting C$10 
million loans into equity and providing C$ 17.5 million 
additional capital in 1973 (Coal Manual 76:188). Mitsubishi 
and the Japanese consumers thus acquired a 27% interest in 
their first Canadian coal mine (Table 6.9).
The reason for this unusual injection of capital from the JSM 
was indicated by the prominent Japanese coal journal, the Coal 
Manual:
'The future of this mine (Balmer) is very promising and 
there are various plans to develop the huge volume of coal 
reserves of this mine amounting to 13 billion tons... Thus 
the significance of this mine will become more and more 
important to the Japanese steel mills.* (Coal Manual 
1976:208)
Given the Japanese desire to diversify their sources of coking 
coal away from USA and Australian supplies (Sakamoto 
1982:359), a small injection of capital enabled them to keep 
a large current and future supplier of coal operating in a 
new coal region (south-east British Columbia)®.
The restrictions on JSM direct investment were eased in the 
1970s as the shortage of Japanese investment capital was 
overcome by substantial annual trade surpluses and the need 
to invest in domestic steel production slowed because demand 
ceased its exponential growth path and became static. The 
steel mills thus found themselves in a position where they 
could afford to invest in 'develop and import' projects as 
described in chapter 5.
Gregg River was proclaimed the first 'overseas coal 
development project' with direct JSM participation (Coal 
Manual 1985:337). (The earlier Westar investment was for an
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operating mine.) In 1981 the JSM finalised a 15 year coal 
contract in return for their direct participation in the new 
coal mine. The project was to sell 100% of the output (2mtpa) 
to the JSM at prices 'based on Gregg River Coal's cost of 
capital, mining, coal transportation, coal storage at port and 
ship loading, with appropriate adjustments for inflation using 
agreed indices' (Dalby 1987:935). The price was to be reviewed 
three times during the 15 year contract and the JSM thus did 
not need to fear excessive profits being taken by foreign or 
hostile owners. Indeed, the JSM argue that they did not 
guarantee Gregg River Coal a profit at all, although this was 
the clear expectation of their partner, Manalta (Dalby 
1987:931).
'Their (investment) decision was prompted as this coal 
project had such advantage over others, as the rail, 
port and other infrastructural facilities are readily 
available, the stripping ratio is relatively low, a 
fairly precise mining condition can be pictured thanks 
to the Luscar coal operations being carried out in its 
neighbourhood region, and the coal production 
proportionate to the 40 percent equity interest can be 
imported at cost.'(Coal Manual 1985:337)
Later in 1981 another coal investment decision was made by 
the JSM. Esso Resources decided to pull out of the Quintette 
project in north east British Columbia where Mitsui Mining and 
Tokyo Boeki had each invested (21% each) in the initial 
project development. The JSM 'decided to make their capital 
participation in this project in a bid to help it tackle the 
threat of becoming unable to raise its development funds.' 
(Coal Manual 1985:338)*.
Quintette is argued to illustrate the importance of direct 
investment to facilitate project financing in the 1980s. 
Whereas long term contracts were considered sufficient proof 
of financial viability for many projects started in the 1970s 
(chapter 7), by the 1980s long term contracts were shown to be 
much less secure than previously thought. Prices and volumes 
were altered in accordance with prevailing market conditions. 
If a project was to ensure its future cash flow, the 
participation of consumers may be desired from the start
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(Vernon in Anderson 1987). The value banks place on consumer 
participation has even been taken further and suggested as the 
banks means to have the maximum degree possible of moral 
persuasion over the steel mills (Gibb 1984). According to this 
view, participation by the JSM was necessary to ensure the 
mine's future cashflow.
Quintette thus became the largest case of JSM direct 
investment in an overseas coal mine. The project involved more 
than just the financing of a mine. Unlike Gregg River where 
other mines and infrastructure existed nearly. Quintette 
involved the opening of a new coal region in north east BC 
with investment by the Canadian and BC governments in new 
port, rail, town and associated facilities estimated to cost 
C$ 1700 million. In total, the project cost an estimated C$ 
3000 million. This investment was extremely large in 
comparison to that required for a new mine of similar size in 
Australia. However, the JSM decision to invest in Canada 
rather than Australia reflects their determination to achieve 
diversity of supply objectives (Sakamoto 1982:359).
The above examples show the Japanese consumers investing as a 
group with their participation set at a size comparable to 
their coal imports. In each case Nippon Steel was the largest
JSM investor (Table 6.9). The result of these many small
investments is that coal projects accounted for over half of 
the Japanese investment projects in Canada in 1982-84 (Blain 
& Narcliffe 1988:148; Wright 1984; Appendix C). This pattern 
demonstrates the conformity of JSM investment decisions and 
the collective behaviour to enter projects as a single group^°. 
Conformity was achieved even when individual members disagreed 
with the investment decision, as in the Quintette case where 
Kawasaki opposed the group decision. The result is the 
extension of the Japanese production structure to include
Canadian coal mines on an integrated industry-wide basis.
(Representation on the board of directors or at meetings is 
generally through a nominated official from one of the two 
largest companies, Nippon Steel or NKK.)
218
Table 6.9: Japanese steel mill participation in coal mines
joint
venture
Westar 
(formerly 
Kaiser Coal)
Gregg
River
Quintette Wallerawang 
Coal & Baal Bone 
(Lithgow)
date
steel company
equity 
1973 1980 
% %
equity
1981
%
equity 
1981 1984 
% %
equity
1979
%
Nippon St 
NKK
Kawasaki St 
Sumitomo Metal 
Kobe St 
Nisshin St 
Nakayama St 
Godo St
6.6
4.0
2.2
2.6
1.2
0.7
0.1
6.4
6.0
1.6
3.9
0.9
0.7
0.1
14.0
5.9
5.4
5.4 
3.2 
1.1
3.8
1.6
1.5
1.5
0.9
0.3
0.2
0.1
15.0
JSM sub-total 17.4 19.5 35.0 0.0 9.9 15.0
Mitsubishi Chem 
Toho Gas
0.5
0.1
0.8
0.1
0.1
Consumer sub-t 18.0 20.3 35.0 0.0 10.0 15.0
Mitsubishi Corp 
Mitsui & Co 
Sumitomo Corp 
Tokyo Boeki
9.0 13.1
5.0
21.0
5.0
10.5
5.0
Sogo shosha tot 9.0 13.1 5.0 21.0 15.5 5.0
Mitsui Mining 21.0 12.5
Japanese total 27.0 33.4 40.0 42.0 38.0 20.0
Japanese investment 
million C$ 27. 5 C$ 74 C$ 134 A$ 7.5
exports to Japan
JFY75
JFY80
JFY85 *
4.7
4.3
2.9
0.0
0.0
1.9
0.0
0.0
4.9
0.2
0.3
0.1
note: * combines Balmer and Greenhills coal 
source: Coal Manual 1976:1988, 1985:319-338
In contrast to this uniform JSM investment pattern, Sumitomo 
Metal has a reputation for being more independent. Sumitomo 
reinforced this image in 1979 when they acquired a 15% 
interest in the Wallerawang mine and its extension, Baal Bone, 
near Lithgow, Australia. The cost of the investment was only 
A$5.6 million and gave the firm a long term supply of soft
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coking coal for use in its production of formed coke (Coal 
Manual 1985). This illustration of independent action follows 
the American competitive pattern of direct investment for 
profitable integration of supply and consumption firms.
Although the Wallerawang example illustrates the model of FDI 
based on economic efficiency and increased profit motives by 
a single firm, it remains an anomaly in JSM practice. Another 
example of independent investment in coal mines occurred 
indirectly when NKK acquired 50% of National Steel in the USA 
and thus gained an interest in the associated coal mines. 
However, this investment was based on steel industry 
objectives and the associated mines concentrate on the 
domestic rather than international coal market.
In summary, JSM coal investment has been predominantly in 
joint ventures in Canada where all JSM members take a share 
corresponding to their import needs^^. The relative importance 
of this backward integration into the coal industry is shown 
by measuring the proportion of imports from these mines. The 
Westar investment gave the JSM an interest in the mine 
supplying over 40% of Canadian coking coal to Japan in the 
late 1970s. By 1985 the investment in Gregg River and 
Quintette raised the share of the Canadian exports to the JSM 
from mines with their investment to 62% of the total. This 
apparent exception to the JSM practice of not investing in 
mines became the standard for the Canada-Japan coking coal 
trade.
The lack of JSM investment in other regions does not imply a 
lack of Japanese interest in other supply countries. Sogo 
shosha also invested in overseas coal mines.
6.4.4 Sogo shosha investments in coal mines
'(R)esource development projects require the extensive 
organizational skills that a general trading company can 
provide. . .. Mitsubishi Corporation has participated in 
many successful projects, but the one I remember most 
clearly is a coal development project in Queensland, 
Australia. We first started by laying railroads through the
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desert. Next, we built roads and then a harbor to ship coal 
from. New towns were built for the people working in the 
mines. Today, 10 million tons of high-grade coking coal 
from these mines are transported to Japan every year and 
are a valuable energy source. This project is a prime 
example of our efforts to work together with people 
throughout the world, and I am extremely proud of our 
accomplishments in this area.* (Vice President Sonoda in 
Mitsubishi Corporation 1986:8)
Sogo shosha invest in coal mines to fulfil multiple 
objectives. They may seek to increase their supply position 
for Japanese markets, to diversify their supply sources, to 
enhance their position in related product markets, to increase 
revenue, to gain profits, and/or to sell the resource in third 
markets. Each of these objectives is considered as the 
investment pattern of sogo shosha is revealed.
Sogo shosha are the most important Japanese sources of direct 
investment in overseas coal projects (Sakurai 1983). Indeed, 
the sogo shosha are the most important source of all direct 
foreign investment from Japan. The top five Japanese overseas 
investors were all trading companies (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Marubeni, C.Itoh, and Sumitomo) in the 1970s. They accounted 
for 43% of the value of overseas investments by the top 50 
Japanese companies (which included the other major trading 
houses) (Ozawa 1979:31)^. Sogo shosha investment in coal 
projects strengthens the company's trading role by integrating 
backwards to have long term supplies for their sales to 
Japanese and other customers.
The Mitsubishi example quoted above refers to the Central 
Queensland Coal Associates (CQCA) unincorporated joint venture 
where Utah Development (85%) and Mitsubishi Corporation (15%) 
agreed in 1968 to develop the Goonyella and Peak Downs mines 
in the Bowen Basin of central Queensland. This joint venture 
was formed following the successful Utah development of the 
Blackwater mine and the 1965 signing of a 2.2mtpa contract for 
Japanese consumers represented by Mitsubishi (McKern 
1976:217). Subsequent long term contracts were signed to 
enable CQCA to develop the Goonyella (1969), Peak Downs (1969) 
and Saraji (1972) mines. The 15 year contracts associated with
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each of these mines provided for the supply of 13mtpa from 
the four mines to Japan. This group of mines thus supplied 21% 
of JSM coal requirements in 1976 (Coal Manual 1976:161). 
Despite Japanese concerns that such a large proportion of 
coking coal coming from a single source might cause the JSM to 
'lose its independence and flexibility on the purchase of raw 
materials as well as its demand and supply position of raw 
material' (Coal Manual 1976:161), a further CQCA mine (Norwich 
Park) was added in 1980.
The incentive for these investments in mines is only partially 
explained by the sogo shosha's subsequent certainty of being 
the trader representing the project in Japan. The commissions 
paid on coal imports are small (100 yen per ton prior to 1977 
and 120 yen per tonne afterward (D'Cruz 1979)). The dividends 
paid on the equity are small given their small shareholdings. 
Sogo shosha also benefit from selling equipment and 
engineering supplies to the mine from other members of the 
associated keiretsu (Edgington 1988). A stronger incentive for 
widespread sogo shosha participation is the informal 
arrangement reported between the JSM and sogo shosha. Under 
this arrangement the trading houses receive a share of the 
steel sales and export business in rough proportion to their 
share of raw material inputs (essentially iron ore and coking 
coal). Not only are commissions larger on the higher valued 
steel products, but the sogo shosha perform a wider range of 
marketing tasks for which they are paid. Coal is thus an 
integral part of a trading company's position in steel 
industry marketing (Anderson 1987:53; D'Cruz 1979:152).
To ensure their position as a major seller of steel products, 
sogo shosha generally want to procure a large supply of coal 
for the JSM. In many cases, the sogo shosha simply performed 
their trading role (discussed further in chapter 8) arranging 
the negotiation of contracts and shipping/customs 
requirements. However, this role was increasingly reinforced 
by direct investment in coal projects. The investment was 
often undertaken prior to project development with the sogo 
shosha taking an interest in exploration projects. Given the
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exploration results, the trading house could promote the 
project with the JSM to gain the long term contract to enable 
the mine to be developed. The partnership in the joint venture 
was then finalised, the finance arranged and the mine 
developed. Sogo shosha thus play a central role in creating 
the production structure which supplies the Japanese and 
global coal trade.
Foreign investment by a trading house is the preferred form of 
FDI in some countries. Given that sogo shosha specialise in 
global marketing and trade, the host country perceives their 
investment as providing the project with access to both the 
Japanese market and that of third countries. In this way, the 
extensive sogo shosha intelligence network is regarded as an 
asset to the project. In contrast, FDI by end users, like JSM 
investment in coking coal mines, involves a conflict of 
interest in which the mine owners would benefit from high 
prices and cashflow, while the investor/consumer benefits from 
low prices^. However, the distinction between the role of end 
users and that of traders when making foreign investments is 
blurred when the traders act on behalf of consumers (Reich and 
Mankin 1986).
The Mitsubishi/CQCA example illustrates the early 
participation of the sogo shosha in project development. The 
second largest sogo shosha, Mitsui & Co., was not to be left 
out of this process and in 1965 it joined with Australian and 
American interests to form the Thiess Peabody Mitsui (later to 
become Thiess Dampier Mitsui, TDM) joint venture to develop 
the Moura mine in central Queensland (McKern 1976:218). Mitsui 
& Co.'s initial 20% interest in TDM was later divided between 
a direct equity interest (13.3%) and an indirect interest 
(6.7%) held by its Australian subsidiary, Mitsui Australia. 
TDM later developed the Riverside mine to increase its export 
capacity in the 1980s. Mitsui also joined other Queensland 
joint venture partners to develop the Curragh mine. This time 
the Mitsui & Co. interest (10%) was held through the 
subsidiary, Mitsui Coal Development Australia. The equity
223
interests and level of exports to Japan are presented for each 
of these mines in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10: Sogo shosha investment in Australian coal mines
Sogo shosha 
coal company/mine
investment 
year %
Japanese imports 
JFY75 JFY80 JFY85
AUSTRALIA million tonnes
Mitsubishi Corporation 10.7 11.1 7.2
CQCA (Central Qld Coal) 68 12-15 10.7 11.1 7.0
Blackwater 2.7 2.1 1.1
Goonyella 3.6 3.3 2.2
Peak Downs 2.6 2.5 1.6
Saraji 1.9 2.3 1.4
Norwich Park 1.0 0.7
Warkworth 76 19 0.2
Ulan % 7 6—88 9-49 0.2
Howick 89 40
Mitsui & Co 2.0 1.8 5.3
TDM 6? 20 2.0 1.8 4.0
Moura 2.0 1.8 1.1
Riverside 2.9
Curragh 82 10 1.3
Drayton 78 2 na
Sumitomo Corp
Hermitage & Fernbrk 78 6 0.2 pjp 0.3 0.2
Wallerawang & Baalbn 79 5
Marubeni Corp
Austen & Butta 71 2.6 0.3 0.2 1.6
Dombarton 0.2 0.1 0.1
Gross Valley 0.1 0.1 0.0
German Creek 1.0
South Bull it 0.6 pjp 0.9 pjp 0.5
Muswellbrook 80 15 na m
Nisho Iwai
Howard Smith 79 2 1.4 pjp 1.1 1.1
Liddell 0.6 pjp 0.6 0.2
Hunter Valley 0.2 0.2
West Wallsend 0.1 pjp 0.3 0.3
Big Ben 0.7 pjp 0.8 pjp 0.4
Toyo Menka
Glennies Creek 89 25
sub-total 13.0 14.5 15.3
Australian exports to Japan 21.3 24.5 26.9
% from sogo shosha joint ventures 61 59 57
note: some equity is held via subsidiaries; na=not available;
Pjp=P^®”Japanese purchase 
source: BIE 1984; Coal Manual 1976, 1988.
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In addition to investment in Queensland mines, the sogo shosha 
also turned to the older mining area of New South Wales. 
Mitsubishi joined other partners in the Warkworth, Ulan and 
Howick mines. Sumitomo Corporation invested in the expansion 
of the Lithgow mines, Hermitage/Fernbrook and Wallerawang/Baal 
Bone and Toyo Menka joined the Glennies Creek project.
Marubeni Corp. preceded these investments by acquiring a 4.6% 
interest in the established mining company Austen & Butta when 
the Japanese foreign investment restrictions were first eased 
in 1971. In addition to its NSW holdings, Austen & Butta 
participated in the German Creek development in Queensland 
during the 1980s. In 1985 Austen & Butta acquired Bellambi as 
part of the rationalisation of Shell coal interests in New 
South Wales. (Shell was the largest shareholder in Austen & 
Butta, Bellambi and German Creek.)
Nissho Iwai created a similar corporate family when it 
acquired 2 million Howard Smith shares in 1979. Howard Smith 
and Coal & Allied Industries (CAID) had interlocking 
shareholdings and in the 1980s Howard Smith increased its 3 3% 
of RW Miller to 67% and then 100% (DMR 1986; DME 1989). The 
1985 acquisition of all remaining shares in RW Miller was part 
of the restructuring of these Hunter Valley companies to 
reduce costs in the face of lower coal prices. CAID and Howard 
Smith sell most of their coal as steam coal, but the JSM also 
buy soft coking coal blended from the same mines.
The overall pattern is one of extensive sogo shosha 
participation in the new mines of Queensland and New South 
Wales coupled with small equity interests acquired in a few of 
the old New South Wales coal producers. The result was that 
approximately 60% of the Australian coking coal exports to 
Japan were from mines with sogo shosha direct investment. The 
decline in this share to 57% in 1985 results in part from the 
decline in Japanese imports of CQCA coal (following the 1984 
BHP acquisition of control over CQCA) and the increase in soft 
coking coal imports from older New South Wales producers.
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The pattern of sogo shosha individually investing in coal 
projects throughout the Australian coalfields is repeated in 
Canada (Table 6.11). In each of the mines where the Japanese 
steel mills invested in Canada (Table 6.9), a trading house 
invested as well. Sogo shosha equity interests were typically 
5-10%, but in the case of Quintette, the holdings of Tokyo 
Boeki and Sumitomo Corp. (15.5%) exceeded those of the JSM 
(10%). Projects without JSM participation, like Bullmoose, 
sometimes included sogo shosha investment. Other projects, 
like Line Creek, negotiated for the direct participation of a 
trading house (Mitsui in this case), but the arrangement was 
not finalised. One of the factors limiting direct investment 
by sogo shosha was the Canadian government objective of having 
50% Canadian ownership. Given the large role played by foreign 
companies in the Canadian coal industry, the allocation of 
shares to Japanese interests could require the reduction in 
shareholdings by other foreign companies^. The overall pattern 
is one of extensive sogo shosha participation involving the 
mines which provided 73% of Canadian coking coal exports to 
Japan in 1985.
Table 6.11: Sogo shosha investment in Canadian coal mines
Sogo shosha investment Japanese imports
coal company/mine year % JFY75 JFY80 JFY85
CANADA million tonnes
Mitsubishi Corporation
Westar 73 13.1 4.7 4.3 2.9
Mitsui & Co
Gregg River 81 5 19
Nisho Iwai ;
Bullmoose 81 10 1.9
Sumitomo Corp
Quintette 81 5 4.9
Tokyo Boeki
Quintette 81 10.5 4.9
sub-total 4.7 4.3 11.6
Canadian exports to Japan 11.0 10.4 15.9
% from sogo shosha joint ventures 43 41 73
note: some equity is held via subsidiaries 
source: BIE 1984; Coal Manual 1976, 1988
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A dominant feature of sogo shosha investment in joint ventures 
is geographic diversity (Hanink 1987). Rather than have some 
trading houses specialise in Australian or Canadian projects, 
most sogo shosha invest in both countries. This enables them 
to contribute directly to the diversity of supply objectives 
held by many of their clients. The sogo shosha also take 
equity interests in coal projects in other countries. For 
example, Nissho Iwai has a 40% interest in the steam coal 
project, PT Belau Coal in Indonesia. The result is an 
extensive network of sogo shosha minority investment in 
international coal projects and the expansion of the Japanese 
production structure.
6.4.5 Other cases of vertical integration
The JSM and sogo shosha are not the only cases of consumers 
and traders integrating backwards by investing in coal mines. 
Japanese steam coal consumers invested in several mines in the 
1980s, following the 1979 lead of the Ube Industries 
investment in Howard Smith (Table 6.12). The Japanese 
electricity companies followed two investment patterns. EPDC 
made direct investments in overseas coal projects, while the 
nine private electricity companies formed the Japan Coal 
Development Corporation to invest in overseas projects and 
import coal on their collective behalf. In this way, the 
electricity industry followed the collective investment 
pattern pursued by the steel mills.
Consumers and traders from South Korea also invested in a few 
mines in Australia, Canada and USA (Table 6.12). Even the 
pattern of investment by European traders and steel mills in 
the 1980s, tended to fit the Japanese tradition of minority 
investments rather than the old model of complete ownership 
(Table 6.13). In a few cases the Europeans acquired a majority 
interest, but this was only in smafl American mines. The 
extent of South Korean and European investment is much smaller 
than the Japanese investments and accounts for less than 25% 
of their imports. The extension of South Korean and European 
national production structures into the global coal trade and
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their associated structural power is thus much weaker than 
that of Japan. Instead, they rely on a global production 
structure owned by other actors and regulated by the 
international market.
Table 6.12: Investments by other consumers and traders
Year of investment % equity
Japanese steam coal consumers
Ube Industries
Howard Smith/CAID 79 2-5
Queensland Allied Ind 88 5
Joban Kosan
Howard Smith/CAID 86
EPDC
Blair Athol 8? 7
Beluga 8?
MacLeod River 81 15
Japan Coal Development
Blair Athol 8? 3
Idemitsu
Boggabri 87 25
Ebenezer 88 49
Ensham 8? 25
Shaunessy,Can 81 20
Wishbone,USA 87 50
Toyota Tsusho
Camberwell 89 40
South Korean investors
Daesung
Drayton 7? 2.5
Lucky Goldstar
Ensham 8? 5
Hyundai
Drayton 7? 2.5
Pohang Iron & Steel
Greenhills 7? 20
Mt Thorley 7? 20
Tanoma 85-88 100-0
source : Appendix C
The prevailing pattern of vertical integration in the coal 
trade is one of partial integration by minority investment 
rather than complete control as in some other resource 
industries. Many mines are integrated into the supply network 
of particular consumers by minority investments, but few mines 
are majority owned by consumers. The result is the extension 
of national, especially Japanese, production structures within 
a diverse global coal production structure.
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Table 6.13: Investments by European consumers and traders
Year of investment % equity
European traders
Anker
VEBA International 81 50
Anker Energy
Bronco Mining 8? 100
Carboex
Ashland Coal 82 10
Ruhrkohle
Capricorn Coal Mgmt 77-8? 17-11
Thyssen Carbometal
Thyssen Mining
Betty B Coal
VEBA
Westmoreland Resources 82-87 15-25
European steel mills
Ensidesa, Sp
Oaky Creek 7? 5
Hooghovens
Oaky Creek 7? 8.5
Holland Carbon Fuels
Scotts Branch mine 82 59
Italsider
Oaky Creek 7?-89 7.5-0
Romania
Pocohontas No. 6 85 33
source : Appendix C
6.5 Conclusion
The production structure of hundreds of mines supplying the 
global coal trade has been shown to include several types of 
horizontal and vertical integration. Many of the 200 companies 
exporting coal have links with other companies, but the high 
degree of concentration found in some domestic industries is 
absent at the international level. Even the extensive holdings 
of BHP and the major oil companies are not considered a threat 
to a competitive global production structure.
Alternative models of FDI based on economic profit or supply 
security were presented and compared to the investment pattern 
in the international coal industry. In most cases, the 
Japanese investment in coal projects was small and the 
potential to earn profits was therefore restricted. If the JSM
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investment in Canadian mines was made simply to gain profits, 
it seems surprising that they waited until two of the projects 
were in financial difficulty before investing. Alternatively, 
the security of supply model of FDI and the associated 
structural IPE model of trade are supported by the diverse 
pattern of investment. The mines with JSM investment supplied 
over 40% of Canadian exports to Japan in the late 1970s and 
60% of Canadian exports to the JSM in the mid 1980s.
The structural model was further supported by the extensive 
practice of small shareholdings in numerous joint ventures. 
The result of diverse investment by trading houses was that 
60% of the Japanese coking coal imports from Australia and 70% 
of those from Canada came from mines with sogo shosha equity 
shares. A diverse network of mines and trading houses to 
supply Japanese consumers was created through the extension of 
the Japanese production structure.
Other consumers and traders in South Korea and Europe also 
invested in overseas mines. While these investments are 
important in terms of linking particular mines into the import 
network of particular consumers, the expansion of their 
national production structures was much smaller than in the 
case of Japan. Rather than extend national production 
structures, they chose to rely on the global production 
structure with its assumed competitive configuration.
The contrast between the Japanese expansion of its production 
structure through minority investment and the limited 
investment patterns of other major consumers raises important 
questions about the global coal trade. In isolation, these 
minority investments may have limited importance. However, if 
quasi-integration in the production structure is reinforced by 
the extension of other structures then national Japanese 
structures may include large segments of the global 
structures. The financial structure is examined next to 
determine whether or not the pattern is repeated.
230
Endnotes:
1. The Peabody sale of TPM shares was required as a result of 
an US anti-trust decision against its parent company, 
Kennecott Copper. Once again government decisions shaped the 
pattern of coal investment.
2. The secondary status of the export industry does not imply 
complacence as the growth in exports in 1988 raised the value 
of exports to $4 billion, a sharp increase from $3 billion in 
1987 (Keystone News 1989).
3. However, they subsequently tested models of 
duopoly/monopsony behaviour (Kolstad and Abbey 1984) to 
suggest that this was an appropriate model of the 
international steam coal trade. Their conclusion was not based 
on a detailed structural study. Instead, it was based on the 
compatibility of model results with US Department of Energy 
forecasts of coal trade in the year 1990 (i.e. low cost South 
African and Australian exports were constrained to generate 
higher prices and continued USA exports).
4. Utah International was the 17th largest US coal producer in 
1987 with the production of 12 mt (Keystone News Bulletin 
1988.6.27:5).
5. The keiretsu structure is argued to have helped the 
domestic mining companies participate in international joint 
ventures because their investment was accompanied with that of 
an affiliated trading house which had more experience in 
assessing international coal projects (section 6.4).
6. An analysis of Japan's 50 most profitable companies in 1984 
found that 19 of these companies belonged to the six major 
keiretsu: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Daiichi-Kangyo 
and Sanwa (Yamazaki 1988:17). A similar analysis of 1955 and 
1973 data revealed that 23 of the 50 most profitable companies 
belonged to the same six keiretsu. This indicates that 
keiretsu companies have been persistently among the top 
companies in Japan.
7. The level of interlocking shareholding within each of the 
six major keiretsu averaged 22.7% in 1987. This represented 
a decline from 25.5% in 1981. However, the shareholdings of 
other corporate investors combined to leave only 25-30% of 
equity available for actual trading. (Economist 1989.8.19:82) 
Instead of having a dominant holding company, shareholdings 
were divided among affiliated finance companies (typically 10- 
20%), affiliated industrial companies (typically 10-15%), and 
other corporate investors, especially financial institutions 
(Yamazaki 1988; Young 1979). Individual shareholders were 
relatively unimportant (38% of shares in 1981 and 29% in 1987) 
and this left post decision making power in the hands of 
professional managers (Economist 1989.8.19:82).
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The interest of managers in the group (as well as company) 
wellbeing is reinforced by the top executives of affiliated 
companies belonging to a President's Club for that keiretsu. 
Regular meetings by this informal organisation, reinforce the 
financial ties with a direct exchange of information and 
collective consideration of group projects. Several of the 
members may form a joint venture to promote a particular 
business opportunity (Marubeni 1984:30). In this way, the 
keiretsu grows from its base of major companies into an 
extensive network of many specialised companies.
8. In 1980 the British Columbian government bought the shares 
in this project from Kaiser and other public shareholders, 
including some of the Japanese holdings (Kawasaki, Kobe and 
Godo Steel sold 50% of their shares while Nippon and Nisshin 
Steel sold 33% of their shares (Coal Manual 1985:319)). The 
restructured private company, Westar, withdrew its shares from 
the public stock exchange and increased the relative Japanese 
interest (steelmills, other consumers and Mitsubishi) to 33% 
of the equity.
9. Development funds were raised in three ways. First, the 
capital investment by shareholders was raised to a total of 
C$325 by the end of 1984. Second, project finance was arranged 
for C$700 from 55 banks with 4 of the 7 lead banks being 
Japanese. Finally, special recourse loans (C$250) were 
arranged. (See chapter 7 for details.)
10. The pattern of many Japanese companies each taking a small 
equity interest in large overseas resource projects has been 
called the Asahan formula, based on earlier experience in 
Indonesia (Ozawa 1980). In developing countries, host 
governments often take equity positions in the projects, but 
in the Quintette case government investment was directed into 
infrastructure.
11. This arrangement remains under active consideration for 
the future. For example, the proposal to develop the Hosmer- 
Wheeler mine in Canada (Westar 70%, Mitsui Mining 25%, 
Mitsubishi Corp 5%) includes a provision for the JSM to take 
a 10% equity interest when the mine is developed (Coal Manual 
1985:352).
12. In 1980 Sumitomo slipped into sixth place leaving the 
other four sogo shosha as the four largest Japanese investors 
in overseas projects (Oriental Economist 1981:312).
13. The Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) in Australia 
was reported to hold this view and prefer investment by 
traders over that by consumers. However, this preference is 
not all-encompassing as shown by the investment by European 
consumers in some Australian coal mines.
14. For example, the allocation of Quintette shares required 
extensive negotiations and renegotiations (Coal Manual, 
various years; Anderson 1983).
15. calculated as 17% average consumer equity of 41% of 
Canadian exports to Japan.
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Chapter 7 
The financial structure: 
credit, contracts and risk
7.1 Introduction
By exploring the power of international financial structures, 
an important new dimension is added to the traditional debate 
at the core of international political economy. Rather than 
regard trade as a two-dimensional product of tension 
between the security and production structures studied in the 
last two chapters, a third structure is added to the model of 
trade being developed in this thesis. The financial structure 
has the ability to create credit and thereby fund new projects 
independent of the production structure where retained profits 
or new equity issues are used as the traditional source of 
investment funds'. Coal producers or consumers can also raise 
corporate loans’ to fund new projects, but in these cases the 
finance is used simply to reinforce or extend established 
production structure interests. The use of credit in this 
manner is considered to be another form of * quasi-integration' 
and will be explored later. First it is considered as an 
independent source of power in the international coal trade.
Credit plays a central role in the creation of new productive 
capacity in the coal industry, as it does in most sectors of 
the global economy. Financial institutions thus offer an 
independent source of investment capital and means of entry 
into the coal trade. The use of this independent finance may 
create conflicts with the interests of prominent members of 
the production structure examined in the last chapter.
The last chapter identified differences between American and 
Japanese investment objectives and ownership patterns in 
resource projects. Yamazawa (1981 cited in Sakurai 1983) 
introduced two terms to describe the different approaches: 
'captive development' was argued to be the prevailing American 
pattern while Japanese consumers employed 'loan-cum-purchase' 
arrangements. Rather than rely on large equity investments to
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gain direct control over resource projects as in the American 
model, the Japanese approach reinforced the minority equity 
investments identified in chapter 6 with loans and long term 
purchase contracts. Despite the tighter integration of 
American mines and consumers in the metal ore trade, Japanese 
industry was judged to have achieved lower cost imports 
(Rodrik 1982). The linkages between these loans, long term 
contracts, minority equity investments and their effect on 
price/tonnage are investigated in this chapter.
The use of individual projects as the basis for credit 
formation can only be accomplished if the lender is assured of 
the future cashflow of the project to repay the loan. A 
critical factor in determining future cashflow is the 
proportion of planned capacity committed under long term 
contracts. The I securing of long term contracts is thus an 
essential component of project financing. Indeed, long term 
contracts may be formally linked to loans from the consumer to 
producer with repayments made by specified reductions in the 
price of the traded good. Even where loans are not provided 
directly by consumers, the signing of long term contracts is 
part of the financial arrangements for new mines. These loans 
and contracts establish significant links between the producer 
and consumer which reinforce the trade pattern. The analysis 
of the importance of these financial linkages in the global 
coal trade starts by examining the rising role of borrowings 
as a source of investment funds.
7.2 Finance as an independent source of investment
The increased importance of finance in the global economy 
needs to be evaluated in the context of the coal industry. 
Investment in new projects can be closely linked to the 
production structure through the retention of profits for 
investment and the issue of new equity. Alternatively, 
investment funds may be raised as borrowings from banks and 
other members of the financial sector. Indeed, borrowings 
accounted for up to 80% of investment funds in new Australian
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resource projects in the early 1980s (Folie 1982). To find out 
whether this pattern prevailed in the coal industry, an 
investigation is made into the source of investment funds for 
the expansion of the Australian coal industry to become the 
largest coal export industry in the world.
In response to the second round of oil price rises in 1979- 
80, annual investment in the Australian coal industry 
quadrupled from A$ 0.5 billion in 1980 to A$ 1.8 billion in 
1983 (Figure 7 . 1 ) \  The magnitude of this capital expenditure 
was far beyond the net annual profits made by the industry (A$ 
0.2-0.3 billion). New equity was issued to help finance some 
projects, but the size (A$ 0.1-0.4 billion) of these issues 
was less than one quarter of the size of the new investments 
(ACA annual).
Figure 7.1 : Capital expenditure and source of funds
Australian coal industry 1980-85
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New borrowings or loans were by far the most important source 
of capital for the new coal projects. The magnitude of this 
shift in industry practice from equity to loan based 
investment is well demonstrated by the change in the 
industry's loan/equity ratio. In 1980 total borrowings 
equalled 34% of the total equity in the industry, but by 1987 
borrowings rose to 129% of equity (Table 7.1). The long term 
nature of this investment and the associated loans is 
demonstrated by the increase in loans which were to be repaid 
over a period longer than five years. Whereas less than 15% of 
the loans outstanding in 1980-81 had repayment periods longer 
than five years, the financing of capital investments in the 
early 1980s raised the level of long term borrowing to over 
40% of the total debt by 1984-85. Not surprisingly, interest 
charges became a major component of industry costs, rising 
from A$ 38 million in 1980 to A$ 108 million in 1982 and $A 
458 million in 1987 (ACA 1987).
Table 7.1: Australian coal industry equity and borrowings
year borrowings equity loan/equity ratio
1980 0.5
A$ billion 
1.6 .34
1981 0.7 2.6 .27
1982 1.6 3.0 .53
1983 2.9 3.3 .88
1984 3.2 3.6 .88
1985 3.6 3.8 .95
1986 4.0 3.6 1.13
1987 4.1 3.2 1.29
source: ACA annual
The source of these borrowings is also of interest. Australian 
sources were initially by far the most important and by the 
early 1980s accounted for 4 to 6 times the borrowings from 
overseas. However, the rapid expansion and reorganisation of 
the industry in the early 1980s was financed with half of the 
funds coming from overseas sources. The outstanding overseas 
borrowings of the Australian coal industry jumped from A$ 0.3
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billion in 1982 to A$ 1.9 billion in 1984 and A$ 2.2 billion 
in 1986 (ACA 1987, Table 7.2). The relative attraction of 
domestic and overseas sources of loans depended on the 
interest rate available and expected changes in exchange 
rates. For example, loans from Japanese banks typically had 
lower interest rates than loans from Australian sources, but 
when the Australian dollar was devalued against the yen in the 
mid 1980s, the cost of repayments (in terms of Australian 
dollars) rose sharply.
Table 7.2: Australian coal industry borrowings by source
year borrowings 
Australian overseas 
A$ billion
duration* 
> 5 years 
%
1980 0.39 0.14 15
1981 0.60 0.11 12
1982 1.30 0.27 23
1983 1.80 1.13 37
1984 1.30 1.91 47
1985 1.65 1.96 41
1986 1.88 2.15 32
1987 2.08 2.02 24
note: * based on 61*-76% of outstanding loans where
respondents specified the repayment period 
source: ACA annual
The principal source of overseas loans changed over the last 
two decades. Japan became the major source of Pacific 
investment funds in the 1980s as it rapidly expanded its 
national production structure and this pattern was repeated 
for loans as the Japanese financial structure was extended. 
The change is well illustrated by the capital intensive, open 
cut coal mines in central Queensland. When the Moura mine was 
developed in the 1960s by Thiess-Peabody-Mitsui, the debt 
(approximately A$ 35 million) was raised from 11 American 
banks and insurance companies, parent company loans and some 
Australian bank loans (McKern 1976:218). By the 1980s the 
mixture of funding sources had changed.
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In 1984 the largest takeover or reorganisation of the 
Australian coal industry to date was initiated by BHP Ltd. BHP 
was the leading partner in a new joint venture, Central 
Queensland Coal Associates (CQCA), which combined all of the 
Australian coal interests of Utah International (the original 
Blackwater mine, the four old CQCA mines and related leases) 
and the BHP Gregory mine\ The financing of these BHP 
acquisitions and reorganisation was coordinated by the Bank of 
Tokyo. The bank's share of the financial arrangements was one 
half of the total $US 2.5 billion takeover (Edgington 
1988:196; Coal Manual 1985:195). BHP initially owned 35% of 
the new CQCA and 47% of the Gregory project. Its share of the 
joint venture rose to 40% in 1985.
The BHP takeover of Utah was the biggest financial deal in the 
Australian export coal industry and it established BHP as the 
largest exporter in the world. The central Queensland mines 
had low extraction costs and proven reserves, making them a 
good investment and it is not surprising that Japanese banks 
would want to participate in such large scale and promising 
business. However, this Japanese banking support for BHP did 
not imply universal Japanese approval of the deal. The steel 
mills were concerned that the concentration of such a large 
share of their imports from a single supplier could alter the 
established bargaining power in the trade.
'BHP's actual export of coking coal to Japan in fiscal 
1984 is estimated at (9.95mtpa), accounting for about 16 
percent of Japanese blast furnace steel mill's imports. 
Such a big share may be considered as a risky dependence 
for the buyers.' (Coal Manual 1985:148).
The tonnage of coal under long term contracts for the seven 
main coking coals exported to Japan by BHP-Utah totalled 
16.3mtpa in 1984', but actual imports were significantly 
reduced. The reduction in tonnage was argued to indicate a 
reluctance on the part of the Japanese steel mills to become 
too heavily dependent upon a single supplier. However, the 
surplus capacity in the international coal industry in the mid 
1980s was accompanied with reductions in imports from most
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established coking coal suppliers. The argument that CQCA 
contracts received disproportionately large cuts is refuted by 
the similar treatment given to established Canadian suppliers.
The BHP reorganisation of the Australian coking coal export 
industry illustrates how the sectoral interests of the
Japanese economy may be divided rather than universal as 
assumed under the Japan Inc model. A large loan scheme to one 
supplier may be beneficial to the banks, yet conflict with the 
steel mills' interest in maintaining many small suppliers with 
limited bargaining power.
The Bank of Tokyo's central role in financing the BHP
acquisitions was the largest, but not the first participation 
of Japanese banks in Australian coal industry borrowing 
programmes. The Industrial Bank of Japan had strong 
connections to the Japanese government and played the largest 
role of any Japanese bank in financing Australian resource 
projects in the 1970s. By 1981 it was estimated to have been 
involved in A$ 6 billion of loans for Australian resource 
projects (Edgington 1988:196). The North West Shelf gas
project was the largest single project, but the list of 
projects which it acted as the financial advisor and loan 
coordinator for included the Saraji, Collinsville and
Riverside coal projects in Queensland. This illustrates how a 
major bank can act as a source of funds for various competing 
coal producers (CQCA in the 1970s, MIM and TDM in the 1980s). 
In this way, funds were made available to established (CQCA 
and TDM) and new (MIM) coal producers alike.
Links between resource projects and banks are not exclusive as 
banks like to divide the risk of projects among many parties 
and spread their portfolio of loans accordingly. The entry of 
MIM into the coal export business in the 1980s illustrates 
this variety of financial partners. The Japanese bank 
coordinating loans for MIM's Collinsville coking coal project 
was the Industrial Bank of Japan, while that associated with 
MIM's Newlands steam coal mine was the Bank of Tokyo 
(Edgington 1988:197).
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The potential independence of and conflict between financial 
and production structures is illustrated in Canada as well as 
Australia. The Canadian coal project with the largest Japanese 
borrowings is Quintette. An international group of 55 banks 
provided C$700 million in project finance for the 5mtpa 
Quintette mine. Of the seven banks coordinating the loans, 
four were Japanese, two were Canadian and one was French^. 
Four of the largest banks in Japan (Bank of Tokyo, Mitsubishi 
Bank, Mitsui Bank and Fuji Bank) thus had a prime interest in 
the economic performance of the project. The JSM signed a long 
term contract for 5mtpa which included price escalation 
clauses from a reference price of C$ 75.00 in 1980. However, 
when the price of coking coal fell in the mid 1980s the JSM 
demanded a cut in the Quintette price. Quintette refused and 
the two parties went to arbitration to settle the dispute.
A conflict in interest emerged between the Japanese steel 
mills and the Japanese banks. The steel mills would benefit 
from a reduction in the price of coal and the corresponding 
fall in the cost of their imports. However, if the price was 
cut sharply (ie. from C$ 95pt to C$ 65pt) then the mine could 
not meet its operating costs and repay the loans. Either the 
project defaults on its loans and the bankers accept the loss 
or the project goes bankrupt. The steel mills and banks have 
conflicting interests in the upholding or dismissal of 
existing contract arrangements. Such conflicts reveal the 
complexity of Japanese structural interests in the coal trade.
7.3 Finance as a form of quasi-integration
7.3.1 Quasi-integration
Having demonstrated the importance of loans for the 
independent expansion of the coal export industry, other types 
of borrowing also need to be considered. Loans for coal 
projects can be raised from purchasing firms or with the help 
of associated trading houses. In this case, finance may be
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used to strengthen the trading link between the parties as a 
form of quasi-integration. Rather than conduct the trade under 
arm's length negotiations (as in a perfectly competitive 
market) or within a vertically integrated firm (as between a 
wholly owned subsidiary and parent company), an intermediate 
relationship is established.
'Quasi-integration exists when a particular buyer is 
linked to a particular seller by contractual, financial 
or technological arrangements that both limit the choice 
of trading partner for a period covering many 
transactions and tend to replace market intermediation of 
prices and volumes.* (D'Cruz 1980:3)
Quasi-integration, as defined by D'Cruz, can be seen as a 
means by which firms respond to market uncertainties and 
reduce their transaction costs. This is especially important 
where transaction specific investment is made, as in the case 
of site proximity, technological specialisation, or where 
alternative trading partners are limited (Joskow 1988a; 
Williamson 1975) . Quasi-integration, occurs in a variety of 
forms: minority equity investments (chapter 6); transactions 
coordinated by specialised trading houses (chapter 8) ; and the 
financial forms (loans and long term contracts) to be studied 
in this chapter. The importance that industry groups place on 
these financial arrangements is also considered.
7.3.2 Consumers survey
The relative importance which consumers and traders attach to 
the different forms of quasi-integration was measured by 
conducting a survey of prominent industry actors (Appendix D) . 
The survey had responses from companies responsible for half 
of the imports of coking and steam coal into Japan (52mtpa) 
and steam coal into Europe (57mtpa). The answers given to 
questions enable three types of comparisons to be made. First 
the relative importance of different arrangements can be 
compared because a common scale was used. Second, the opinions 
of respondents in different industries can be studied to 
identify variations among different groups of consumers. 
Third, time series comparisons can be made because three
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different reference years were used: 1980 (when coal prices 
were high), 1987 (when coal prices were low) and 1995.
Each of these three types of insights can be gained from Table 
7.3. The relative importance of consumer loans to suppliers 
and bilateral investment agreements is examined. The steel 
mills and mining companies considered loans to producers to be 
of average importance to coal purchases in 1980 while 
bilateral agreements were of below average importance. The 
steel mills considered both arrangements to be less important 
in the mid 1980s and 1990s; their use was thus likely to 
decline. The mining companies shared the steel mills' view on 
the lower importance of loans to producers, but disagreed on 
the importance of bilateral agreements. The average importance 
attached to bilateral investment agreements by mining 
companies is explained by their desire to sell consultancy, 
management, mining and training skills as part of the exchange 
offered to centrally planned economies for coal exports.
Table 7.3: Importance of financial arrangements to coal
purchases , 1980 -95
respondent consumer !loans bilateral investment
to producers agreements
1980 1987 1995 1980 1987 1995
Japanese groups
steel mills 3 4 5 4 5 5
mining companies 3 5 4 4 3 3
steam coal groups 4 4 4 3 3 3
electricity cos 4 4 4 5 5 5
general industry 4 4 4 2 2 2
oil companies 5 5 4 4 3 3
sogo shosha 5 5 5 5 5 5
European groups
electric utilities
northern Europe 5 5 5 5 5 5
southern Europe 5 5 5 5 5 5
trading companies 5 5 5 4 3 2
key: 1 = very important 2 = above average importance
3 = average importance 4 = below average importance
5 = not important source: Appendix D
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Japanese steam coal consumers generally placed below average 
or no importance on loans to producers when considering coal 
purchases. Bilateral investment agreements were given a much 
more varied review. The electricity companies considered them 
of no importance while general industry placed above average 
importance on these agreements. The reason is that many of the 
small consumers in general industry receive their coal in 
small shipments from China and thus place a high importance on 
continuing bilateral trade between China and Japan. The oil 
companies placed average importance on such agreements. They 
are often directly involved with bilateral agreements because 
oil is the other major commodity (in addition to coal) in 
Sino-Japanese bilateral trade negotiations (Newby 1988).
The differences between Japanese and European attitudes toward 
the coal trade are clearly articulated. European respondents 
placed no importance on the special financial arrangements 
which some Japanese counterparts valued more highly. The 
exception to this pattern was the growing importance attached 
by European trading companies to bilateral investment 
agreements. The reason for this European interest in these 
agreements is that one of the specialised roles for European 
coal traders is in conducting trade with Eastern European 
countries. For example, Polish coal supplies are often 
arranged through specialised traders (like Polkohle in West 
Germany) and consuming countries like Austria, Netherlands and 
West Germany have signed agreements to finance coal projects 
in Poland in return for long term coal imports. Bilateral 
agreements are important to this trade and the traders expect 
to play a significant role. The coal trade implications of the 
rapid political changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and expected 
in the early 1990s are difficult to predict. Old production 
plans have little meaning and new arrangements need to be 
negotiated.
In summary, Japanese coal consumers placed greater importance 
on special financial arrangements to support coal trade flows 
than European consumers. Japanese and European bilateral
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agreements were reviewed in chapter 5 as part of the security 
structure where government arrangements were used to ensure 
diverse and secure supplies of coal. These agreements 
demonstrate the reinforcing use of the financial and security 
structure to meet the needs of coal consumers. In contrast to 
the strong role of government in bilateral investment 
agreements, corporations in the production structure use 
finance to facilitate their trade interests in the case of 
consumer loans to producers. These loans were valued most 
highly by Japanese coking coal interests and are examined 
next.
7.3.3 Japanese public finance to support private investment
'Special funding was provided by the Japanese Government 
that was made available to Japanese Companies to find 
secure quality coal supplies to help meet the future 
needs of the country's steelmaking and electric power 
industries.' (Dalby 1987:921).
The higher importance attached to special financial 
arrangements by Japanese than European consumers is reinforced 
by a detailed examination of the coal trade. The Japanese 
consumers arranged long term loans and contracts as part of 
their develop and import policy to secure the majority of 
their raw material imports. The importance of financing a 
large-scale efficient supply chain has remained a high 
priority throughout the post-war expansion of Japanese 
industry*. By 1969 long term contracts and loans dominated 
trade arrangements and provided 75% of the iron ore imports 
and 62% of the coking coal imports (Ozawa 1979:176). A further 
14% and 22% of iron ore and coal supplies (respectively) came 
from domestic mines and less than 10% of supplies were 
purchased under competitive, spot market conditions. This 
integrated supply network was achieved not through controlling 
ownership of mines, but through facilitating financial 
arrangements.
The link between government security objectives and the 
financial structure is well illustrated by the bilateral
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investment agreements which Japan signed with China and the 
USSR. Government policies were supported with credit from 
public sector banks like the Export Import Bank of Japan 
(Ozawa 1986). Private banks were often included in these loan 
schemes, just as public banks shared in the loans which 
private banks sourced for coal consumers to support their coal 
suppliers.
In addition to financing new projects, the Export Import Bank 
was used as a leading source of Japanese finance to assist 
operating coal mines. These loans were frequently arranged to 
construct a new washery or make a similar improvement to 
existing mining operations. The loans were generally arranged 
by the sogo shosha which imported coal from the mine, 
guaranteed jointly by Nippon Steel and the sogo shosha, and 
financed by a combination of Export Import Bank of Japan and 
major city bank funds. Guarantees of repayment were also 
obtained from the parent of the mining company in most cases. 
Actual repayments were usually a fixed reduction in the coal 
price for an agreed tonnage of coal to be delivered under a 
long term contract (Table 7.4). However, if the supplier 
discontinued deliveries, then the parent company had to repay 
the loan at a higher rate of interest (for example, interest 
rates for the Barnes & Tucker loan rose from 8.5% to 14.5% if 
exports were discontinued, D'Cruz 1979:185).
Other financial transfers were made on an ad hoc basis. For 
example, in addition to the C$16.5 million loan to Smoky River 
in 1974, the JSM provided an extra C$7.5 million in a special 
financial deal. This was done by increasing the coal price by 
C$ll/t (to equal the FOR price for Itman coal in the USA) for 
the 700,000 tonnes exported that year. This increase in price 
can be regarded as either a special grant (non-repayable loan) 
to the mining company (Japanese view) or the recognition of 
prevailing market prices for coal (Canadian view). The C$16.5 
million loan was to be repaid in the usual manner from the 
revenue generated by the JSM import of 1.5mtpa of coal from 
the mine for the next three years (Coal Manual 1976:199,215).
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Table 7.4: Small Japanese loans to overseas coal mines
date company (mine) amount interest 
lender $ million %
repayment 
years $/t
volume
mt
agreed and implemented
1970 to ICC (VP no 4) 25 6.5 
by Nissho Iwai
15 0.92 1.8
1970 to Barnes & Tucker 5 8.5 
by Tokyo Boeki (Lancashire)
12.5 0.56 0.8
1970 to Kaiser Res (Balmer) 1.9 5.0
1970 to Coleman (Vickery Cr) 1.5 1.0
1971 to FCCI (Cerro) 35 1.0
1972 to CQCA (Saraji) 25 2.7
1974 to McIntyre (Smoky R) C$16.5 3 C$3.67 2.0
1975 to J.Walter (Blue Cr) 40 
by C.Itoh & JSM
6 2.7
1975 to Mead Corp (Mulga) 6.5 
by Sumitomo
agreed but not implemented
1.0
1974 to Gregg River C$20 8 15.5 C$1.00 2.7
source: Coal Manual 1976, 1985: 74-78; D'Cruz 1979:184-219
The financial arrangements for Gregg River illustrate the role 
of the Japanese government in supplying resource project 
finance. The initial C$20 million loan agreed (but not 
implemented) in 1974 was to be financed by the JSM using funds 
70% from the Export Import Bank and 30% from city banks. 
Japanese banks later agreed to finance the majority of the 
development costs (total = C$185 million). The Japanese equity 
partners provided a C$30 million farm-in fund and C$74 million 
in project finance from Fuji Bank and 18 other Japanese banks 
(floating interest rate and 12.5 year term). In addition, the 
Japanese partners arranged a C$15 million low interest loan 
from the Export Import Bank and city banks on behalf of 
Manalta (their joint venture partner) to finance part of its 
share of development costs. Manalta raised the remaining C$66 
million from a group of Canadian banks ! led by the Bank of
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Montreal (Coal Manual 1985:8). The result was that Japanese 
sources provided 64% of the project finance despite having an 
equity position of only 40%.
Loans have also been converted into equity when a mine proved 
unable to make its repayments. This occurred in the Canadian 
case of Kaiser Coal in 1973 and was the first case of the JSM 
taking direct equity participation in an overseas coal project 
(chapter 6) . Rather than force the mine into bankruptcy or 
harm its financial viability, the JSM demonstrated their 
flexibility in using either financial or production structures 
to achieve their supply objectives. They converted their 
outstanding loans to the project into an equity interest. This 
replaced the assured interest and principal repayments with 
uncertain dividends based on mine profits.
Financial concerns were also given as the reason for JSM 
investment in the Quintette project. When Esso Resources 
decided to withdraw from the project in 1981, the JSM decided 
to take a direct equity position to ensure that funds would be 
found to meet the cost of development. Once again the Japanese 
banks were involved. The senior loans for project finance 
(C$700 million) were raised from 55 international banks. 
Recourse loans were then arranged for a further C$100 million 
with the C$33 million financed by Mitsui Mining and Tokyo 
Boeki being endorsed by NEDO. Sumitomo Corporation financed 
its C$15 million of the recourse loans independent of NEDO.
The above examples of public finance used to support private 
investment in coal mines are small (with the exception of 
Quintette) in comparison to the finance provided by Japanese 
government and city banks for coal development projects in 
China and the USSR. However, the small size of typical loans 
to operating coking coal mines in Appalachia is not the only 
measure of Japanese financial interest in US coal.
In 1981 the Japanese government wanted to diversify its 
sources of steam coal and avoid dependence on Australia and 
China. The development of steam coal mines in Utah, Colorado
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and Wyoming was proposed. The Japanese government decided in 
principle to underwrite a Y300 billion ($1 billion) loan for 
investment in infrastructure on the west coast to support the 
export of lOmtpa of steam coal starting in 1985. À further 
Y200 billion would be invested, largely in mines, by private 
interests. The government finance for these projects would be 
directed through NEDO and the Export Import Bank of Japan. 
City banks were also expected to participate (AFR 
1981.5.21:29). Despite the advanced stage of planning achieved 
by this proposal, it was never implemented. Instead, the 
largest amounts of Japanese public finance for coal projects 
went to China, the USSR and north east British Columbia.
The Export Import Bank of Japan is generally the most 
important source of finance and coordinator of other 
government and city banks. In addition to their role in 
providing the loans described in this chapter, the Export 
Import and other banks can support the production structure by 
providing the funds used for equity participation. For 
example, Nissho Iwai has a 10% equity share in the Bullmoose 
mine in northeast BC. The C$31 million (10% of total) of 
development costs financed by Nissho Iwai was drawn not from 
corporate reserves, but from the Export Import Bank and other 
city banks (Coal Manual 85:346). In this way, the equity 
investments by Japanese corporations are reinforced by the 
financial provisions identified in this chapter.
7.3.4 Coordinated finance and investment integration
The coordination of financial and equity holdings within 
Japanese keiretsu is well known (chapter 6). This domestic 
pattern is extended to international coal projects by the 
large sogo shosha and banks at the centre of each keiretsu.
Four groups of Japanese investors in overseas coal mines were 
identified: the sogo shosha, consumers (the steel mills, the 
electricity companies, and Ube Industries), mining and oil 
companies. Of these groups, the Japanese coal mining companies 
best demonstrate the combination of financial and ownership
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structures to achieve international integration for relatively 
small companies. When Japanese mining companies invest in an 
overseas coal mine, the importer of the coal is usually an 
affiliated sogo shosha (belongs to the same keiretsu). This 
pattern of shared keiretsu interest in a project is reinforced 
by the finding that the two coal projects where Mitsui Mining 
invested overseas had Mitsui Bank as a leading bank to arrange 
project borrowings. In the case of Drayton Coal, Mitsui Bank 
organised a major project loan through its representative 
office in Sydney (Edgington 1988:196). In the case of 
Quintette Coal, Mitsui Bank was one of the seven leading banks 
which coordinated a group of 55 banks involved in the 
financing of the project (Coal Manual 1985:8). In each case, 
the role of the bank can be regarded as reinforcing the equity 
investment of another keiretsu member^. Further financial 
support is gained by the signing of long term contracts.
7.4 Long term contracts as part of the financial structure
Long term contracts serve several purposes as a means to 
conduct trade (Daintith 1987; Joskow 1987). The issue of 
interest in this chapter is how they affect financial 
structures in coal trade. Financial structures were shown 
earlier to provide either an independent source of investment 
funds or to reinforce integration within the production 
structure. The argument is extended in this section by 
demonstrating that contracts are used in the same way.
Long term contracts can be used as a means to ensure the 
future cashflow of a project and its value for independent 
financing by the financial sector. Projects with known 
resource endowments and predicted extraction costs can thus 
enter into the negotiation of long term contracts to ensure 
the future sale of the resource to meet operating costs and to 
repay loans. Given the capital intensive nature of mining, 
most projects seek to have their production capacity committed 
under contract to consumers and thus achieve the low unit 
costs required to gain a profit from the mining operation.
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The Kaltim Prima coal project in Indonesia was heralded in 
1989 as the first new project to be financed on the basis of 
its long term contracts since the series of new mines which 
came on stream in the early 1980s (ICR 1989). The project was 
completing negotiations for three major contracts - with China 
Light and Power in Hong Kong, GKE in the Netherlands and AES 
in Hawaii - and was expected to begin exports in 1991. A 
forecast increase in demand for international coal supplies 
created the expectation that more projects would be 
established in the 1990s under financial arrangements similar 
to those prevailing in the 1980s. An examination of past 
experience may thus provide some lessons regarding the likely 
relationship between long term contracts and project finance.
The definition and nature of long term contracts in the coal 
trade is also subject to debate. Long term contracts were 
traditionally based on the assumptions that a transaction was 
to be framed as a legally binding contract and that the 
contract could be viewed independently from any other links 
between the parties (Daintith 1987). However, empirical 
studies found limited recourse to legal proceedings (Macauley 
1977) and transaction cost theory pointed to the continuum of 
transaction arrangements from discrete transactions governed 
by binding contracts at one extreme to unitary governance 
under vertical integration at the other extreme (Cheung 1983; 
Macneil 1981; Williamson 1979). In between these extremes 
contracts were reinforced by other links (loans, equity, 
technology, personnel, etc.) between the parties.
Long term contracts cover transactions to be repeated over 
time and are generally governed by negotiations between the 
two parties rather than referral to a third party (arbitrator 
or judge). The study of these various contract and transaction 
types is incomplete (Daintith 1987) and this study extends 
current research. Contract data will be evaluated to determine 
the extent to which global coal trade conforms to the two 
types of relationships between coal contracts and finance. Are 
contracts the basis for independent project finance or do they 
reinforce other*forms of quasi-integration?
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7.4.1 Contracts and independent financing
Contracts are often used to facilitate independent project 
financing. The project is typically financed through a small 
equity investment by the owner or joint venture partners and 
large borrowings (Folie 1982). To ensure repayment of these 
loans the lenders require long term contracts for the sale of 
most mine output. These contracts also provide the operator 
with an assured market for the coal produced. To reduce the 
risk of the mine losing sales through an unexpected decrease 
in the demand by a particular buyer, preference is often given 
for contracts to be arranged with several buyers (Table 7.5).
Table 7.5: New coking coal mines (1980s) with diverse 
long term contracts®
mine buyers
BHP (Gregory) JSM, China Steel, Pohang, China L&P
German Creek JSM, China Steel, Cockerill, Ensidesa 
Pohang, Iran, Siderbras, British Steel
Oaky Creek JSM, Ensidesa, Hoogovens, Italsider
Greenhills JSM, China L&P, China Steel 
Kepco, Pohang, Elkraft
Line Creek JSM, Kepco
source: APR - Australian Financial Review. Sydney.
ACR - Australian Coal Report. Sydney.
CM - Coal Manual. Tokyo
CWI - Coal Week International.
ICL - International Coal Letter. Brussels.
ICR - International Coal Report. London.
QCB - Queensland Coal Board. Annual Report. Brisbane.
Many new mines in the 1980s had multiple contracts to ensure 
their future sales and cashflow. New coking coal mines like
German Creek, Gregory and Oaky Creek in Queensland and Line
Creek and Greenhills in Canada illustrate this pattern (Table 
7.5). In each case contracts were signed to account for 
virtually the full production capacity of the mine.
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New steam coal mines like Drayton, Hunter Valley, Mt. Thorley, 
Saxonvale, Warkworth, Coal Valley and Obed Marsh followed the 
same pattern. The buyers include steel mills which use the 
coal as a soft or semi-soft coking coal for blending with 
higher priced hard coking coals (Table 7.6). In these cases, 
the mines spread their sales among several industries with 
buyers typically including electric power companies, steel 
mills, cement manufacturers and general industry with coal 
fired boilers. The range of buyers is thus diversified on the 
basis of country, industry and keiretsu.
Table 7.6; New steam and soft coking coal mines (1980s) 
with diverse long term contracts*
mine
Drayton
buyers under long term contracts
Hokkaido EPC, Mitsui Mining, Shikoku EPC, 
Toyo Soda, Kepco, CEGB, Kyushu EPC
Hunter Valley Mitsubishi Chem, W.Germany, Kyushu EPC, NCSC,
Ube Ind, Hong Kong Electric, Kepco, NEB, EFO
Warkworth 
Coal Valley
Obed Marsh
El Cerrejon 
(Carbocol) 
El Cerrejon 
(Intercor)
Clarence
Newlands
Saxonvale
Ulan
Gencor
JSM, Mitsubishi Chem, EPDC, Hokuriku EPC, 
Mitsubishi MC
Ontario Hydro, W.Germany, Chugoku EPC, 
Hokkaido EPC, Ono Cement, Toyo Soda, Ube Ind
Kepco, Taipower, ATIC, Denmark, Chugoku EPC
China L&P, Cementos Panama, Electric Fuels C, 
NCSC, ATIC, Carboex, CEGB, EFO, Finnish Sugar
St.Johns RPP, Elkraft, Elsam, ^ESB, Fincoal
Kepco, NCSC, Taipower, ATIC
Shikoku, Sumitomo, China L&P, NEB, Taio Paper
Mitsui Mining, Oji Paper, Shikoku EPC, EPDC, 
Sumitomo Cement, Onoda Cem, Tepco, Tohoku EPC
Chugoku EPC, Denmark, Hokkaido EPC, Kyushu EPC, 
Mitsubishi MC, Tohoku EPC, Kepco, PNOC
Enel, Hokuriku EPC, Volkswagen
Shell SA Enel, Atic, GKE
Shell (Rietspruit) EPDC
Kangra Cementir, Enel
source: as for Table 7.5
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Old mines or old mining companies wishing to expand existing 
operations also used the same range of diverse contracts to 
support their increase in operations in the 1980s (Table 7.7) . 
The role of the CQCA mines in central Queensland as coking 
coal supplies to the steel mills of Asia and Europe was well 
established in the 1970s. In the 1980s new contracts were 
signed with consumers in the Middle East and Eastern Europe to 
diversify markets further. At the same time, exports to 
traditional buyers like the JSM were extended beyond the end 
of the original contract. In the case of old NSW coal 
producers the JSM sometimes signed a series of five year 
contracts, but by the 1980s the more common practice was 
simply to continue the trading relationship on an annual 
basis.
The prevalence of signing multiple long term contracts to sell 
the output of new or expanded mines in the 1980s was expected 
to guarantee mine operators a future cashflow. However, the 
prices, volumes and even duration of contracts was found to be 
variable in the mid 1980s. Supply grew faster than demand and 
prices fell. In many cases price escalation clauses were 
abandoned. In some cases, higher cost mines closed as they 
were unable to cover costs at prevailing price levels. The 
result of this experience was that long term contracts lost 
their value as guarantees of future cashflow and only provided 
a framework for annual renegotiations. The independent value 
of a contract was under question. Rather than view the 
contract as the complete definition of a trading relationship, 
it was increasingly viewed as simply another form of quasi­
integration.
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Table 7.7: Old mines (prel980) with diverse long term
contracts 10
mine
Bayswater 
CQCA (various)
buyers under long term contracts 
Sumitomo, Chugoku EPC, CEGB, Kepco
ATIC, British Steel, Cockerill, 
Italsider, Mimex 
(Blackwater) JSM, A1 Nasr, China Steel, Pohang
(Goonyella) JSM, Pohang, China Steel
(Norwich Park) JSM, China Steel, Pohang 
(Peak Downs) JSM 
JSM(Saraji)
Lemmington
Lithgow
Moura
Balmer 
Balmer ox 
Coal Mountain 
Fording R 
Luscar 
Smoky River 
Witbank
JSM, EPDC, Kyushu EPC, China L&P, EFO
EPDC, Chugiku EPC, Hokkaido EPC,
Kyushu EPC, ATIC, CEGB, Sumitomo Metal
JSM, Chugoku EPC, Hokkaido EPC 
Hokuriku EPC
JSM, Energy Factors, Siderbras,
British Steel, Elkraft 
Sumitomo Metal
Sumitomo Metal, China Cement
JSM, Kepco, Pohang, Siderchil, Siderbras
JSM, Ontario Hydro
JSM, China Steel, Pohang
JSM, NCSC, CdF, CdF Energie, Enel, EPDC
Weglokoks (First Maya) JSM
Weglokoks Siderbras, Austrian el, EFO, GKE,
Elkraft, Enel, Hoogovens
Cook
Ermelo
Bloomfield
Pohang, Ssangyong 
EPDC, Hokuriku EPC 
Tohoku EPC, Toyo Soda
A&B (Western Blend) Nippon Cement
A&B (Invincible) China L&P, Shell, ATIC, CEGB, Denmark
Macquarie
Miller
Wambo
Idemitsu, Tohoku EPC, Taio Paper
JSM, EPDC, Kepco, Pohang
Chugoku EPC, Hokkaido EPC,
Nippon Cement, Shikoku EPC
source: as for Table 7.5
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7.4.2 Contracts as a form of quasi-integration
Long term contracts are frequently studied as a form of quasi­
integration where they establish a stronger relationship 
between the buyer and seller than that under arm's length or 
spot market transactions (O'Cruz 1980; Joskow 1985; Williamson 
1979). All long term contracts can be considered to form an 
extended relationship between the trading partners. However, 
this section examines those long term contracts where the 
contract reinforces or supports another form of quasi­
integration, especially loans from the consumer or minority 
equity investment by the consumer.
Another measure of the degree of integration between two 
trading partners is the proportion of the party's trade which 
goes to the partner. For example, where coal is exported to 
many buyers the degree of integration of the mine into a 
particular consumer's production system is limited. However, 
where all of a mine's output is purchased under a single 
contract the level of integration is high. Examples of both of 
these arrangements are found in the coal trade.
The link between contracts and consumer-producer loans was 
identified earlier where the repayment of loans from the JSM 
was implemented by reducing the coal price by a fixed amount. 
Although the USA-JSM coking coal trade is large and has 
continued for over four decades, most of it is conducted 
without long term contracts. Instead, new contracts are 
negotiated each year. The trading result may be similar to 
that achieved under long term contracts with some producers 
exporting coal continuously for many years. The system is 
generally neither restricted nor secured by long term 
contractual obligations. Where long term contracts exist 
between the JSM and American suppliers, they are sometimes 
associated with producer loans as well (Table 7.8).
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Table 7.8; Long term contracts between American coal 
companies and the Japanese steel mills
mine buyer loan contract 
start end
•ooot
tonnage
Caribbean JSM 1972 1982 180
CCB (Keystone) : JSM 1967 1981 400
FCCI (Cerro) JSM y 1975 1987 1000
Consol (Rowland) JSM 1977 1979 600
Ellsworth JSM 1985 1987
FCCI (Stott) JSM 1984 1995 600
ICC (Beatrice) JSM 1974 1988 1000
ICC (Vir. Pocahontas 4) JSM y 1974 1988 1800
Jim Walter (Blue Creek) JSM y 1979 1993 2600
Kellerman JSM 1970 1983 800
Lancashire JSM y 1972 1986 700
Mulga JSM y 1975 1985 900
Pittston MV & BS JSM 1977 1988 5500
Sewanee JSM 1970 1981 900
note: y = yes consumer-producer loan arranged 
source: as for Table 7.5
In addition to the supporting use of loans and contracts to 
integrate mines and consumers, small equity holdings are also 
used. Joint ventures in Australia and Canada were studied 
earlier to identify where consumers integrated backward by 
taking equity interests in mines. The signing of long term 
contracts reinforces this relationship and examples are 
identified in Table 7.9.
Two groups of mines immediately appear where equity and 
contracts are used to link coal mines and consumers. In 
several cases, the mine only has a long term contract with 
its partial parent. The degree of integration is considered 
much higher in these cases because of the greater degree of 
dependence which the mine has on the consumer. The Canadian 
examples of Gregg River and Quintette demonstrate this type 
of close relationship. The mines are effectively dedicated to 
the supply of a single customer.
The JSM were also the dominant purchasers of most Australian 
coking coals in the 1960s and 1970s. Not surprisingly, new 
mines in the 1980s like Bullmoose, Collinsville, Curragh and 
Riverside also depended upon sales to the Japanese steel
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mills. Other contracts were sometimes gained, but the JSM 
remained of primary importance.
Table 7.9; Selected mines with single or dominant long term 
contracts
mine form of buyer 
integration
contract 
start end tonnage
Coal Cliff JSM
JSM
1968
1974
1973
1986
1500
2600
Cerrejon (central) Carboex 1982 1987 700
Collinsville JSM 1984 1998 1000
Curragh ET JSM
Lukavac
1984
198?
1986
It
1500
200
Dombarton ET
ET
ET
Mitsubishi Chem 
Mitsubishi Chem 
Mitsubishi Chem
1969
1977
1982
1976
1981
1986
280
150
105
Huntley JSM 1971 1975 200
Riverside ET JSM 1983 1997 3300
South Blackwater JSM
China L&P
1970
1985
1984
1987
1500
250
South Bulli JSM
JSM
1969
1974
1973
1978
1400
1300
Wollondilly JSM 1974 1978 3000
Bullmoose ET JSM 1983 1997 1700
Gregg River ET, EC JSM 1983 1998 2100
Quintette ET, EC JSM 1983 1997 5000
Vickery Creek JSM 1967 1981 1000
Devco Siderbras 198? It 200
Kuznetsky L JSM 1979 1998 1000
Neryungrinsky L JSM 1983 1998 5500
Blair Athol 
Clutha
EC
EC
EPDC
JCD
Shikoku EPC
1984
1984
1984
1998
199?
2003
3000
2000
200
note: EC = equity held by consumer, ET = equity by trader 
L = loan from consumer or consuming country lender 
source: as for Table 7.5
In other cases, a mine might only have one coking coal 
contract, but also sell its output as steam coal. Numerous 
Hunter Valley mines fit this pattern^*. Their dependence upon
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the single coking coal contract is thus reduced because of 
alternative sales to other industries (often under different 
brand names and meeting different quality specifications).
Coal is also sold under annual or spot contracts and in many 
cases these transactions are repeated year after year. When 
these transactions are repeated their distinction from long 
term contracts becomes blurred. This is especially the case in 
the coal trade where most prices are renegotiated annually, 
even if a long term contract governs the transaction. Even in 
the USA domestic steam coal market, Joskow (1987) concluded 
that coal prices under long term contracts generally followed 
the market trend (despite noted rigidities or imperfections). 
In this context, long term contracts become little more than 
an expression of interest in a specified volume of trade while 
the price fixing provisions are over-ruled on the basis of an 
equity review clause.
Disputes over long term contracts can arise when prices vary 
from that prevailing in the market. A difference of $5 between 
contract and spot prices was argued by the Japanese to be 
sufficient to invoke an equity review clause (AFR 
1984.4.9:17).
Arbitration cases resulted with the JSM and Quintette going 
to arbitration in Vancouver while Taipower and P&C Bituminous 
went to the International Chamber of Commerce arbitration 
centre in Paris. In both cases the buyers sought a substantial 
reduction in price. More frequently, a solution was negotiated 
between the two parties. For example, the Blair Athol contract 
called for EPDC and JCD to import most of the mine's output 
(up to Smtpa) from the mine beginning in 1984. Their demand 
was lower than expected and they wanted both a reduction in 
tonnage and price. In the end the contract price was paid for 
the first couple years and then the price was lowered to 
competitive levels. In addition, EPDC helped find alternative 
buyers through its contacts in the Asian electricity industry 
(AFR 1984.4.9:17).
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The recession of the early 1980s reduced demand below 
contracted levels. This combined with increased coal 
production to reduce international prices. Many long term 
contracts were renegotiated with both prices and tonnage being 
cut (Figure 7.2). In the case of JSM contracts, many 
established suppliers had their volumes cut in half while 
prices in $US fell by 25 per cent.
Figure 7.2: Contract volume by age of contract 
Japanese coking coal contracts
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The pattern of trade volumes falling below originally agreed 
levels is not simply a feature of oversupply in the 1980s. 
Contracts in the 1970s also had volumes cut. The overall 
pattern is for performance to decline with age (Figure 7.2), 
although the reasons for the decline may vary. In the high 
price context of 1976, suppliers may be able to get higher 
prices in other markets and want to reduce the tonnage 
committed under long term contracts. The same argument applies 
to consumers in the low price setting of 1987 when supplies
2 5 9
were abundant, phey may seek to lower volume commitments in 
order to purchase cheaper coal from other sources. Volume 
reductions may also be used to facilitate the diversification 
of supply when demand levels are static. Finally, volumes may 
be cut because of production problems at either the mine or 
mill.
Despite the mixed experience in the fulfilment of long term 
contracts, they are expected to remain an important feature 
of international coal trade in the 1990s. Long term contracts 
are especially important as part of the financial arrangements 
for new coal projects. As a result, consumers who expect to 
expand their demand in the 1990s or who want to increase their 
supply security! also place greater importance on long term 
contracts in the 1990s (Table 7.10). Steam coal consumers in 
Japan and electric utilities in southern Europe illustrate the 
higher (above average) importance attached to long term 
contracts in the future.
Table 7.10: Suitability of long term contracts and joint
ventures to establish new coal supplies, 1980-95
respondent joint venture long term contract
1980 1987 1995 1980 1987 1995
Japanese groups
steel mills 1.5 3.5 3.5 1 3 3.5
mining companies 2.5 3.5 4 3 4 3.5
steam coal groups 3 3.5 3.3 2 2.5 2.3
electricity cos 3 4 3.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
general industry 3.5 3.5 3.5 2 2 2
oil companies 3 2.5 2.5 2 1.5 2.5
sogo shosha 3 4 3 2 4 2
European groups
electric utilities
northern Europe 5 5 5 3 3 3
southern Europe 5 5 3 1 1 1.5
cement companies 5 5 5 5 5 5
key: 1 = very suitable 2 = above average suitability
3 = average suitability 4 = below average suitability 
5 = not suitable
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The extensive use of long term contracts and minority equity 
investments in the coal trade has been demonstrated. These 
arrangements are argued to form part of the structures which 
shape trade patterns to the advantage of some parties. The 
impact of these arrangements on trade prices and volumes needs 
to be tested to verify or refute these arguments.
7.5 The impact of quasi-integration on trade
The identification of supply location (country or region) was 
demonstrated to provide a better explanation of coal prices 
than that based on coal quality alone (chapter 4). Coals from 
different countries received different prices. The purchase of
coal from these diverse supply locations was shown to be a
i
persistent objective of consumers and structures were used to 
facilitate the investment and finance required to bring new 
sources into operation. However, not all mines received the 
loans, long term contracts and minority equity investments 
identified above. These forms of quasi-integration are argued 
to be significant in shaping coal trade patterns not only in 
response to the price differences identified, but also because 
of the impact they have on trade flows directly.
7.5.1 Quasi-integration and price
The impact of quasi-integration on price is generally expected 
to depend on whether prices are rising or falling, or the 
stage of the business cycle (Vernon 1966) . In the case of 
short supply and rising prices quasi-integration may protect 
the buyer from rapid price increases. The price of coal traded 
between quasi-integrated companies would be expected to be 
below that received by independent mines. The opposite pattern 
is expected when supplies are abundant and prices decline. 
Quasi-integration should protect producers, at least in part, 
from rapid price cuts. Their prices should be higher than 
those received by independent mines. In each case, quasi­
integration is expected to delay the impact of market changes
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on the affiliated firms. The extent of this protection to 
trade partners is reduced by the transition to shorter term 
contract periods, like annual price negotiations, instead of 
longer term quasi-integration arrangements.
To measure the effect of quasi-integration on coal prices a 
series of quasi-integration variables were defined. The direct 
investment by Japanese consumers, mining companies and sogo 
shosha in mines which supply coal to Japan was represented by 
a series of dummy variables (EQCON, EQJMC and EQJSS, 
respectively). The size of the investment was represented by 
a similar series of variables measuring the percentage of 
equity owned by ; the Japanese investor (EPCON, EPJMC and EPJSS, 
respectively). Additional dummy variables were created to 
represent financial measures like loans, long term contracts, 
escalation clauses in long term contracts, the extension of 
trade after long term contracts expire and dependence upon a 
single or dominant contract (LOAN, LTC, ESP, LTCX, DEP 
respectively).
Other trade variables included the duration of the trade to 
date (YR), the original volume of the contract (OVOL) and the 
current volume of the contract (VOL) . The relationship between 
duration of the trade and price may be positive if a trading 
partnership is to be extended or supported, or it may be 
negative if new sources of supply are preferred over 
established suppliers. Similarly, the relationship between 
volume and price may be positive if the consumer wishes to 
promote large projects to achieve economies of scale or 
negative if the consumer prefers to promote smaller suppliers.
The analysis of coal transaction data thus offers answers to 
two sets of questions. First, does the data support the 
argument that quasi-integration affects the coal trade (the 
variables are significant)? Second, does the data demonstrate 
that quasi-integration has a negative effect on price in a 
rising market and a positive effect on price in a declining 
market?
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Quasi-integration was argued to be important to the Japanese 
coal trade by D* Cruz (1979). He compared coal quality, 
country of origin and quasi-integration variables to price 
and concluded that each of the three types of variables had 
a significant effect on price in the 1970s. Kittredge and 
Sivertson (1980) discussed the possible influence of quasi­
integration, but only included a variable for the term of the 
contract in their equation. They discussed the reduction of 
prices (transfer pricing) based on Japanese equity in or loan 
commitments to particular mines, but rejected this hypothesis 
indirectly. They concluded that Canadian coal prices were 
competitively priced (based on coal quality) in comparison to 
other international suppliers and did not test the impact of 
quasi-integration directly. The opposing conclusions of D'Cruz 
(1979) and Kittredge and Siverston (1980) regarding the effect 
of quasi-integration on coal prices demonstrate the need for 
further analysis.
This study provides a more detailed analysis of coal prices 
in the 1970s and the 1980s. More coal brands are included in 
the analysis than used by Kittredge and Siverston and more 
detailed variables are constructed than those used by D'Cruz. 
The D'Cruz conclusion that the effect of integration variables 
was significant, but small (accounting for 3% of price 
variation) in the 1970s was not supported by the more detailed 
analysis conducted in this study. Possible explanations for 
this difference in findings are that he used data for a longer 
time period, 1970-77 rather than the single year 1976, and his 
quality and source variables were more aggregated than those 
used in this study. In contrast to the aggregate analysis of 
the contribution of quasi-intégrâtion variables by D'Cruz, 
this study found none of the individual variables to be 
significant in predicting Japanese coking coal prices in 1976 
(Table 7.11). This result supports the Kittredge and Sivertson 
analysis of 1977 data.
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Table 7.11: Comparison of FOB price estimate equations
attributes quality q+source q+s+integration
1987 n=83 R2 .41 .86 .88
se ($/t) 6.65 3.24 3.01
1984 n=73 R2 .58 .73 .83
se ($/t) 5.40 4.28 3.39
1976 n=46 R2 .83 .87 no
se ($/t) 3.83 3.37 change
equations with integration variables:
1987 FOB = 35.24 + 33.37 NEBC + 1.93 CSN - .92 A + .0015 Vol
1984 FOB = 42.79 + 2.27 CSN +9.66 ESP +3.02 Can - .24 VM 
+8.18 NEBC
1976 FOB = 37.23 + 2.57 CSN + 8.21 USA + 5.29 Can - .20 VM 
no integration variables added
A = % Ash
Aus = Australia
CSN = Crucible Swelling Number
EPCON = % equity held by Japanese coal consumer
EPJMC = % equity held by Japanese mining company
EPJSS = % equity held by Japanese sogo shosha
EQCON = equity held by Japanese coal consumer
EQJMC = equity held by Japanese mining company
EQJSS = equity held by Japanese sogo shosha
ESP = price based on escalation clause
LTC = long term contract
LTCX = long term contract extension
M = % total moisture
NEBC = north east British Columbia
Ovol = original contract volume (*000t)
S = % total sulphur
Vol = contract volume ('OOOt)
VM = % volatile matter
A different conclusion was reached in the 1980s. The D'Cruz 
finding that quasi-integration variables provided significant 
explanations of variations in Japanese coal prices was 
supported by the analysis of transaction data for 1984 and 
1987. The use of escalation clauses in several long term 
contracts resulted in prices above those prevailing in
264
contracts with prices negotiated annually. This result 
supports the expectation that integration should result in 
higher prices when market prices fall. The importance of this 
variable could be understated in the equation because the 
higher prices received by mines in northeast British Columbia 
are also based on escalation clauses in contracts. However, 
the NEBC escalation clauses were being used at the same time 
as those in other contracts were abandoned and the security 
priority to diversify supply better explains the abnormally 
high NEBC prices.
The volume of coal contracted in 1987 also correlated with 
price indicating that the large scale mines established in 
the 1980s received preferential treatment. The questionnaire 
found that mine size and economies of scale declined from 
above average to below average importance to the JSM in the 
1980s, but is expected to return to average importance to the 
sogo shosha in the 1990s (Appendix D) . This is reflected in 
the relatively small effect the variable has on the equation. 
(The explanation for price variation is improved by 2%.)
The overall result of including quasi-integration variables 
in the coal price equation is that over 80% of the variation 
in prices is accounted for and the estimation of prices is 
improved markedly. The standard error of the estimated price 
declined from $5-6/t in the quality only equation to $3/t in 
the full equation. The result is a more complex equation, but 
a better prediction of coal prices.
The improved explanation of coal prices by recognising quasi­
integration variables is not only found in the equations for 
all coking coals imported by Japan. The two major groups of 
coking coals (hard and soft/semi-soft) also demonstrate marked 
improvements in the fit between the regression equations and 
prices when quasi-integration variables are included (Tables 
7.12 and 7.13).
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Table 7.12: Comparison of FOB price estimate equations for
hard coking coals imported into Japan
attributes quality q+source q+s+integration
1987 n=40 R2 .00 .87 .88
se ($/t) ' 2.97 2.82
1984 n=50 R2 .14 .42 .67
se ($/t) 5.70 4.66 3.50
1976 n=31 R2 .69 .78 no
se ($/t) 2.97 2.49 change
equations with integration variables:
1987 FOB = 45.36 + 30.18 NEBC -1.28 M + 1.12 CSN +.69 EPJMC
1984 FOB = 72.80 + 10.39 ESP - .37 VM - .56 M + 11.00 EQJMC 
- .65 A
1976 FOB = 63.39 + 7.96 USA - .21 VM - .78 A + 3.58 Can 
no integration variables added
Although the 1976 equation for hard coking coal prices was 
not improved by quasi-integration variables, escalation 
clauses and the north east British Columbia regional variable 
were the most important factor to explain price variations in 
1984 and 1987, respectively. In addition, the variables for 
equity investment by Japanese mining companies were 
significant. Both Quintette and Warkworth received higher 
prices than that predicted by their coal quality and direct 
minority investment provides an explanation.
The soft and semi-soft coking coals cover a wide range of 
coals not conventionally considered as coking coal. An 
interesting illustration of this change in the role of coal 
in the blast furnace is demonstrated by the value placed on 
volatile matter. Whereas volatile matter has a negative value 
in conventional coking coal because it vaporises and does not 
form part of the coke to support the blast furnace mixture, it 
has a positive value as a source of energy because it oxides 
first. Thus when semi-soft coals replace oil as the source of 
energy in the blast furnace, volatile matter has a positive 
value (as in the 1987 equation).
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Table 7.13; Comparison of FOB price estimate equations for
soft and semi-soft coking coals imported into Japan
attributes quality q+source q+s+integration
1987 n=43 R2 .56 .72 no
se ($/t) 1.80 1.44 change
1984 n=21 R2 .78 no .94
se ($/t) 1.57 change 0.82
1976 n=17 R2 .90 no .93
se ($/t) 0.92 change 0.78
equations with integration variables:
1987 FOB = 33.63 +.79 CSN -.88 A -6.63 Col +.17 VM -2.17 SA 
no integration variables added
1984 FOB = 53.15 + .66 CSN + .12 YR - 4.94 SA - .78 M
1976 FOB = 42.81 + 1.64 CSN - 1.37 M - .0089 Ovol
The most important variable to explain price variation was 
the CSN in each year. However, non-quality variables were also 
significant. The size of original contract volumes had a 
negative coefficient in 1976. Premiums were paid for small 
contracts of extra coal while the large scale mines (often 
with long term contracts) received lower prices. By 1984 the 
duration of a contract or trading relationship was positively 
correlated with price indicating that the positive value 
placed on new sources of supply had changed and that new semi- 
soft coking coals had to be offered at a lower price to 
displace old brands. This numerical finding supports the 
change in attitudes identified in the consumer survey.
By 1987 no integration variables were significant predictors 
of soft and semi-soft coking coal prices. This supports the 
general view that this segment of the market was extremely 
competitive at this time. Abundant supplies were available and 
fixed prices offered for a wide range of semi-soft coking 
coals. However, the differences identified in prices at the 
national level remained significant. Given these changes in 
the determinants of soft and semi-soft coal prices, a similar 
pattern may emerge among steam coals.
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Table 7.14: Comparison of FOB price estimate equations for
steam coals imported into Japan
attributes quality q+source q+s+integration
1987 n=31 R2 .13 .46 .71
se ($/t) 3.74 2.95 2.18
1984 n=27 R2 .16 .57 .67
se ($/t) 5.07 3.64 3.16
1980 n=21 R2 .22 .42 .58
se ($/t) 4.00 3.46 2.95
equations with integration variables:
1987 FOB = -35.99 + 15. 89 Can + .0089 Kcal + 11.17 Esp
+ 4.Ô7 USSR + .15 VM
1984 FOB = 33.90 - 7.48 SA - 6.97 USSR + 1.16 EPCON + .25 V]
1980 FOB = 26.35 - 9.49 SA + 6.14 EQCON + .26 VM
The improvements in coking coal price prediction equations 
made by quasi-integration variables are even more pronounced 
in the steam coal trade. The poor predictions offered by 
quality variables were improved by country of supply variables 
(chapter 4), but the equations created above demonstrate the 
need for integration variables as well. The use of the 
escalation clause in the Blair Athol contract was still 
important in 1987. In 1984 the higher price received by Blair 
Athol is attributed to the 10% equity holding of the Japanese 
electricity utilities. Other investments by consumers in CAID 
mines in NSW were also associated with higher prices. These 
higher prices were predicted as an outcome of quasi­
integration in the context of declining coal prices in 1984. 
However, the positive influence of equity on price in 1980 
conflicts with the expected lower prices in the rapidly 
growing market. Instead, CAID was able to negotiate higher 
prices from its Japanese consumers^\
An even better test of the importance of integration rather 
than quality alone can be made by comparing coals from the
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competitive supply countries of Australia, South Africa and 
Canada. These countries supply most of the steam coal imported 
by Japan and also provide data on more steam coal qualities 
(eight rather than five variables) . The result is that an 
equation can be constructed to account for almost all of the 
variations in coal prices in the 1980s (Table 7.15). However, 
these equations include quasi-integration variables rather 
than a longer list of coal qualities. Each equation contained 
only one or two of the eight coal quality variables. To 
achieve a 99% prediction of price variation and reduce the 
standard error of price estimates from $3/t to $0.3/t, country 
of supply and quasi-integration variables were essential.
Additional integration variables reinforced the escalation 
clause and consumer investment variables discussed before. In 
1984 both the existence of a long term contract and investment 
by sogo shosha had a positive influence on price. These 
findings support the argument that quasi-integration reduced 
the fall in prices for mines with these arrangements. This 
indicates that the Japanese consumers did not benefit 
unconditionally from their special investment, finance and 
contracting arrangements with mines. Benefits were derived 
from the expansion of supply capacity and the resulting fall 
in price. However, those mines with quasi-integration 
connections to Japanese consumers and traders suffered less in 
terms of price cuts than the independent mines.
The most important variables to predict steam coal prices in 
the 1980s were location or source of supply variables. This 
demonstrates the fragmented nature of the trade with the 
smaller price variations explained by quasi-integration 
arrangements and coal quality. However, price is not the only 
feature of interest. Contract duration is also important to 
the cashflow of a project.
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Table 7.15; Comparison of FOB price estimate equations for
steam coals with eight quality variables
attributes quality q+source q+s+integration
1987 n=19 R2 .23 .91 .99
se ($/t) 3.01 1.06 0.32
1984 n—16 R2 .71 .97 .99
se ($/t) 2.96 1.01 0.34
1980 n=21 R2 .22 .42 .58
se ($/t) 4.00 3.46 2.95
equations with integration variables:
1987 FOB = -5.44 +16.23 Can +3.09 Aus +.0047 Kcal +8.91 ESP
1984 FOB = 48.14 - 8.62 SA + 8.34 Can - 2.60 S - .28 A
+ 6.76 ESP + .70 LTC + .052 EPJSS
1980 FOB = 26.35 - 9.49 SA + 6.14 EQCON + .26 VM
7.5.2 Quasi-integration and contract duration
The linkage between contract duration and sogo shosha 
investment is strongly demonstrated by the Japanese coking 
coal trade. Quasi-integration is argued to promote contract 
duration (Joskow 1987) and the Japanese linkages identified 
earlier provide a substantive data set to test the hypothesis.
Of the 516 transactions arranged by sogo shosha in 1976, 51% 
were still active in 1987 (Table 7.16). However, the 
percentage of transactions remaining active over the 11 year 
period is much higher among those from mines with sogo shosha 
investment. Purchases of coal from these mines were still 
being made in 66% of the cases while only 47% of the 
transactions for coal from independent mines remained active. 
This finding supports the argument that sogo shosha promote 
brands which they have an equity interest in. Alternatively, 
they may have made good decisions in selecting the most viable
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mines when investment was made. In either case, the 
participation of sogo shosha in a joint venture achieved 
longer term cashflows for the project.
Table 7.16: Contract duration and sogo shosha investment
sogo shosha equity 
in mine
# transactions 
in 1976 active 
in 1987
duration
1976-87
%
Mitsubishi yes 57 51 89
no 52 27 52
Mitsui yes 12 9 75
no 89 61 69
Marubeni yes 1 1 100
no 79 25 32
C.Itoh yes 22 6 27
no 36 11 31
Nissho Iwai yes 19 6 32
no 30 8 27
Toyo Menka yes 0 0
no 44 19 43
Sumitomo yes 1 1 100
no 36 21 58
Nichimen yes 0 0
no 31 16 52
Kanematsu Gosho yes 0 0
no 7 3 43
sogo shosha yes 112 74 66
no 404 191 47
total 516 265 51
source: contract data
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7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated the importance of finance in 
the expansion of global coal trade in the 1980s. The financial 
structure is used to create credit and provide loans for 
investment in new projects. These loans can be forms of 
'quasi-integration* where they are offered as part of an 
integrated package which includes minority equity holdings, 
long term contracts and loans from consumers to producers. In 
these cases, the mine is often dependent upon a single 
consumer or national industry. The resulting coal trade thus 
forms part of an integrated system where elements of the 
production, security and financial structures are combined to 
support an integrated trading network. The Japanese policy of 
develop and import projects based on *loans-cum-purchases* 
provides numerous examples of this integrated approach.
These quasi-integration links also contribute to the trade 
pattern with integrated mines receiving significantly higher 
prices and longer contract duration in the 1980s. Contract 
data for hard coking coal, soft/semi-soft coking coal and 
steam coal all demonstrate the importance of quasi-integration 
to improve the prediction of coal prices and better understand 
the persistence of coal trade patterns with significant price 
differentials.
The financial structure can also offer loans to projects 
independent of their links with the production structure. Once 
again long term contracts are considered an important part of 
the financial package. They are used to ensure future cashflow 
and loan repayments. Despite the experience of only partial 
fulfilment of many long term contract provisions in the 1980s, 
it is expected that they will continue to be an important part 
of the process of financing new mines in the 1990s.
Finally, the growing importance of the financial structure is 
demonstrated by its dominant role in financing new capital 
investment and the takeover of existing coal companies. As a
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result, the financial structure can also emerge as a 
conflicting interest group to established parties in the 
production structure. Both cooperation and conflict were found 
among the major parties in the global coal trade. This mixture 
of conflict and cooperation explains how the coal trade is 
fragmented from a uniform global exchange into specialised 
sets of transactions meeting different trade objectives.
Cooperation or coordination among trade structures is best 
illustrated by the sogo shosha who invest in the production 
structure, arrange loans and contracts as part of the 
financial structure and promote diversity of supply as part 
of the security structure. To achieve these many objectives, 
the sogo shosha specialise as collectors and users of 
information. This central importance of information in the 
coal trade is investigated next.
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Endnotes:
1. The financial structure was divided into two sections by 
Strange (1988). The first component creates credit and is 
exemplified by banks. However, the banks' desire to extend 
increasing amounts of credit is limited by government 
regulation (to limit the instability of the credit system and 
control inflation). Another influence over the creation of 
credit is the link between the financial and production 
structures. Loans may be made by consumers to the producers of 
raw materials which they import. Alternatively, loans may be 
made independent of the production structure to create new 
trade partners or new corporate entities with increased market 
power.
The second component of the international financial structure 
is the exchange rate system where the relative strength of 
different currencies is determined by a combination of 
government and market decisions. In this study, the creation 
of credit is of more interest than the regulation of exchange 
rates. Exchange rates affect the competitive position of mines 
in different countries, but the fragmentation of coal trade 
prices demonstrated in Chapter 4 indicates that this is not as 
central a point in the analysis as expected by the 
conventional least cost trade model.
2. The source of this data is the annual financial survey of 
the Australian coal industry conducted by Coopers & Lybrand 
for the Australian Coal Association. Respondents to the survey 
account for 80-90% of Australian coal production (excluding 
that from electric utility mines). Although incomplete, it 
provides the most comprehensive view of industry finance 
available.
3. In addition to the CQCA joint venture, BMP acquired 100% 
ownership of Utah International's American coal mines and 
other international holdings.
4. Blackwater 1.4mtpa, Goonyella 4.1mtpa, Gregory 1.94mtpa, 
Moura 1.6mtpa, Norwich Park 1.Smtpa, Peak Downs 3.Omtpa and 
Saraji 2.7mtpa (Coal Manual 1985).
5. The Bank of Montreal and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
were the Canadian leading banks while Credit Lyonnais was the 
French leading bank (Coal Manual 1985:303).
6. Despite the intense demand for capital in Japan for post­
war reconstruction, a loan was made to India in 1954 to fund 
$8 million of Japanese equipment purchases for the $50 million 
Rourkela iron ore mine (D'Cruz 1979:108).
7. Mitsui Bank was also the leading bank in arranging the 
finance of the Blair Athol coal mine in Queensland. Neither 
Mitsui & Co nor Mitsui Mining invested in the project. 
However, Mitsui & Co was one of the three sogo shosha 
importing the coal to Japan and the bank's financial 
activities complemented this trading role (Edgington 1988:197; 
Coal Manual 1985:465).
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8. contract details for Table 7.5 are as follows:
mine buyer contract 
start end tonnage
BHP (Gregory) JSM 1980 1995 1900
China Steel 1982 1996 250
Pohang 1980 1994 500
China L&P 198? It 120
German Creek JSM 1982 1991 1500
China Steel 1982 1991 300
Cockerill 1982 It 100
Iran 1983 It 300
Pohang 1982 1991 200
Siderbras 1982 1991 200
British Steel 1982 1991 800
Ensidesa 1982 1991 300
Oaky Creek JSM 1983 1985 500
Ensidesa 1983 1990 500
Hoogovens 198? It 500
Italsider 1983 1990 700
Greenhills JSM 1983 1986 750
China L&P 1983 1985 250
China Steel 1983 1990 300
Kepco 1983 It 350
Pohang 1983 2002 500
Elkraft 1982 1991 300
Line Creek JSM 1983 1997 1000
Kepco 1982 It 750
note: tonnage is typical for the period, but does not
represent smaller uptakes in the first couple years
9'. contract details for Table 7.6 are as follows:
mine buyer contract
start end tonnage
Drayton Hokkaido EPC 1985 1994 300
Mitsui Mining 1983 1987 200
Shikoku EPC 1984 1988 100
Toyo Soda 1983 1987 150
Kepco 1983 It 500
CEGB 1988 1990 400
Kyushu EPC 1983 1991 180
Hunter Valley Mitsubishi Chem 1979 1998 400
W .Germany 1979 1991 300
Kyushu EPC 1988 1997 300
Ube Ind 1979 1998 750
NCSC 1980 2009 500
Hong Kong Electric 1981 It 400
Kepco 1981 It 250
NEB 198? It 120
EFO 198? It 500
Warkworth JSM 1981 1991 500
Mitsubishi Chem 1981 1991 50
EPOC 1981 1991 500
Hokuriku EPC 1984 1987 220
Mitsubishi MC 1981 1991 500
Coal Valley Ontario Hydro 198? It 1800
W .Germany 1982 1986 450
Chugoku EPC 1982 1986 150
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9. contd
mine
buyer contract
start end tonnage
Obed Marsh
El Cerrejon 
(Carbocol)
El Cerrejon 
(Intercor)
Clarence
Newlands
Saxonvale
Ulan
Gencor 
Shell SA
Shell (Rietspruit) 
Kangra
Hokkaido EPC 1982 1986 200
Ono Cement 1982 1986 200
Toyo Soda 1982 1986 100
Ube Ind 1982 1986 500
Kepco 1983 It
Taipower 1983 It
ATIC 1983 1986 500
Denmark 1983 1985 500
Chugoku EPC 1984 1988 500
China L&P 1987 1996 1000
Cementos Panama 1985 1990 36
Electric Fuels Corp 1985 1989 500
NCSC 1986 1990 1000
ATIC 1985 1987 1000
ATIC 1988 1991 900
Carboex 1985 1987 600
CEGB 1988 1990 400
EFO 1985 1990 300
Finnish Sugar 1985 1987 25
St.Johns RPP 1987 1999 800
Elkraft 1986 1990 600
Elsam 1985 1990 2000
ESB 1986 1992 400
Fincoal 1985 1987 400
Kepco 1982 It 450
NCSC 1980 2013 500
Taipower 1984 It 300
ATIC 1980 1986 500
Shikoku 1984 1988 200
Sumitomo 1984 1988 100
China L&P 1984 It 400
NEB 198? It 120
Taio Paper 
Mitsui Mining
1988 1990 150
1982 1991 110
Oji Paper 1982 1991 40
Shikoku 1982 1991 50
Sumitomo Cement 1982 It 400
Onoda Cement 1982 It 200
Tepco 1984 1988 200
EPDC It 1988 200
Tohoku EPC 1984 1988 50
Chugoku EPC 1980 1987 400
Den 1981 1986 50
Hokkaido 1984 2004 200
Kyushu 1988 2007 200
Mitsubishi MC 1981 1987 100
Tohoku EPC 1983 2003
Kepco 1982 It 600
PNOC 198? It 700
Enel 198? It 300
Hokuriku 1984 It 220
Volkswagen 1985 1989 190
Enel 197? It 1000
Atic It 1987 plOOO
GKE 198? It
EPDC 1981 1985
Cementir 198? +5
Enel 198? It 400
source: as for Table 7.5
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10. contract details for Table 7.7 are as follows:
mine buyer contract 
start end tonnage
Bayswater Sumitomo 1975 1984 300
Chugoku EPC 1987 1991 80
CEGB 1982 1986 300
Kepco 198? It 40
CQCA (various) ATIC 1978 1987 2000
British Steel 197? It
Cockerill 197? It 300
Italsider 197? It 1500
Mimex 198? It 800
CQCA (Blackwater) JSM 1968 1977 3200
A1 Nasr 1982 1984 300
China Steel It 1992 150
Pohang It 1986 200
CQCA (Goonyella) JSM 1971 1984 4000
JSM 1984 1986 2200
Pohang It 1986 200
China Steel 1976 1981 150
CQCA (Norwich Park) JSM 1980 1987 1300
China Steel 1979 1992 300
Pohang 1979 1986 200
CQCA (Peak Downs) JSM 1972 1984 3000
CQCA (Saraji) JSM 1975 1984 2700
Lemmington JSM 1974 1983 1100
EPDC 1983 1986 200
Kyushu EPC 1988 2013 300
China L&P 1987 1991 500
EFO 198? It 200
Lithgow EPDC 1980 1984 300
Chugiku EPC 1980 1984 400
Hokkaido EPC 1985 1994 100
Kyushu EPC 1989 1997 200
ATIC 1980 1985 300
CEGB 1980 1984 500
Sumitomo Metal 1974 1984 350
Moura JSM 1965 1977 4000
Chugoku EPC 1984 1988 400
Hokkaido EPC 1985 1994 150
Hokuriku EPC 1984 1993 165
Balmer JSM 1970 1984 4750
i JSM 1985 1990 2400
Energy Factors 1988 1992 100
Siderbras 1989 1994 300
British Steel 1985 It 150
Elkraft 1981 1989 300
Balmer ox Sumitomo Metal 1975 1984 100
Coal Mountain Sumitomo Metal 1975 1977 100
China Cement 1982 1987 500
Fording R JSM 1972 1986 3000
JSM 1987 1989 1500
Kepco 1981 It 200
Pohang It
Siderchil 1980 It 200
Siderbras It 200
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10. contd
mine
buyer contract
start end tonnage
Luscar
Smoky River
Witbank
Weglokoks (First Maya) 
Weglokoks
Cook
Ermelo
Bloomfield
A&B (Western Blend) 
A&B (Invincible)
Macquarie
Miller
Wambo
JSM 1970 1984 2000
JSM 1981 1990 2750
Ontario Hydro 198? It
JSM 1969 1984
JSM 1973 1974 1500
JSM 1975 1978 1500
China Steel 198? It 70
Pohang 1982 1986 200
Pohang 1987 1991 300
JSM 1972 1986 2700
NCSC 1983 It 800
CdF 198? It 400
CdF Energie 198? It 450
Enel 197? It 1000
Enel 1984 1991 1000
EPDC 1980 1984 300
JSM 1974 1976 1000
Siderbras 1980 It 2000
Austrian el 198? 1000
EFO 198? It 300
Elkraft 197? 1984 1000
Enel 197? It 1000
GKE 1980 1989 600
Hoogovens 1977 1986 400
Pohang 1983 1988 100
Ssangyong 1983 It 200
EPDC 1980 1984 300
Hokuriku EPC 1984 It 110
Tohoku EPC 1983 2002 200
Toyo Soda 1980 1984 80
Nippon Cement 1980 1984 500
China L&P 1982 It 200
Shell Aus 1983 It 500
ATIC 1983 1987 500
CEGB 1973 1987 750
Denmark 1983 1987 200
Idemitsu 1983 1997 400
Tohoku EPC 1981 1990 150
Taio Paper 1988 1990 150
JSM 1969 1974 1500
EPDC 1980 1984 300
Kepco 1983 It 600
Pohang 1983 It 500
Chugoku EPC 1980 1984 500
Hokkaido EPC 1985 1994 200
Nippon Cement 1980 1984 250
Shikoku 1984 1988 150
source: as for Table 7.5
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11. examples include:
coal brand buyer contract 
start end tonnage
Big Ben (Hunter Valley) 
Daiyon (Hunter Valley)
Gross Valley (S.Coast)
JSM 1975 1979 900
JSM 1969 1974
JSM 1976 1985 2000
JSM 1974 1983 100
CEGB 1976 1982 200
JSM 1969 1974 200
JSM 1974 1978 350
12. A similar pattern was found in the equations for GIF steam 
coal prices. Quasi-integration variables improved price 
prediction in each of the three years studied.
Table 7.A: Comparison of GIF price estimate equations for 
steam coals imported into Japan
attributes quality q+source q+s+integration
1987 n=31 R2 no .45 .65
se ($/t) equation 2.97 2.37
1984 n=27 R2 .24 .69 .77
se ($/t) 5.51 3.49 3.00
1980 n=21 R2 no no .20
se ($/t) equation equation 4.21
equations with integration variables:
1987 GIF = -20.04 + 17.97 Gan + .0085 Kcal +9.96 ESP
1984 GIF = 44.39 - 11.79 USSR - 4.02 SA + .97 EPGON + .31 VM 
- 4.85 S
1980 GIF = 48.04 + 7.73 EQGON
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Chapter 8 
The information structure:
Trade information and coordination
8.1 Introduction
'For too long, many academic economists have indulged 
themselves with static concepts of the * comparative
advantage theory' of foreign trade, and have totally 
avoided the importance of international marketing. ...the
intricate workings of foreign market intelligence
monitoring, as well as the complex logistics and finances
of foreign trade ... (that) pose formidable barriers-to- 
entry to exports.' (Tsurumi with Tsurumi 1984:1)
'If any single factor explains Japanese success, it is the 
group-directed quest for knowledge.' (Vogel 1979:27)
Information has value, even if it is not priced. The
acquisition of information and its treatment as a private 
rather than a public good illustrates this point. Indeed, 
information may be transferred from the private to public 
domain, but still hold significant value for the critical 
period when trade agreements are negotiated. Access to 
information is thus argued to be of central importance to the 
determination of trade patterns. This hypothesis stands in 
contrast to the classical economic assumption of perfect 
information.
Information and the structure whereby information is
collected, organised, transferred and applied to trade are 
usually ignored in trade studies. One of the notable 
exceptions is the Gaskin (1981) assessment of the European 
steam coal trade. He called for improved access to trade 
information by collecting and publishing contract data. 
Unfortunately, the recommendation was not implemented and
information is rarely made public, but treated as a private
commodity with specialised consultants and newsletters 
providing the best insights into European coal imports. 
Academic studies rarely incorporate contract details^ To 
overcome this deficiency, this chapter argues that information 
is a critical component in the trade process and the
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structures which collect and use market information are of 
vital concern in any study of trade patterns.
The specialised trade information structures identified in 
this chapter illustrate the central argument of the thesis; 
that trade patterns are shaped by several sets of structures 
rather than simple market or administrative principles alone. 
Indeed, the information structure is an essential means to 
achieve both the efficiency and the security/diversity of 
supply objectives identified earlier.
The information structure can be divided into three levels; 
beliefs, knowledge/information and channels of communication. 
As in the case of the financial structure, power in the 
information structure is important in both the negative and 
positive direction. The decision to withhold or restrict 
information is just as important as the positive decision to 
provide information (Strange 1988:115).
Changes in information channels have received more academic 
attention than other changes in the information structure^. 
However, this attention has been concentrated on the 
technology and changing use of satellite communication and 
computer storage and exchange of information. In this study, 
European and Japanese trading houses are identified as 
important information channels in the coal trade.
The structural model of trade incorporates information 
directly into the model. This stands in contrast to the 
traditional representation of trade in free market models 
which assume a frictionless market where transactions meet 
the objectives of perfectly informed buyers and sellers with 
no special arrangements. Clear distinctions are also made from 
the administrative model of internal transfers that are 
efficiently administered within a fully informed corporate 
entity. Both of these models are refuted in this chapter. 
Instead, the information structure can consist of specialised 
information owners who do not own the commodity traded, but 
use their information to promote and coordinate trade. The
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transaction between producer and consumer is argued to be 
complex, yet mutually beneficial.
The sogo shosha of Japan provide an excellent illustration of 
a specialised trade structure which coordinates information to 
create trade flows. They facilitate trade through the 
reduction of transaction costs, financial risk and trade 
uncertainty. One of the ways they achieve this is to create 
and coordinate complete product systems where economies of 
scale can be achieved to reduce unit costs. To better 
understand the role of these trading structures, the 
interaction between trading companies and their clients 
(consumers and producers) will be explored in detail.
8.2 Incorporating information in the trade model
*(Sogo shosha are) probably the world's most efficient 
marketing channel', (former US Secretary of Commerce Peter 
Peterson in Young 1979:xix)
Global coal trade has been shown to conform to neither the 
commodity market nor captive mine model. Instead, elements of 
both are found. On one hand, consumers pay different prices 
for coal from different countries, while on the other hand 
suppliers compete at the national level and in international 
spot markets. Some mines are integrated into the supply system 
of particular consumers, but the integration is not as 
complete as in domestic coal industries. Instead, several 
groups of consumers have established 'quasi-integration' 
systems where minority equity investment, special loans and 
long term contracts are used to support particular trade 
partnerships. This variety of structures in the global coal 
trade is further integrated by the establishment of a 
specialised trade information structure.
Specialised trading companies are argued to reduce transaction 
costs and unit (product) costs through the collection and use 
of information; first to facilitate a deal or agreed 
transaction and second to coordinate a stable trade delivery
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system. In this way, they share the interests of both parties 
to the transaction: costs are lowered and the client's
international competitive position enhanced. This specialised 
use of information for transaction cost reduction and system 
coordination is best understood by contrasting it with the two 
conventional trade models of frictionless markets and vertical 
integration.
Traders can be introduced into the conventional market model 
as distinct entities which perform the trading function of 
selling the coal to, or buying the coal from, the 
international market (Figure 8.1a,b). In this case the trader 
is a principal who owns the coal for a period of time. Gaskin 
(1981) illustrated how two types of traders (exporters and 
importers) are introduced into the conventional trade 
sequence. The trade process is simply divided into three 
specialised exchanges rather than the single exchange (from 
producer to consumer) considered before.
Exporters can buy coal from producers and then sell it on the 
international market. This pattern of exporters acting as 
principals in the trade is most common in the American coal 
industry where coal from several mines may be purchased and 
exported by a single exporter. Exporters also buy excess coal 
from large producers in many countries when the mining company 
has not arranged sales for all of its output. Importers 
operate in a similar manner by buying coal from international 
sources and then selling it to many smaller domestic 
consumers. The house and industrial coal markets of Europe 
have a long tradition of importers fulfilling this role. 
Importers may arrange the import of large shipments which are 
divided among many consumers or they may buy the excess coal 
from a large shipment when most of the cargo is committed to 
another buyer.
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Figure 8.1: Alternative models of trade and traders
A. Direct producer - consumer contracts
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consumerproducer
B. Independent traders
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D. Sogo shosha
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This pattern of dividing the coal trade into a series of 
transactions is simply a refinement of the market model and 
illustrates the specialisation of tasks and extension of 
markets advocated by Stigler (1951). Traders are able to 
operate profitably because they are able to buy large
quantities at low unit costs and then sell to small users at 
lower unit costs than the consumers could have negotiated on 
their own (but high enough to create profits for the trader). 
This type of trader is common in the European coal trade and 
accounts for their reputation of reaching the markets which no 
one else can supply.
The problem with increased market fragmentation and 
specialisation was pointed out by Coase (1937). Each
transaction in the marketplace has an inherent cost. By 
recognising the transaction cost of each exchange in the
marketplace, the incentive for creating organisations which 
integrate rather than separate tasks is found. The gain from 
integration is the reduction in transaction costs (including 
information collection, communication and partner searches) 
(Arrow 1975). The cost of conducting transactions is thus 
reduced to the internal (within the firm) cost of transfer 
(Coase 1988b:32). When transaction costs are high the
incentive to integrate vertically is also high (Figure 8.1c). 
In these cases, the trading function is often integrated with 
the production or consumption functions.
The large Australian, Canadian, South African and American 
coal producers often act as their own exporters or sellers. 
A marketing division or affiliated 'Coal Sales Company* is 
created to market the company's product. Large consumers often 
make a similar decision and use their purchasing division or 
an affiliated importer to arrange their supply needs. The 
increased European demand for steam coal in power stations in 
the late 1970s and 1980s was accompanied by the formation of 
several new coal importers to purchase coal on behalf of 
groups of domestic power companies. The structure of these 
consumer-importer configurations depended in part on the 
structure of the domestic power industry. Where the power
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industry was a domestic monopoly as in the case of the CEGB 
and Enel, the consumer held direct negotiations with coal 
suppliers. Where electricity generation was more fragmented, 
joint purchasing companies or importers like Caralec, Carboex, 
Elkraft, Elsam, GKE, and Pool des Calories were established to 
buy coal on behalf of a group of consumers.
In addition to the specialised exporters and importers noted 
above, many trading companies combine more than one part of 
the trade sequence. Some traders act as both the exporter and 
importer in the same transaction. Alternatively they will 
combine the trading role (typically importing) with shipping 
and short term financial arrangements. In this case they will 
buy the coal from the producer at an fob price and sell it to 
a consumer at a cif price equivalent to fob plus freight and 
the commission. When this is arranged on a 'back to back' 
basis the trader has paired contracts with a producer and a 
consumer and faces no risk (Gaskin 1981). In other cases, the 
traders assume more risk or market exposure by arranging fob, 
cif and freight prices independently. They use their market 
information to judge the best combination to meet consumer 
needs and generate a profit for themselves.
An alternative to the trader acting as a principal (buying 
and selling coal) and the integrated trader (part of a 
producer or consumer company) is the trader acting as an 
agent:
'(T)he agent brings the two parties together but is not 
involved in a contractual capacity in the movement of the 
coal. He may continue to act for one of the parties in 
monitoring coal shipments and handling documentation; but 
in the contract he is not involved as a principal, that 
is, at no point does he 'own' the coal.' (Gaskin 1981:12).
Because agents do not own the coal Gaskin excluded them from 
the transaction sequence in Figure 8.1. Instead a line of 
interest parallel to the transaction was drawn for the agent 
to illustrate how they connected the exporter to the consumer. 
The most developed group of agents are the sogo shosha. 
Although they do not own the coal, they assist in the 
transaction, frequently arrange the shipping, insurance,
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quality testing and even provide short term finance for the 
trade. In short, traders can adopt any of several roles in 
the coal trade.
The reason for the persistence of traders in the global coal 
trade is argued to be their ability to provide information 
services (including coordination) to producers and consumers. 
These services are important for several reasons. Information 
is an important means to achieve the consumer objectives 
identified earlier. In particular, the international 
information network of traders facilitates security objectives 
by diversifying supply sources without the consumers having to 
conduct international searches on their own. In this way, 
traders reduce transaction costs.
Transaction costs arise from a variety of sources; asset 
specificity, information costs, etc.  ^The sunk investment in 
any type of transaction specific asset (technology, plant, 
human capital, etc.) creates a string of potentially 
appropriable * quasi-rents * (the difference between anticipated 
and second best uses) which can be gained after the investment 
is made (Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978; Joskow 1985). One 
party can then 'hold up* the other to gain a larger share of 
these rents than that agreed in the original contract. 
Contracts are often designed to reduce this friction by 
specifying long term volumes and prices, but these provisions 
have become increasingly flexible (less binding) (chapter 7) .
Given the inability of contracts to overcome the problems 
created by transaction costs, the role of trading companies 
reducing these costs warrants attention. For example, trading 
companies can reduce the information cost of searching for 
diverse trading partners. Rather than each consumer or 
producer searching for desired trading partners, they can 
approach a trading company to use its global network of 
offices and specialised staff to identify appropriate 
partners. Once a trading company has invested its human and 
corporate resources in gaining information about a particular 
industry, it will want to sell this information to as many
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clients as possible, and for as long as possible, because of 
the high initial cost and relatively low incremental cost. 
Economies of scale can be achieved in the information network 
and the service provided to clients. Not surprisingly, trading 
companies try to develop long term trading relations where 
their assets will be of value in future years rather than just 
for a single transaction. The success of traders in fulfilling 
this information role is assessed in Europe and Japan.
8.3 European coal traders
'SSM's in depth knowledge and close contacts with the coal 
market are offered to coal mining companies, which in this 
way acquire an immediate interface with SSM's well 
established sales organization and its extensive know-how 
in operational and logistical services in the downstream 
markets of most coal importing countries in the world.' 
'(C)ustomers are assured of SSM taking care of all, or part 
of, the necessary intermediate actions right from locating 
the required coal until the final delivery at the 
customer's stockyard. With the increasing costs of energy 
supplies SSM provides both reliability and flexibility for 
secured and diversified coal supplies at competitive 
terms.' SSM (1987).
European coal traders have a long and varied history. SSM 
provides an example of a major trader active in the coal trade 
since 1896. They purchase large quantities of coal and 
distribute it among many small consumers. However, the trading 
role of commercial market intermediaries has been under 
pressure in Europe for several reasons. First, coal has 
continued to lose its marketshare for energy supply to small 
household and industrial users. Second, the major coal 
consumers (electric utilities in particular) grew in size to 
a point where they decided to conduct their own market 
searches, avoid commissions paid to traders and negotiate 
their own contracts directly with producers and exporters. 
Third, the growth in coal demand was in the steam coal sector 
where the range of coal attributes needing to be monitored was 
less than in the coking coal sector. Fourth, new sources of 
trade information emerged in the form of industry newsletters, 
consultants and frequent conferences. Fifth, the average size
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of coal shipments increased, especially on the long haul 
routes from South Africa and Australia.
*It is frequently said that larger carriers, involving 
bigger shipments, have made life increasingly difficult 
for the small trader for whom a typical contract may be 
too small to fill even a single hold of a modern carrier.' 
(Gaskin 1981:13)
The size of vessels active in the European coal trade has 
shifted progressively from 50-60,000 dwt Panamax vessels to
110.000 dwt Capesize vessels in the 1980s. These larger 
vessels enable coal to be shipped over long distances at lower 
unit costs. For example, using 160,000 dwt carriers instead of
60.000 dwt vessels reduces transport costs by an estimated 19% 
(Kojima cited in Ozawa 1979:90). Small traders find it 
difficult to handle such large tonnages, especially when their 
customers have limited stockyards and require regular small 
shipments.
The result of these pressures on coal traders is the 
concentration of trading activities in the hands of a few 
major companies despite dozens of firms maintaining small and 
specialised roles in the industry^. One of the enduring roles 
of coal traders is the transhipment of coal from large 
carriers onto small coastal vessels for delivery in northern 
Europe or onto barges for shipment up the Rhine to German, 
Austrian and even Swiss customers. The Dutch traders based in 
Rotterdam illustrate this role. SSM has the largest barge 
fleet on the Rhine and maintains a prominent position in the 
continental and international coal trade.
The largest European traders are active not only in Europe 
but also in other continents. Most large traders have offices 
in the USA reflecting its traditional role in supplying coking 
coal to Europe. German traders like Hansen Neuerburg, 
Ruhrkohle, Stinnes and Thyssen Carbometal are joined by Dutch 
traders Anker Coal and SSM. Each of these companies has strong 
interests in trans-Atlantic coal trade (Table 8.1). However, 
they also have offices or representatives in other supply 
countries like. South Africa, Australia and Canada. In the
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1980s, Colombia and China also became sources of coal for 
these traders^. The result is that the traders can supply coal 
to European customers from a variety of sources.
Table 8.1: Maj or coal traders and customers in Europe
traders: Anker Hansen 
consumer
Phibro Ruhrk SSM Stinnes Thyssen
Belgium X X X
Cockerill X X
Denmark X X X X X
Elkraft X X X X
Elsam X X X X
Finland (IVO) X
France X X X X
EdF X X X
Greece (Heracles and Titan cem) X
Ireland (ESB) X
Italy X
Netherlands X X X
ACZC X
GKE X X X
Hoogovens X X
Norway (Norsk Kok) X
Portugal X X
EdP X
Sesil X
Spain X X X
Caralec/Carboex X X
Ensidesa X
Sweden X X X
Malmoe X
SSAB X X X
UK X X X X X X
BSC X
CEGB X X X
NIES X
SSEB X X
W.Germany X X X X X
note: Phibro is a USA based trader 
source: contract data set
European consumers regularly supplied by traders in the 1980s 
are presented in Table 8.1*. Most of the customers identified 
are in northern Europe. This is explained in part by the need 
of many consumers in northern Europe to have their coal 
transferred from large carriers onto small coastal carriers 
because of the limited port size in most Scandinavian and UK 
areas. In other cases, it reflects the traditional links which 
traders have with their national and regional consumers.
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The prominent role of European traders as exporters of USA 
coal enabled them to participate in the supply of many non- 
European markets as well. For example, Stinnes, Hansen 
Neuerburg and Thyssen were significant USA exporters to Japan 
in the 1970s. This export role declined in the 1980s, but they 
expanded activity in other markets (Table 8.2).
Table 8.2: Major coal traders and non-European customers
traders: Anker Hansen Phibro Ruhrk SSM 
consumer
Stinnes Thyssen
Eastern Europe
Albania X
Romania X
Mimex X
Yugoslavia X X X
Lukavac X X
Sisak X X
Middle East, north Africa
Morocco X X X
cement (Cior, Nador) X
ONdE X X
Turkey X X X X X
Ankara Mun X
cement (Adana) X
TDCI
j
X X X X
Asia
Hong Kong X
Hong Kong Electric X
Pakistan X
Pasmic X
Philippines X
PNOC X
S.Korea X X
Pohang X
Tongyang X
Taiwan X
China Steel X
South America
Argentina X
Somisa X
North America,
Canada ‘ x X
cement (St. L) X
Ontario Hydro x
note: Phibro is a USA based trader
source: contract data set
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The large European trading companies have good contacts in 
Eastern Europe and are able to facilitate countertrade deals 
which coal producers may prefer to avoid without the 
assistance of an intermediary. Similarly, the business 
practices in some Middle East and north African markets are 
reported to require special arrangements. In each case, 
traders have proven their adaptability. Even the Asian and 
South American markets have been successfully entered by 
traders selling coal from a variety of international sources.
In some cases traders are the exclusive sellers of selected 
coal brands, while in other cases many traders may sell the 
same coal in the same market. For example, the import of 
Polish coal is typically handled by only one trader per 
country. In the case of West Germany, where importers held 
the government allocated import quotas until 1987 (they were 
transferred to consumers in 1988), a special trading company 
was established. Polkohle is the sole importer of Polish coal 
and has eight German trading companies as equity holders along 
with Weglokoks, the sole exporter of Polish coal.
The role of Polkohle was stable for years, while other traders 
faced rapid change. For example, the German trader Krupp 
Handel, was appointed the sole European agent for the import 
of Cerrejon coal from Carbocol, but many consumers preferred 
to deal directly with Carbocol or Intercor (CWI 843:8). The 
result was that Krupp was bypassed with most Cerrejon coal 
contracts signed directly with the producer.
In addition to the long established European coal traders, 
new traders entered the market in the 1980s. Sometimes small 
firms would be started by staff with experience in one of the 
established companies. More significant was the move by oil 
companies to use their oil trade experience to establish a 
coal trade network. Shell and BP were the two most prominent 
oil companies in the international coal trade in the early 
1980s^, but Total, Agip, Exxon and Arco also became significant 
actors during the 1980s. Different strategies were adopted by
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individual companies. Some oil companies restricted their 
activities to production and export like most coal companies. 
Others established a complete coal chain of production, 
export, transport, import and delivery to meet the needs of 
their clients.
The combined production and trading role of some oil companies 
demonstrates their belief in the importance of vertically 
integrated trade systems. The control over international 
market information and coordination of delivery systems was 
thus internalised within a single corporate entity. 
Information services simply became one of the many tasks 
administered within the corporation. This model of complete 
corporate integration is assumed to reduce transaction and 
coordination costs through internal efficiencies rather than 
the specialised external services offered by conventional 
European coal traders.
Neither of these models (of information controlled by complete 
integration or specialised external traders) dominate global 
coal trade. European oil companies and coal traders illustrate 
these models, but a different pattern is found in Japan. The 
Japanese sogo shosha usually act as specialised agents who 
control and coordinate information related to trade (Figure 
8.Id). They combine attributes of both the internal 
coordination and the external market, information specialist 
models to create the largest information structure in the coal 
trade.
8.4 The sogo shosha
'Sogo shosha is usually translated into English as "general 
trading firm", "trading house", or "comprehensive trader", 
but these companies do far more than simply buy and sell 
goods for a profit. They are a unique and significant type 
of institution that deserves to be understood on its own 
terms. Rather than utilizing an inadequate translation, we 
simply call them sogo shosha, with the intention of adding 
a new word and concept to the English language by borrowing 
from Japanese.' (Yoshino and Lifson 1986:3).
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Sogo shosha use information to facilitate trade at both the 
transaction and the product system level. At the transaction 
level, sogo shosha share some of the interests of both 
parties to the transaction (Figure 8.Id). Sogo shosha profits 
are generally based on trade volumes with a small commission 
earned on each unit traded. In the case of raw materials for 
the steel mills, commissions are generally in the range of 
0.5% - 2% of value. Given this small level of commission, 
priority is placed on trade volumes and the sogo shosha often 
set their company objectives in terms of maximum value of 
sales or turnover. Large trade flows are therefore desired and 
information is used to achieve this end.
Sogo shosha are often defined as the nine Japanese general 
trading companies with a global trading network which 
coordinates flows in a diverse range of products. The two 
largest sogo shosha are Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsui & 
Co., each with an annual turnover of 17-18 trillion yen ($100 
billion) in JFY85 (Mitsubishi 1986; Mitsui 1986). The range 
of goods and services traded seems unlimited with 20,000 
different products and many services handled. Their global 
networks typically include over 200 offices distributed among 
80 countries. The value of annual sales consistently ranks 
sogo shosha as 6 of the 10 largest companies in the world 
(Times 1989). The total turnover of these companies has grown 
by a factor of 10 in the last 20 years (Figure 8.2).
In terms of aggregate importance, Mitsubishi Corp. and Mitsui 
& Co. handled nearly 30% of all Japanese import transactions 
in 1985 (16% and 13% respectively). This pattern has endured 
with 60% of Japan's imports and 50% of the exports controlled 
by the nine major trading companies in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Ozawa 1979:115; Young 1979:87)®. Historically, this 
concentration of trade is well illustrated by Mitsui which 
accounted for 10-20% of all Japanese imports and exports in 
the 1900-1930 period (Yoshihara 1982:313)*.
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Figure 8,2: Sogo shosha annual sales
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Sogo shosha specialise in the trading function with operations 
divided among the domestic Japanese market, Japanese imports, 
Japanese exports and trade among third countries. The division 
of JFY85 transactions among the four categories is 39%, 28%, 
15% and 18%, respectively for Mitsubishi and 33%, 24%, 17% and 
26% for Mitsui. During the 1980s, trade among third countries 
was the area of fastest growth^° and often developed from 
initial experience gained in Japanese trade. In this way 
experience gained in initial 'transaction-based' services was 
transferred to integrated 'systems-based' services.
8.4.1 Sogo shosha information services
'Because of Mitsui's worldwide marketing capabilities, a 
natural course of development has been marketing in 
countries other than Japan the natural resource output of 
ventures overseas, or what is referred to as offshore 
trade. This area has shown one of the highest rates of 
expansion in recent years.
Mitsui's strong international position in resource 
development and trading has been the result of several 
capabilities. With its information sources and abilities 
in compiling and analyzing market information, Mitsui is
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in an excellent position to assess long-term market 
potential and feasibility and therefore can make 
appropriate decisions on the location and timing of 
ventures.
Another strength is Mitsui's ability to arrange for various 
forms of financing because of its own capital base and the 
excellent relationships it maintains with leading banks in 
Japan and around the world. Typically, Mitsui will sign 
long term supply contracts with producers and processors of 
raw materials to assure the success of these developments.' 
Mitsui 1984:73
Many analysts have identified services provided by sogo 
shosha, but their emphasis and classifications vary markedly. 
The services are listed in Table 8.3 under the major headings 
assigned by Mitsui (1984:5). The relative importance assigned 
to each of these services by analysts depends upon the purpose 
of the study. Yoshina and Lifson (1986) concentrated on the 
role of sogo shosha as organisers of other firms (integrated 
services) with a special emphasis on their promotion of 
product systems: and the coordination of new projects. Young 
(1979) highlighted the transition from their Japanese base to 
the increased international role of sogo shosha in trade among 
countries other than Japan.
This study concentrates on the role of sogo shosha as a 
specialised information structure which reduces transaction 
costs through the provision of market information, enhancing 
the reputation of individual parties, facilitating 
international supply diversification, coordinating contract 
negotiations, providing trade credits, insurance, transport 
coordination and stockpile control. The sogo shosha gain 
economies of scale in these functions through their 
specialisation, yet the number of competing sogo shosha 
ensures that costs are controlled. The recurring theme found 
in the coal trade is one of balancing trade conducted through 
external (competitive) and internal (administrative) 
structures.
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Table 8.3: Services provided by sogo shosha
Basic trading services
Conduct of transactions
linking, buyers and sellers 
arranging trade documentation 
satisfying legal requirements 
making collections and payments 
foreign language skills
Physical distribution
arranging optimal transport and distribution 
providing transport 
insuring goods during transport 
warehousing
providing storage facilities 
providing stockpiles 
providing distribution network
Finance
trade credits 
equity investments 
direct loans 
bridging loans 
loan guarantees
Market information
product markets
prices
trends
Integrated services, system promotion
Investment
equity investments 
loans
other forms of finance
Organising business ventures 
corporate integration
downstream firms/joint ventures 
upstream firms/joint ventures 
project coordination services
identify/organise suppliers 
finance
equipment, technology
engineering
markets
transport
infrastructure
Resource development
project investment
contractual commitment to market in Japan 
contractual commitment to market elsewhere
Technology transfer
provide new technologies
promote development of competitive industry
sources: Mitsui 1984; Yoshino and Lifson 1986; Young 1979
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In contrast to the decline of western traders^, sogo shosha 
continued to grow through a wide range of economic conditions. 
Various explanations have been offered to explain the 
successful creation and expansion of sogo shosha^. Their 
success is explained by initial specialisation in trade 
promoting services (finance, insurance and transport) which 
reduce transaction costs and then by their organisational 
skills to coordinate other firms in the creation of new trade 
and product systems (Yoshino and Lifson 1986). In this way, 
soga shosha acted as the information network connecting 
Japanese firms to international markets.
8.4.2 Sogo shosha and Japanese coal consumers
Sogo shosha arranged the coal imports (largely from China) to 
supply the growing demand of Japanese industry in the 1890s 
and early 20th century. Not surprisingly, the sogo shosha also 
organised the first imports of American coking coal for the 
JSM in the postwar period. The net result is a century of 
experience in the international coal trade.
The role of sogo shosha in the coal trade can be considered 
as either being the trading arm of a group of affiliated 
companies (keiretsu) or as an independent information service. 
If sogo shosha act as the trading arm of affiliated companies, 
then their trade would be expected to be concentrated among 
affiliated companies. If sogo shosha are independent sources 
of information on global trade opportunities, then their trade 
would be expected to be spread among many companies. To test 
the relative importance of these alternative roles, an 
evaluation of Japanese coal contract data is required. The 
data can be examined for each of the major consuming 
industries to determine whether a general pattern emerges or 
whether it varies from industry to industry.
The relationship between sogo shosha and Japanese industry is 
thus important to the central argument of this chapter: that 
information structures influence trade. The steel industry is 
examined first. If steel was simply produced by a steel mill
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with its inputs acquired and its products sold by an 
affiliated trading house, then the pattern would conform to 
that of an integrated corporation or quasi-integrated group of 
companies. Alternatively, independent sogo shosha may sell 
their information services to reduce transaction costs and 
establish diverse supply sources for each of the companies in 
the industry.
The Japanese steel industry was built around Nippon Steel 
(initially called Japan Iron and Steel), a government owned 
and managed firm, whose primary objective was to supply steel 
for military purposes (Okazaki 1987). Only excess production 
was sold to the cilivian sector. In the late 19th century a 
few trading houses were designated to sell this steel, but the 
allocations to the traders were made by Nippon Steel. The 
traders were in an inferior bargaining position. Private steel 
mills were later established and Nippon Steel was sold to 
private interests after the war (independent of the six 
largest keiretsu), but the historical relationship is 
considered to have continued (Yoshino and Lifson 1986:44).
"The steel mills continue to dominate the sogo shosha, even 
though some sogo shosha are stronger than others in this 
field. The mills have attempted to maintain a careful 
balance among the sogo shosha they deal with.* (Yoshino and 
Lifson 1986:44)
The implication is that there is no corporate obligation to 
use any or all sogo shosha. They must provide a cost saving 
service or face being eliminated by direct producer-consumer 
transactions. To ensure their position in the domestic steel 
industry, sogo shosha created over 200 specialised steel 
centres in Japan where manufacturers or fabricators can 
purchase their steel requirements^^. On the supply side, the 
sogo shosha supply raw materials to the steel mills. However, 
sogo shosha are not principals who buy coal from the mine and 
then sell it to the consumer under back-to-back contracts as 
in the European case. Instead, they are the importers who make 
the arrangements to facilitate the contract and shipment 
between the producer and consumer.
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8.4.3 Sogo shosha coking coal imports for the JSM
Sogo shosha dominate the import of coking coal for Japanese 
steel mills (80-90% of total imports). A summary of coking 
coal contracts which nominate sogo shosha as the importer is 
presented for selected years in Table 8.4^\ Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi are by far the largest importers accounting for a 
total of 52% of coking coal tonnage in JFY76 and 43% in JFY87. 
The decline in their total share of imports was largely caused 
by the decline in Mitsubishi tonnage for the JSM from 22.3mt 
in JFY76 to 9.8mt in JFY87. The Mitsui tonnage declined by a 
much smaller amount (from 16.6mt to 14.7mt) and Mitsui became
the largest importer of coking coal in the mid 1980s.
j
C.Itoh was the third largest importer with 10% of the total 
contracted tonnage while Sumitomo and Nissho-Iwai had 7% and 
6% of JFY87 contracts, respectively. Each of these three 
importers kept their import tonnage relatively stable over the 
1976-87 period. In contrast, Marubeni's tonnage was cut by 65% 
from 6.9mt in JFY76 to 2.4mt in JFY87. The smaller sogo shosha 
(Nichimen, Toyomenka and Kanematsu-Gosho) faced a similar 
problem with declining tonnage and import shares. The 
declining role of smaller sogo shosha in the coking coal trade 
mirrored their slow overall growth in the 1980s when compared 
to the largest trading companies (Yoshino and Lifson 1986).
I
Most sogo shosha continued to import coal for all eight steel 
mills. The exceptions to this pattern were Nichimen which did 
not have a contract for Sumitomo Metal and the 1% of contracts 
held by Kanematsu-Gosho which included only three buyers. The 
implication of these diverse contract holdings is that sogo 
shosha act as importers for the entire industry rather than 
any particular company or group of companies. Similarly, 
consumers chose to divide their trade among all the major 
importers. In this case, the evidence supports the argument 
that sogo shosha are valued for their diverse international 
trade and information services rather than as part of a 
particular corporate group. This conclusion from the coking 
coal trade can be tested for the steam coal trade.
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Table 8.4: Sogo shosha share of Japanese consumer's coking 
coal contracts, 1976-87
consumer NS NKK Kaw Sumi Kobe Niss Naka Godo JSM MitC oth
importer % of consumer * s contracts
Mitsui
1976 31 13 14 19 28 25 21 37 23 na na
1984 33 22 22 26 32 28 27 35 28 7 27
1987 29 
Mitsubishi
19 21 31 31 25 23 36 26 9 18
1976 29 32 28 35 29 37 28 55 30 na na
1984 23 26 23 29 18 29 17 36 24 27 16
1987 
C.Itoh (*
16 21 
includes
15 22 14 22 
Ataka contracts)
14 32 18 18 12
1976* 7 7 13 8 5 1 0 0 8 na na
1984 8 7 16 10 7 6 2 2 9 15 14
1987 9 13 12 10 6 5 2 2 10 17 7
Sumitomo
1976 5 3 1 26 2 2 0 1 7 na na
1984 5 4 2 16 4 3 4 6 6 4 9
1987 6 
Nissho-Iwai
5 4 17 4 6 10 8 7 3 18
1976 5 0 0 2 10 12 0 0 4 na na
1984 5 2 2 3 18 10 4 5 5 15 2
1987
Marubeni
5 5 3 3 20 14 7 5 6 16 2
1976 6 18 9 4 16 10 21 4 9 na na
1984 4 12 5 4 4 11 7 6 6 24 12
1987 2 11 3 2 4 7 6 4 4 24 7
Nichimen
1976 5 8 3 1 4 7 2 0 5 na na
1984 2 9 1 0 1 1 1 0 3 1 0
1987 3 8 6 0 2 4 4 0 4 4 0
Toyomenka
1976 4 8 2 3 4 3 11 3 4 na na
1984 2 7 3 2 2 2 10 0 3 5 6
1987
Kanematsu
3 7 
-Gosho
2 3 2 4 9 0 4 6 8
1976 3 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 1 na na
1984 2 0 0 0 2 0 12 0 1 0 0
1987 2 0 0 0 3 0 9 0 1 0 0
Sogo shosha
1976 94 90 71 98 97 97 100 100 91 na na
1984 85 88 73 90 88 89 85 90 85 97 85
1987 76 88 66 88 85 87 82 87 80 97 73
millionL tonnes contracted
1976 27.0 11.8 8.1 11.5 5.7 1.7 0.6 0.3 66.6 na na
1984 20.3 9.3 7.3 8.1 5.6 1.6 0.7 0.3 53.2 2.4 1.2
1987 15.2 8.4 6.2 7.9 4.5 1.6 0.6 0.2 44.5 3.2 0.8
note: NS = Nippon St, NKK = Nippon Kokan, Kaw = Kawasaki St 
Sumi = Sumitomo Metal Industries, Kobe = Kobe Steel 
Niss = Nisshin St, Naka = Nakayama St, Godo = Godo St 
JSM = Japanese steel mills, MitC = Mitsubishi Chemical 
source: Coal Manual, annual
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8.4.4 Sogo shosha and steam coal imports
In the 1980s Japanese electric power companies (EPCs) entered 
the international coal trade as part of their energy security 
strategy to reduce dependence upon oil from the Middle East. 
The government owned EPDC (Electric Power Development Company) 
and the private Chugoku EPC were by far the largest consumers 
of imported coal with contracts totalling 3-4mtpa in the late 
1980s. Four other regional EPCs (Hokkaido, Hokuriku, Shikoku 
and Tohoku) each held contracts for over O.Smtpa and a further 
four companies signed contracts for smaller tonnages (Table 
8.5) .
The experience gained by sogo shosha in the coking coal trade 
placed them in a good position to also become major importers 
of steam coal. Indeed, 90% of the tonnage of coal contracted 
by electric poWer companies was typically imported by sogo 
shosha. Once again Mitsui and Mitsubishi were the largest 
importers and coordinated contracts for all six EPCs with 
contracts of over O.Smtpa. Marubeni and Sumitomo were the 
importers for five of these six EPCs. In contrast, the smaller 
sogo shosha (Nichimen, Toyomenka and Kanematsu-Gosho) were not 
importers for any of the major EPC contracts.
The general pattern was one of extensive contract holdings. 
The electricity industry reinforced the earlier argument that 
sogo shosha are active in the coal trade because of their 
information and, trade services rather than their affiliation 
with particular! companies. Each electric power company used 
the services of several sogo shosha rather than rely on a 
single trader^. In contrast to the declining share of coking 
coal imports arranged by sogo shosha, their share of 
electricity industry contracts remained at 90% in the 1980s.
302
Table 8.5: Sogo shosha share of Japanese electric company's
steam coal contracts, 1980-87
EPDC Chug Hokk Hoku Shik Toho Kyus lSumi JJ Kan Tok tot
% of consumer's contracts
Mitsui
1980 63 28 53
1984 15 18 52 17 12 10 41 15
1987 14 16 55 23 12 15 35 18
Mitsubishi
1980 13 17 14
1984 10 17 48 33 23 14 33 15
1987 10 19 10 31 24 23 15
C.Itoh
1980
1984 2 33 23 5 11 5
1987 2 31 24 14 4
Sumitomo
1980 13 17 14
1984 4 17 12 10 25 50 9
1987 4 18 10 12 23 32 50 11
Nissho-Iwai
1980
1984 12 21 2
1987 12 21 1
Marubeni
1980 13 28 17
1984 4 24 17 17 9 33 10
1987 4 22 20 15 18 15 12
several (Blair Athol)
1984 37 10 17 54 33 21
1987 51 10 35 55 25
several (China)
1980 0 10 3
1984 15 12 2 24 8 12
1987 14 12 8 9
Sogo shosha
1980 100 100 100
1984 85 99 100 100 100 78 59 57 54 100 50 88
1987 97 99 94 100 100 96 58 68 55 50 95
Total tonnage contracted (mt)
1980 0.8 0.3 1.1
1984 4.3 2.5 0.2 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.2 0.3 .3 .1 .1 10.6
1987 4.3 3.4 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.3 .3 .2 11.9
note: Chug = Chugoku EPC, Hokk = Hokkaido EPC,
Hoku =Hokurikù EPC, Shik = Shikoku EPC, Toho = Tohoku EPC, 
Kyus = Kyushu*EPC, Sumi = Sumitomo Joint EPC,
JJ = Joban Joint PC, Kan = Kansai EPC, Tok = Tokyo EPC 
source: contract data set
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The other Japanese industry which imported a large tonnage of 
coal was the cement industry and it is examined next to 
determine whether or not the pattern of diverse sogo shosha 
involvement is maintained (Table 8.6). The cement industry 
had steam coal contracts for 7-9mtpa in the late 1980s. Sogo 
shosha were the importers for 90% of these contracts, just as 
they were in the electricity industry in the 1980s and the 
steel industry in the 1970s. However, Mitsui and Mitsubishi 
were no longer the largest importers. Instead, Nissho Iwai and 
Marubeni each arranged over 20% of the 1987 contracts.
The leading import role of Nissho Iwai is based on its large 
contracts with Coal & Allied for the supply of steam coal to 
Ube Industries, the largest Japanese cement company^. 
Similarly, the large role of Marubeni is based on its supply 
of almost 80% of the imports for Nippon Cement under contracts 
with Muswellbrook, Wambo and Austen & Butta (Western Blend).
The pattern of relatively uniform marketshares among the 
various steel and electricity companies is replaced in the 
cement industry with higher degrees of concentration and 
greater variety in the relative importance of particular sogo 
shosha. Despite this variety, consumers almost always chose to 
divide their import requirements among three or more 
importers. In short, the priority remained one of using 
numerous trading networks rather than simply rely upon an 
affiliated firm. The information and diversification roles of 
sogo shosha thus appear to be more important than the role of 
an affiliated trader to explain contract patterns.
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Table 8.6: Sogo shosha share of Japanese cement company's
steam coal contracts, 1984-87
Chic Denk Mitb NipC Onod Osak Sumi Toka Toyo Ube tot
sogo shosha 
Mitsui 
1984 
1987 
Mitsubishi 
1984 69 53
1987 100 60
C.Itoh 
1984 26 5
1987 20 5
Sumitomo 
1984 
1987 
Nissho-Iwai 
1984 11
1987 13
Marubeni 
1984 55 11
1987 68 13
Nichimen 
1984 4
1987 4
Toyo Menka 
1984 
1987
several (Blair Athol) 
1984 
1987 
several (China)
% of consumer's contracts 
45
4 32 9
81
76
14
19
21
28
31
7
58
93 14
14
76
84
18
25
14
19
23
32
21 14
9
10
13
21 13
23 11
7
10
16
24
17
21
2
3
2
3
1
0
52
77
1984
1987
19 31 12 9 9 11 11 16 3 4 10
Sogo i 
1984 
1987
shosha
100
88
100
100
96
96
97
96
75
63
79
100
100
100
16
29
84
76
100
100
92
92
Total
1984
1987
tonnage
.4
.3
contracted (mt) 
.1 1.3 1.3 
.1 1.2 1.2
.9
.6
.7
.5
1.1
.7
.2
.1
.4
.4
2.4
2.0
8.8
7.1
note: Chic = Chichibu Cem, Denk = Denki Kagaku,
Mitb = Mitsubishi Mining & Cem, NipC = Nippon Cem, 
Onod = Onoda Cem, Osak = Osaka Cem, Toyo = Toyo Soda, 
Sumi = Sumitomo Cement, Toka = Tokayama Soda,
Ube = Ube Industries 
source: contract data set
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8.4.5 Sogo shosha and trade for affiliated companies
Although most sogo shosha imported coal for all of the steel 
mills and major electric utilities, the relative importance 
of each sogo shosha varied among the different companies. This 
variation in contract tonnage is worth examining to determine 
whether or not membership in particular keiretsu, or corporate 
groups, explain the pattern. The marketshare of each sogo 
shosha for imports by the industry is subtracted from the 
marketshare for each company (Table 8.7). Positive numbers 
indicate a larger marketshare than that expected on the basis 
of industry-wide performance.
Variations from average import shares were identified. Mitsui 
and Mitsubishi are major suppliers to each of the steel mills, 
but their share of total imports is greatest for the smallest 
mill, Godo Steel and lowest for Kawasaki Steel (which relied 
less on the sogo shosha than any of the other mills). The 
largest consumer, Nippon Steel relied more on Mitsui than did 
the industry as a whole. Overall, Mitsui supplied 5-10% more 
than its industry average to Nippon Steel, Kobe Steel and Godo 
Steel. Similarly, Mitsubishi typically had a 5% larger share 
of Sumitomo Metal and Nisshin Steel's import contracts than 
its industry average. These higher import shares are not 
explained by keiretsu membership.
In contrast, the 5% higher share of Kawasaki contracts held 
by C.Itoh could be argued to be a result of their membership 
in the keiretsu based on the Daiichi-Kangyo Bank. This pattern 
of stronger ties between trading houses and steel mills in the 
same keiretsu is even more pronounced in the case of Sumitomo 
Corporation. Sumitomo's import share of coking coal contracted 
by Sumitomo Metal is typically 10% higher than its share for 
the steel industry as a whole. Nissho Iwai has a similar 
advantage with its extra 15% share of Kobe Steel's JFY87 
tonnage, despite having an industry average of only 6% of 
total import tonnage. Nissho-Iwai also plays a strong role in 
supplying coal to Nisshin Steel. Marubeni has a fairly uniform 
import share among steel mills, but it still supplies Nippon
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Kokan with twice its average share of imports. This is 
explained by the membership of both companies in the Fuyo 
group of companies.
Table 8.7: Differences (>4%) in share of coking coal 
contracts between consumer and JSM average 
value, 1976-87
consumer NS NKK Kaw Sumi Kobe Niss Naka Godo JSM MitC oth
importer % of consumer's contracts - average % for JSM
Mitsui
1976 8 -10 -8 - 5 - - 14 0 na na
1984 5 —6 -7 - - - - 6 0 -21
1987 -7 —5 - 5 - - 10 0 -17 -8
Mitsubishi
1976 - - 5 - 6 - 25 0 na na
1984 - - 5 —6 5 -7 12 0 -8
1987 - - 5 - - - 14 0 —6
C.Itoh (* includes Ataka contracts)
1976* - 5 - - -7 -8 -8 0 na na
1984 - 7 - - - -7 -7 0 6 5
1987 - - - - - -8 -8 0 8
Sumitomo
1976 - —6 19 -5 —5 -7 —6 0 na na
1984 - - 10 - - - - 0
1987 - - 10 - - - - 0 —5 10
Nissho-Iwai
1976 - - - 7 8 - - 0 na na
1984 - - - 13 - - - 0 9 -4
1987 - - - 15 8 - - 0 11 -4
Marubeni
1976 9 - -5 6 - 12 —6 0 na na
1984 6 - - - 5 - - 0 18 7
1987 7 - - - - - - 0 20
Nichimen
1976 - - -5 0 na na
1984 6 - - 0
1987 - - - 0 -4
Toyomenka
1976 - 7 0
1984 - 7 0
1987 - 6 - 0 5
Kanematsu-Gosho
1976 16 0
1984 ) 11 0
1987 ' 8 0
Sogo shosha
1976 - -20 7 6 7 9 9 0 na na
1984 - -11 5 - - - 5 0 12
1987 8 -14 8 6 8 — 8 0 18 —6
source: Coal Manual, annual
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However, the explanation of increased marketshare based on 
keiretsu affiliation is not without its exceptions. Nichimen 
and Toyomenka are also the importers of more coal for Nippon 
Kokan than would be expected by their share of industry 
imports. An alternative explanation could be Nippon Kokan's 
continued high reliance upon the sogo shosha (88% of JFY87 
tonnage) when other steel mills turned to other importers. In 
this case, NKK might seek diverse supply networks by cutting 
the annual tonnage of smaller sogo shosha less drastically 
than mills like Nippon Steel.
Coking coal consumers outside the steel industry created an 
equally interesting pattern. In the case of Mitsubishi 
Chemical, Mitsubishi Corporation simply supplied its national 
import share. Significantly less coal was imported by Mitsui 
& Co (Mitsubishi's traditional rival), while Marubeni, C.Itoh 
and Nissho Iwai played more significant roles. Mitsui Mining, 
the gas companies and other coking coal consumers accounted 
for less than Imt of imports in 1987. Sumitomo, Marubeni and 
Toyomenka had larger marketshares for these consumers than 
their steel industry average.
The pattern of variation in sogo shosha marketshares from the 
steel industry average can be compared to the pattern found in 
the major steam coal importing industries (electricity and 
cement). Given the smaller number of steam coal contracts and 
the younger nature of the market, larger variations are 
expected in comparison to those in the steel industry. The 
electricity and cement industries should also provide further 
evidence of the extent of consumer imports being arranged by 
sogo shosha from the same keiretsu.
A clear pattern emerged with each sogo shosha typically having 
a larger marketshare for two of the electric power companies 
(Table 8.8). In some cases, this pattern reinforced the 
relationship between firms in the same keiretsu. For example, 
Sumitomo had a 20% higher marketshare for Sumitomo Joint Power 
than its industry average. However, in many cases the larger 
shares were independent of keiretsu affiliations.
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Table 8.8: Differences (>9%) in share of coal contracts
between consumer and EPC average value, 1980-87
EPDC Chug Hokk Hoku Shik Toho Kyus Sumi JJ Kan Tok tot
% of consumer *s contracts - average % for EPCs (ave%)
Mitsui
1980 10 -25 53
1984 - 37 — — — 2 6 15
1987 - 37 — — — 17 18
Mitsubishi
1980 - 14
1984 - 33 18 18 15
1987 - - 16 — — 15
C .Itoh
1980
1984 - 28 18 - 5
1987 - 27 20 10 4
Sumitomo
1980 - 14
1984 - — — 16 41 9
1987 - - 12 21 39 11
Nissho-Iwai
1980
1984 10 19 2
1987 11 20 1
Marubeni
1980 11 17
1984 14 — — — 23 10
1987 10 - — — — 12
several (Blair Athol)
1984 16 -11 - 33 12 21
1987 26 -15 10 30 25
several (China)
1980 - 3
1984 - -10 12 12
1987 — — 9
Sogo shosha
1980 - 100
1984 11 12 12 12 -10 -29 -31 -34 12 -38 88
1987 — — — — — —37 —27 —40 -45 95
source: contract data set
The import pattern of the cement industry repeated that found 
in the electricity industry. Import shares were much more 
concentrated than in the steel industry with each trader 
having a stronger position in the import of coal for a couple 
cement firms (Table 8.9). These concentrations in trading 
relations sometimes reflected keiretsu affiliations as in the 
cases of Mitsubishi Corp. importing more coal for Mitsubishi 
Cement, Mitsui & Co. importing more coal for Onoda Cement and 
Sumitomo Corp. importing more coal for Sumitomo Cement.
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Table 8.9: Differences (>9%) in share of coal contracts
between consumer and cement industry average, 1984-87
Chic Denk Mitb NipC Onod Osak Sumi Toka Toyo Ube tot
% of consumer's contracts - average % (ave%)
Mitsui
1984 31 67 - 14
1987 — 23 — 67 9
Mitsubishi
1984 59 43 —  — 10
1987 87 47 —  — 13
C.Itoh
1984 13 - - 18 - 13
1987 - 17 - 12 11
Sumitomo
1984 51 7
1987 83 10
Nissho-Iwai
1984 -15 36 16
1987 -11 -10 53 24
Marubeni
1984 38 - 59 17
1987 47 - 63 21
Nichimen
1984 - 12 2
1987 - 16 3
Toyo Menka
1984 21 2
1987 29 3
several (Blair Athol)
1984 - 1
1987 0
several (China)
1984 - 21 - — — — — — - - 10
1987
Sogo shosha
1984 - — —17 —13 - -76 - - 92
1987 — — —29 — — —63 -16 — 92
source: contract data set
Keiretsu affiliations were reinforced, but they did not result 
in fully integrated import services. The affiliated trading 
company did not supply all imports, it only held a larger 
marketshare. The existence of keiretsu affiliations thus 
provides only a partial explanation of import patterns. A 
better explanation is that consumers decided to divide their 
import requirements among multiple sogo shosha to gain the 
advantages offered by more than one information network and 
achieve supply security through sogo shosha diversity.
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8.4.6 The international diversity of sogo shosha
The success of the sogo shosha in managing the coking coal 
trading or procurement function for the JSM enabled them to 
control 80-90% of all coking coal imports. Although steel 
mills signed their own contracts with coal producers, these 
contracts were always arranged with the assistance of sogo 
shosha. Each sogo shosha has a list of mines in different 
countries whose coal it supplied to the JSM.
The overall pattern of sogo shosha marketshares among the 
companies in major coal importing industries is one of diverse 
supply arrangements. Indeed, Nippon Steel, the largest private 
steel manufacturer and coking coal importer (24.Imt in JFY84) 
in the world, makes extensive use of all nine sogo shosha. 
Nippon Steel could avoid using traders and deal directly with 
producers to avoid the commissions paid to traders. Instead, 
the network of each trader is used to import coal from several 
countries. The result is an extensive and diversified supply 
configuration for coking coal contracts (Figure 8.3).
Rather than specialise in coal from a particular country or 
region, each sogo shosha competes to provide its own diverse 
sources. The elaborate international network created by the 
sogo shosha are not used exclusively by Nippon Steel, but are 
also made available to other consumers. Kobe Steel used an 
almost identical combination of traders and international 
sources as Nippon Steel (Figure 8.4), despite its import of 
one quarter the tonnage of coal (6.3mt in JFY84).
Even the smallest steel mill, Godo Steel, used six of the nine 
sogo shosha to import its tiny coal needs (0.3mt in JFY84). 
Rather than receive its annual coal supply on two or three 
large coal carriers, it joins the network of many producers 
and consumers created by sogo shosha to use 19 combinations of 
international supply countries and coordinating sogo shosha 
(Figure 8.5). The sogo shosha thus successfully create a large 
and diverse trading network to facilitate trade for for even 
the smallest consumers.
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Figure 8.3: Sogo shosha coal Imports for Nippon Steel, 1984
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Figure 8.4: Sogo shosha coal imports for Kobe Steel, 1984
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Figure 8.5: Sogo shosha coal imports for Godo Steel, 1984
Country
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This pattern of extensive sogo shosha involvement in arranging 
coal imports is repeated even among the steel mills most 
tightly integrated into keiretsu (Kawasaki and Sumitomo). The 
common factor is not ownership or direct integration (although 
import shares of sogo shosha belonging to the same keiretsu as 
a steel mill were typically 10% higher than their industry 
average), but the desire to use the global trade and 
information services offered by each sogo shosha. The same 
pattern was found among major steam coal importers. The 
marketshare between affiliated companies was often 20-40% 
higher than industry marketshares, but the role of importer 
was never exclusive as all major companies preferred to use 
the information and trading services of multiple sogo shosha.
The sogo shosha generally do not own shipping and transport 
facilities directly (although they may participate in a 
particular project by taking a minority equity position, 
negotiating the finance, or arranging a vessel charter). 
Instead, they use information to coordinate shipping schedules 
to reduce transport costs and provide optimal levels of 
stocks. Shipping costs are reduced by promoting large capacity 
ports and ships. Furthermore, the coordination of shipping 
enables vessels to haul cargos on more than one leg of the 
voyage. The savings of large scale facilities and coordinated 
shipping are especially important for the longer routes to 
achieve low cost diversity of supply (Ozawa 1979:191). Sogo 
shosha thus use their information and organisational resources 
to achieve consumer objectives defined earlier.
8.5 Other Japanese traders
Despite the sogo shosha import of 80-90% of all Japanese coal 
needs, they face competition from other traders and attention 
needs to be given to these smaller importers and the service 
they offer. The first question is who is filling the import 
role being lost by sogo shosha in the coking coal sector. 
Given the mature nature of the coking coal trade, the 
extensive sogo shosha information network may be of less value 
to consumers. Unlike the early period of rapid growth.
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consumers in the 1980s have less need to seek new suppliers. 
The stability of the trade reduces market risk and other 
traders may compete with sogo shosha for marketshare. Indeed, 
new importers may be preferred to add to the diversity of 
supply organisers, just as consumers seek diversity among coal 
producers.
Examples of sogo shosha and consumers which belong to the same 
keiretsu having stronger trading links than those among 
unaffiliated firms were noted earlier. Sogo shosha are not 
the only traders belonging to keiretsu and small specialised 
trading companies may perform a similar trading role as sogo 
shosha for particular commodities. Although nine trading 
companies are considered to have a sufficiently diverse 
product range and international trade network to be called, 
sogo shosha, over 6,000 other Japanese companies are active 
in international trading. Of these, 37 were listed as 
importers of coking coal in the 1980s (Coal Manual annual).
The most important specialised trader in coking coal 
successfully established new trading systems in the 1980s. 
Tokyo Boeki, an offshoot from Mitsubishi Corporation when it 
was disbanded after the war, successfully changed from being 
a small specialised importer of coking coal for Nippon Steel, 
NKK and Nisshin Steel in the 1970s to become the fourth 
largest importer of coking coal to Japan in the late 1980s 
(5.6mt in JFY87). Its import contracts in the 1980s are 
especially interesting because they follow the sogo shosha 
pattern with coal going to each of the steel mill (Table 
8.10). This transition was achieved by Tokyo Boeki being the 
dominant importer for coal from two new mines. Quintette in 
British Columbia and Gregory in Queensland.
The next group of traders clearly reflected the model of 
vertical integration (internalising trade activities) reviewed 
at the start of this chapter. In each case, a trading company 
specialised in supplying the needs of its affiliated steel 
mill. Kawasho (and before their 1983 merger Kawatetsu Bussan) 
provides an excellent example of this pattern.
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Table 8.10 : Specialised trader's coking coal contracts by 
consumer, 1976-87
consumer NS NKK Kaw Sumi Kobe Niss Naka Godo JSM MitC oth
importer 
Tokyo Boeki
% of consumer's contracts
1976 6 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 na na
1984 9 7 6 5 7 8 12 10 8 2 13
1987 11 7 10 7 9 11 14 13 9 2 21
Nittetsu
1976 0 0
1984 5 3 2
1987 11 4
Kawasho (* includes Kawatetsu Bussan)
1976 29 4
1984 20 3
1987 24 4
Kokan Kogyo (Mining) and Okura Trading
1976 6 1 1
1984 4 1
1987 4 1
Sumikin
1976 2 0
1984 4 1
1987 5 1
Shinsho (Shinko Shoji)
1976 0.03 0.0
1984 4 0.4 1
1987 5 0.4
Toyota Tusho, Toko Bussan, Trinity Development
1976
1984 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 2.7 0.3 0.4 0.3
1987 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.6 3.7 0.6 0.4 1.6
Other
1976
1984 0.4 0.6 1.8 0.4
1987 0.5 0.6 2.2 0.5
specialised traders
1976 6 10 29 2 3 3 0 0 9 na na
1984 15 12 27 10 12 11 15 10 15 3 15
1987 24 12 34 12 15 13 18 13 20 3 27
million tonnes contracted
1976 1.7 1.3 3.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 na na
1984 3.7 1.2 2.6 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 9.6 0.1 0.2
1987 4.8 1.2 3.2 1.1 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.0 11.5 0.1 0.3
Total tonnage contracted
1976 28.7 13.1 11.3 11.7 5.9 1.7 0.6 0.3 73.3 0.0 0.0
1984 24.1 10.6 9.9 9.0 6.3 1.8 0.8 0.3 62.7 2.5 1.5
1987 20.0 9.6 9.4 9.0 5.2 1.9 0.7 0.3 56.0 3.3 1.1
source: Coal Manual 1976, 1985, 1988
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Kawasho provided 20-30% of the coking coal imported by 
Kawasaki Steel, yet provided no coal to other steel mills. 
This import pattern matched its equally specialised role in 
selling steel products. Kawasaki Steel and its affiliated 
companies produced 63% of all the products sold by Kawasho in 
JYF85 (Kawasho 1986:1)^. Not surprisingly, the principle 
shareholders in Kawasho are Kawasaki Steel, Kawasaki Heavy 
Industries, "K" Line (Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha), Daiichi-Kangyo 
Bank, Bank of Tokyo, Daiwa Bank, and Taiyo-Kobe Bank (Kawasho 
1986:27). Kawasho thus illustrates the significant role of a 
specialised trading company with strong integration into the 
family of companies existing in the keiretsu. This type of 
relationship is found frequently in Japanese trade and is 
wrongly assumed to prevail in the steel industry too. Despite 
this close relationship between Kawasho and Kawasaki Steel, 
three quarters of Kawasaki Steel ' s coking coal came from other 
trading companies. The desire to promote an affiliated company 
is balanced by the decision to use the information network of 
sogo shosha as well.
In the 1980s, Nippon Steel followed the Kawasaki example and 
its specialised steel-selling subsidiary, Nittetsu, became a 
coking coal importer. By JFY87, the volume of imports 
contracted through Kawasho and Nittetsu was equal at 2.2mt. 
The rapid promotion of Nittetsu accounts for two thirds of 
the decline in sogo shosha imports for Nippon Steel. The other 
one third of the decline was attributable to Tokyo Boeki's 
increased role. These two specialised traders reduced the sogo 
shosha supply of coking coal to Nippon Steel from 94% in JFY76 
to 76% in JFY87 (Figure 8.3).
The other steel mills had similar specialised arrangements 
with affiliated trading companies. Nippon Kokan acquired 4% 
of its coking coal through Kokan Mining in the 1980s (Okura 
Trading had a similar specialised role in the 1970s). Sumikin 
imported 5% of Sumitomo Metal's coking coal and Shinsho 
(Shinko Shoji) imported 5% of Kobe Steel's coal requirements 
(Figure 8.4).
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The remaining trading companies each imported less than 0.2mt 
of the 60mt of coking coal contracted in JFY87. Despite their 
small size, these firms are of interest because they found a 
trade and information niche by specialising in trade with 
centrally planned economies. The three largest importers in 
this group (Toyota Tusho, Toko Bussan and Trinity Development) 
each supplied coal to five or more steel mills in the 1980s. 
Most annual contracts were for less than 10,000t. The entire 
year's business of each firm could fit in a single ship on the 
trade routes from Australia or Canada. Instead, these firms 
specialised in trade with centrally planned economies. Their 
small trade flows were met by small shipments from China or 
the USSR. The other 20 or so small traders (<0.1mtpa in coking 
coal contracts) also specialised in Soviet or Chinese trade^®.
Specialist traders also established a role for themselves in 
the Japanese steam coal trade, although their market share in 
the 1980s was small. Tokyo Boeki extended its position in the 
coking coal trade by also arranging steam coal contracts. 
These contracts were for Saxonvale coal (to be imported in 
conjunction with Japan Coal Development Corporation) for Tokyo 
and Tohoku Electric Power. A similar contract was signed to 
supply coal to Onoda Cement.
Another specialist coal trader is Mitsui Mining, the 
established coal mining company which was seeking to diversify 
its activities. In part this new role as an importer was 
simply to continue supplying the customers which had 
previously been supplied from domestic mines. Sumitomo Coal 
Mining followed a similar pattern through Nomura Trading^.
A more significant group of specialist steam coal importers 
emerged in the 1980s with large plans to expand their role in 
the 1990s. Three Japanese oil companies (Nippon Oil, Idemitsu 
and Showa Shell) imported coal for electric power companies 
and cement companies in the 1980s. These imports were linked 
to the investments in coal mines discussed in chapter 6. 
Although the oil companies are new to the coal trade, their 
role is argued to demonstrate the importance of information
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structures. Their experience in the oil part of the energy 
industry enabled them to establish strong marketing and 
consumer information networks. Coal is simply added as another 
fuel choice in their portfolio of energy supply systems.
Having demonstrated the ability of sogo shosha and other 
traders to provide a diverse coal supply network for Japanese 
consumers, the question remains as to why they succeeded.
8.6 Information structure and transaction costs
The basis of the success of sogo shosha is argued to be their 
ability to reduce transaction costs. Three techniques enable 
them to use information to reduce transaction costs. Given the 
high initial cost and low incremental cost of information, 
sogo shosha maximise the return on their information assets by 
aggregating multiple transactions for a particular good (coal 
type), repeating transactions over time, and coordinating the 
smooth and efficient timing of the supply system. The combined 
application of these techniques enables them to coordinate a 
large numer of small transactions as part of their information 
services.
8.6.1 Coal transaction size and numbers
The Japanese coking coal trade is distinctive because it is 
the largest international coal trade by tonnage (SOmtpa), yet 
is comprised of very small transaction sizes (75kt on 
average). The result is that the contracted import of 60mt in 
JFY87 was based on a total of over 800 transactions. Each 
transaction consists of the agreement for a producer to supply 
a consumer with a designated quantity of coking coal for an 
agreed price. The producer and consumer sign the contract and 
are the legal parties involved. However, traders take an 
active part in the transaction despite their lack of legal 
status as owner of the coal. The largest traders, Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi, coordinate contracts for over 100 pairs of clients 
(170 and 135 transactions respectively in JFY87). In
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comparison, Marubeni participates in 74 transactions, Sumitomo 
in 67, C.Itoh in 55, Nichimen 44, Nissho Iwai 42, and Toyo 
Menka 38.
In contrast to this variation in transaction numbers, the 
average size of each trading house's transactions is generally 
in the 50-100kt range. Mitsui and Mitsubishi transactions 
average 89kt and 76 kt each, while C.Itoh contracts average 
lllkt and Nissho Iwai 90kt. Smaller JFY87 averages were found 
for Sumitomo (63kt), Toyo Menka (60kt), Nichimen (53kt), 
Kanematsu (52kt) and Marubeni (44kt). The striking thing about 
these averages is that they are all smaller in size than a 
typical Capesize vessel (100-120kt) bringing coal to Japan. 
Given that deliveries under a contract are normally spread 
over the year, the average delivery size is quite small. Some 
means is required to coordinate all of these small 
transactions. By participating in 40-140 transactions, a sogo 
shosha can provide this coordination and arrange for a variety 
of coals to be delivered at the required times throughout the 
year.
The average values noted above disguise the interests of 
smaller and larger consumers. Nippon Steel is the largest 
consumer of coking coal and it enters 120 contracts to import 
the 20mt required for its annual operation. The average size 
of each transaction is 165kt. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, Godo Steel only imports 280kt of coking coal, or 
less than two of Nippon Steel's average purchases. However, 
Godo Steel enters 34 contracts to secure this coal and the 
average transaction size is reduced to 8kt. The average 
transaction size for Nippon Steel is thus 20 times that of 
Godo Steel. The relationship between average transaction size 
and total coal imports is virtually linear (Figure 8.7).
The most striking feature of coking coal transactions for the 
steel mills is the similar number and pattern of contracts 
used by each mill. NKK, Kawasaki, Sumitomo and Kobe each have 
approximately 100 contracts for their annual supply of coking 
coal (Figure 8.6).
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Figure 8.6: Number of coal contracts by
size of steel mill imports
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Variation in the quantity of consumer demand is met by varying 
contract size (instead of varying the number of contracts) 
once the desired level of approximately 100 contracts is 
reached. It can be assumed that additional contracts would not 
add significantly to diversity objectives.
The smaller mills of Nisshin Steel and Nakayama Steel have 
fewer transactions (76 and 38 respectively) because of their 
small total demand. The surprising feature is the average size 
of transactions, only 24kt and 19kt, respectively. To 
negotiate this large number of small transactions would 
require a great deal of time, increase transaction costs and 
result in higher cost coal. How can these costs be reduced?
Rather than deal with small contracts of only 20kt in size, 
other major steel mills importing coal from the international 
market operate with average contracts ten times larger. Pohang 
Iron & Steel in South Korea, China Steel in Taiwan, Siderbras 
in Brazil and the Steel Authority in India each have an 
average contract size of approximately 200-400kt rather than 
the 20kt of small mills in Japan. The average for European 
steel mills is 360kt per contract (290kt per contract if you 
count BHP-Utah contracts as four contracts because of the 
various brands supplied). In each case, these smaller steel 
mills have larger average contract sizes than Nippon Steel.
To achieve similar transaction sizes, either the Japanese 
steel mills must purchase as a group or the sogo shosha must 
procure coal on a scale directed at the entire industry. The 
selling of a particular type of coal to several consumers is 
common practice in the coking coal trade. For example, Mitsui 
is the importer responsible for 170 transactions in 1987, but 
only 28 brands of coal are involved. In most cases 6 or 8 
steel mills plus Mitsubishi Chemical and sometimes 1 or 2 
smaller consumers will purchase the same brand of coal. In 
this way the average Mitsui transaction size is increased from 
90kt per transaction to 540kt per coal type. This facilitates 
larger scale purchasing, gains economies of scale in the 
transport function and reduces transaction costs.
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8.6.2 Traders and incremental demand.
To identify the benefits of aggregating the demands of several 
consumers within a single procurement system (organised by a 
trading house) comparisons can be made among selected Japanese 
consumers and their coal contracts. The largest consumer, 
Nippon Steel (19.9mt in JFY87) is compared to a steel mill one 
quarter its size, Kobe Steel (5.2mt), and to the smallest 
steel mill, Godo Steel (0.28mt).
If the problem of coal procurement is approached from the 
consumer's perspective, the problem of how to arrange diverse 
supplies for a mill which consumes less than 0.3mt is 
considerable. Given that typical mines which supply the 
international market have a production capacity of 0.5-1.0mt 
for an underground mine or 2-5mt for an open cut mine, the 
steel mill could easily be supplied by a single producer. Such 
an arrangement might be appealing because of its simplicity 
with only one producer to negotiate with and only one trade 
flow to arrange. However, if diverse sources are desired to 
prevent any supply disruptions or promote diversity and 
competition, then an alternative arrangement is required.
The supply of coal to a small steel mill could be linked as 
the incremental demand to that of a larger consumer. In this 
case, the contract arrangements would be expected to be 
similar. The use of the same sogo shosha supply networks for 
various steel mills was demonstrated earlier at the 
international level, but is even better illustrated by 
identifying the national contracts and coal brands imported 
by specific sogo shosha. Despite the small tonnage imported 
by Godo Steel, 16 Australian mines supply the mill with coking 
coal (Figure 8.8). This small tonnage could only be supplied 
on such a diverse basis by combining it with the demand of 
other steel mills. The network of Australian mines supplying 
larger mills (Kobe and Nippon Steel, for example) is even more 
elaborate (Figure 8.9 and Figure 8.10).
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Figure 8.8: Australian coal contracts with Godo Steel, 1984
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Figure 8.9: Australian coal contracts with Kobe Steel, 1984
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Figure 8.10: Australian coal contracts with Nippon Steel, 1984
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The first feature which emerges from the comparison of the 
three different sized mills is the similarity of their 
contract arrangements. In each case, the number of contracts 
with Mitsui or Mitsubishi as the importer is very similar. 
The contrast is found in the size of each contract. Godo Steel 
contracts average only lOkt each while most Nippon Steel 
contracts are over lOOkt in size and average 200kt when sogo 
shosha are the importer^. Kobe Steel formed an intermediate 
position with a similar number of contracts as Nippon Steel, 
but a smaller average size (50-100kt). The general pattern 
identified in Figure 8.6 is reinforced.
Other sogo shosha were also active in this trade. The number 
of their contracts was similar for Nippon and Kobe Steel but 
smaller for Godo Steel. Presumably, the benefits of further 
dividing this small trade are limited. For example if the 
number of transactions doubled, the size of each contract 
would fall from lOkt to 5kt. With commissions based on 
contract tonnage, the incentive to further divide the trade 
is diminished. The Godo case illustrates that the largest sogo 
shosha extend their trade network to the smallest consumers 
while other traders are less active in this area.
In contrast to the extension of large sogo shosha networks to 
the smallest consumers, the smallest traders were found to be 
most active in providing supplies to the largest consumer. 
More specialist traders have contracts with Nippon Steel than 
any other consumer. Despite its complexity the pattern is 
highly stable. Most trade links are used for several consumers 
and then repeated in future years.
8.6.3 Traders and repeated transactions
The repetition of transactions was identified as another means 
to reduce transaction costs. These repetitions can be 
conducted under long term contracts, evergreen contracts or 
repeated annual contracts. The extent of contracts remaining 
active for over a decade is illustrated in Table 8.11. The
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largest traders had more transactions in 1976 than other 
traders and also had contracts of longer duration. Mitsubishi 
and Mitsui arranged over 100 transactions each and 11 years 
later, 70% of these transactions were still active.
A time series comparison of transaction data for 1976 and 1987 
reveals that this pattern is very common in the coking coal 
trade. Almost exactly one half of the 568 transactions in 1976 
were still active with the same coal brand imported by the 
same trader for the same consumer 11 years later (288 cases = 
50.7%). This pattern is only partially explained by the 
existence of long term contracts. Many of the trading 
relationships persisted after long term contracts expired (as 
in the case of Australian hard coking coals from central 
Queensland and the south coast of NSW, and Canadian coals from 
mines established in the early 1970s). Alternatively, the 
trade may persist on the basis of annual renegotiations as in 
the case of soft coking coal producers in the Hunter Valley.
Table 8.11: Proportion of 1976 transactions still active 
in 1987
trader # 1976 transactions # active in 1987 %
Mitsubishi 109 78 72
Mitsui 101 70 69
Marubeni 80 26 33
C.Itoh 58 17 29
Nissho Iwai 49 14 29
Toyo Menka 44 19 43
Sumitomo 37 22 60
Nichimen 31 16 52
Kanematsu 7 3 43
sogo shosha 516 265 51
Tokyo Boeki 15 6 40
trading subsidiaries 30 8 27
other 7 4 57
other traders 52 23 44
total 568 288 51
source: derived from contract data
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8.6.4 Traders and coal brands
The creation of an integrated trading system based upon trade 
in particular brands being coordinated by sogo shosha is 
argued to be the Japanese method to reduce transaction costs 
in a fragmented global coal trade. The relationship between 
traders and coal brands is important for two reasons. First, 
it illustrates the general pattern of sogo shosha gaining 
exclusive rights for trade in particular brands which can be 
identified with the firm. Second, it illustrates the system 
approach adopted by sogo shosha whereby they promote 
particular mines or brands to meet incremental demand and 
sustain the system during repeated transactions.
To gain insight into this process the coal transactions were 
classified according to the proportion of the contracts for 
each brand which involved each trader. If a trader was 
nominated as the importer for all (100%) of the contracted 
volume of a particular brand of coal then it was classified 
as the sole importer. If the trader imported the majority of 
the contracted volume (>50%,<100%) then it is called the 
dominant importer. If the share of imports is not dominant, 
but still greater than 10%, the trader is termed a significant 
importer. Finally, if the share of imports is less than 10% of 
the volume for that brand of coal, then the trader is termed 
a small importer of that coal. Tables 8.12 and 8.13 provide 
the distribution of coal contracts by classifying the importer 
as being either the sole, dominant, significant or small 
importer for that brand.
The pattern of sogo shosha having sole import rights for 
particular coal brands is present, but Table 8.12 indicates 
that it is not as extensive as might be expected from the 
discussion of their control over trade systems. In 1976 and 
1987 approximately 50 brands of coal were imported by only 
one importer. Other arrangements were more numerous with 
several traders importing the same brand of coal. Despite the 
numerical diversity of these smaller arrangements, the 50 
brands imported by sole traders provided over half of the
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total contracted tonnage. The conventional sogo shosha 
practice of controlling trade in its particular lines of 
products thus forms the basis of the Japanese coking coal 
trade, but is not an exclusive practice.
Table 8.12: Class of importer in coking coal contracts.
1976 and 1987 .
1976 contracts
importer class sole dominant significant small
100% >50% >10% <10%
trader
Mitsui 6
# of coal brands 
4 8 2
Mitsubishi 7 4 2 1
other sogo shosha 32 13 40 13
sogo shosha 45 21 50 16
Tokyo Boeki 5 0 3 2
trading subsidiaries 2 0 11 6
specialised traders 7 0 14 8
total 52 21 64 24
1987 contracts
Mitsui 9 9 8 3
Mitsubishi 11 4 2 3
other sogo shosha 25 15 26 20
sogo shosha 45 28 36 26
Tokyo Boeki 3 1 0 4
trading subs 1 2 16 51
other 0 0 3 29
specialised traders 4 3 19 84
total 49 31 54 111
source: derived from contract data
The importance of the largest sogo shosha is particularly 
evident when the continuation of trade in the same brands is 
compared between 1976 and 1987 (Table 8.13). Of the 6 or 7 
brands which Mitsui and Mitsubishi were the sole importer for 
in 1976, 4 of these brands were still traded in 1987. This 
continuation of two thirds of their 'exclusive' brands stands 
in contrast to the position of other sogo shosha. Of the 32 
brands which other sogo shosha were the sole importer of in
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1976 only 6 were still traded under the same arrangement in 
1987. Mitsui and Mitsubishi had the most stable pattern.
Table 8.13: Class of importer in contracts continued
from 1976 to 1987
importer class sole dominant significant small
100% >50% >10% <10%
trader # of coal brands
Mitsui 4 3 6 0
Mitsubishi 4 2 1 1
other sogo shosha 6 3 9 11
sogo shosha 14 8 16 12
Tokyo Boeki 1 0 1 1
trading subs 0 0 3 3
other 0 0 0 0
specialised traders 1 0 4 4
total 15 8 20 16
source: derived from contract data
The strength of the bargaining position of steel mills and 
their strategy of using many importers offers an explanation 
of the coal trade where particular brands were imported by 
multiple traders. One of the important developments in the 
coking coal trade was the rise in the role of specialised 
traders. This increase in their share of trade will be shown 
in this section to be a refinement of the dominant sogo shosha 
pattern rather than a complete replacement. Tokyo Boeki 
adopted the sogo shosha pattern of investing directly in a new 
mine and being the largest importer of that coal. This 
strategy was not followed by the trading subsidiaries of the 
steel mills.
Nittetsu, Kawasho and the other trading companies affiliated 
with steel mills did not invest directly in coal mines to form 
new vertically integrated corporate structures. Instead, they 
became a new dimension of the dominant sogo shosha trading 
structure. New coal mines in the 1980s were established under 
more complex arrangements than their predecessors. The 
prevalence of joint ventures with several investment partners
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was discussed earlier. Similar changes occurred in the trading 
arrangements.
Sogo shosha did not necessarily gain sole import rights in 
new mines. A new formula was often negotiated where the sogo 
shosha retained primary responsibility, but other traders were 
also included. The usual arrangement was for the trading 
subsidiary of each steel mill to be the importer of a fixed 
proportion (typically 10, 20 or 30%) of its coal contract from 
that particular mine. Each contract between a steel mill and 
its trading subsidiary would rarely exceed 5% of the imports 
of a particular coal brand. The existence of 3-6 such 
contracts still left 70-90% of the imports in the hands of the 
sogo shosha. Their exclusive position was replaced with one of 
continued primary responsibility (Table 8.12). The decline in 
sogo shosha share of coal imports does not represent an equal 
decline in their control over the coal trade.
New mines like Collinsville, Curragh, German Creek, Oaky Creek 
and Riverside in Queensland each had several steel mill 
subsidiaries as small importers of their coal while the 
largest tonnage was still imported by a sogo shosha (C.Itoh, 
Mitsui, Marubeni, Sumitomo and Mitsui, respectively). The sogo 
shosha thus retained the dominant role with 70-90% of total 
trade. However, the steel mills also gained as their trading 
subsidiaries established a parallel trade network to act as 
another source of information on the coal and a competitor to 
the sogo shosha.
The pattern of a uniform share of steel mill imports, 
typically 20%, being procured by a trading subsidiary emerged 
in the 1980s^\ This new pattern replaced the more uneven 
experience of earlier mines where some of the smaller sogo 
shosha performed this role of providing a second pathway for 
the coal (like Nissho Iwai imports for Kobe Steel) or imports 
were obtained directly from the affiliated trading house (like 
Sumitomo or Kawasho) instead of the sogo shosha which 
dominated imports of that brand.
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The new pattern for hard coking coal imports from new mines 
was not universal. The pattern of imports from the USA or 
semi-soft coking coal imports was much less structured and 
reflected the needs of individual mills and the best prices 
which could be negotiated with individual mines. The uniform 
allocation of American coals among the steel mills in 
proportion to their total import needs (as in the case of 
Australian and Canadian coals) was only followed for major 
brands under long term contracts. Instead, the prevailing 
pattern of sogo shosha including selected brands in their 
portfolio of information and trade networks was extended to 
cover most USA brands available for export. The steel mills 
still acquire their USA coal through the traders, but the 
combination of mines is not the same for each mill. Once again 
the pattern is one of diverse supply arrangements with sogo 
shosha using their extensive international information network 
to facilitate trade.
8.7 Conclusion
This chapter made a detailed investigation into coal trade 
transactions and discovered the extent and effectiveness of 
the specialised information structure represented by trading 
companies. In Europe coal traders were shown to extend the 
coal market by specialising in selling to small consumers, 
transhipping coal to small ports in northern Europe, arranging 
East-West trade and meeting special trade arrangements in 
north Africa. They often supplied large national consumers and 
maintained extensive contacts in supply countries. Despite 
their continued activity, the relative importance of European 
coal traders is in decline. New traders like the oil companies 
offer alternative fully integrated supply networks and new 
sources of information grow (newsletters, consultants and 
conferences). In contrast to the decline of traders in Europe, 
the sogo shosha continue to dominate Japanese coal trade.
The sogo shosha were shown to reduce transaction costs by 
aggregating the incremental demand of consumers, especially
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small consumers, to generate demand volumes which can be 
efficiently arranged. They also promote the repetition of 
transactions (beyond the legal reguirements of long term 
contracts) to further reduce transaction costs and increase 
the benefits gained from their information assets. Finally, 
they promote the creation of new supply systems (mine, 
transport and infrastructure) to achieve the diversity and 
security objectives of consumers as well as enhance their 
marketshare.
The elaborate network of 100 transactions to supply the annual 
coking coal needs of each major steel mill provides several 
opportunities for competition. The large sogo shosha compete 
with smaller sogo shosha, with specialised traders like Tokyo 
Boeki, with trading subsidiaries of the steel mills and with 
specialised traders supplying Soviet or Chinese coal. 
Contracts are still signed by producers and consumers directly 
and the opportunity is present to change the sogo shosha based 
configuration to a conventional market model if the elaborate 
trade structures fail to benefit the parties involved.
One of the important benefits of sogo shosha activities is 
their attention to system creation and coordination whereby 
the costs of trade are reduced and security through diversity 
is increased. Simultaneous investment is made in production, 
transport, storage, distribution and consumption systems to 
gain economies of scale and incorporate advanced technology. 
The dominance of sogo shosha in Japanese coking coal trade is 
repeated in Japanese steam coal trade and growing in trade 
among third countries. In short, the Japanese information 
structure created by the sogo shosha is used to coordinate the 
extension of the Japanese production and financial structures 
to achieve Japanese security objectives. Their technique is to 
use several complementary forms of quasi-integration rather 
than the direct control implied by conventional equity based 
integration. The result is an extensive Japanese trade 
structure which includes many of the members of the global 
coal industry.
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Endnotes :
1. Daintith and Rogers have a contract-based study of European 
energy (including coal) imports underway. Their results should 
provide much greater academic insights into the trade.
2. The three tiered information structure can undergo four 
types of associated change. First, the perceptions and beliefs 
which underlie value judgements and political/economic 
decision making can change (at the belief level). Second, the 
type of use of information channels can change (at the 
information level). Third, the provision of and control over 
information can change (at the information level), and finally 
the channel itself can be changed in terms of technology, 
composition or access (at the information channel level). Of 
these four types of change, the investigation concentrates on 
the provision of information and changes in the information 
channel. Information is used to agree on transactions and to 
coordinate trade at the system level. The control over this 
trade-related information is reviewed.
3. Asset specificity is the investment in an asset which has 
greater value in its expected use than in its second best use 
(Williamson 1975). For example if a mine is constructed to 
supply raw material to a nearby plant, its second best value 
may be much smaller if the next consumer is located further 
away and the transport costs are high. This example of site 
specificity can be repeated for other types of asset 
specificity: physical assets, technology (e.g. boiler design 
for specific coal qualitites), human capital, or dedicated 
assets where the production capacity is beyond current demand 
levels outside of the agreed contract.
4. For example, the German Coal Importers Association listed 
39 members in 1988.
5. The list of branch offices or subsidiary companies of 
traders based in supply countries is illustrated by SSM of 
Rotterdam who have subsidiaries in the USA, Australia, 
Colombia and South Africa (SSM 1987). A similar list of SSM 
subsidiaries is found in the importing countries of Belgium, 
Brazil, Denmark, France, Hong Kong, Switerland, W.Germany and 
the UK.
6. This list excludes the small household and industrial 
consumers traditionally supplied by the traders. Similarly, 
the barge traffic in Europe where traders play an important 
role is not examined in detail. Instead, the table presents 
the large consumers whose contract arrangements are monitored 
by the international coal press.
7. In 1989 BP decided to sell its coal interests (ICR 1989).
8. An exception to the repeated success of the sogo shosha is 
the tenth sogo shosha, Ataka, which went bankrupt in 1978 
after an outstanding loan of $800 million to the oil refinery, 
Newfoundland Refinery was unable to be repaid. The bankrupt
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firm was merged with C.Itoh and its coal contracts are 
included in the C.Itoh total throughout this study.
9. The origins of the sogo shosha are traced back to the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868 when Japan was re-opened to international 
trade. The dominance of foreign traders soon led the 
government to place a priority on the rapid development of 
indigenous institutions that would be able to perform foreign 
trade functions (Yoshina and Lifson 1986:10). The companies 
were to fulfill three functions: reduce the near monopoly of 
foreign trade controlled by foreign business; develop external 
trade to supply materials, equipment and technology for 
Japanese industry; and build a system where labour was divided 
between the manufacturing role of domestic companies and the 
trade specialisation of trading houses (Young 1979:24).
Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi Corp. both expanded rapidly in 
the 1870-90 period and included coal mining and coal exports 
as two of their principal activities (Tsurumi and Tsurumi 
1984:17; Mitsubishi 1986:60). Coal was later imported for 
Japanese manufacturing firms when domestic demand grew.
10. This represented a major recovery of an area of activity 
which ceased following the World War 11, but had been an 
important pursuit in the early part of the century. Third 
country trade comprised 15, 33 and 2 3% of Mitsui sales in 
1910, 1920 and 1930, respectivley (Kunio 1982).
11. Western trading companies typically adapted to 
industrialisation by either specialising as a particular 
commodity trader or establishing retail chains (Tsurumi and 
Tsurumi 1984).
12. Yamazawa (1989) provided a detailed investigation of the 
early trading activities of the sogo shosha in Japan. He 
constructed a production function for sogo shosha based on 
three types of inputs: market information, foreign transaction 
skills, and trade promotion services. He argued that the lack 
of trade promotion services (including trade credits and 
finance, marine insurance, and ocean transportation) were 
especially important to explain the failure of most of the 75 
traders operating in 1878. The Suzuki case of a sogo shosha 
with weak internal financial institutions supports his theory. 
The importance of links with government was not considered.
In contrast to Yamazawa's internal assessment of sogo shosha 
success, Yonekawa (1985) complained that too much attention 
has been directed toward the financial, information and 
organisational services of sogo shosha. Instead, he 
concentrated on the stage of economic development in the 
national economy and entrepreneurial zeal as explanations of 
their success. While the stage of economic development may be 
important in creating opportunities for establishing sogo 
shosha, this external explanation seems inadequate to explain 
why similar trading companies did not emerge when other 
countries were at a similar stage of development. Indeed, the 
transition from the mercantile to the industrial era in Europe 
and North America was marked by the decline of traders rather 
than the growth experienced by their Japanese counterparts.
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13. Large volumes of steel are purchased and then sold to many 
consumers with the sogo shosha maintaining the required stock. 
Most steel consumers found this system advantageous, although 
some large steel consumers like shipyards and automobile 
manufacturers try to avoid the sogo shosha by making direct 
deals with the mills (Yoshino and Lifson 1986).
14. This contract data is compiled largely from secondary 
sources. The validity was checked by presenting the contract 
data to coal traders and consumers and asking them to make 
any corrections. The result was a verification of the 
reliability of the data sources. As one sogo shosha official 
responded: 'We are reluctant to answer this question, but (the 
contract data is) surprisingly correct except for some minor 
details.' (response to Appendix D). The firm kindly revised 
some of the delivery volumes and verified that the enclosed 
list of coal contracts was accurate.
15. Each of the electric power companies with large import 
requirements over 0. Smtpa used the services of four or more 
sogo shosha while the smaller companies used three or fewer. 
In some cases, the import share of each sogo shosha was not 
clear because they shared the responsibility for imports from 
a single mine. The biggest example of this pattern is the 
Blair Athol mine which commenced exports in 1984. Blair Athol 
became the largest supplier of steam coal to the EPCs, 
reflecting their direct investment in the mine. However, the 
role of importer was divided between Nissho Iwai and Marubeni 
for the EPDC contract. The contracts for other EPCs involved 
Mitsui, Nissho Iwai and Marubeni as importers. Rather than 
make arbitrary allocations among the sogo shosha, the tonnage 
is presented as a separate item as part of the sogo shosha 
total. Imports from China are also divided among several 
traders and are treated in the same way (as a distinct group 
based on source rather than trader).
16. This large contract is reinforced by the joint 
shareholdings (1-4%) which Howard Smith (owner of Coal & 
Allied), Nissho Iwai and Ube Industries have in each other.
17. The success of Kawasho in selling Kawasaki products is 
demonstrated by its rise to the position of the tenth largest 
Japanese trading company based on turnover in the 1980s.
18. Those importing Soviet coking coal included Kyoho Tusho, 
Shinten Jitugyo, Okura trading, Tonan Trading, Hyuka Sangyo 
and Nomura Trading. Soviet steam coal was imported by 
Sumitomo, Nichimen, Hokkaido Coal Import Centre, Taiheiyo 
Kohatsu, Maizuru Koeki, Shinsui, Joban Kosan, Mitsui Mining, 
Peace Enterprise, Beryoza and Toho Bussan (Coal Manual 
1985:427). The China specialists included: Kyoho Tusho, Okura 
Trading, Tonan Trading, Meiwa Sangyo, Kyoei Shoji, Asahi 
Bussan, Okaya Koki, Nishinihon Boeki, Tosho, Wako Koeki, 
Nichien, Hyogoken Boeki, Nishimura Shoji, Nihon Keitokuchin, 
Sangen Tsukuba, Shin-Nihon Tsusho, Mitsui Mining, Tokai Shoji 
and Itohman (Coal Manual 1988:94).
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19. Table 8.À: Specialised traders' share of Japanese steam
coal contracts, 1980-87
EPDC Chug Hokk Hoku Shik Toho Kyus Sumi JobJ Kan Tok tot
specialised trader 
Tokyo Boeki 
1984 
1987 
Mitsui Mining
of EPC contracts
50
50
1984 12 5 41 6
1987 35 1
Showa Shell
1984 3 14 43 4
1987 3 6 32 2
Joban Kosan
1984 24 .6
1987 24 .6
Taiheiyo
1984 22 .6
1987 21 .5
Nippon Oil
1984 & 1987 1 . 3
Idemitsu
1987 8 .2
Specialised traders
1984 15 1 22 41 43 46 50 12
1987 3 1 6 4 42 32 45 50 5
Total tonnage contracted (mt)
1980 0.8 0.3 1.1
1984 4.3 2.5 0.2 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.2 0.3 .3 .1 .1 10.6
1987 4.3 3.4 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.3 . 3 .2 11.9
Chic Denk MitbM NipC Onod Osak Sumi Toka Toyo Ube tot
% of cement company contractsspecialised trader 
Tokyo Boeki 
1984 23
1987 32
Bayswater (Nippon Oil, Sumitomo, Idemitsu) 
1984
1987 12
Showa Shell
84
71
16
24
1984
1987
Idemitsu
1987
4 4 
4 4
6
21 3
1
.4
Specialised traders 
1984 0 0 4 4 23 21 0 84 16 0 8
1987 12 0 4 4 37 0 0 71 24 0 8
Total tonnage contracted (mt) 
1984 .4 .1 1.3 1.3 .9 .7 1.1 .2 .4 2.4 8.8
1987 .3 .1 1 .2 1.2 .6 .5 .7 .1 .4 2.0 7.1
source: contract data set
3 3 9
20. Table 8.B: Number of coking coal contracts by importer
importer JFY 1976 1984 1987
Nippon ;Steel # of contracts
sogo shosha
Mitsui 18 24 22
Mitsubishi 12 18 15
other sogo shosha 47 50 42
sub-total 77 92 79
other traders
Tokyo Boeki 7 8 8
Nittetsu 0 15 19
others 3 14 14
sub-total 10 37 41
total 87 129 120
Kobe Steel
sogo shosha
Mitsui 9 17 19
Mitsubishi 12 14 15
other sogo shosha 38 38 39
sub-total 59 69 73
other traders
Tokyo Boeki 1 4 5
Shinsho 3 12 10
others 1 7 8
sub-total 5 23 23
total 64 92 96
Godo Steel
sogo shosha
Mitsui 11 12 13
Mitsubishi 9 12 10
other sogo shosha 5 8 9
sub-total 25 32 32
other traders
Tokyo Boeki 0 2 2
others 0 0 0
sub-total 0 2 2
total 25 34 34
source: Coal Manual 1976, 1985, 1988
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20 contd.
Table 8.C: Average coking coal contract size by importer
importer JFY 1976 1984 1987
Nippon Steel average size (kt = '000 tonnes)
sogo shosha
Mitsui 485 334 262
Mitsubishi 686 308 207
other sogo shosha 215 137 149
sub-total 352 222 191
other traders
Tokyo Boeki 231 282 278
Nittetsu 72 117
others 33 27 21
sub-total 172 101 116
average 331 187 165
total tonnage 28,800 24,100 19,900
sogo shosha Kobe Steel
Mitsui 181 119 85
Mitsubishi 141 83 47
other sogo shosha 63 63 54
sub-total 97 81 61
other traders
Tokyo Boeki 4 106 94
Shinsho 50 22 25
others 2 5 6
sub-total 31 32 34
average 92 69 54
total tonnage 5,900 6,300 5,200
sogo shosha Godo Steel
Mitsui 9 10 8
Mitsubishi 18 10 9
other sogo shosha 5 8 6
sub-total 11 9 8
other traders
Tokyo Boeki 0 17 18
Shinsho 0 0 0
others 0 0 0
sub-total 0 17 18
average 11 10 8
total tonnage 280 340 280
source: Coal Manual 1976, 1985, 1988.
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21. The exceptions to these arrangements are where an 
affiliated sogo shosha was involved in the project. The 
affiliation between sogo shosha and steel mills within the 
same keiretsu was discussed earlier and is reinforced by the 
new contracting pattern. Each steel mill used its trading 
subsidiary to import a proportion of the coal from new mines 
in the 1980s except where the sogo shosha (the dominant 
importer) was also from the same keiretsu. The affiliations 
of steel mills, sogo shosha and the trading subsidiaries of 
steel mills are provided along with the names of mines where 
the sogo shosha and trading subsidiaries of affiliated steel 
mills avoid competition (Table 8.D).
Table 8.D: Affiliations among traders and steel mills
steel mill affiliated 
sogo shosha
trading house 
subsidiary
mine without 
competition
Nippon Steel Nittetsu
NKK Marubeni Kokan Kogyo German Cr
Kawasaki Steel C.Itoh,Sumitomo Kawasho Collinsville 
Oaky Cr
Sumitomo Metal Sumitomo Sumikin Oaky Cr
Kobe Steel Nissho Iwai Shinsho Bullmoose
source: Yoshino and Lifson 1986; Coal Manual 1988
3 4 2
Chapter 9
Conclusion
9.1 Summary
This thesis offers five contributions to the study of resource 
trade in general and coal trade in particular. It develops an 
understanding of trade based on multiple structures rather 
than the single structure selected by most ideologies; it 
extends our knowledge of market structures, not just as 
numbers of firms, but as instruments which extend the power 
and bargaining position of their creators; it demonstrates the 
advantages of using contract or transaction level data and 
avoids the weaknesses of studies based on aggregate data; it 
links micro-economic detail at the transaction level to the 
international structures which are built to shape them; and it 
analyses changes in and extensions to the four primary 
structures (security, production, financial and information). 
These structures reach beyond the coal trade to also provide 
a framework for the analysis of other trade relations and the 
management of international environmental problems.
The theoretical basis of most trade studies is argued to be 
internally consistent, yet selective in its correlation with 
reality. The dominant ideologies of neo-classical economics, 
neo-mercantilism and Marxism offer valuable insights into 
socio-economic systems, but each suffers from their adherence 
to a model which values the actions of one dominant type of 
actor (individuals, states or classes). Each ideology includes 
normative judgements on how the system operates as well as 
positive tests (using selected data) to verify its 
predictions. The result is a consistent theory which 
correlates with only part of its object of study.
This thesis adopts the opposite strategy and starts with the 
known details of trade and then develops a structural 
international political economy model based on the identified 
dominant structures. The result is that rather than having a 
simple model derived from one aspect of international trade, 
a more comprehensive model is developed which can inform the
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debate in any of the dominant ideologies. For example, the 
desire of consumers to diversify supply sources was quantified 
in the consumer survey. The results could be used to define 
parameters (maximum marketshare, minimum number of supply 
countries, etc.) in a conventional least cost coal trade 
model. Instead, this study emphasised how consumers achieved 
this objective by identifying the quasi-integration linkages 
and price mechanisms which they considered important.
The most common coal trade models of least cost, efficiency 
maximising supply and political domination by an all- 
encompassing 'Japan Inc.' are both judged to be inadequate to 
represent global coal trade patterns. Instead, economics and 
politics are both recognised as contributing to international 
trade patterns. In addition, the conventional political 
economy approach of measuring the relative strength of market 
or state forces is replaced by a more comprehensive framework 
which includes financial and information structures.
The limitations of the conventional commodity market were 
demonstrated by the failure of least cost trade patterns and 
a single market price for coal to emerge. New supplies in the 
1980s included high cost coal and long distance shipments. 
Both of these patterns conflicted with the least cost model.
Despite meeting the conditions for a commodity market and the 
reports in industry journals of competitive prices among coals 
from different sources, the overall pattern was one of 
persistent price variation. The expectation that international 
prices would vary less at the regional or national level 
(compared to intercontinental price variations) was not found 
in the data. Instead, prices at the national level showed wide 
variation based on the country of origin. Adjustments for the 
quality of coal did not remove this pattern and even steam 
coal in Europe (a widely publicised competitive market) 
demonstrated persistent price variations. Indeed, the 
uniformly high prices of 1980-82 were replaced by much lower 
and more varied prices in the late 1980s. These price 
variations equalled those found in the late 1970s and
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demonstrated a persistent feature of the trade. The conclusion 
is that global coal trade is fragmented rather than uniform.
One explanation of a fragmented pricing regime is that the 
market is dominated by a monopsonist which dictates prices to 
the respective markets. The hypothesis that Japan acts as a 
monopsonist through its 'Japan Inc.' machinery has some 
evidence (price, tonnage and classification discrimination) to 
support it. However, this model of an all-encompassing state 
based structure is rejected in favour of the more elaborate 
structural IPE model which better explains variations in the 
Japanese interaction with suppliers from various regions.
Consumer objectives were identified as a cause of the
variation in trade patterns and price. The results of the
consumer survey (covering 50% of Japanese and European coal 
imports) were used to assess the importance placed on 
different trade structures to achieve objectives like
diversity of supply, least cost coal and limiting the
marketshare of particular companies or countries.
The four primary structures were investigated in detail to 
determine how they each influenced global coal trade. 
Interactions among the structures are recognised and used to 
explain variations in trade patterns. For example, in some 
cases finance was used to achieve security objectives rather 
than the least cost extension of the production structure. 
Conflict can thus arise among the structures just as readily 
as support.
The security structure consists of state and private measures 
to increase the security of the state, its citizens and its 
industries. Private concerns about the security of supply of 
essential raw materials are thus included as part of the 
security structure. Corporate diversity of supply objectives 
may be reinforced by government policies. In particular, many 
governments responded to the oil price rises of the 1970s with 
explicit energy policies to enhance national supplies. 
National policies to support the coal industry occur in most
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coal producing countries. However, the annual cost of these 
policies reached over $10 billion per annum in the mid 1980s 
as the value of subsidies often exceeded international coal 
prices. Rather than continue to rely on expensive national 
sources of supply, governments turned increasingly to the 
international trade system as promoted by multilateral 
organisations like IEÀ and GATT.
The inherent conflict between national protectionist policies 
and multilateral free trade objectives was slowly resolved 
with a shift in emphasis from national to international 
security structures. This shift was most apparent in Europe 
where price signals were used to gain the desired diversity of 
supply from the global production structure. Japan also relied 
on the global production structure for its coal supply, but 
adopted a more active role to extend its national structures 
into the international arena.
The convergence of national policies on the acceptance of 
greater reliance on the international trading system created 
the need to examine the international production system 
itself. Hundreds of mines and companies were shown to supply 
the global coal trade. Measures of concentration were prepared 
at the national and international level. Despite some 
companies owning many mines and having dominant positions in 
a national industry, their position in the international trade 
was greatly reduced. Even the extensive international holdings 
of oil companies did not eliminate competition. The horizontal 
structure of the industry is based on many operators and is 
therefore considered competitive.
The vertical structure of the international coal industry is 
of equal interest. The prominent national pattern of mines 
wholly owned by consumers like steel mills or electric 
utilities is not repeated in the international industry. 
Instead, an extensive network of minority investments is 
found. Japanese consumers and sogo shosha have an extensive 
range of equity holdings, but European consumers and traders 
also followed the pattern for some of their imports. The
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result is not a system of fully integrated mines being 
controlled directly by a parent/consumer, but the quasi­
integration of many mines into the supply network of 
particular traders or consumers. These investments generally 
increase the security and stability of trading relationships 
and thus reinforce the security objectives identified earlier.
Another source of power in the coal trade is the financial 
structure. Banks can create credit for investment in new mines 
independent from established members of the production 
structure (where retained profits and new equity issues are 
often used for investment) . In the 1970s and 1980s the 
importance of the financial structure increased as new mines 
were increasingly funded from the financial sector through 
large project loans based on future cash flows from long term 
contracts. Contracts thus became an essential part of project 
finance. Both loans and long term contracts were used to 
establish new independent projects which compete with 
established members of the production structure.
In other cases, finance created another form of quasi- 
integration to reinforce minority equity investments in the 
production structure. Loans linked to long term contracts were 
sometimes repaid by fixed reductions in the coal price. 
Security objectives were reinforced by the use of 
concessionary funds from public sources like the Export Import 
Bank of Japan to finance new projects under bilateral trade 
agreements with China and the USSR. European governments also 
made loans to Poland in return for long term supply contracts. 
Even new private mines in Australian, Canada and the USA 
received loans from public as well as private banks. The 
result is a supportive combination or linking of the security, 
production and financial structures.
The extensive use of several forms of quasi-integration in the 
Japanese trade was proven to have a direct impact on trade. 
Higher prices were received in the 1980s by mines with 
Japanese minority investments. Contract duration was also 
longer (as measured by the percentage of transactions active
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throughout an 11 year period, 1976-87) for brands where sogo 
shosha had investments in the mine than for independent coal 
brands. The quasi-integration variables thus added an 
important explanation for trade patterns and price variation. 
Coal quality, country of origin and quasi-integration were 
each recognised as significant predictors of price.
The information structure added further insights into the 
global coal trade. The trading process was recognised as more 
complex than assumed in most studies. Transaction costs were 
reduced by the introduction of traders with specialised 
information networks. This reduced the cost of searching for 
trading partners, establishing diverse supplies, monitoring 
trade flows, supplying small consumers and conducting repeated 
transactions. The sogo shosha were especially successful in 
providing diverse supply networks to small consumers to enable 
them to achieve diversity of supply objectives at low unit 
costs. This was accomplished by the economies of scale gained 
by sogo shosha procurement on an industry scale rather than 
considering each transaction as discrete and separate. This 
system-wide view demonstrated that traders used information 
not only to facilitate particular transactions, but also to 
arrange and monitor complete trade flows to Japan and other 
countries.
The use of transaction data for analysis provided evidence 
and insights which is absent from other coal trade studies. 
European traders were shown to extend international coal 
markets with facilities to supply small consumers, tranship 
coal to small ports, conduct East-West countertrade deals and 
adapt to the special business arrangements of north Africa. 
Their extensive networks are also used to supply established 
national and new international customers. Despite these 
specialised achievements, the importance of traditional 
traders in Europe is in decline. More coal is sold by direct 
consumer-producer contracts and some oil companies act as new 
traders with integrated production, transport and delivery 
systems. Specialised sources of industry information
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(consultants, newsletters and conferences) have also grown to 
compete with the traders.
Despite widespread opinions emphasising the importance of 
least cost supplies in Europe, contract data demonstrated a 
persistent emphasis on price differentiation to achieve supply 
diversity. Prices for USA coals were almost universally higher 
than prices for other non-European coals. Only one quarter of 
European imports were from sources linked to consumers or 
traders by minority investment or bilateral trade agreements. 
In Japan, the opposite was true: three quarters of the imports 
came from such mines. Even long term contracts were less 
important in Europe than in the Japanese trade.
In contrast to European traders, Japanese sogo shosha dominate 
the Japanese trade. The common assertion that sogo shosha are 
the marketing arm for their keiretsu was refuted in the case 
of Japanese coal trade. Although sogo shosha may have a 10- 
20% larger marketshare for a fellow member of their keiretsu, 
the universal pattern is one of consumers using multiple sogo 
shosha for their import requirements. In this way, consumers 
can use the information resources of different sogo shosha to 
further implement their diversity of supply objectives. Sogo 
shosha actively construct international supply structures in 
cooperation with other Japanese actors. The result is a 
network of supportive Japanese trade structures which deliver 
coal from diverse sources with smaller price differentials 
than those in Europe.
The outcome of this recognition of four primary structures 
shaping the global coal trade pattern is a much richer 
understanding of the processes controlling trade and insights 
into variations from the standard models. The relative 
importance of each structure and the interaction among the 
four structures is used to explain diverse patterns in the 
trade. The European coal trade has only limited national 
structures extended internationally and will rely more on the 
diverse global structures for future supplies. In contrast, 
the production, financial, and information structures of Japan
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have been systematically extended to achieve security as well 
as efficiency objectives. The result is that Japanese
industries hold more structural power over suppliers than
their European counterparts. This power may be latent and not 
used or it can be exercised to ensure more reliable supplies.
However, the exercise of power and definition of objectives 
can create conflicts among the four primary structures. For 
example, conflict over the contract price for Quintette coal 
is in part a conflict between the Japanese financial structure
where banks want their loans repaid and the Japanese
production structure where steel mills want lower input costs. 
Similarly, the Japanese banks funding of the BMP takeover of 
CQCÀ created the largest coking coal exporter in the world and 
conflicted with the desire of Japanese steel mills to have 
many suppliers who can not affect market prices.
In other cases, the four structures were used to achieve 
shared objectives and create new trading systems through: 
minority equity holdings, loans, long term contracts and 
supportive government policies. The overall framework is more 
complex than that used in other studies, but explanations are 
provided for more of the trade anomalies which do not fit 
neatly into conventional trade models.
9.2 Future research
The structural international political economy model of trade 
offers a strong basis for the investigation of trade patterns 
and processes. Global coal trade demonstrates the insights and 
explanations offered by the model. The results can be used to 
improve conventional trade models by providing a better 
understanding of the institutions and structures which define 
the parameters required to make conventional models conform to 
actual trade patterns.
Of the four primary structures studied in the global coal 
trade, more research is needed into the operation of the
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financial structure and the increased importance of 
environmental security. The financial trends identified in 
this study can be better understood by a more detailed 
investigation of the project selection and finance negotiation 
process. Particular coal projects are selected for the 
funding of development loans and the signing of long term 
contracts. A variety of factors (including quasi-integration 
and the support of other primary structures) influence this 
process and a more complete understanding is required to 
advise potential participants in the trade.
Equally important is the increased priority attached to 
environmental security. National and international energy 
systems affect both the local and global environment. 
Irreversible changes are being recognised and adjustments in 
energy systems proposed. The interaction among security, 
production, financial and information structures are important 
to analyse the effects of and advise on proposed changes (like 
the introduction of a carbon tax).
The structural framework thus provides an excellent base for 
the investigation of global environmental management issues. 
The problems of resource use and modern energy systems are 
well illustrated by coal combustion. A decision to reduce the 
environmental damage (local and/or global) caused by coal 
combustion is not based on any single criterion and a 
comprehensive investigation is required.
Issues of environmental security have reached international 
forums and new policy debates are emerging. The compatibility 
of these new policies with the interests of dominant members 
of the production and other structures needs to be examined. 
Changing energy systems and reducing pollution emissions 
require massive investments and the financial structure is 
essential for the creation of credit to make such investments. 
Information again plays a central role. One of the most 
important forms of information is that embedded in technology. 
The development and use of technology which is less 
environmentally damaging is an essential element of policies
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to achieve environmental objectives. The investigation of the 
four primary structures thus offers a clear way to advance our 
understanding of how global trade and economic systems can be 
adapted to meet enhanced environmental security objectives.
If changes are desired in the way a particular trade is 
conducted, a thorough understanding of its operation is 
required first. The structural IPE model can be used to 
dissect the complexities of trade. The importance of national 
and international elements within each of the four primary 
structures can be used to explain the allocation of power 
among various groups of actors. If some national structures 
are developed far more than others, as in the case of the 
global coal trade, then different approaches need to be used 
in different sections of the global structure. For example, 
the future expansion of supply to meet increased demand in 
Japan will almost certainly involve the extension of sogo 
shosha supply networks. In contrast, increased European demand 
for imports, as caused by the privatisation of the CEGB, will 
be met by independent producers responding in accord with 
their expectations of future market conditions. The linkages 
among firms are weaker and trade patterns less certain. The 
expected, result will be more uncertainty over supply sources 
and increased price variations, in comparison to those 
experienced in Japan.
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Appendix À: Coal brands and producers/sellers in international coal trade
brand seller producer/seller full name country source
Aberdare Aberdare Aberdare Collieries PL Australia ICR169:3
Upshur Agip USA Agip USA USA ICR164:5
Carbozulia Agipcoal Agipcoal Venezuela CWI924:3
Kangra Agipcoal Agipcoal SA CWI824:3
Allied Indo C Allied Indonesia Coal Indonesia ICQ206:5
New Whitwood Allied QC Allied Queensland Coalfields Australia QCB85:6
Gunnedah AMI Australian Mining Investments Australia JCB87:39
Anadex Anadex USA CWI927:6
Amcor ss Anglo Am Anglo American Coal Corp L SA CN861017
Bank Anglo Am Anglo American Coal Corp L SA . CM85:382
Bank ss Anglo Am Anglo American Coal Corp L SA CM88:360
Good Hope Anglo Am Anglo American Coal Corp L SA CM87:392
Goodhope ss Anglo Am Anglo American Coal Corp L SA CN860804
Kleinkopje Anglo Am Anglo American Coal Corp L SA ICR182:3
ANN Coal American National Resources Coal Co USA CWI843:1
AOV Coal Alla-Ohio Valley Coal USA ICR1:14
Arch Min Arch Mineral Corp USA K588:4
Ashland Ashland Ashland Coal Co USA CM87:390
Associated C Associated Coal Sales USA CWI860:29
Dombarton A&B Austen & Butta L Australia CM76;100
Dombarton 2 A&B Austen & Butta L Australia CM85:190
Dombarton 7 A&B Austen & Butta L Australia CM85:222
Grose Valley A&B Austen & Butta L Australia CM76:122
Invincible A&B Austen & Butta L Australia ICR184:1
Western Blend A&B Austen & Butta L Australia CM87:433
Balis AG Balis AG USA ICR188:3
Paramount Barber Paramt Barber Paramount Coal CO USA CM85:120
Great Greta Barix Barix L Australia CM88:405
Lancashire Barnes&Tucker Barnes & Tucker Co USA CM88:130
Bayswater Bayswater Bayswater Colliery Co PL Australia CM87:390
BC British Coal UK ICR170:9
Beckley Beckley Coal Mining Co USA ICR119:5
South Bulli Bellambi Bellambi Coal Co L Australia CM88:184
West Bellambi Bellambi Bellambi Coal Co L Australia CM76:97
Beth Energy Beth Energy Mines Inc USA CWI843:1
Macquarie BHP Broken Hill Proprietary Co L Australia CM88:405
Blackwater BHP-Utah BHP-Utah (producer = CQCÀ) Australia QCM85
Blackwater sc BHP-Utah BHP-Utah (producer = CQCA) Australia CM85
Blackwater weak BHP-Utah BHP-Utah (producer = CQCA) Australia CM85:216
Goonyella BHP-Utah BHP-Utah (producer = CQCA) Australia QCM85
Gregory BHP-Utah BHP-Utah (producer = CQCA) Australia QCM85
Gregory ss BHP-Utah BHP-Utah (producer = CQCA) Australia CM87:7
Harrow Creek BHP-Utah BHP-Utah (producer = CQCA) Australia QCM85
Illawarra BHP-Utah BHP-Utah (producer = BHP) Australia ICR183:3
Norwich P sc BHP-Utah BHP-Utah (producer = CQCA) Australia QCM85
Norwich Park BHP-Utah BHP-Utah (producer = CQCA) Australia QCM85
Peak Downs BHP-Utah BHP-Utah (producer = CQCA) Australia QCM85
Saraji BHP-Utah BHP-Utah (producer = CQCA) Australia QCM85
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Saxonvale BHP-ütah BHP-ütah (producer = BHP) Australia CWI828:3
Big Sandy Big Sandy Coal USA ICR164:5
Blair Athol Blair Athol Blair Athol Coal Australia CWI841:7
Bloomfield Bloomfield Col Bloomfield Collieries PL Australia CM87:387
Donaldson Bloomfield Col Bloomfield Collieries PL Australia CM88;194
Donaldson ss Bloomfield Col Bloomfield Collieries PL Australia CM88:194
Rathluba soft Bloomfield Col Bloomfield Collieries PL Australia CM88:175
Charbon ss Blue Circle SC Blue Circle Southern Cement L Australia CM88:196
Royal Scot Blue Diamond Blue Diamond Mining Inc USA CM85;126
Goedenhoop Bordex M Bordex Mining SA CM87:457
Clutha BP Coal A BP Coal Australia Australia CM87:394
Howick A ss BP Coal A BP Coal Australia Australia CN87
Howick ss BP Coal A BP Coal Australia Australia CM88:192
Newdell BP Coal A BP Coal Australia Australia CM85:211
Newdell ss BP Coal A BP Coal Australia Australia CM88:176
Tahmoor BP Coal A BP Coal Australia Australia CM88:185
Western Main BP Coal A BP Coal Australia Australia CM85:433
Ermelo BP Coal SA BP Coal SA SA CM85:477
Middelburg BP Coal SA BP Coal SA SA CM85:480
Kaltim Prima BP/CRA BP/CRA Indonesia ICR184:7
Coal Mountain Byron Cr Byron Creek Collieries L Canada CM87:394
CAEEBrasileras Companhia Auxiliar de Empresas Electricas B Brazil ICR137:8
Abersea CAID Coal & Allied Industries L Australia CM76:112
Hunter Valley CAID Coal & Allied Industries L Australia CWI839:5
Hunter Valley ss CAID Coal & Allied Industries L Australia CM88:9
Liddell soft CAID Coal & Allied Industries L Australia CM85:209
Maitland A CAID Coal & Allied Industries L Australia CM76:83
Maitland B CAID Coal & Allied Industries L Australia CM76:146
Wallarah CAID Coal & Allied Industries L Australia CM87:394
West Wallsend typeCAID Coal & Allied Industries L Australia CM85:179
Indian Creek Cannelton Cannelton Industries Inc USA CWI843;1
Maple Meadow Cannelton Cannelton Industries Inc USA CWI843:1
German Creek Capricorn Capricorn Coal Management PL Australia CWI825:3
Cerrejon Carbocol Carbones de Colombia SA Columbia CWI829:2
Cerrejon (C) Carbocol Carbones de Colombia SA Columbia ICR212
Carbomin Carbomin Coal Sales USA ICR129:12
Luscar HV Cardinal R Cardinal River Co Canada CM88:276
Luscar std Cardinal R Cardinal River Co Canada CM88:276
Carter Roag C Carter-Roag Coal USA CWI917:5
Fila Maestra Cavoven Cavoven CWI927:6
Big Rock CCB Castner, Curran & Bullit USA CM76:70
CCS HV CCB Castner, Curran & Bullit USA CM85:133
CCB LV CCB Castner, Curran & Bullit USA CM85:125
Keystone CCB Castner, Curran & Bullit USA CM76:70
Moatise CCM Compania Carbonifera de Mozambique Mozambique CM76:266
BV Blend Clutha Clutha L Australia CM85;226
Clutha Clutha Clutha L Australia ICR186:2
Clutha ss Clutha Clutha L Australia CM85:217
An Tai Bao CNCIEC China National Coal Import & Export Corp China ICR186:2
Datong CMCIEC China National Coal Import & Export Corp China CWI837:3
Fengfeng CNCIEC China National Coal Import & Export Corp China ICR197:9
Huaibei CNCIEC China National Coal Import & Export Corp China CM85;442
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Kailuan CNCIEC China National Coal Import & Export Corp China CM85:367
Pingshuo CNCIEC China National Coal Import & Export Corp China CM85:442
TAISI anth CNCIEC China National Coal Import & Export Corp China CWI837:3
Xinqlongzhuang CNCIEC China National Coal Import & Export Corp China CM88:10
Zaozhuang CNCIEC China National Coal Import & Export Corp China ICR197:9
Coal As Coal Associates USA CWI828:1
Coal Co of P Coal Co of P ICR31:14
Bui 1er Coal Corp NZ Coal Corp of NZ NZ CM88:374
Strongman ss Coal Corp NZ Coal Corp of NZ NZ CM88:374
Cook Coal RQ Coal Resources of Queensland PL Australia QCB85:60
Cook sc Coal RQ Coal Resources of Queensland PL Australia QCB85:60
Iv cc Coalarbed Coalarbed USA K582:4
Bedash Coalarbed Coalarbed USA CM85:120
Baal Bone Coalex Coalex PL Australia CWI827;3
Clarence Coalex Coalex PL Australia CM76:102
Lithgow Coalex Coalex PL Australia CWI825:3
Wolgan Coalex Coalex PL Australia CM76:103
Coastal Coal Coastal Coal International USA CWI860528
Sufco Coastal States Coastal States Energy Co USA CM85:439
Consol Blend Consol Consolidation Coal USA CM88:122
Emery Consol Consolidation COal USA CM85:437
Faraday Consol Consolidation Coal USA CM76:70
Itman Consol Consolidation Coal USA IEA89
Jenkinjones Consol Consolidation COal USA K586:4
Loveridge Consol Consolidation Coal USA ICE225:6
Iv Consol Consolidation Coal USA CWI811:7
mv Consol Consolidation Coal USA ICR183:11
Rowland Consol Consolidation Coal USA CM76:1
Workman's Cr Consol Consolidation Coal USA CM85:8
Hail Cr CRA Conzinc Riotinto of Australia L Australia CM76:110
Cravat Cravat Coal Co USA ICR181:3
Line Creek Crows Nest Crows Nest Resources L Canada ICR165:12
Line Creek ss Crows Nest Crows Nest Resources L Canada CM88:97
CSN Companhia Siderugica Nacional Brazil ICR122:17
Lemmington CSR Commonwealth Sugar Refinery L Australia ICR162:6
South Blackwater CSR Commonwealth Sugar Refinery L Australia QCB85:64
W ss CSR Commonwealth Sugar Refinery L Australia CN860804
Woodlands CSR Commonwealth Sugar Refinery L Australia CM88:196
Yarrabee CSR Commonwealth Sugar Refinery L Australia QCB85:70
Curragh Curragh Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd Australia CWI834;1
Curragh sc Curragh Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd Australia CWI842:3
Curragh ss Curra# Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd Australia CM87:7
Bowen Dacon/CAID Dacon/CAID Australia CM76:83
Derby Coal Derby Coal USA ICR161:2
hv Devco Cape Breton Development Corp Canada CWI812:1
Lingan Devco Cape Breton Development Corp Canada CWI849:3
Phelan Devco Cape Breton Development Corp Canada CWI849:3
Lundale Diamond Shamrock Diamond Shamrock Coal Co USA CM85:125
Drayton Drayton Drayton Coal PL Australia ICR165:12
Alabama blend Drummond CS Drummond Coal Sales USA CM85:120
Brookwood Drummond CS Drummond Coal Sales USA ICR139:2
Cedrum Drummond CS Drummond Coal Sales USA ICR164:5
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Drummond HV Drummond CS Drummond Coal Sales USA CH85:125
Drummond HVII Drummond CS Drummond Coal Sales. USA CH87:7
Drummond LV Drummond CS Drummond Coal Sales USA CH88:116
Drummond HV Drummond CS Drummond Coal Sales USA CH85:125
Drummond ss Drummond CS Drummond Coal Sales USA CH88:122
Lint Drummond CS Drummond Coal Sales USA CH85:125
Nebo Drummond CS Drummond Coal Sales USA CH85:120
PHL Drummond CS Drummond Coal Sales USA CH85:8
Short Creek Drummond CS Drummond Coal Sales USA CH88;122
Iv Eastern As Eastern Associated Coal Corp USA ICR115:15
Wells-Lightfoot Eastern As Eastern Associated Coal Corp USA K586;13
Huntley Elcom Electricity Commission of NSW Australia CH76:100
Saxonvale Elders Elders Resources L Australia ICR225:9
üpshur Enoxy Enoxy Coal Co USA CWI309:2
Lemmington Exxon A Exxon Australia Resources PL Australia ICR170:9
Woodlands Exxon A Exxon Australia Resources PL Aus CH88:196
Cerro FCCI Fetterolf Coal & Construction Ind USA CH88:130
Ellsworth FCCI Fetterolf Coal & Construction Ind USA CH88:130
Stott HV FCCI Fetterolf Coal & Construction Ind USA CH88:130
Fording HV ss Fording Fording Coal L Canada CH87:7
Fording LV ss Fording Fording Coal L Canada CH88:97
Fording R.HV Fording Fording Coal L Canada CH88:276
Fording R.std Fording Fording Coal L Canada CH88:276
Fording weaker LVFording Fording Coal L Canada CH88:295
mid-vol Fording Fording Coal L Canada ICR169:4
Foreston HV Foreston Foreston Coal Sales USA AFR830216
Foreston LV Foreston Foreston Coal Sales USA CH76
Foreston HV Foreston Foreston Coal Sales USA CH76
Gem No 7À Foreston Foreston Coal Sales USA CH85:8
Foreston Cl Foreston Coal International USA CWI860129:7
Freeman Freeman United Coal Hining Corp USA CWI250:4
Carribbean Garland Coal Garland Coal USA CH76:78
Ermelo Gencor General Hining Union Corp L SA CH87:389
Gencor Gencor General Hining Union Corp L SA CH85:452
Optimum Gencor General Hining Union Corp L SA CH85:382
Optimum ss Gencor General Hining Union Corp L SA CH88:360
Plateau Getty Hin Getty Kinerals USA CH85;416
Gilberton Gilberton Coal Hining USA K594:l
Hoskisson Golin Wallsend Golin Wallsend Coal Australia CH88:196
Hoskisson ss Golin Wallsend Golin Wallsend Coal Australia CH88:196
Gregg River Gregg River C Gregg River Coal Canada CH88:276
Sewanee Grundy Grundy Hining Co Inc USA CH76:76
Colowyo Hanna-Grace Hanna Hining Co - WR Grace Co USA CH87:392
Ramsey blend Harber Param't Harber Paramount USA CH85;125
Ramsey type Harber Param't Harber Paramount USA CH85:125
Hawley Fuel Hawley Fuel USA ICR181:3
Hickman-W Hickman-Williams USA CWI860129;7
Holand Carb Holand Carbon Fuels USA CWI840:3
Alpine ICC Island Creek Coal Co USA CH88:122
Beatrice ICC Island Creek Coal Co USA CH85:118
Bird B ICC Island Creek Coal Co USA CH76:58
Gualey-Eagle ICC Island Creek Coal Co USA CH85:122
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ICC HV ICC Island Creek Coal Co USA CM88:122
ICC HV (üpshur) ICC Island Creek Coal Co OSA CM85:8,125
Pocah No6 ICC Island Creek Coal Co USA ICR124:3
Sewell ICC Island Creek Coal Co USA CM76:60
Tioca ICC Island Creek Coal Co USA CM76:62
VP Ho4 ICC Island Creek Coal Co USA CM76:74
ICCJ Island Creek Coal Co of Japan USA CWI860129:7
ÜK ICF London ICF London UK CWI850:3
IMC CP IMC Carbon Products USA CWI860129:7
Incontra Incontra Ltd USA CWI850528
Raven Int Carbon International Carbon & Minerals Corp USA CM85:119
Cerrejon Intercor International Colombia Resources Corp Columbia ICR188:5
Beverly Intermountain Intermountain Coals Inc USA CM85:125
International C International Coal USA CWI860528
Arthur Taylor JCI Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co L SA CM85:480
Aiberley Jeebropilly Jeebropilly Collieries PL • Australia QCB85:7
Rylance Jeebropilly Jeebropilly Collieries PL Australia CM85:470
Blue Creek Iv Jim Walter Jim Walter Resources Co USA K584:3
Williams John Irish M John K Irish Mining USA CWI860129
Madison Kanawha C Kanawha Coal Co USA CWI839:1
Coal Cliff KCC Kembla Coke & Coal Australia IEA89
Vickery KCC Kembla Coke & Coal Australia CM85
Kellerman Kellerman M Kellerman Mining USA CM76.-76
Kentucky ER Kentucky Energy Resources USA CWI860528
Koal Ind Koal Indus. USA K593:3
Koch Coal Koch Coal International USA K586:13
Coal Valley Luscar St Luscar Stereo L Canada CM87:390
Kettiki Mapco Mapco Coals USA K586:4
cc Maran Coal Maran Coal USA CWI841:7
sc Marcoal Marcoal USA K594:4
cc Marimpex Marimpex USA K598:4
Charleston HV Massey Massey Coal Export USA CM88:122
Charleston LV Massey Massey Coal Export USA CM88:116
Charleston MV Massey Massey Coal Export USA CM85:125
Clintwood Massey Massey Coal Export USA CM76:64
Masco Massey Massey Coal Export USA IEA89
Massey HV Massey Massey Coal Export USA CM76:64
Massey LV Massey Massey Coal Export USA CM88:116
Massey MV Massey Massey Coal Export USA CH76:64
Massey Pocahontas Massey Massey Coal Export USA CM76:64
Massey ss Massey Massey Coal Export USA CM88:122
Premier Massey Massey Coal Export USA CM88:116
Russel Fork Massey Massey Coal Export USA CM88:120
Slab Fork Massey Massey Coal Export USA CM88:116
Tenessee Consol Massey Massey Coal Export USA CWI846:3
anthracite McCall Jno McCall Coal Export USA K594:l
Iv McCall Jno McCall Coal Export USA K598:4
McCall HV McCall Jno McCall Coal Export USA CM85:125
Permac McCall Jno McCall Coal Export USA ICR224:1
Prime McCall Jno McCall Coal Export USA CM85:125
sc McCall Jno McCall Coal Export USA K591:4
Smoky R McIntyre McIntyre Mines L Canada ICR122:10
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Smoky R Iv McIntyre McIntyre Mines L Canada ICR169:4
Smoky R ss McIntyre McIntyre Mines L Canada CM88:295
Hulga Mead Corp Head Corp USA CM76:77
Mercury C&C Mercury Coal & Coke Inc USA CWI115:3
Metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan Collieries L Australia JCB87:39
Coal Basin Mid-Cont R Mid-Continental Resources USA K595;2
Big Ben soft Miller RW Miller Australia CM88:175
Big Ben SS Miller RW Miller Australia CM88:175
Hiller blend Miller RW Miller Australia CM85:417
Ht. Thorley Miller RW Miller Australia CM85:417
Collinsville HIM Mount Isa Mines Ltd Australia QCB85:59
Newlands HIM Mount Isa Mines Ltd Australia ICR181:14
Oaky Creek HIM Mount Isa Mines Ltd Australia QCB85
Oaky Creek sc HIM Mount Isa Mines Ltd Australia CM88:97
Oaky Creek ss HIM Mount Isa Mines Ltd Australia CM88:97
MMTC Minerals & Metal Trading Corp India
Huswellbrook Muswellb'k E&H Huswellbrook Energy & Minerals L Australia CM85:458
Huswellbrook ss Muswellb'k E&M Huswellbrook Energy & Minerals L Australia CM88:197
stoker National National Mines USA K582:4
Hathies National St National Steel USA CWI839:1
Nerco Nerco Coal Sales USA K593:2
Penn-Pocahontas Neris Int Neris International USA CWI860129
Svonavec Neris Int Neris International USA CWI860129
New Hope New Hope New Hope Collieries PL Australia CM87:393
Walloon New Hope New Hope Collieries PL Australia CM87:406
Daiyon soft Newcastle Wall Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co PL Australia CM88:194
USA Newco Newco USA ICR161:2
Gilbert Newera Res Newera Resources Corp USA KCIM86:678
Nigerian C Nigerian Coal Corp Nigeria ICR122:17
sc Noranda C Noranda Coal USA CM87:392
Spitzbergen Norway Norway Norway CWI84H7
NSF National Smokeless Fuels UK K598:4
Oakleigh Oakleigh Col Oakleigh Colliery PL Australia CM88:408
Kitt Old Ben Old Ben Coal Co USA CH85;125
Old Ben Old Ben Old Ben Coal Co USA CM88:9
China Omega Omega Industries USA CWI836;2
Oneida Oneida Coal Co USA CWI828:!
Cumberland Ontario H Ontario Hydro USA ICR124:17
Oremco Oremco Inc USA K584:3
anth Palfflco Corp Palmco Corp USA K594:l
PBS HV PBS Coals PBS Coals USA CM87:7
PBS LV PBS Coals PBS Coals USA CM85:118
hv Peabody Peabody Development USA K588:l
Nebo Peabody Peabody Australia CM76:110
Ellalong Peko W Peko Wallsend L Australia ICR197;5
Ellalong he Peko W Peko Wallsend L Australia ICR197:5
Ellalong ic Peko W Peko Wallsend L Australia ICR197:5
Peko blend Peko W Peko Wallsend L Australia CM85:431
Peko ss Peko W Peko Wallsend L Australia CM88:194
Pelton-Ellalong soPeko W Peko Wallsend L Australia CM88:176
Baiduri Peru Negara Perusahaan Negara Tambang Batubara Indonesia CM85:447
PG&H PG&H PG&H USA CM87
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Bradford Phipps Co Phipps Co ÜSA CM85:120
ÜS Pickands H Pickands Mather & Co USA K586:13
Chisholm Pikeville Pikeville Coal Co USA CWI839:1
Pittcari Pittcari Coal USA K588:12
Elkay Pittston Pittston Coal Export USA CM87
Eum Cr Pittston Pittston Coal Export USA CWI927:6
Grand Baja HV Pittston Pittston Coal Export USA CM88:128
Pittson BS Blend Pittston Pittston Coal Export USA CM76:73
Pittson HV Blend Pittston Pittston Coal Export USA CM88:128
Plateau Plateau Plateau Mining USA ICR161;2
Ombilin PN Tambang B PN Tambang B Indonesia CM88:424
Powellton Powellton Coal USA CWI860129
bit.c Primary Primary Coal USA K582:4
Prodeco Prodeco Columbia CWI740:5
Kutal PT Fajar Bumi PT Fajar Bumi Sokti Indonesia CM87:394
Katima PT Katima PT Katima Prima Coal Indonesia CWI842:1
Kitadin PT Kitadin PT Kitadin Corp Indonesia CM85:447
Tanito Harum PT Tanito H PT Tanito Harum Indonesia CM87:422
P&C Bit P&C Bitumous USA K586:l
P&C-Ryan Walsh P&C-Ryan Walsh USA CM88:394
Quintette Quintette Coal Quintette Coal Canada CM88:294
Quintette sc Quintette Coal Quintette Coal Canada CM87:453
Rand Rand Mines SA ICR162:6
Rhondda Rhondda Col Rhondda Collieries PL Australia CM88:450
Roch&Pit Rochester & Pittsburgh USA K586:13
Ipswich Rylance Col Rylance Collieries & Brickworks Australia CM87:406
Saarbergwerke Saarbergwerke W Germany ICR182:11
Scancarbon Scancarbon CWI921:3
Ingram Shell Shell UK ICR224:7
Drayton Shell A Shell Australia Australia CWI817:3
Line Creek Shell Canada Shell Canada Canada ICR169:2
Kleinkopje Shell SA Shell South Africa SA CM85:445
Reitspruit Shell SA Shell South Africa SA CM85:445
Bukachachinsky Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR CM85;427
Cheremkhovsky Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR CM85:427
GSEH Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR CM85:426
Kuznetsky coal Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR CM88:10
Kuznetsky G6 Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR CM76;240
Kuznetsky GK Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR K598:4
Kuznetsky GSSH Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR CM85:427
Kuznetsky K Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR ICR169:3
Kuznetsky KIO Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR CM76:240
Kuznetsky KJ14 Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR CM76:240
Kuznetsky OS Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR CM76:240
Neliungla K Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR CM85:361
Neliungla ss Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR CH85:427
Neryungrinshy G Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR ICR169:3
Neryungrinshy ss Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR ICR169:3
Partizansky J6 Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR CM85:427
Partizansky T Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR CM85:427
Shaktersky Sojuzpromx Sojuzpromexport USSR IEA89
Solar Int Solar International Trading K590:l
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Polly South East South East USA CM85:122
Special PocahontasSprague Cl Sprague Coal International USA CM76:58
Sprague HV Sprague Cl Sprague Coal International USA CM85:125
Sprague HV Sprague Cl Sprague Coal International USA CM76:60
Tams type Sprague Cl Sprague Coal International USA CM76;58
West Gulf Sprague Cl Sprague Coal International USA CM76:58
Gilberton OH Star Energy Star Energy USA K594:l
Sture Norske Sture Norske Norway CWI927:7
China,sized coal Sucre Danre Sucre Danre France CWI836:2
Majestic Summers Fuels Summers Fuels USA CM85:125
Sunedco Sun Coal Sun Coal Co Inc USA ICR224:1
Usibelli Suneel Suneel Alaska USA K592:14
MV Blend Tanoma Tanoma Coal USA K598:4
sc Taywood Taywood Coal USA CM87:392
Witbank TCOA Transvaal Coal Owners Association SA ICR162:6
K coal TDM Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Australia CM85:217
K ss TDM Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Australia CM88:177
Moura TDM Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Australia QCB85:65
Moura sc TDM Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Australia QCB86
Moura weak TDM Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Australia CM85:8,194
Riverside TDM Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Australia K598:4
Riverside sc TDM Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Australia QCB86
Bullmoose Teck-Bullmoose Teck-Bullmoose Coal Canada CM88:276
Plateau Texaco Texaco USA CM87;392
S. Blackwater Thiess Bros Thiess Bros PL Australia CM85:279
S.Blackwater sc Thiess Bros Thiess Bros PL Australia QCB86
Tee coal Thiess Bros Thiess Bros PL Australia CM85;217
Blair Green Thyssen Thyssen Carbometal USA CM85:125
Green Thyssen Thyssen Carbometal USA CM85:125
Morton Thyssen Thyssen Carbometal USA CM85:125
Arthur Taylor Total Total Exploration SA SA CM88:392
Ermelo Total Total Exploration SA SA CM85:445
Pinnacle Tower Res Tower Resources USA CM85:416
Optimum Transnatal Transnatal Coal Corp SA ICR182:3
Olan ülan Ulan Coal Mines L Australia ICR165:12
Olan #3 Ulan Ulan Coal Mines L Australia ICR167:3
Obed Marsh Union Oil Union Oil of Canada Canada CM87:390
McCoy United Coal United Coal USA CM85:125
sc United Coal United Coal USA K586:l
Adrian United Eastern United Eastern USA CM85:126
United En United Energy Resource K592:2
King US Fuel US Fuel Co USA CM85:416
Corbin US Steel US Steel Mining Co USA CM87:7
Maple Cr US Steel US Steel Mining Co USA CM87
Oakgrove US Steel US Steel Mining Co USA CM88:122
Pocahantas 3 US Steel US Steel Mining Co USA CIR117:10
Cumberland US Steel (op) US Steel Mining Co USA CWI
Sierra Utah Int Utah International USA CM87:390
Veba Int Veba International USA ICR136:13
Vickery Cr Vickery Cr Vickery Cr Canada CM76:195
Wambo Wambo Wambo Mining Corp PL Australia CWI832:2
Wambo ss Wambo Wambo Mining Corp PL Australia CM88:196
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Warkworth Warkworth Warkworth Associates Australia CM87:392
Warkworth ss Warkworth Warkworth Associates Australia CM88:176
Watson AL Watson & Co ÜSA CWI860129:8
Commercial Brand Weglokoks Weglokoks Poland ICR169:2
First Maja Weglokoks Weglokoks Poland CM85:389
house coal Weglokoks Weglokoks Poland CWI851:5
Quinsam Weldwood Weldwood of Canada Canada ICR225:9
Balmer Westar Westar Mining L Canada ICR169:4
Balmer ox Westar Westar Mining L Canada CM76:194
Greenhills Westar Westar Mining L Canada ICR169:4
Westar special Westar Westar Mining L Canada CM88:295
Westar ss Westar Westar Mining L Canada CM88:292
Westfalen Westfalen Westfalen Colliery PL Australia QCB85:6
Iv Westmoreland Westmoreland Coal Co USA K598:4
soft cc Westmoreland Westmoreland Coal Co USA K584:ll
Westmoreland Westmoreland Westmoreland Coal Co USA CWI829:7
sources:
AFR830216 = Australian Financial Review. 1983 Feb 16.
CM88:120 = Coal Manual. 1988. pl20.
CWI924:1 = Coal Week International, issue 924. pi.
ICL8917:2 = International Coal Letter. 1989. Number 17. p2.
ICR47:11 = International Coal Report, issue 47. pll.
K590:3 = King's International Coal Trade, issue 590. p3.
KCIK85:11 = Keystone Coal Industry Manual. 1985. OS Coal Production by Company, pll. 
KCIM86:678 = Keystone Coal Industry Manual. 1986. p678.
KHB7.1:6 = Keystone News Bulletin, vol.7 no.l p6.
QCB85:70 = Queensland Coal Board. 1985. Annual Report. p70.
S0M089:12 = SOMO. 1989b. Bijlagen De keten Gebroken. pl2.
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Appendix B: List of international coal buyers by country and industry
buyer buyer, full name industry country source
Aalborg Cem Aalborg Portland Cement cem Denmark IEA88:I95
Acme St Acme Steel st USA ICR170:9
ACZC ACZ de Carbonisation cok Neth ICE14:5
Adana Cem Adana Cement cem Turkey CWI828:3
AES AES (Hawaii) el USA ICR224:8
Agadir Cem Agadir Cement cem ICR170:15
Agipcoal Agipcoal tr Italy CWI919;2
AHV AHV st Spain CM85:86
A1 Nasr A1 Nasr steelworks st Egypt ICR164:2
Algoma St Algoma Steel st Canada CWI843:1
Analiese Zem Analiese Zement AG cem W Germany ICR156:5
Ankara Hun Ankara Municipality el Turkey CWI850:5
Anker Anker Coal tr Neth ICR48:12
Antalya Antalya Turkey K586:4
Asahi Chem Asahi Chemical chem Japan CM88:403
ASEA ASEA mfr Sweden ICR182:13
Asia Cem Asia Cement cem Taiwan CWI927:1
Asland Cem Asland Cement cem Spain CWI830:3
Aso Cem Aso Cement cem Japan CM85:427
ATIC Association Technique de l'Importation Charbonniereimp France K584:ll
Atlas CHD Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Co Philippines CWI908:9
Balls AG Balls AG W Germany ICR
Banbury Fuels Banbury Fuels tr UK K584:3
Banwal Banwal S Korea ICR182:3
Baoshan Baoshan steelmill st China ICR225:9
Barcelona Cem Barcelona Cement cem Spain ACR83
Belbrico Belgian British Coal Co tr Belgium ICR
BEWAG Berliner Kraft und Licht el W Germany CWI850:7
BHP BHP st Australia ICR226:1
Bolu Cem Bolu Cement cem Turkey CWI810;3
BSC British Steel Corp st UK ICR169:2
Caralec Caralec imp Spain ICR136:16
Carbocem Carbocem cem Spain CWI927:6
Carboex Carboex imp Spain ICR22:12
Carbomed Carbomed Spain ICR114:12
Carboneras Carboneras = Litoral de Almeria el Spain ICR
Caribean Cem Caribean Cement cem Jamaica CWI921:3
Catalan Group Catalan Group cem Spain CWI839:3
Catalanes Catalanes Spain ICR164:3
CCA Container Corp of America USA CWI
CdF Charbonnages de France prod France ICR137:5
CdF Energie CdF Energie tr France ICR137:5
CDL CDL Ireland ICR182:3
CEEB Compania de Empresas Electricas Brasileras el Brazil CWI922:3
CEGB Central Electricity Generating Board el UK CWI851:5
Cem dHallorca Cementos de Mallorca cem Spain ICR216:3
Cem Panama Cementos Panama cem Panama CWI833:7
Cementir Cementir cem Italy CWI824:3
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Cementos Nac Cementos Nacionales cem Dominican RepK587:4
Central P&L Central Power & Light el ÜSÀ,Texas K595:l
CEP Compagnie Français Petroles oil France CWI232:1
Chekka Cem Chekka Cement cem Lebanon K584:3
Chichibu Cem Chichibu Cement cem Japan CM88:407
China L&P China Light & Power el Hong Kong CWI842:1
China St China Steel st Taiwan K584:3
Chugoku EPC Chugoku Electric Power Co el Japan CM87:390
Cim d'Haiti Ciment d'Haiti cem Haiti K584:3
Cim La Farge Ciments La Farge cem France AFR850201
Cimpor Cimpor cem Portugal CWI848;2
Cior Cem Cior Cement cem Morocco CWI814:3
Co de Elect Companhia de Electricidad el Spain ICR195:11
Cockerill Cockerill Sambre st Belgium K584:ll
Coe&C Coe & Clerici tr Italy CM88:463
Columbia Cem Columbia Cement cem ÜSÀ,Wash ICR134:8
Cosipa Companhia Siderugica Paulista st Brazil K582:4
CVG/Sidor St CVG/Sidor Steel st Venezuela K594:4
Daewoo Daewoo S Korea CWI840:7
Dai Han Dai Han Coal S Korea K594:l
Daicel Chem I Daicel Chemical Industries chem Japan ICR228:4
Daichi Cem Daichi Cement cem Japan CM85:427
Daio Sheisho Daio Seishi pap Japan CM88:440
Daishowa paperDaishowa Paper pap Japan CM88:408
David Chem I David Chemical Industries chem Japan ICR228:4
Denki Kagaku Denki Kagaku cem Japan CM87:428
Dofasco Dofasco st Canada K584:2
EdF Electricité de France el France CWI832:1
EdP Electricidade de Portugal el Portugal CWI843:8
EFC Electric Fuels Corp el ÜSÀ CWI922:3
EFO EFO Sweden ICR170:9
Ehime Seishi Ehime Seishi pap Japan CM88:450
Elkem Elkem Metal Canada K584:ll
Elkraft Elkraft el Denmark ICR169:3
Elsam Elsam el Denmark K584:ll
Endesa Empresa Nacional de Electricidad el Spain ICR15:16
Endesa,Ch Empresa Nacional de Electricidad of Chile el Chile CWI846:3
ENEL Ente Nazionale per I'Energia Electrica el Italy ICR164:5
Enemalta Enemalta el Malta ICR182:3
Energy Fact Energy Factors ÜSA,Cal CWI840;7
Ensidesa Empresa Nacional Siderugica st Spain K584:2
EPDC Electric Power Development Company el Japan ICR184;7
Eregli Eregli Iron & Steel st Turkey K584:2
ESB Electricity Supply Board el Ireland K584:2
EVN EVN Austria CWI929:8
Finaminera Finaminera ICR198:9
Finncoal Finncoal imp Finland CWI836:1
Finnc/VantSaeh Finncoal/Vantaan Saehkoelaitos Finland CWI841:3
FinSugar Finnish Sugar sug Finland CM88:462
Florida Pow Florida Power el ÜSA CM87:424
Focoex Focoex ICR122:17
Fuel Commod Fuel Commodities tr ÜK ICR197:5
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Genstar Cem Genstar Cement cem USA,Calif ICR134:8
GKB Gemeenschappelisk Kolenbureau Electroicitsdrijven tr Netherlands K586:4
GKE Gemeenschappelisk Kolenbureau Electroicitsdrijven tr Netherlands CWI846:3
Godo St Godo Steel st Japan CH85:182
Guangdong CPC Guangdong Central Power Co el China ICR224:1
Hansen N Hansen Neuerburg tr W Germany K594:4
HBCH HBCH st France ICR167:5
Heidel Zem Heidelberger Zement AG cem W Germany CWI848:2
Heracles Heracles Cement cem Greece CWI841:3
HEW Hamburgische Elektricitats-werke el W Germany ICR136:13
Hiroshima G Hiroshima Gas gas Japan CH85:182
Hisalba Cem Hisalba Cement cem Spain CWI943:3
Hitachi Cem Hitachi Cement cem Japan CH85:427
Hokkaido CIC Hokkaido Coal Import Centre tr Japan CWI928:1
Hokkaido EPC Hokkaido Electric Power Co el Japan CH87:386
Hokuriku EPC Hokuriku Electric Power Co el Japan CH87:391
Hokuyo Paper Hokuyo Paper pap Japan CH88:424
Holla/Trond Holla/Trondheim Norway K585;4
Hong Kong El Hong Kong Electric el Hong Kong CWI832:7
Honshu Paper Honshu Paper pap Japan CH85:447
Hoogovens Estel Hoogovens st Netherlands K584:ll
Iberduero Iberduero Spain CWI840:3
IBO IBO Finland CWI801:3
Icelandic All Icelandic Alloys Iceland K595:4
ICH ICH Luxenburg K584:3
Idemitsu Idemitsu Kosan tr Japan CH88:405
IFV Power IFV Power el ICR1:14
Indo Cem Indonesia Cement cem Indo CWI749:3
Inland St Inland Steel st USA K598:l
Intercom Intercom el Belgium K582:4
Intertrade Intertrade Yugoslavia CWI839:2
Int.Anth International Anthracite Trading CO,OK tr UK CWI837:3
Iskenderum Iskenderum st Turkey ICR135:13
Italiana Italiana Coke Italy K584:3
Italsider Italsider st Italy K584:2
IVO Imatran Voima Oy imp Finland CWI849:3
JCD Japan Coal Development Corp Japan K598:4
JEA Jacksonville Electricity Authority el USA CWI
Joban Joint PCJoban Joint Power Co el Japan CH87:393
JSH Japanese steel mills st Japan ICR168:5
Jujo Paper Jujo Paper pap Japan CH88:408
Kalundborg Kalundborg Denmark K587:4
Kanai EPC Kansai Electric Power Co el Japan CH87:389
Kardeljevo Kardeljevo Yugoslavia K587:4
Kawasaki St Kawasaki Steel Corp st Japan CH85:85
Kelly Coal Kelly Coal Ireland K593;4
Kepco Korean Electric Power Company el S Korea K598:4
KFK KFK Denmark K585:4
Kipsas Kipsas Turkey CWI810:3
Kobe St Kobe Steel Ltd st Japan CH85:85
Koper Koper Yugoslavia K585:4
Krupp Krupp Handel tr W Germany CWI843:8
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Kyushu EPC Kyushu Electric Power Co el Japan CM87:391
La Caruna La Caruna Spain K593:4
Lafarge Lafarge Moroc Cinorica Morocco ICR
Lake Ontario CeLake Ontario Cement cem Canada K586:13
Larco Larco ref Greece K590:l
Lehigh Cem Lehigh Portland Cement cem USA ICR134:8
Lucky Go Lucky Goldstar tr S.Korea CWI928.-2
Lukavac Lukavac prod Yugoslavia K593:4
Halmoe Malmoe Sweden K582:4
Mazda Mazda Motors Corp man Japan CWI825:3
Himex Mimex Romania K586:13
Mississippi P Mississippi Power el USA ICR180:5
Mitsubishi Ch Mitsubishi Chemical chem Japan CM85:182
Mitsubishi MetMitsubishi Metal st Japan CM88:405
Mitsubishi M&CMitsubishi Mining & Cement cem Japan CM85:182
Mitsui M Mitsui Mining prod Japan CM85-.182
Mohammedia Mohammedia Power el Morocco CWI829:3
Moore McCor Moore McCormack USA CWI829;2
Mueller Otto Mueller tr W Germany CWI812;1
Nador Cem Nador Cement cem Morocco ICR170:15
Nakayama Nakayama Steel st Japan CM85:182
Naoshima YGyp Naoshima Yoshino Gypsum ref Japan CM88:408
NCSC National Coal Supply Corp imp Israel K589:2
NEB National Electricity Board el Malaysia ICR181:14
Nepco New England Power Co el USA ICR128:9
Nescher Nescher Cement Works Ltd cem Israel CWI
Neste Neste Coal Corp tr USA,NY ICR185:4
NIES Northern Ireland Electricity Service el Ireland CWI848:2
Nikko Paper Nikko Paper pap Japan CM88:424
Nippon Cem Nippon Cem cem Japan CM87:403
Nippon Yakin Nippon Yakin Japan m u m
Nishi Nippon PNishi Nippon Paper pap Japan CM88:424
Nisshin Nisshin Steel Co Ltd st Japan CM85:85
Nittetsu Cem Nittetsu Cement cem Japan CM85:427
NKK Nippon Kokan KK st Japan CM85:85
Nomura T Nomura Trading tr Japan CN85:360
Nonoc MIC Nonoc Mining & Industry Corp ref Phil CM88:443
Norsk Kok Norsk Koksverk st Norway CWI841:7
Northern Cem Northern Cement Group cem Spain CWI839:3
NS Nippon Steel Corp st Japan CM85:85
NSF National Smokeless Fuels UK K584:3
Oji Paper Oji Paper Manufacturing pap Japan CM88:408
Onahama S & E Onahama Smelting & Refining ref Japan CM88:405
Onahama SeirenOnahama Seiren Japan CM85:426
Onahama Y Gyp Onahama Yoshino Gypsum ref Japan CM88:424
ONdE Office National d'Electricité el Morocco K584:ll
Onoda Cem Onoda Cement cem Japan CM88:448
Ontario Hydro Ontario Hydro el Canada CWI828:1
Osaka Cem Osaka Cement cem Japan CM88:406
Osaka G Osaka Gas gas Japan CM85:182
Pacific M Pacific Metals Japan CM
Pasmic Pakistan Steel st Pakistan K594:4
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Phibro Phillip Brothers tr USA CWI808:2
PNOC Philippines National Oil Company oil Philippines CWI908:9
PNPC Philippines National Power Corp el Philippines ICR182:13
Pohang Pohang Iron & Steel Company st S Korea K595:2
Pool dC Pool des Calories tr Belgium QBC85
Preag Preussen Elecktra (Prussian Electric) el W Germany K584:ll
PSNH Public Service of New Hampshire el USA CWI849:3
Public Power Public Power Corp el Greece K592:2
Puerto R Cem Puerto Rican Cement cem Puerto Rico CWI848:2
QIT Quebec Iron & Titanium Canada K586:13
Qualicement Qualicement Italy ICR190:10
Rautarruukki Rautarruukki st Finland CM85:86
Rugby Cem Rugby Portland Cement cem UK ICR170:15
Ruhrkohle Ruhrkohle AH tr W Germany CWI84:2
Ruhrkolen Ruhrkolen tr Morocco CWI843:8
SAIL Steel Authority of India Ltd st India CWI827-.3
Scancem Scancem imp Scandinavia K588:3
SEP Samenwerkende Electriciteits Productieberdrijven el Neth ICL89:18:
Sesil Sesil Port ICR209:4
SevEl Companhia Sevilliano de Electicidad el Spain CWI814:3
Sevllliana Sevilliana el Spain ICR164:3
Shell Shell Coal tr UK,Neth ICR187:4
Shikoku EPC Shikodu Electric Power Co el Japan CM87:389
Showa Denko Showa Denko Japan CM85:429
Siam Cem Siam Cement cem Thailand ICR183:3
Siderbras Siderbras st Brazil K588:12
Siderchil Siderugia Nacional (CAP) st Chile K584:2
Siderchil Companhia de Acero del Pacifico (CAP) st Chile ICR14:17
Sidermex Sidermex (AHHSA) st Mexico K584:3
Siderport Siderugia Nacional st Portugal K582:4
Sidmar Sidmar st Belgium CM85:86
Sidor Sidor, Orinoco St st Venezuela CWI740:5
Sisak Sisak Yugoslavia K591:4
SNS Charbon SNS Charbon Algeria K584:2
Sococharbo Sococharbo imp Morocco CWI850:3
Sollac Sollac st France CWI925:3
Somisa Somisa st Argentina K584:3
SSAB Swedish Metals Group (Svensk Stal) st Sweden CWI830:3
Ssanyong Ssanyong S Korea ICR187:3
SSEB South of Scotland Electricity Board el UK CWI911:1
SSH Scheepvaart Steenkolen Maatschappij tr Netherlands CWI843:8
SSH-YCF SSM-YCF tr Argentina CWI843:8
St Mary's Cem St Mary's Cement cem K586:13
Stelco Stelco st Canada CWI839:1
Stwk Hannover Stadtwerke Hannover st W Germany ICR157:3
Styrische El Styrische Electric el CWI320
St.Johns RPP St.Johns River Power Park el USA,Florida ICR188:5
St.L Cem St.Lawrence Cement cem Canada K584;ll
Sucden Sucres et Denrees imp France CWI843:8
Sumitomo Sumitomo Metal Industries st Japan CM85:85
Sumitomo Cem Sumitomo Cement cem Japan CM87:442
Sumitomo JPC Sumitomo Joint Power Co el Japan CM87:394
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Sumitomo Kyodo Sumitomo Kyodo Karyoku Japan CM85:459
Suralaya Suralaya Power Station el Indonesia ICR182:3
Surefire C Surefire Coal Co tr N Ireland ICR206:5
Swedish St Swedish Steel (Svenskt Stal AB) st Sweden K582:3
Sydkraft Sydkraft el Sweden ICR6:2
Taiheiyo Metal Taiheiyo Metal ref Japan CM85:429
Taipower Taiwan Power Corp el Taiwan K595:4
Taiwan Cem Taiwan Cement cem Taiwan ICR183:3
Tambang Bat Tambang Batubara el Indonesia ICR
TDCI TDCI st Turkey ICR161:2
TECSA TECSA el Spain ICR195:11
Teigin Ind Teigin Industries Japan CM87:429
TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Co el Japan CWI828:3
Titan Cem Titan Cement cem Greece CWI833:7
Toho G Toho Gas gas Japan CM85:182
Tohoku EPC Tohoku Electric Power Co el Japan CWI828:3
Tokuyama Soda Tokuyama Soda cem Japan CM88:405
Tokyo G Tokyo Gas gas Japan CM85:182
Tomoegawa P Tomoegawa Paper Manufacturing pap Japan CM85:479
Tong Yang cem Tong Yang cement cem S Korea ICR168:5
Toray Ind Toray Industries Inc Japan CM88:408
Toyo Soda Toyo Soda cem Japan CM87:457
Transcor Transcor Coal tr UK ICR135:10
Tsuruga Cem Tsuruga Cement cem Japan CM85:427
Tsurusaki PulpTsurusaki Pulp pap Japan CM88:408
Tubarao Companhia Siderugica de Tubarao st Brazil CWI
Turkey cem Turkey cement cem Turkey ICR165:3
Dbe Ind Ube Industries cem Japan CM85:453
DEI Fenesa Union Electra Fenesa el Spain ICR195:11
Unicem Unicem cem Italy ICR
Union Carbide Union Carbide Canada K584:ll
Universal Cem Universal Cement cem Taiwan ICR206:3
US Def. Fuel US Defense Fuel Supply Center W Germany CWI829:7
Vallenciana Vallenciana Spain ICR182:3
Vattenfal Vattenfal el Sweden ICR208:9
Veba Veba AG W Germany ICR47:11
VEW Vereinigte Elektrizitatswerke Westfalien AG el W Germany ICR190:6
Voest Alpine Voest Alpine st Austria CWI851:3
Volkswagen Volkswagen ind W Germany ICR93:15
VP Virginia Power el USA ICR137:15
Weyerhauser P Weyerhauser Paper pap USA ICR51:11
Yugometal Yugometal Yugoslavia K590:2
Zenica Zenica Yugoslavia CWI
note: cem = cement, chem = chemicals, cok = coke ovens, el = electricity, imp = importer
mfr = manufacturing, pap = paper, prod = producer, ref = refinery, st = steel, tr = trader 
source: as in Appendix A
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Appendix C: Coal companies, parent companies and selected investments
company name
% investment 
country equity year $m parent company name country year source
Aberdare Collieries PL Aus 100 Allied Queensland Coalfields Aus 87 CM88:452;J89:5
ACI International Aus 12 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 84 BIE84:309
ACI Resources L Aus 100 ACI International Aus 84 BIE84:309
Addington Bros Mining Inc DSA 100 Ashland Coal Co USA 84 KCIM85:13
Agip BC mine Can 80 Agip It 80 ICR6:9
Agip Carbonne (Coal) It 100 82 Ente Mazionale Indrocarburi It 82 ICR49:9
Agip Coal OSA 0 85 Agip Carbone It 85 ICR134:19
Agip Coal OSA 100 81 Agip Carbone It 85 ICR134:19
Agip Coal Aus Aus 100 Agip Coal Ita 87 Agip87
Agip Coal Inti Meth 100 Agip Coal Ita 87 Agip87
Alla-Obio Valley Coal USA 100 AOV Industries USA 81 ICR33:10
Allied Queensland Coalfields Aus 64 Crusader Oil ML 84 BIE84:312
Allied Queensland Coalfields Aus 16.1ms Crusader Oil ML 88 J89:5
Allied Queensland Coalfields Aus 1.7ms Suncorp 88 J89:5
Allied Queensland Coalfields Aus 1.0ms Genera Sekiyu 88 J89:5
Allied Queensland Coalfields Aus 1.0ms AMP Society Aus 88 J89:5
Amax Coal Co USA 100 84 AMAX Inc USA 84 KCIM85;8
American Coal Co DSA 100 Utah Power & Light Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
American Smelting & Refining USA 16 84 MIM Holdings L Aus 84 BIE84:313
American Smelting & Refining USA 16 MIM Holdings L Aus 84 BIE84:363
Amherst Coal USA 100 81 200 Diamond Shamrock USA 81 ICR20:8
Amoco Australia Aus 100 84 British Petroleum UK 85 0&G86:54
Amoco Minerals USA 100 Amoco Corp USA 85 0&G86:19
Amoco Minerals USA Standard Oil Indiana USA 81 ICR27:8
An Tai Ba Chin loan 475 BA Asia Coordinator 88 ICR197:2
An Tai Ba Chin 25 85 Island Creek Coal USA 88 ICR197:2
Anaconda Australia Inc Aus 100 Anaconda Co L USA 84 BIE84:313
Anaconda Co L USA 100 77 Atlantic Richfield Corp USA 84 BIE84:313
Anaconda Minerals Co USA 100 77 Atlantic Richfield Corp USA 84 KCIM85;9
Anglo American Coal Corp L SA 100 Anglo American SA 87 CM88;457
AMR Coal Co USA 100 American Matural Resources USA 80 ICR38:10
AMR Coal Co USA 100 Coastal Coal International USA 85 KCIM84:677
Antelope Coal Co USA 100 Merco Inc USA 85 KCIM86:678
AOV Industries USA 50 Howard Smith L Aus 81 ICR33;10
Apex Mines L SA 100 Gold Fields of SA SA 87 CM88:363
Aprocar Sp Adaro sp 82 ICW102:7
Aprocar Sp Hunosa Sp 82 ICW102:7
Arcadia Co Inc USA 100 Pennsylvania Power & Light USA 85 KCIM86:678
Arch Mineral Corp USA Ashland Oil Co USA 85 KCIM86:677
Arch Mineral Corp USA Hunt Petroleum Corp USA 85 KCIM86:677
Arco Aust Coal L Aus 100 Atlantic Richfield Corp USA 84 BIE84:315
Arco Coal Co USA 100 Atlantic Richfield Corp USA 85 KCIM86:677
Arthur Taylor coal SA 50 Johannesburg Consol Inv CoL SA 87 CM88:460
Arthur Taylor coal SA 50 Total Exploration SA PL SA 87 CM88:460
Arthur Taylor Colliery SA 100 Johannesburg Consol Inv CoL SA 87 CM88:362
Aruntmin mine Indo BHP-Utah Aus 89 ICR217:6
Asalco USA 32 MIM Holdings L Aus 87 CM88:444
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Ashland Coal Co USA 100 7? Ashland Oil Co USA 81ICR20:8
Ashland Coal Co USA 10 82 44 Carboex Spa 82ICR40:10
Ashland Coal Co USA 25 81 103 Saarbergerwerke WGer 81ICR20:8
Ashland Mining Corp USA 100 Inspiration Coal Inc USA 85KCIM86:678
Associated Porcupine mine Can 85 80 Esso Resources Canada Can 80ICR6:9
Associates Mining Co USA 100 Nerco Inc USA 84KCIM85:9
Austen & Butta L Aus 17 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 86NSW86:198
Austen & Butta L Aus 10 8? Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 88NSW89:168
Austen & Butta L Aus 0 77 Brascan Can 82DIC82:309
Austen & Butta L Aus 25 7? Brascan Can 76McK76:69
Austen & Butta L Aus 5 71 Marubeni Corp Jap 81ICR17:8;CM76:11
Austen i Butta L Aus 3 Marubeni Corp Jap 87BIE84:361;CM88:
Austen & Butta L Aus 5 71 Mitsubishi Chemical Ind L Jap 81ICR17:8;CM76:ll
Austen & Butta L Aus 3 Mitsubishi Chemical Ind L Jap 87BIE84:364;CM88:
Austen & Butta L Aus 7 88 Perpetual Trustee Co L Aus 88NSW89:168
Austen & Butta L Aus 20 81 38 Pioneer Sugar Mills Aus 81ICR17:8
Austen & Butta L Aus 7 Riange Investments PL Aus 86NSW86:198
Austen & Butta L Aus 6 Rivon Investments Lithgow PL Aus 86NSW86:198
Austen & Butta L Aus 42 7? Shell Australia L Aus 84BIE84;316
Austen & Butta L Aus 37 77 Shell Australia L Aus 81 ICR17:8;Par86;l
Austen & Butta L Aus 46 88 Shell Australia L Aus 88NSW89:168
Austen & Butta L Aus 45 Shell Australia L Aus 86NSW86:198
Australian Mining InvestmentsAus 4 ANZ Nominees L Aus 86NSW86:198;CM88:
Australian Mining InvestmentsAus 5 88 ANZ Nominees L Aus 88J89:22
Australian Mining InvestmentsAus 8 Darian Sampey PL 86NSW86:198;CM88:
Australian Mining InvestmentsAus 10 88 Liberty Life L 88J89:22
Australian Mining InvestmentsAus 29 NIT Co PL 86NSW86:198rCM88:
Australian Mining InvestmentsAus 25 88 NIT Co PL 88J89:22
Australian Mining InvestmentsAus 5 Toyo Menka Kaisha Jap 86 NSW86:198;CM88:
Australian Mining InvestmentsAus 17 Trafalgar Gold PL 86NSW86;198;CM88:
Australian Mining InvestmentsAus 15 88 Trafalgar Gold PL 88J89:22
Baal Bone mine Aus 80 Coalex Aus 89ICR226;7
Baal Bone mine Aus 5 Sumitomo Corp Jap 89ICR226:7
Baal Bone nine Aus 15 Sumitomo Metal Industries L Jap 891CR226:7
Badger Coal Co USA 100 Pittston Co USA 84KCIM85:9
Bailey Hill Mining Corp USA 100 Cumberland Mountain Coal Co USA 84KCIM85:11
Bailey Mining Co Inc USA 100 Inspiration Coal Inc USA 85KCIM86:678
Ballymoney Mire 50 BHP-Utah Aus 89 ICL8918:6
Ballymoney Hire 50 Meekatharra Aus 89
Bank Colliery SA 100 Anglo American Coal Corp SA 87CM88:362
BanWiead Mining Co USA 100 Nerco Inc USA 84KCIM85:9
Bargo Collieries Aus 33 8? BHP Minerals PL Aus 84BIE84:320
Bargo Collieries Aus 33 8? Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 84BIE84:320
Bargo Collieries Aus 33 89 Elders Resources NZFPL Aus 89 ICR217:13
Bargo Collieries Aus 33 8? Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Aus 84BIE84:320
Barix PL Aus 100 Pacific Copper L Aus 86NSW86:I99;BIE84
Barnes i Tucker Co USA 100 Alco Standard Corp USA 87CM88:116;KCIM86
Bayswater Colliery Aus 35 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 86NSW86:199;BIE84
Bayswater Colliery Aus 55 Caltex Oil (Aust) PL Aus 86NSW86:199;BIE84
Bayswater Colliery Aus 10 88 Nippon Oil (Aust) PL Aus 88NSW89:184
Bayswater Colliery Aus 0 88 Pioneer Sugar Mills Aus 88NSW89:184
Bayswater Colliery Aus 10 Pioneer Sugar Mills Aus 86NSW86:199;BIE84
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BC Resources Can 100 BC Resources Investment Co Can 87 CM88;286
BC Resources Investment Co Can 5 80 C55/sGovt, British Columbia (Can) BC 80 1CR1:6
BCNR Mining Corp DSA 100 LTV Corp DSA 85 KC1M86:678
BCSC Collieries PL Aus 100 Blue Circle Southern Cement Aus 86 NSW86:200
Beaver Creek Coal OSA 100 Arco Coal Co DSA 85 KC1M86;677
Beaver Creek Coal Co USA 100 Anaconda Minerals Co DSA 84 KC1M85:9
Beckley Coal Mining Co DSA 100 Pickands Mather & Co DSA 85 KC1M86:678
Beckley Lick Run Co DSA 100 CSX Corp DSA 85 KC1M86:677
Bedcor Inc DSA 100 Carbon Industries DSA 85 KC1M86:677
Bell County Coal Corp DSA 100 Transco Coal Services Co DSA 85 KC1M86:679
Bell Coal Aus 100 Bell Resources Aus 88 J89:28
Bell Resources Aus 58 Bond Corp Aus 89 1CR226:7
Bellambi Coal Co L Aus 100 85 Austen & Butta L Aus 86 NSW86:200
Bellambi Coal Co L Aus 0 85 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 88 NSW89:166
Bellambi Coal Co L Aus 15 7? Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 84 B1E84:321
Bellambi Coal Co L Aus 65 64 Gold Fields Australia L Aus 69 AZ69;69;McK76:6
Bellambi Coal Co L Aus 0 79 Gold Fields Australia L Aus 79 Par86:ll
Bellambi Coal Co L Aus 40 79 Mcllwraith McEacham Ltd Aus 84 B1E84:321
Bellambi Coal Co L Aus 45 79 Shell Australia L Aus 84 B1E84:321
Bellambi Coal Co L Aus 65 79 Shell Australia L Aus 79 Par86:ll
Beluga Coal Co DSA Placer DS Inc DSA 87 CM88:417
BethEnergy Mines Inc DSA 100 Bethlehem Steel Co DSA 85 KC1M86:677
Bethlehem Mines Corp DSA 100 Bethlehem Steel Co DSA 85 KC1M86:677
Betty B Coal Co DSA 100 Thyssen Mining Constrctn Inc DSA 85 KC1M86:679
BHP Co PL Aus 40 Bell Group L Aus 88 J89;36
m  Co PL Aus 23 Beswick PL Aus 88 J89:36
BHP Co PL Aus 23 Elders IXL Aus 88 J89:36
BHP Minerals Aus 100 BHP Co PL Aus 87 CM88:438
BHP-ütah Aus 100 BHP Co PL Aus 87 CM88:200
Bienfait Coal Co Can 100 Luscar L Can 85 KC1M86:678
Big Bear Mining Co DSA 100 85 Fluor Corp DSA 85 KC1M86:678
Big Horn Coal Co DSA 100 Peter Kiewit Sons Mining DSA 84 KC1M85::11
Big Mountain Coal Inc DSA 0 84 Armco Steel DSA 87 K590:3
Big Mountain Coal Inc DSA 100 7? Armco Steel DSA 87 K590:3
Big Mountain Coals DSA 100 84 Peabody Holding Co DSA 87 K590:3
Bishop Coal Co DSA As Consolidation Coal Co DSA 84 KC1M85
Black Butte Coal Co DSA 50 Peter Kiewit Sons Mining DSA 84 KC1M85:11
Black Butte Coal Co DSA 50 Rocky Mountain Energy DSA 84 KC1M85:11
Blackwater mine Aus 100 84 Central Queensland Coal Ass Aus 75 QCB85:54
Blackwater mine Aus 90 64 Utah International Inc DSA 75 McK76:216
Blackwater mine Aus 10 64 Utah Mining Australia L Aus 75 McK76;216
Blair Athol Aus 50 85 Coal Cliff Collieries PL Aus 85 QCB85:56
Blair Athol Coal PL Aus 100 Coal Cliff Collieries PL Aus 89 J89:204
Blair Athol Coal PL Aus 100 CRA L Aus 87 CM88:442
Blair Athol mine Aus 0 88 ACI Resources L Aus 88 CW188:525
Blair Athol mine Ays 12 ACI Resources L Aus 87 B1E84:322;CK88:
Blair Athol mine Aus 15 85 Anaconda Australia Inc Aus 87 CM88:442;Qcfe85:
Blair Athol mine Aus 15 Arco Aust Coal L Aus 84 B1E84:322
Blair Athol mine Aus 38 78 A17 Arco Aust Coal L Aus 78 Fox81:72
Blair Athol mine Aus 12 85 Arco Aust Coal L Aus 88 CW188:525;QCB85
Blair Athol mine Aus 28 88 pl38 ARCO Coal Aus 88 1CR208:7
Blair Athol mine Aus 50 Blair Athol Coal PL Aus 87 BIE84:322;CM88:
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Blair Athol mine Aus 12 88 Bundaberg Sugar Aus 88 BIE:322;ICR208:
Blair Athol mine Aus 4 85 Bundaberg Sugar CoL Aus 87 CM88:442;QCB85:
Blair Athol mine Aus 38 Clutha Development Aus 76 CM76:175
Blair Athol mine Aus 0 78 A17Clutha Development Aus 76 F81:72
Blair Athol mine Aus 57 CRA L Aus 76 CM76:175
Blair Athol mine Aus 60 6? CRA L Aus 69 AZ69:15
Blair Athol mine Aus 7 81 EPDC (Australia) PL Aus 87 CM88;442
Blair Athol mine Aus 5 81 EPDC (Australia) PL Aus 84 BIE84:322
Blair Athol mine Aus 4 85 Gibson & Howes PL 87 CM88:442;QCB85:
Blair Athol mine Aus 3 81 JCD Australia PL Aus 87 CM88:442
Blair Athol mine Aus 5 81 JCD Australia PL Aus 84 BIE84:322
Blair Athol mine Aus 4 85 Hillaquin Sugar CoPL 87 CM88:442;QCB85:
Blair Athol mine Aus 5 Mines Administration PL Aus 76 CM76:175
Bloomfield Collieries PL Aus 100 Big Ben Holdings PL Aus 86 NSW86:201;CM88:
Blossom Coal Co OSA 100 Old Ben Coal Co DSA 85 KCIM86:678
Blue Circle Southern Cement Aus 41 BHP Co PL Aus 86 BIE84:323;NSW86
Blue Circle Southern Cement Aus 41 Blue Circle Industries PLC DK 86 BIE84:323;NSW86
Blue Circle Southern Cement Aus 100 87 Boral Ltd Aus 87 J89;CM88:162
Blue Circle Southern Cement Aus 2 Natnl Mutual Life Ass A'asia Aus 86 NSW86:201
Blue Creek Coal Co Inc USA 100 Dnetco Minerals Corp DSA 85 KCIM86:679
Blue Diamond Mining Inc DSA 100 Blue Diamond Coal Co DSA 85 KCIM86:677
Bluestone Coal Co DSA 81 Bluestone Coal Corp DSA 84 KCIM85:10
Bluestone Coal Co DSA 19 Eastern Associated Coal Corp DSA 84 KCIM85:10
Bogqabri Coal Co Aus 25 87 Agip Australia PL It 87 NSW89:171;CWI81
Boggabri Coal Co Aus 25 Amax Iron Ore Corp 86 NSN86:166
Bo^ abri Coal Co Aus 0 87 Amax Iron Ore Corp 87 NSW89:171;CWI81
Bo^ abri Coal Co Aus 13 Amax Iron Ore Corp 87 CWI810
Bo^ abri Coal Co Aus 50 BHP Minerals PL Aus 87 CWI810
Boggabri Coal Co Aus 50 BHP Minerals PL Aus 86 NSW86:166
Boggabri Coal Co Aus 25 87 Idemitsu Boggabri Coal PL Aus 87 NSW89;171;CWI81
Boggabri Coal Co Aus 25 Mobil Energy Minerals Inc 86 NSW86:166
Bo^ abri Coal Co Aus 0 87 Mobil Energy Minerals Inc 87 CWI810
Bo^ abri Coal Co Aus 13 Mobil Energy Minerals Inc 87 CWI810
Bond Corp Holdings L Aus 3 ANZ Nominees L Aus 86 NSW86:202
Bond Corp Holdings L Aus 43 Dallhold Investments PL Aus 86 NSW86:202
Bond Corp Holdings L Aus 230ms Dallhold Investments PL Aus 89 J89:33
Bond Corp Holdings L Aus 25ms Indosuez Nominees PL 89 J89:33
Bond Corp Holdings L Aus 13ms FAI Traders Insurance Co L Aus 89 J89:33
Bond Corp Holdings L Aus 13ms ANZ Nominees L Aus 89 J89:33
Bond Corp Holdings L Aus 10ms Bowola PL Aus 89 J89:33
Boral Ltd Aus 11 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 88 NSW89:167
Boral Ltd Aus 13 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 84 BIE84:324
Box Flat Mine Aus 100 8? Bundaberg Sugar Co L Aus 84 ICR194:7
Box Flat Mine Aus 0 87 p3.2Bundaberg Sugar Co L Aus 88 ICR194:7
Box Flat Mine Aus 87 p3.2 Endeavour Resources Aus 88 ICR194:7
Box Flat Nine Aus 87 p3.2 Showa Shell Jap 88 ICR194:7
BP Canada Can 57 British Petroleum DK 89 ICR226:14
BP Coal DK 100 British Petroleum DK 85 0&G86:54
BP Coal America DSA 100 BP Coal DK 88 CWI880525
BP Coal Development Aust L Aus 100 BP Coal DK 87 CM88:192
BP Coal South Africa SA 100 BP Coal DK 87 CM88:423
Bridger Coal Co DSA 50 Idaho Power Co DSA 85 KCIM86:678
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Bridger Coal Co DSA 50 Nerco Inc DSA 85 KCIM86:678
Bronco Mining Co Inc DSA 100 Anker Energy Corp DSA 85 KCIM86:677
Brown Badgett Inc DSA 100 Diamond Shamrock DSA 84 KCIM85:11
Brownies Creek Collieries IncDSA 100 Cumberland Mountain Coal Co DSA 84 KCIM85:11
Buffalo Mining Co DSA 100 Pittston Co USA 84 KCIM85:9
Bulkships, TNT Aus 100 Thomas Nationwide Transport Aus 75 Fox81:72
Bullmoose coal ujv Can 39 82 Lornex Mining Corp L Can 87 CM88:456,304
Bullmoose coal ujv Can 10 Nissho Iwai Coal Dev (Can) L Jap 87 CM88:456
Bullmoose coal ujv Can 51 Teck-Bullmoose Coal Inc Can 87 CM88:456
Byron Creek Collieries L Can 100 81 Esso Resources Canada L Can 84 CM85:350
Caballo mine DSA 100 Exxon Coal DSA Inc DSA 85 ICR122:12
Callide Coal Aus 15 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 87 CM88:450;QCB85:
Callide Coal Aus 30 Shell Australia L Aus 87 CM88:450;QCB85:
Callide Coal Aus 55 Thiess Bros PL Aus 87 CM88:450;QCB85:
Callide jv Aus 30 80 Shell Australia L Aus 80 Par86:ll
Caltex Oil (Aust) PL Aus 2 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 88 J89:39
Caltex Oil (Aust) PL Aus 2 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 86 NSW86:203
Caltex Oil (Aust) PL Aus 75 Caltex Petroleum Corp DSA 86 NSW86:202
Caltex Oil (Aust) PL Aus 88 Caltex Petroleum Corp DSA 88 J89:39
Caltex Oil (Aust) PL Aus 5 Whitloyd Nominees PL Aus 86 NSW86:203
Caltex Oil (Aust) PL Aus 7 Whitloyd Nominees PL Aus 88 J89;39
Camberwell jv Aus 50 Southland Coal Aus 88 NSW89:173
Camberwell jv Aus 50 Toyota Tsusho Corp Jap 88 NSW89:173
Camberwell jv Aus 40 Toyota Tsusho Corp Jap 89 K752:12
Camberwell jv Aus 10 Mitsubishi Mining & Cement Jap 89 K752:12
Cambria Coal Co DSA 100 Gulf Resources & Chemical Co DSA 85 KCIM86:678
Cannelton Industries Inc DSA 100 84 Algoma Steel Corp L DSA 85 KCIM86:677
Cape Breton Development Corp Can 100 7? government Can 87 CM88:412
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 0 8? ACI Resources L Aus 87 CM88:164
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 13 7? ACI Resources L Aus 84 BIE84:329
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 26 Austen & Butta L Aus 80 ICR5:13
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 21 Austen & Butta L Aus 84 BIE84:329;QCB85
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 17 77 British Coal DK 80 ICR5:13
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 11 British Coal DK 84 BIE84.-329
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 12 Coal Dev'ts (German Cr) PL Aus 85 QCB85:62
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 2 Commercial Dnion Assurance 80 ICR5:13
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 1 Commercial Dnion Assurance 84 BIE84;329;CM88:
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 26 8? Natnl Mutual Life Ass A'asia Aus 87 CM88:164
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 13 7? Natnl Mutual Life Ass A'asia Aus 84 BIE84:329:QCB85
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 11 Ruhrkohle Australia PL Aus 84 BIE84:329:QCB85
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 17 77 Ruhrkohle Australia PL Aus 80 ICR5:13
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 17 Shell Australia L Aus 84 BIE84:329;CM88:
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 39 Shell Australia L Aus 80 ICR5:13
Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 13 Superannuation Fund Inv Trust Aus 84 BIE84:329
Caralec Sp private electric util. Sp 80 ICW114:4
Carboex Sp 80 Electrica de Cordoba Sp 80 ICW102:7
Carboex Sp 80 Endesa Sp 80 ICW102:7
Carboex Sp 80 National Inst of Industry Sp 80 ICW102:7
Carbon Industries DSA 100 77 International Tel & Tel DSA 85 ICR115:7
Carbones de Colombia SA Col 100 government Col 87 CM88:462
Carbosuleis Spa Ita 100 Agip Coal Ita 87 EN187
Carbozulia Ven 8? Agip Coal It 87 CWI838:3
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Carbozulia Ven 8? Arco DSA 87CWI838:3
Cardinal River Coals Can 50 Consolidation Coal Co of Can Can 87CH88:287,297
Cardinal River Coals Can 50 Luscar L Can 87CH88:287,297
Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co DSA 100 Sharon Steel Corp DSA 85KCIH86:679
Carter Hining Co DSA 100 Exxon Coal DSA Inc DSA 84KCIH85:9
Castner Curran & Bullit DSA 100 Eastern Associated Coal Corp DSA 81ICR14:3
Cedar Coal Co DSA 100 Central Ohio Coal Co DSA 84KCIH85:10
Central Appalachian Coal Co DSA 100 Central Ohio Coal Co DSA 84KCIH85:10
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 8 84 Aust'n Hutual Provident Soc Aus 87CR88;164;QCB85:
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 8 76 Aust'n Hutual Provident Soc Aus 76CH76:160
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 9 89pA262Aust'n Hutual Provident Soc Aus 89CWI1035:7
Central Queensland Coal Ass Aus 5 84 Bell Resources L Aus 84QCB85:84;CH85:1
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 10 85 Bell Resources L Aus 87CH88:164
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 0 89A262 Bell Resources L Aus 89CWI1035:7
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 35 84 BHP Hinerals PL Aus 84QCB85:84
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 40 85 BHP Hinerals PL Aus 87CH88:164
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 45 89pA262BflP Hinerals PL Aus 89CWI1035:7
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 0 85 General Electric DSA 87CH88:164;QCB85:
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 16 84 General Electric DSA 84CH85:198
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 15 66 Hitsubishi Development PL Aus 75CH76:160
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 12 76 Hitsubishi Development PL Aus 76CH76:160
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 12 84 Hitsubishi Development PL Aus 87CH88:164:QCB85:
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 13 89 Hitsubishi Development PL Aus 89CWI1035:7
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 3 84 Pancontinental Hining L Aus 84QCB85:84
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 5 85 Pancontinental Hining L Aus 87CH88:164
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 6 89 Pancontinental Hining L Aus 89CWI1035:7
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 22 84 Queensland Coal Trust Aus 84QCB85:54
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 25 85 Queensland Coal Trust Aus 87CH88:164
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 28 89 Queensland Coal Trust Aus 89CWI1035:7
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 85 66 Dtah International Inc DSA 75CH76;160
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 76 76 Dtah International Inc DSA 76CH76:160
Central Queensland CoalAss Aus 4 76 Dtah Hining Australia L Aus 76CH76:160
Chapperal Coal Co Inc DSA 100 Industrial Fuels Corp DSA 85KCIH86:678
Charles Coal Co DSA 100 85 Fluor Corp DSA 85KCIH86:678
Chestnut Coal Co DSA 100 85 Fluor Corp DSA 85KCIH86:678
China Natl Coal Imp&ExpCorp China 100 government China 87CH88:418
Clarence Colliery PL Aus 49 77 A35BP Coal Development Aust PL Aus 86NSW86:203;Par86
Clarence Colliery PL Aus 51 77 Coalex PL Aus 86HSW86:203;Par86
Clermont Coal Hines L Aus 75 89 Exxon DSA ICR220:3
Clermont Coal Hines L Aus 25 8? Hitsubishi Dev PL Aus QCB85:86
Clermont Coal Hines L Aus 75 8? White Industries L Aus QCB85:86
Clermont Coal Hines L Aus 0 89 White Industries L Aus ICR220:3
Clinchfield Coal Div DSA 100 Pittston Co DSA 85KCIH86:678
Clutha Coal PL Aus 100 Clutha L Aus 88HSW89:173
Clutha Coal PL Aus 100 85 A30 Royaust PL Aus 86NSW86:203
Clutha Development Aus 100 78A169BP Coal & Hinerals Aus Aus 84BIE84:332
Clutha Development Aus 50 77A162BP Coal & Hinerals Aus Aus 84ParS6:ll
Clutha Development Aus 0 78A169 Daniel K. Ludwig DSA 84Par86:ll
Clutha Development Aui- 100 6? Daniel K. Ludwig DSA 84Par86:ll
Clutha Development Aus 50 77A162Daniel K. Ludwig DSA 84Par86:ll
Clutha Development Aus 0 6? Rio Tinto Collieries Aus 76HcK76;218
Clutha Development Aus 100 62 Rio Tinto Collieries Aus 76HcK76:218
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Coal Cliff Collieries PL Aus 100 Kembla Coal & Coke PL Aus 86 NSW86:205
Coal Corp of MZ NZ 100 NZ govt NZ 87 CH88:374
Coal Dev'ts (German Cr) PL Aus Commercial Union Assurance Co 85 QCB85:62
Coal Dev'ts (German Cr) PL Aus National Coal Board UK 85 QCB85:62
Coal Resources of Qld HarketinAus 100 Mcllwraith McEacham Op PL Aus 87 CM88:407
Coal Resources of Queensland Aus 100 Mcllwraith McEacham Op PL Aus 85 CM88:448:QCB85:
Coal X Inc USA 100 Gulf Energy Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Coal k Allied Industries L Aus 3 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 86 NSW86:204
Coal k Allied Industries L Aus 16 85 Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 86 NSW86:204
Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 14 78 CRA L Aus 84 BIE84:332
Coal k Allied Industries L Aus 16 CRA L Aus 84 CM88:189
Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 0 85 CRA L Aus 87 CM88:189
Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 6 88 Howard Smith Industries L Aus 88 J89:48
Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 39 6? 4.3msHoward Smith L Aus 77 AZ69:69;Par86:2
Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 50 78 Howard Smith L Aus 86 BIE84:332;NSW86
Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 42 89 Howard Smith L Aus 89 ICR228:7
Coal k Allied Industries L Aus 45 88 Howard Smith L Aus 88 NSW89:174
Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 36 88 Howard Smith L Aus 88 J89:48
Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 8? Joban Kosan Jap 87 CM88:189
Coal k Allied Industries L Aus 1 80 Mitsubishi Chemical Jap 87 CM88;189;CM85:4
Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 5 88 Natnl Mutual Life Ass A'asia Aus 88 J89:48
Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 7 Natnl Mutual Life Ass A'asia Aus 86 NSW86:204
Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 5 88 Nissho Iwai Corp Jap 88 J89:48
Coal k Allied Industries L Aus 1 79 Nissho Iwai Corp Jap 87 CM88:189;CM85:4
Coal k Allied Industries L Aus 5 8? Pendal Nominees PL Aus 88 NSW89:174
Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 2 79 Ube Industries Jap 87 CM88:189;CM85:4
Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 5 88 Ube Industries Jap 88 NSW89:174
Coal & Allied Operations PL Aus 100 Coal k Allied Industries L Aus 86 NSW86:174
Coalex PL Aus 100 Oakbridge L Aus 86 NSW86:205
Coastal States Energy Co USA 100 84 Coastal Corp USA 85 KCIM86;677
Cobb Coal Co USA 100 Nerco Inc USA 84 KCIM85:9
Collinsville Coal CoPL Aus 25 89 pl60 Agipcoal It 89 ICR208:11
Collinsville Coal CoPL Aus 100 8? Mount Isa Mines L Aus 84 BIE84:367
Collinsville Coal CoPL Aus 60 75 Mount Isa Mines L Aus 76 CM76:181
Collinsville Coal CoPL Aus 75 89 pl60 Mount Isa Mines L Aus 89 ICR208:11
Collinsville Coal CoPL Aus 40 75 Wood Hall L Aus 76 CM76;181
Colony Bay Coal Co USA 50 Bluestone Coal Corp USA 84 KCIM85:10
Colony Bay Coal Co USA 50 Eastern Associated Coal Corp USA 84 KCIM85:10
Colorado Westmoreland Inc USA 100 84 Westmoreland Coal Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Colowyo Coal Co USA Hanna Mining Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Colowyo Coal Co USA WR Grace Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Commonwealth Smelting UK CRA L Aus 85 ICR127;14
Compagnie Europeene de Comcl Belg Krupp WGerm 81 ICR23:11
Compagnie Europeene de Comcl Belg Petrofina Belg 81 ICR23:11
Companhia de Acero d Pacifico Chil 100 govt,Chile Chile 81 ICR14:17
Consolidation Coal Co USA 100 Dupont USA 85 KCIM86:677
Container Corp of America USA Mobil Oil Co USA 82 ICR51:11
Cook Colliery Aus 100 7? All BHP Minerals PL Aus 84 CM85:471
Cook Colliery Aus 0 83 All BHP Minerals PL Aus 84 CM85:449
Cook Colliery Aus 100 83 Coal Resources of Queensland Aus 84 CM85:471;QCB85:
Coos Bay lease USA 0 89 Menasha Corp Jap 89 ICR217:13
Coos Bay lease USA 100 89 Sumitomo Coal Mining Jap 89 ICR217:13
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Cordero Mining Co USA 100 Elk River Resources Inc DSA 85KCIM86:677
Costain Australia PL Aus 8 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 86NSW86:206
Costain Australia PL Aus 67 Costain Investments (Aust) PL Aus 86NSW86:206
Coteau Properties Co DSA 100 North American Coal Corp DSA 85KCIM86:678
CRA L Aus 53 Rio-Tinto Zinc Corp PLC DK 86NSW86:206
Cravat Coal Co DSA 100 Puskarich Bros DSA 85KCIM86:678
Crows Nest Industries L Can 100 Shell Canada Resources Can 850&G86:295
Crows Nest Resources L Can 100 Shell Canada Resources Can 87CM88:301,454
CSR L Aus 7 ANZ Nominees L Aus 86NSW86:206
CSR L Aus 13 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 86NSW86:206
Cumberland Collieries Inc DSA 100 Elk River Resources Inc DSA 85KCIM86:677
Cumberland mine DSA 50 Ontario Hydro Can 85 ICR124:17
Cumberland mine DSA 50 United States Steel Corp DSA 85ICR124:17
Cumberland Mountain Coal Co DSA 100 Cyprus Coal Co DSA 84KCIM85:11
Cumberland Village Coal DSA 100 89 Massey Coal Co, AT DSA 89KNB7.1;6
Curragh coal unincorp jv Aus 30 82 ACI Resources L Aus 87CM88:447,BIE84:
Curragh coal unincorp jv Aus 0 88 ACI Resources L Aus 88CWI880525
Curragh coal unincorp jv Aus 30 82 Anaconda Australia Inc Aus 87CM88:447,BIE84:
Curraÿi coal unincorp jv Aus 60 88pl38Arco Australia Aus 88 ICR208:7
Curragh coal unincorp jv Aus 10 82 Mitsui Coal Dev Aust PL Aus 87CM88:447,BIE84:
Curragh coal unincorp jv Aus 30 82 RW Miller & Co PL Aus 87CM88:447,BIE84:
Curragh Queensland Mining L Aus 100 ARCO Australia Aus 87CM88:447
C&K Coal Co DSA 100 Gulf Resources & Chemical Co DSA 85KCIM86:678
Dal-Tex Coal Corp DSA 100 United Coal Co DSA 84KCIM84:11
Dampier Coal (Qld) PL Aus 100 BHP Minerals PL Aus 84BIE84:337
Decker Coal Co DSA 50 Nerco Inc DSA 84KCIM85:9
Decker Coal Co DSA 50 Peter Kiewit Sons Mining DSA 84KCIM85::11
Denham Coal Ass Aus 5 8? Arco Coal Aus 89 ICR220:3
Denham Coal Ass Aus 10 82 John Holland Mgmt Services PL Aus 84QCM85:77
Denham Coal Ass Aus 45 82 Kennecott Expl Aust L Aus 84QCM85:77
Denham Coal Ass Aus 15 82 Lend Lease Resources PL Aus 84QCM85:77
Denham Coal Ass Aus 8 82 New Hope Collieries PL Aus 84QMC85:77
Denham Coal Ass Aus 23 82 State Govt Insurance Office Aus 84QCM85:77
Diamond Alaska Coal Co DSA Diamond Shamrock DSA 85KCIM86;677
Diamond Alaska Coal Co DSA Hunt Energy DSA 85KCIM86:677
Diamond Shamrock Coal Co DSA 100 87 135 Arch Mineral Corp DSA 88KNB6.10:7
Dombarton Colliery PL Aus 100 Austen & Butta L Aus 86NSW86:207
Donaldson Mine Co DSA 100 Valley Camp Coal Co DSA 85KCIM86:679
Douglas Colliery L SA 100 Rand Mines SA 87CM88:460
Douglas Colliery L SA 100 Witbank Colliery SA 89 ICR228:1
Douglas Pocahontas Coal Corp OSA 100 85 Fluor Corp DSA 85KCIM86;678
Drayton Coal PL Aus 7 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 86NSW86:207
Drayton Coal PL Aus 0 88 CSR L Aus 88NSW89:176
Drayton Coal PL Aus 44 CSR L Aus 87CM88:437
Drayton Coal PL Aus 3 Daesung Australia PL SKor 86NSW86:207
Drayton Coal PL Aus 3 Hyundai Australia PL SKor 86NSW86:207
Drayton Coal PL Aus 2 Mitsui Coal Dev Aust PL Aus 86NSW86:207
Drayton Coal PL Aus 3 Mitsui Mining (Aust) PL Aus 86NSW86:207
Drayton Coal PL Aus 83 88 Shell Australia L Aus 88NSW89:176
Drayton Coal PL Aus 39 Shell Australia L Aus 86NSW86:207
Drummond Coal Co DSA 100 Drummond Co DSA 85KCIM86:677
Duvha Opencut Services PL SA 100 Rand Mines L SA 87CM88:362
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EÀS Coal Co DSA 100 Elk River Resources Inc USA 85 KCIM86:677
Eastern Associated Coal Corp USA 0 87 Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc USA 87 K590:3
Eastern Associated Coal Corp USA 100 8? Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc USA 87 K590:3
Eastern Associated Coal Corp USA 100 87 Peabody Holding Co USA 87 K590:3
Eastern Coal Corp USA 100 Pittston Co USA 84 KCIM85:9
Ebenezer coal Aus 51 88 Allied Queensland Coalfields Aus 88 CWI924:1
Ebenezer coal Aus 100 Allied Queensland Coalfields Aus 87 CWI924:1
Ebenezer coal Aus 49 88 Idemitsu Kosan Jap 88 CWI924;1
Elders Resources Aus 100 88 NZ Forest Products L NZ 89 J89:68
Elkay Mining Co USA 100 Pittston Co USA 84 KCIM85:9
Elkorn Coal Corp USA 100 International Paper Co USA 85 KCIM86:678
Elkraft Den City of Copenhagen Den 82 CWI109:2
Elkraft Den Isefjordvaerket Den 82 CWI109:2
Elkraft Den SEAS Den 82 CWI109:2
EHO Neth 51 Frans Swarttouw Holding BV Neth 89 S0M089:9
EHO Neth 30 Frans Swarttouw Holding BV Neth 89 S0M089:9
EHO Neth 19 Manufrance Fr 89 S0M089:9
Empire Coal Co USA 100 Industrial Fuels Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Empire Energy Corp USA 100 Cyprus Coal Co USA 84 KCIM85:11
Emway Resource Inc USA 100 Cyprus Coal Co USA 84 KCIM85:11
Endeavour Resources Aus 39 84 Bond Corp Aus 84 BIE84:341
Energy Development Corp USA 100 Ruhr-American Coal Corp USA 85 KCIM86:679
Energy Fuels USA 100 7? Centurian Investment USA 81 ICR20:8
Energy Fuels USA 100 81 70 Getty Oil USA 81 ICR20:8
Enoxy Coal Co USA 100 Enoxy Holding USA 85 ICR134:19
Enoxy Coal Sales USA 100 85 Enoxy Holding USA 85 ICR134:19
Enoxy Holding USA 50 81 Agip It 85 ICR134:19
Enoxy Holding USA 50 81 Island Creek Coal Co USA 85 ICR134:19
Ensham coal project Aus 15 Agip Coal Aust PL Aus 84 QCB85:76
Ensham coal project Aus 15 Allied Queensland Coalfields Aus 84 QCB85:76
Ensham coal project Aus 23 8? Bligh Coal L Aus 84 QCB85:76
Ensham coal project Aus 23 Idemitsu Queensland PL Aus 84 QCB85:76
Ensham coal project Aus 5 Lucky Goldstar Inti Aus PL Aus 84 QCB85:76
Ensham coal project Aus 15 Pacific Coal PL Aus 84 QCB85:76
Ensham coal project Aus 5 Rheinbraun Aust PL Aus 84 QCB85:76
Ensham Coal Qld Aus 25 87 Idemitsu Kosan Jap 87 CWI810
Enviro Energy Inc USA 100 Mower Lumber Co USA 85 KCIM86:678
EPDC Overseas Coal CoL Jap 100 81 Electric Power Dev Co Jap 87 CM88:442
EPDC (Australia) PL Aus 100 81 EPDC Overseas Coal CoL Jap 87 CM88:442
Ermelo coal SA 33 BP Coal SA PL SA 87 CM88:458
Ermelo coal SA 0 87 BP Coal SA PL SA 89 ICR228:3
Ermelo coal SA 50 87 Total Exploration SA PL SA 89 ICR228:3
Ermelo coal SA 33 Total Exploration SA PL SA 87 CM88:458
Ermelo coal SA 50 87 Trans Natal Corp L SA 89 ICR228:3
Ermelo coal SA 33 Trans Natal Corp L SA 87 CM88:458
Ermelo Mines Services PL SA 100 General Mining Union Corp SA 87 CM88:362
Esso Resources Canada L Can 100 Imperial Oil Can 87 CM88:320
Estel Delfstoffen BV Estel (st) Neth 82 ICR48:8
Expansion Mining Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86;678
Exxon Australia Resources PL Aus 100 Esso Expl & Production Aust Aus 87 CM88:230
Exxon Coal & Minerals Aus L Aus 100 8? Exxon USA 87 Exxon87:16
Falcoln Coal USA 100 Diamond Shamrock USA 81 ICR20:8
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Falkirk Mining Co DSA 100 North American Coal Corp DSA 84 KCIM85:9
FCCI Inc DSA 100 Cerrro-Marmon Coal Group DSA 87 CM88:131
Federale Hynbou BPK SA 51 84 SA National Life Assurance SA 84 BIE84:343
Florence Mining Co DSA 0 84 North American Coal Corp DSA 84 KCIM85:11
Florence Mining Co DSA 100 North American Coal Corp DSA 84 KCIM85:9
Florence Mining Co DSA 100 84 Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal DSA 84 KCIM85:11
Fording Coal Ltd Can 60 7? Canadian Pacific Investment Can 84 CM76:217;CM85:3
Fording Coal Ltd Can 100 86 Canadian Pacific Investment Can 87 CM88:299
Fording Coal Ltd Can 40 7? Cominco L DSA 84 CM76:217;CM85:3
Fording Coal Ltd Can 0 86 Cominco L DSA 87 CM88:299
Forestburg Collieries 1984 L Can 100 Luscar L Can 85 KCIM86:1225
Fort Dnion mine DSA 100 Frontier Coal DSA 85 ICR120:16
Frans Swarttouw Holding BV Neth 60 HEW Beheer NV Neth 89 S0M089:9
Frans Swarttouw Holding BV Neth 40 Intematio Muller NV Neth 89 S0M089:9
Freeman United Coal Mining DSA 100 General Dynamics DSA 81 ICR34:9
Fremont Coal Co DSA 100 Dtah International Inc DSA 84 KCIM85:9
Frontier Coal DSA 100 Compagnie Français Petroles Fr 85 ICR120:16
F&M Coal Co Inc DSA 50 Jno McCall Coal Co DSA 85 KCIM86:678
Gateway Coal Co DSA 100 Diamond Shamrock DSA 84 KCIM85:11
General Mining Onion Corp L SA 7 84 Anglo American SA 84 BIE84:345
General Mining Dnion Corp L SA 51 84 Federale Mynbou BPK SA 84 BIE84:345
General (Aust) PL Aus 100 84 General Mining Dnion Corp SA 84 BIE84:345
German Creek mine Aus op Capricorn Coal Management PL Aus 87 CM88:164
Getty Minerals Marketing Inc DSA Plateau Mining Co DSA 87 CM88:120
Glenbarold Mine DSA As Consolidation Coal Co DSA 84 KCIM85
Glennies Creek Aus 50 89 Australian Mining InvestmentsAus 89 K752:12
Glennies Creek Aus 25 89 Nippon Oil Co L Jap 89 K752:12
Glennies Creek Aus 25 89 Toyo Menka Kaisha L Jap 89 K752:12
Glenrock Coal Co DSA 100 Nerco Inc DSA 84 KCIM85:9
Goedenhoop Colliery SA 100 Anglo American Coal Corp SA 87 CM88:362
Gold Fields Coal L SA 100 Gold Fields of SA SA 87 CM88:363
Gold Fields of SA SA 100 Fraser Alexander L SA 87 CM88:363
Golin Wallsend Coal Co L Aus 49 82 Agip It 82 Par86:28
Golin Wallsend Coal Co L Aus 0 84 Agip It 82 Par86:28
Golin Wallsend Coal Co L Aus 100 84 Australian Mining Inv Aus 84 CM85:215
Golin Wallsend Coal Co L Aus 49 81 Consolidation Coal of Aust Aus 84 NSW84:163
Golin Wallsend Coal Co L Aus 0 82 Consolidation Coal of Aust Aus 84 Par86:28
Golin Wallsend Coal Co L Aus 49 Gollin Administration PL Aus 84 NSW84:163
Golin Wallsend Coal Co L Aus 2 Warman Holdings PL Aus 84 NSW84:163
Gollin Administration PL Aus 100 Australian Mining Inv Aus 84 NSW84:163
Gordonstone mine Aus 100 Denham Coal Ass Aus 84 QCM85:77
Greenhills ujv Can 20 80 Pohang Iron & Steel Co SKor 87 CM88:305,453
Greenhills ujv Can 80 80 Westar Mining L Can 87 CM88:305,453
Greenich Collieries Co DSA 100 Pennsylvania Power & Light DSA 85 KCIM86:678
Gregg River Coal L Can 100 Manalta Coal L Can 87 CM88:286,277,30
Gregg River Resources L Can 100 Manalta Coal L Can 87 CM88:286,277,30
Gregg River ujv Can 60 Gregg River Coal L Can 87 CM88:286,277;Da
Gregg River ujv Can 40 Japan Gregg River Coal Can 87 CM88:286,277;Da
Gregg River ujv Can 5 Kawasaki Steel Can L Can 87 CM88:277;Dalby8
Gregg River ujv Can 3 Kobe Steel Can L Can 87 CM88:277;Dalby8
Gregg River ujv Can 5 Mitsui Coal Dev Can L Can 87 CM88;277;Dalby8
Gregg River ujv Can 14 Nippon Steel Dev Can Can 87 CM88:277;Dalby8
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Gregg River ujv Can 1 Nisshin Steel Can L Can 87CM88:277;Dalby8
Gregg River ujv Can 6 NKK Coal Can L Can 87CM88:277;Dalby8
Gregg River ujv Can 5 Sumitomo Metal Can L Can 87CM88:277;Dalby8
Gregory joint venture Aus 8 84 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 87CM88:164;QCB85:
Gregory joint venture Aus 9 89pA25 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 89CW11035:7
Gregory joint venture Aus 5 84 Bell Resources L Aus 85CM85:198
Gregory joint venture Aus 10 85 Bell Resources L Aus 87CM88:164;QCB85:
Gregory joint venture Aus 0 89A25 Bell Resources L Aus 89CW11035:7
Gregory joint venture Aus 52 85 BHP Minerals PL Aus 87CM88:164;QCB85:
Gregory joint venture Aus 55 84 BHP Minerals PL Aus 85QCB85:64
Gregory joint venture Aus 47 84 BHP Minerals PL Aus 84CM88:261
Gregory joint venture Aus 55 89pA25 BHP Minerals PL Aus 89CW11035:7
Gregory joint venture Aus 0 85 General Electric USA 84CM88:261;QCB85:
Gregory joint venture Aus 16 84 General Electric USA 84CM88:261;CM85:1
Gregory joint venture Aus 9 84 General Electric USA 84CM88:261
Gregory joint venture Aus 3 89pA25 Mitsubishi Development PL Aus 89CW11035:7
Gregory joint venture Aus 3 84 Pancontinental Mining L Aus 85CM85:198
Gregory joint venture Aus 5 84 Pancontinental Mining L Aus 87CM88:164;QCB85:
Gregory joint venture Aus 6 89pA25 Pancontinental Mining L Aus 89CW11035:7
Gregory joint venture Aus 25 85 Queensland Coal Trust Aus 84CM88:261
Gregory joint venture Aus 22 84 Queensland Coal Trust Aus 87CH88:164;QCB85:
Gregory joint venture Aus 28 89pA25 Queensland Coal Trust Aus 89CW11035:7
Gregory mine Aus 100 7? BHP Minerals PL Aus 85QCB85:64
Grundy Mining Co Inc USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85KC1M86:678
Gunnedah Coal Co Aus 100 85? Australian Mining Inv Aus 86NSW86:198
Gunnedah Coal Co Aus 100 74 Gollin Aus 86Par86:ll
Gunnedah Coal Co Aus 50 7? Gollin Aus 86Par86:ll
Gunnedah Coal Co Aus 51 76 Peko Wallsend L Aus 86Par86:ll
Guyan Mining Co USA 100 Occidental Petroleum Corp USA 85KC1M86:678
Hansen & Neuerburg AG WGer 100 Raab Karcher WGer 89S0M089:12
Herbert Corp, Ala USA 100 81 300 Amoco Minerals USA 81 1CR27:8
Harman Mining USA 81 Hudsons Bay Mining & Smelting Can 81 1CR21:9
Harman Mining USA 81 Minerals & Res of Bermuda Ber 81 1CR21:9
Harman Mining Corp USA 100 Inspiration Coal Inc USA 84KC1M85:14
Hawkeye Coal, Ken USA 100 Frontier Coal USA 85 1CR120:16
Helen Mining Co USA 100 North American Coal Corp USA 84KC1M85:9
Helen Mining Co USA 100 Valley Camp Coal Co USA 85KC1M86:679
Helvetia Coal Co USA 100 Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal USA 84KC1M85:11
Hermitage Collieries Co L Aus Coalex PL Aus 87CM88:162
Hermitage Collieries Co L Aus 0 8? Sumitomo Coal Mining Jap 87CM88:213
Hermitage Collieries Co L Aus 5 78 Sumitomo Coal Mining Jap 87CM88:213
Hermitage Collieries Co L Aus 10 78A4.5 Sumitomo Corp Jap 84CM85:193
Hermitage Collieries Co L Aus 6 8? Sumitomo Corp Jap 87CM88:213
Hobet Mining & Const Co Inc USA 100 Ashland Coal Co USA 84KC1M85:13
Holland Carbon Fuels USA DSM, Dutch state chem group Neth 82 1CR48:8
Holland Carbon Fuels USA Estel Delfstoffen BV Neth 82 1CR48:8
Holland Carbon Fuels USA Samenwerkende Electriciteits PNeth 82 1CR48:8
Hopkins Creek Coal Inc USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85KC1M86:678
Howard Smith L Aus ? 6? 3ms Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 69AZ69:69
Howard Smith L Aus 22 89 Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 89 1CR223:19
Howard Smith L Aus 19 6? Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 87CM88:217
Howard Smith L Aus 86 Joban Kosan Jap 87CM88:426
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Howard Smith L Aus 1ms 80 Mitsubishi Chemical Ind L Jap 87 CM88:426
Howard Smith L Aus 1ms 79 Nissho Iwai Corp Jap 87 CM88:426
Howard Smith L Aus 2ms 79 Ube Industries Jap 87 CM88:426
Howick mine Aus 100 78 BP Coal Aus 89 ICR235:6
Howick mine Aus 0 89 BP Coal Aus 89 ICR235:6
Howick mine Aus 100 89 CRA Aus 89 ICR235:6
Howick mine Aus 60 89 CRA Aus 89 ICR235:6
Howick mine Aus 40 89 Mitsubishi Jap 89 ICR235:6
Hudsons Bay Mining & Smelting Can Anglo American SA 81 ICR21:9
Idemitsu Boggabri Coal PL Aus 100 87 Idemitsu Kosan Jap 87 NSW89:171
Idemitsu Inti Res Can Can 100 81 40 Idemitsu Kosan Jap 86 CM87:475
Indian Creek USA 100 Cannelton Industries USA 87 CWI843:1
Imperial Oil Can Exxon USA 87 CM88:320
Inspiration Coal USA 7? Hudsons Bay Mining & Smelting Can 81 ICR21:9
Inspiration Coal USA 7? Minerals & Res of Bermuda Ber 81 ICR21:9
International Anthracite Corp USA 100 Frontier Coal USA 85 ICR120:16
International Coal Trading SA 100 Agip SA SA 82 ICR49:9
Internatl Colombia Res Corp Col 100 8? Exxon USA 87 CM88M62
Island Creek Coal Co USA 100 Occidental Petroleum Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678;ICR1
Island Creek Coal Sales Co USA 100 Island Creek Coal Co USA 87 CM88:116
Italiana Coke Spa Ita 100 Agip Coal Ita 87 ENI87
Itmann Coal Co USA As Consolidation Coal Co USA 84 KCIM85
JCD Australia PL Aus 100 Japan Coal Development Co Jap 87 CM88:442
Jeebropilly Collieries PL Aus 100 Surrey Propeties PL Aus 84 BIE84;355
Jemm Mining Co USA 100 Enviro-Fuels Inc USA 85 KCIM86:678
Jessie Shipley Coal Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp USA 100 Pittston Co USA 84 KCIM85:9
Jewell Smokeless Coal Co USA 100 Elk River Resources Inc USA 85 KCIM86:677
Jim Walter Resources Co USA 100 Jim Walter Corp USA 87 CM88:118;KCIM86
JMJ UK 100 Anglo International UK 81 ICR33:13
JMJ/SM jv,Kentucky USA JMJ UK 81 ICR33:13
JMJ/SM jv,Kentucky USA Simons Brothers USA 81 ICR33:13
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp USA 100 LTV Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Kaiser Resources L Can 40 JSM Jap 80 ICR1:6
Kaiser Resources L Can 27 JSM + Mitsubishi Jap 76 CM76:204
Kaiser Resources L Can 5 Kaiser,Edgar USA 80 ICR1;6
Kaiser Resources L Can 46 Kaiser Steel Corp USA 76 CM76:204
Kaiser Resources L Can 24 Kaiser Steel of Calif USA 80 ICR1:6
Kaiser Resources L Can 27 public USA 76 CM76:204
Kanawha Coal Co USA 100 Pickands Mather & Co USA 85 KCIM86:678
Kangra Coal Corp SA 100 Kangra Group L SA 87 CM88:363
Kangra Coal Corp SA 50 79 Agip Coal It 87 ENI87
Kanhym SA 100 General Mining Union Corp SA 89 ICR228:1
Kawasaki Steel Can L Can 100 Kawasaki Steel Corp Jap 87 CM88:277
Kern Coal Co USA 100 Transco Coal Services Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Kembla Coal & Coke PL Aus 20 6? Broken Hill South Aus 78 Rich83:74
Kembla Coal & Coke PL Aus 50 6? CRA L Aus 69 AZ69:14
Kembla Coal & Coke PL Aus 100 7? CRA L Aus 86 NSW86:211
Kembla Coal & Coke PL Aus 30 6? North Broken Hill Aus 78 Rich83:74
Kennecott Explorations USA 100 Standard Oil Co of Ohio USA 82 DIC82:351
Kennecott Explorations Aus L Aus 100 Kennecott Corp USA 82 DIC82:351
Kent Coal Mining Co USA 100 Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal USA 84 KCIM85:11
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Kentland Elkhorn Coal Co OSA 100 Pittston Co USA 85 KCIM86:678
Kentucky Carbon Corp OSA 100 Carbon Industries USA 85 KCIM86:677
Kentucky jv OSA 81 Compagnie Français Petroles Fr 81 CWI232:1
Kentucky jv OSA 81 Diamond Shamrock USA 81 CWI232:1
Kermit Coal Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Kerr-HcGee Coal Corp OSA 100 Kerr-McGee Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Kesscoal Inc OSA 7 89 Massey Coal Co, AT USA 89 KNB7.1:6
Keystone Coal Mining Corp USA 100 Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal USA 84 KCIM85:11
Kitt Energy Corp USA 100 8? Old Ben Coal Co USA 84 KCIM85:10
Kitt mine USA Republic Coal USA 81 ICR41:10
Kleinkopje Colliery SA 100 Anglo American Coal Corp SA 87 CM88:362
Kobe Steel Can L Can 100 Kobe Steel L Jap 87 CM88:277
Koch Carbon Inc USA 100 Koch Industries Inc USA 85 KCIM86:678
La Loma Col Drummond C USA 89 ICL8917;2
La Loma Col Drummond C Col 89 ICL8917:2
Landau Colliery SA 100 Anglo American Coal Corp SA 87 CM88:362
Laurel Mines Corp USA 100 National Mines Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Leeco Inc USA 100 Transco Coal Services Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Lemington Collieries Aus 50 74 CSR L Aus 74 Par86:ll
Lemington Collieries Aus 50 86 CSR L Aus 86 NSW86:211
Lemin^ on Collieries Aus 100 7? CSR L Aus 84 CM85;250
Lemin<^on Collieries Aus 93 7? CSR L Aus 78 Rich83:74
Lemin^ on Collieries Aus 100 88 Exxon Aust Resources PL Aus 88 Exxon88:16
Lemington Collieries Aus 50 86 Exxon Aust Resources PL Aus 86 NSW86:211
Lemington Collieries Aus 7 7? Johnstone, J Aus 78 Rich83:74
Leiin^ on Collieries Aus 50 74 Johnstone, J Aus 74 Par86;ll
Leslie Coal Co Inc USA Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Leslie Coal Mining Co USA Pickands Mather & Co USA 85 KCIM86;678
Liddell mine Aus 100 7? Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 89 ICR222:11
Liddell mine Aus 0 89 Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 89 ICR222:11
Liddell mine Aus 38 89 Marion Mining Aus 89 ICR222:11
Liddell mine Aus 38 89 Massey Coal Co Inc, AT USA 89 ICR222:11
Liddell mine Aus 5 89 private Aus 89 ICR222:11
Liddell mine Aus 20 89 Savage Resources Aus 89 ICR222:11
Line Creek coal mine Can 100 Crows Nest Resources L Can 87 CM88:286,301
Litbgow Valley Colliery CoL Aus 94 Coalex PL Aus 86 NSW86:211
Lithgow Valley Colliery CoL Aus, 6 78 Sumitomo Corp Jap 86 NSW86:211
Lomex Mining Corp L Can 68 Rio Algom 87 CM88:304
Lomex Mining Corp L Can 22 Teck Corp Can 87 CH88:304
Luscar coal Can op Cardinal River Coals L Can 87 CM88:286
Luscar-Sterco L Can 25 Alberta Energy Co Can 87 CM88:452
Luscar-Sterco L Can 75 Luscar L Can 87 CM88:452
Macquarrie Aus 100 89 A125Bell Resources L Aus 89 ICR226:7
Macquarrie Aus 100 7? BMP Co PL Aus 89 ICR226:7
Macquarrie Aus 100 89 Elders Resources NZFPL Aus 89 ICR226:7
Maitland Main Collieries PL Aus 100 Australian Mining Inv Aus 86 NSW86:198
Majestic Collieries Co USA 100 Inspiration Coal Inc USA 84 KCIM85:14
Manalta Coal L Can 100 Mancal L Can 87 CM88:286,277,30
Mancal L Can 100 Loram L 87 CM88:286,277
Manitoba & Saskatchewan 1984 Can 100 Luscar L Can 85 KCIM86:1225
Manor/Mineveh coalfield USA 100 7? Consolidation Coal Co USA 81 ICR22:16;32:9
Manor/Mineveh coalfield USA 76 Consolidation Coal Co USA 81 ICR22:16;32:9
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Manor/Nineveh coalfield USA 24 81 Rheinbraun WGer 81 ICR22:16;32:9
Maple Meadow Mining Co USA 100 Cannelton Industries USA 85 KCIM86:677
Marion Coal Co Inc USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Martin County Coal Inc USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86;678
Mary Lee Coal Co Inc USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Massey Coal Co USA 50 Royal Dutch Shell UK/Ne 85 0&G86:294
Massey Coal Co Inc , AT USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Massey Coal Export Corp USA 100 Massey Coal Co, AT USA 87 CM88:118
Mathies Coal Co USA As Consolidation Coal Co USA 84 KCIM85
Mathies Coal Co USA As Stelco Can 87 CWI839:1
Mathies Coal Co USA As National Steel Corp USA 87 CWI839:1
Matla Coal L SA 100 General Mining Union Corp SA 87 CM88:362
McCoy Caney Coal Co USA 100 84 Coastal Corp USA 85 KCIM86:677
McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corp USA 100 Transco Coal Services Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Mcllwraith McEacham L Aus 46 Thomas Nationwide Transport Aus 84 BIE84:361
Mclnnes Coal Mining Co USA 100 Pickands Mather & Co USA 85 KCIM86:678
McIntyre Coal Mines L Can 100 McIntyre Porcupine L Can 76 CM76:213
McIntyre Porcupine L Can Superior Oil Co L USA 76 CM76;213
Medicine Bow USA 50 8? Arch Mineral Corp USA 88 KNB7.1:5
Medicine Bow USA 100 88 Arch Mineral Corp USA 88 KNB7.1:5
Medicine Bow USA 0 88 Union Pacific Mineral Co USA 88 KNB7.1:5
Medicine Bow USA 50 8? Union Pacific Mineral Co USA 88 KNB7.1:5
Mercury Coal & Coke Inc USA 100 Valley Mining Co Inc USA 85 KCIM86:679
Middelburg Mines Services PL SA 89 BP Coal SA PL SA 87 CH88:460
Hiddelburg Mines Services PL SA 5 Douglas Colliery L SA 87 CM88:460
Middelburg Nines Services PL SA 12 89 7 Douglas Colliery L SA 89 ICR228:1
Middelburg Mines Services PL SA 7 Kanhym SA 87 CK88:460
Middelburg Mines Services PL SA 0 89 7 Kanhym SA 89 ICR228:1
Midland Coal Co USA 100 American Smelting & Refining USA 85 KCIM86:677
MIN Holdings L Aus 49 American Smelting & Refining Aus 87 CM88:444
MIM Holdings L Aus 32 Mount Isa Mines Aus
Minerals & Ses of Bermuda Ber Anglo American SA 81 IŒ21:9
Mingo-Logan Coal USA 100 8? BP Coal America USA 88 CWI880525
Minsarco Resource PL General Mining Union Corp SA 87 CK88:437
Missouri Valley Properties Co ÜSÀ 100 North American Coal Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Mitsui Coal Development Aust PAus 70 Mitsui & Co L Jap 84 BIE84:365,CM88:
Mitsui Coal Development Aus PLAus 30 Mitsui i Co (Aust) L Aus 84 BIE84:365,CM88:
Mitsui Coal Development Can L Can 100 Mitsui & Co L Jap 87 CM88:277
Mitsui & Co (Aust) L Aus 100 Mitsui & Co L Jap 84 BIE84:365
Mobil Coal Producing USA 100 Mobil Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Monterey Coal Co USA 100 Exxon Coal USA Inc USA 84 KCIM85:9
Mount Isa Mines L Aus 100 MIM Holdings L Aus 84 BIE84:367
Mount Thorley Colliery Aus 20 Pohang Iron & Steel Co S.Kor 86 NSW86:217
Mount Thorley Colliery Aus 80 RW Killer & Co PL Aus 86 NSW86:212
Mountain Clay Inc USA 100 Transco Coal Services Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Mountain Coals Inc USA 100 Cyprus Coal Co USA 84 KCIM85:11
Mountian Drive Coal Co USA 100 Cumberland Mountain Coal Co USA 84 KCIM85:11
Nulga Coal Co USA 100 Drummond Co USA 85 KCIM86:677
Muswellbrook Coal Co Aus 100 Muswellbrook Energy & Hinrls Aus 86 NSW86:212
Huswellbrook Energy & Minis L Aus 62 80 Consolidated Press Res Aus 86 NSW86:212;CN88:
Muswellbrook Energy & Minis L Aus 15 80 Marubeni Corp Jap 84 CM85:458
Nacco Mining Co USA 100 North American Coal Corp USA 84 KCIM85:9
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National Coal Supply Corp Isr 80 govt,Israel Isr 80 ICR9:12
National Coal Supply Corp Isr 80 Israel Electric Co Isr 80 ICR9:12
National Mines Corp OSA 100 National Steel Corp USA 85 ICR123:17
National Smokeless Fuels UK 100 British Coal UK 87 K584:2
National Steel Corp USA 50 84 292 National Intergroup Inc USA 84 AFR840427:18
National Steel Corp USA 100 7? National Intergroup Inc USA 84 AFR840427:18
National Steel Corp USA 50 84 292 Nippon Kokan KK Jap 84 ICR123:17;AFR84
Neptune Terminal Can 20 80 C4 Consolidation Coal Co of Can Can 80 ICR5:15
Neptune Terminal Can 79 7? Federal Industries Can 80 ICR5:15
Neptune Terminal Can 20 80 C4 Luscar L Can 80 ICR5:15
Neptune Terminal Can 20 80 C4 McIntyre Mines Can 80 ICR5:15
Nerco USA 100 Pacific Power & Light USA 80 ICR9:12;KCIM86:
Nerco Coal Sales USA 100 Nerco Inc USA 80 ICR9:12
Nerco Eastern Coal Co USA 100 Nerco Inc USA 84 KCIM85:9
Neste Coal Corp 100 Neste Oy Fin 0&G86
Neste Coal Ltd 100 Neste Oy Fin 0&G86
New Hope Collieries Aus 100 Surrey Propeties PL Aus 84 BIE84:389
New River Co USA 100 CSX Corp USA 85 KCIM86:677
Newcastle Wallsend Coal CoPL Aus 100 88 Elders Resources NZFPL Aus 88 NSW89:177
Newcastle Wallsend Coal CoPL Aus 100 Peko Wallsend L Aus 86 NSW86:215;CM88:
NewEra Resources Corp USA 100 Mower Lumber Co USA 85 KCIM86:678
Newlands Coal PL Aus 25 89 pl60 Agipcoal It 89 ICR208:11
Newlands Coal PL Aus 75 89 pl60 MIM Holdings L Aus 89 ICR208:11
Newlands Coal PL Aus 100 78 MIM Holdings L Aus 84 BIE84:363
Newmont Mining 22 84 Consolidated Gold Fields PLC SA 84 BIE84:369
Newiont Mining 8 Consolidated Gold Fields PLC SA 81 ICR30:12
New Whitwood Collieries PL Aus 100 Allied Queensland Coalfields Aus 88 J89:5
Nippon Steel Dev Can L Can 100 Nippon Steel Corp Jap 87 CM88:277
Nissbin Steel Can L Can 100 Nissbin Steel Co L Jap 87 CM88:277
Nissho Iwai Corp Jap .5ms 79 Howard Smith L Aus 87 CM88:426
NKK Coal Can L Can 100 Nippon Kokan KK Jap 87 CM88:277
North Antelope Coal Co USA 50 Paneastern Coal Co USA 85 KCIM86.-678
North Antelope Coal Co USA 50 Powder River Coal Co USA 85 KCIM86:678
North River Energy Co USA 50 LTV Steel Co USA 84 KCIM85:10
North River Energy Co USA 50 Pittsburg & Midway Coal Co USA 84 KCIM85:10
Northwestern Resources Co USA 100 Western Energy Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Norton mine USA 100 87 Diamond Shamrock Coal Co USA 88 KNB6.10:7
Norton mine USA 100 88 Zielinski Construction USA 88 KNB6.10;7
NuEast Mining Corp USA 100 Eastern Associated Coal Corp USA 84 KCIH85:10
Oak Grove Coal Co USA 100 Pyro Energy Corp USA 84 KCIM85:12
Oakbridge L Aus 19 ANZ Nominees L Aus 86 NSW86:215
Oakbridge L Aus 23.9ms ANZ Nominees L Aus 89 J89:137
Oakbridge L Aus 11 Aust'n Mutual Provident Soc Aus 86 NSW86:215
Oakbridge L Aus 5 81 11 Austin Mutual Provident Soc Aus 81 ICR10:8
Oakbridge L Aus 12 Bankers Trustees Aus 88 NSW89:185
Oakbridge L Aus 49 89 Elders Resources NZFPL Aus 89 ICR226:7
Oakbridge L Aus 20 8? Gencor (Aust) PL Aus 89 ICR226:7
Oakbridge L Aus 14 84 Gencor (Aust) PL Aus 84 BIE84:344
Oakbridge L Aus 0 89 Gencor (Aust) PL Aus 89 ICR226:7
Oakbridge L Aus 13 89 Japan consumer? Jap 89 ICR226:7
Oakbridge L Aus 8 89 Mapp, G Aus 89 ICR225:15
Oakbridge L Aus 5 7? Mapp, G Aus 81 ICR10:8
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Oakbridge L Aus 20 Hinsarco Resource PL 88 NSW89:185
Oakbridge L Aus 14 Hinsarco Resource PL 86 NSW86:215
Oakbridge L Aus 7.1ms Pendall Nominees Aus 89 J89:137
Oakbridge L Aus 6.4ms S&A Nominees Aus 89 J89:137
Oakbridge L Aus 3.6ms Sumitomo Jap 89 J89:137
Oakbridge L Aus 8.0ms Superannuation Investment FundAus 89 J89:137
Oaky Creek joint venture Aus 5 7? Empresa Nacional Siderugica Sp 84 BIE84:372;QCB85
Oaky Creek joint venture Aus 9 7? Hoogovens Delfstoffen BV Neth 84 BIE84:372;QCB85
Oaky Creek joint venture Aus 0 80 A45 Houston Oil & Hin of Aus Inc Aus 87 CH88:264
Oaky Creek joint venture Aus 38 7? Houston Oil & Hin of Aus Inc Aus 87 CH88:266
Oaky Creek joint venture Aus 0 89 Italsider SPA It 89 ICR218;5
Oaky Creek joint venture Aus 8 7? Italsider SPA It 84 BIE84:372
Oaky Creek joint venture Aus 79 80 A45 Hount Isa Hines L Aus 80 ICR5:12;QCB85:6
Oaky Creek joint venture Aus 87 89 Hount Isa Hines L Aus 89 ICR218:5
Oaky Creek joint venture Aus 40 7? Hount Isa Hines L Aus 87 CH88:266
Obed Harsh Can 3 Norcen Energy Resources L 87 CH88M53
Obed Harsh Can 97 Union Oil Co of Canada L Can 87 CH88:453
Old Ben Coal Co USA 100 8? Standard Oil of Ohio (Sohio) USA 87 KCIH86:679;CH88
Omar Hining Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIH86;678
Oneida Coal Co USA 100 Elk River Resources Inc USA 85 KCIH86:677
Optimum Collieries PL SA 40 Sir Alfred HcAlpine and Son UK 87 CH88:458
Optimum Collieries PL SA 60 Trans Natal Corp L SA 87 CH88:458
Ora Hae Coal Co Inc USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIH86:678
O'Donnell Coal Co USA 100 Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal USA 85 KCIH86:679
Pacific Coal Aus 100 CRA L Aus 88 ICR208:17
Pacific Copper L Aus 100 Bond Corp Aus 86 NSW86:202
Patrick Coal Corp USA 100 Patrick Petroleum Corp USA 85 KCIH86:678
Patton Coal Co Inc USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIH86:678
Peabody Coal Co USA 85 Bechtel Corp USA 85 KCIH86:678
Peabody Coal Co USA 85 Boeing Co USA 85 KCIH86:678
Peabody Coal Co USA 85 Equitable Life Assurance Soc USA . 85 KCIH86:678
Peabody Coal Co USA 10 84 Fluor Corp USA 84 BIE84:344
Peabody Coal Co USA 100 68 Kennecott Copper Corp USA 75 HcK76:218;Fox81
Peabody Coal Co USA 85 Newmont Hining Co USA 85 KCIH86:678
Peabody Coal Co USA 85 Williams Cos USA 85 KCIH86:678
Peabody Development USA 27 80 Newmont Hining 81 ICR30:12
Peabody Development USA 28 84 Newmont Hining 84 BIE84:369
Peabody Development USA 50 89 Newmont Hining 89 ICR227:9
Peabody Holdings USA 0 86 Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc USA 87 K590:3
Peabody Holdings USA 15 87 Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc USA 87 K590:3
Peerless Eagle Coal Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIH86:678
Peko Wallsend L Aus 19 ANZ Nominees L Aus 86 NSW86:216
Peko Wallsend L Aus 0 ANZ Nominees L Aus 88 NSW89:185
Peko Wallsend L Aus 0 Aust'n Hutual Provident Soc Aus 88 NSW89;185
Peko Wallsend L Aus 21 Aust'n Hutual Provident Soc Aus 86 NSW86:216
Peko Wallsend L Aus 100 88 North Broken Hill PL Aus 88 NSW89:185;J89:1
Pembroke Coal Co USA 100 Utah International Inc USA 84 KCIH85:9
Permac Inc USA 100 Jno HcCall Coal Co USA 85 KCIH86:678
Permac Inc USA 0 89 Jno HcCall Coal Co USA 89 ICR2335:6
Permac Inc USA 100 89 Hapco USA 89 ICR2335:6
Perry County Coal Co USA 100 Blue Diamond Coal Co USA 85 KCIH86;677
Peter Cave Coal Co Inc USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIH86:678
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Peter White Coal Mining Corp ÜSA 100 National Mines Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Phillips Coal Co ÜSA 100 Phillips Petroleum Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Pickands Mather & Co USA 100 Moore McCormack Resources USA 85 KCIM86:678
Pike Coal USA 100 BP Coal America USA 88 CWI880525
Pikeco Mining Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Pikeville Coal Co USA 100 Pickands Mather & Co USA 85 KCIM86:678
Piney Creek Coal Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Pioneer Sugar Mills Aus 29 CSR L Aus 86 NSW86:216
Pioneer Sugar Mills Aus 16 Thiess Holdings L Aus 86 NSW86:216
Pittsburg & Midway Coal Ming USA 100 Chevron Corp USA 85 KCIM86:677
Pittston Coal Export Corp USA 100 Pittston Co USA 87 CM88:128
Placer Coal Inc USA 100 Placer US Inc USA 85 KCIM86:678
Plateau Mining USA 100 Getty Oil USA 85 CM85M39
Pocahontas No6 USA 67 Island Creek Coal Co USA 85 ICR124:3
Pocahontas No6 USA 33 Romania Rom 85 ICR124:3
Polkohle WGer 15 Weglokoks Pol 80 Gas81:16
Pond Creek Mining Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Prater Creek Processing USA 100 Industrial Fuels Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Premier Coal Sales USA 100 Peabody Development USA 85 ICR115:7
Preussen-Elektra AG WGer 95 Veba AG WGer 89 S0M089:12
Price River Coal Co USA 100 Central Ohio Coal Co USA 84 KCIM85:10
Prospect Point Coal CO USA 100 Rocky Mountain Energy USA 85 KCIM86:679
PT Belau Coal Indo 60 Mobil Oil Co USA 87 CM88:478
PT Belau Coal Indo 40 Nissho Iwai Corp Jap 87 CM88;478
PT Kaltii Prima Coal Indo 50 BP Coal UK 87 CM88:424
PT Kaltim Prima Coal Indo 50 CRA L Aus 87 CM88:424
PT Tambang Batubara Indo government Indo 87 CM88:478
PV Mining Co USA 100 Nerco Inc USA 84 KCIM85:9
Pyro Mining Co USA 100 89 Costain Holdings L UK 89 ICL8917:2
Pyro Mining Co USA 50? Costain Holdings L UK 85 KCIM86:678
Pyro Mining Co USA 50? Pyro Energy Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
pJro-Alcoa Coal Co USA 100 P^ o Energy Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Quarto Mining Co USA 100 North American Coal Corp USA 84 KCIM85:9
Queensland Allied Industries Aus 5 88 Nissho Iwai Corp Jap 88 ICR208:15
Queensland Allied Industries Aus 5 88 Ube Industries Jap 88 IŒ208:15
Quinsam Coal L Can 50 81 Brinco Mining L 86 CM87:473
Quinsam Coal L Can 0 81 Luscar L Can 86 CM87:473
Quinsam Coal L Can 50 7? Luscar L Can 86 CM87:473
Quinsam Coal L Can 50 7? Weldwood of Can L Can 86 CM87:473
Quintette Coal L Can 0 76 C22.5A1CO Standard Corp USA 76 CM76:222
Quintette Coal L Can 37 7? Alco Standard Corp USA 76 CM76:222
Quintette Coal L Can 12 81 Charbonnages de France Fr 87 CM88:278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 10 7? Charbonnages de France Fr 87 ICR13:10
Quintette Coal L Can 38 76 Denison Mines L Can 81 ICR13/10;CM76:2
Quintette Coal L Can 50 81 Denison Mines L Can 87 CM88:278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 17 7? Esso Resources Canada Can 81 ICR13:10
Quintette Coal L Can 0 81 Esso Resources Canada Can 81 ICR13:10
Quintette Coal L Can 0 81 Godo Steel Jap 87 CM88;278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 2 81 Kawasaki Steel Corp Jap 87 CM88:278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 1 81 Kobe Steel L Jap 87 CM88:278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 0 81 Mitsubishi Chemical Ind L Jap 87 CM88:278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 31 76 C11.2Mitsui Mining Overseas Dev Co Jap 76 CM76;222
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Quintette Coal L Can 18 7? Mitsui Mining Overseas Dev Co Jap 87 ICR13:10
Quintette Coal L Can 13 81 Mitsui Mining Overseas Dev Co Jap 87 CM88:278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 13 7? Mitsui Mining Overseas Dev Co Jap 75 CM76:222
Quintette Coal L Can 21 7? Mitsui Mining Overseas Dev Co Jap 80 CM85:380
Quintette Coal L Can 0 81 Nakayama Steel Jap 87 CM88:278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 2 81 Nippon Kokan KK Jap 87 CM88:278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 4 81 Nippon Steel Corp Jap 87 CM88:278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 0 81 Nisshin Steel Co L Jap 87 CM88:278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 5 81 Sumitomo Corp Jap 87 CM88:278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 1 81 Sumitomo Metal Industries L Jap 87 CM88:278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 13 7? Tokyo Boeki L Jap 75 CM76:222
Quintette Coal L Can 21 7? Tokyo Boeki L Jap 80 CM85:380
Quintette Coal L Can 11 81 Tokyo Boeki L Jap 87 CM88:278,455
Quintette Coal L Can 31 76 C11.2Tokyo Boeki L Jap 76 CM76;222
Quintette Coal L Can 18 7? Tokyo Boeki L Jap 87 ICR13:10
Raab Karcher Ag WGer 96 Veba Oil AG WGer 89 S0M089:12;Gas81
Race Fork Coal Corp ÜSA 100 Jno McCall Coal Co USA 85 KCIM86:678
Race Fork Coal Corp USA 0 89 Jno McCall Coal Co USA 89 ICR235:6
Race Fork Coal Corp USA 100 89 Mapco USA 89 ICR235:6
Rand London Coal SA 100 Rand London Corp 87 CM88:363
Ranger Fuel Corp USA 100 Pittston Co USA 84 KCIM85:9
Rawhide nine USA 100 Exxon Coal USA Inc USA 85 ICR122/12
Ray Coal Co USA 100 Elk River Resources Inc USA 85 KCIM86:677
Red Ash Sales Co USA 100 Coalarbed Inc USA 85 KCIM84:677
Republic Coal USA 7 8? Sohio Petroleum Co USA ICR41:10
Republic Steel Corp USA 100 LTV Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Rhondda Collieries PL Aus 100 80 20 Endeavour Resources Aus 80 ICR5;12
Rhondda Collieries PL Aus 20 88 Showa Shell Jap 88 ICR194:7
Rietspruit coal SA 50 Rietspruit Opencast Serv PL SA 87 CM88:456
Rietspruit coal SA 50 Shell South Africa PL SA 87 CM88;456
Rietspruit Opencast Serv PL SA 100 Transvaal Consol Land & Exp SA 87 CM88:456
Robinson Phillips Coal Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Rockcastle Inc USA 100 Ryan Inc USA 85 KCIM86:679
Rocky Holly Coal Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Rocky Mountain Energy USA 100 Union Pacific Corp USA 87 CWI810;KCIM86:6
Rose Branch Development Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Rosebud Coal Co USA 100 Peter Kiewit Sons Mining USA 84 KCIM85::ll
Royal Dutch Shell Keth/ 60 Royal Dutch Petroleum Co Neth 86 0&G86:310
Royal Dutch Shell Neth/ 40 Shell Transport & Trading Co UK 86 0&G86:310
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 7? Harpener WGer 87 Gor87:78
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 8 85 Hoesch WGer 87 Gor87:78
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 7? Hoesch WGer 87 Gor87:78
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 7? Klockner WGer 87 Gor87:78
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 7? Krupp WGer 87 Gor87:78
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 7? Mannesmann WGer 87 Gor87:78
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 8 85 Sidechar WGer 87 Gor87:78
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 7? Sidechar WGer 87 Gor87;78
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 13 85 Thyssen WGer 87 Gor87:78
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 7? Thyssen WGer 87 Gor87:78
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 39 85 VEBA WGer 87 Gor87:78
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 37 8? VEBA WGer 89 S0M089:12
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 7? VEBA WGer 87 Gor87:78
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Ruhrkohle AG WGer 7? Vereinigite Elektzk Westfalen WGer 87 Gor87:78
Ruhrkohle AG WGer 22 85 Vereinigite Elektzk Westfalen WGer 87 Gor87:78
Ruhrkohle Australia Aus 100 Ruhrkohle Trading Pacific PL 89 J98:212
Ruhrkohle Trading Pacific PL 100 Ruhrkohle Handel Inti GmbH WGer 89 J98;212
Rushton Mining Co USA 100 Pennsylvania Power & Light USA 85 KCIM86:678
RW Killer & Co PL Aus 33 72 Ampol Australia Aus 72 Par86:ll
RW Miller & Co PL Aus 0 79 Ampol Australia Aus 72 Par86:ll
RW Miller & Co PL Aus 33 78 A28 Arco Aust Coal L Aus 84 CM88:193
RW Miller & Co PL Aus 0 86 Arco Aust Coal L Aus 84 CM88:193
RW Miller & Co PL Aus 0 78 Bulkships Aus 72 Par86:ll
RW Miller & Co PL Aus 33 72 Bulkships Aus 72 Par86:ll
RW Miller & Co PL Aus 100 89 Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 89 ICR222:19
RW Miller & Co PL Aus 33 72 Howard Smith L Aus 72 Par86:ll
RW Miller & Co PL Aus 67 79 Howard Smith L Aus 84 CM88:193
RW Miller & Co PL Aus 100 86 Howard Smith L Aus 88 NSW89:180
RW Miller & Co PL Aus 0 89 Howard Smith L Aus 89 ICR222:19
R&F Coal Co USA 100 Shell Mining Co USA 84 KCIM85:11
Saarcar Coal Inc USA 100 Ashland Oil Co USA 85 KCIM86:677
Sabine Mining Co USA 100 North American Coal Corp USA 84 KCIM85:9
San Juan Coal Co USA 100 Utah International Inc USA 84 KCIM85:9
Sand Mountain Minerals USA 100 Nerco Inc USA 85 KCIM86:678
Saronvale Aus 100 8? BHP Minerals PL Aus 87 CM88:162
Saxonvale Aus 100 88 Elders Resources NZFPL Aus 88 ICR208:19
Saxonvale Aus 100 87 Peko Wallsend L Aus 87 K593:ll
Scotts Branch Co USA 41 82 10 Pickands Mather & Co USA 82 IŒ48:8
Scotts Branch Co USA 20 7? Pickands Mather & Co USA 82 ICR48:8
Scotts Branch mine USA 59 82 Holland Carbon Fuels USA 82 ICR 48:8
Sequatchie Valley Coal Co USA 100 Nerco Inc USA 84 KCIM85:9
Sevmin Coal Mining PL SA 100 Kangra Coal Corp SA 87 ENI87
Sewell Coal Co USA 100 Pittston Co USA 84 KCIM85:9
Shamrock Coal Co USA 100 Elk River Resources Inc USA 85 KCIM86:677
Shannon Coal Co USA 100 Gulf Resources & Chemical Co USA 85 KCIM86:678
Shannon Pocahontas Mining Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIK86:678
Shaunessy Coal Can 80 81 Fording Coal L Can 86 CM87:475
Shaunessy Coal Can 20 81 Idemitsu Inti Res Can Can 86 CM87:475
Shell Australia Aus 100 Royal Dutch Shell Neth/ 86 0&G86:310
Shell Canada Can 79 Royal Dutch Shell Neth/ 86 0&G86:310
Shell Canada Resources Can 100 Shell Canada Can 86 0&G86:310
Shell Coal International I. UK 100 Royal Dutch Shell Neth/ 86 0&G86:310
Shell South Africa SA 100 Royal Dutch Shell Neth/ 87 CM88:422
Showa Shell Jap 50 85 Royal Dutch Shell Neth/ 88 ICR218:8
Showmass Coal Co USA 100 Western Associated Coal Corp USA 85 KCIM86:679
Shrewsbury Coal Co USA 100 Valley Camp Coal Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Sierra Coal USA 100 Utah Development USA 85 ICR135:14
Simron Fuel Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Smith J. Coal USA 100 Costain UK 89 ICL8917:K
Smoky River Holdings L Can 100 McIntyre Coal Mines L Can 76 CM76:213 %
Smoky River mine Can 100 Smoky River Holdings L Can 87 CM88:286,295 '
Sojuzpromexport USSR 100 government USSR 87 CM88:338
Soldier Creek Coal Co USA 100 California Portland Cement USA 85 KCIM86:677
South Blackwater Aus 50 88 John Holland Holdings Aus 88 ICR228:7
South Blackwater Aus 0 89 A15 John Holland Holdings Aus 89 ICE228:7
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South Blackwater Aus 51 89 Pennant Holdings L Aus 89 ICR228:7
South Blackwater Aus 50 88 Pennant Holdings L Aus 88 ICR228:7
South Blackwater Aus 49 89 A15 R Balcock Aus 89 ICR228.-7
South Blackwater Aus 0 88 Thiess Bros PL Aus 88 ICR228:7
South Blackwater Aus 100 84 Thiess Bros PL Aus 84 CM85:200
South Ohio Coal Co USA 100 Central Ohio Coal Co USA 84 KCIM85:10
South Utah Fuel Co USA 100 84 Coastal States Energy Co USA 85 KCIM86:677
South Witbank Coal Mines SA 100 Johannesburg Consol Inv CoL SA 87 CM88:362
South Atlantic Coal USA 100 89 Mapco USA 89 ICR235:6
South Atlantic Coal USA 0 89 McCall, Jno USA 89 ICR235:6
South Atlantic Coal USA 100 McCall, Jno USA 89 ICR235:6
Southland Coal Aus 100 Devec L Aus 88 NSW89:188
Southland Coal PL Aus 100 Southland Mining L Aus 86 NSW86:218
Sovereign Coal Corp USA 100 Inspiration Coal Inc USA 84 KCIM85;14;ICR21
Spague Coal USA 100 General Coal 83 AFR830216
Spitzkop Colliery PL SA 100 Kangra Coal Corp SA 87 ENI87
Spring Creek Coal Co USA 100 Nerco Inc USA 84 KCIM85:9
Spring Ridge Coal Co USA 100 Jno McCall Coal Co USA 85 KCIM86:678
Spur Coal Co Inc ,James USA 100 Mountain Inc USA 85 KCIM86:678
Scheepvaart Steenkolen NaatschNeth 100 Steenkolen Handels Verenining Neth 80 SSM87:9
Stahlman Coal Co USA 100 Gulf Resources & Chemical Co USA 85 KCIM86:678
Standard Oil USA 100 87 British Petroleum UK/Ne 88 CWI880525
Standard Oil USA 55 8? British Petroleum UK/Ne 87 BP88.-2
Stansbury Coal Co USA 100 Union Pacific Corp USA 85 KCIM86:679
Stansbury & Co Inc USA 100 Transco Coal Services Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Steenkolen Utrecht BV Neth Ruhrkohle AG WGer 89 S0M089:9
Steenkolen Utrecht BV Neth Shell - Netherlands Neth 89 S0M089:9
Steenkolen Utrecht BV Neth Shell - West Germany WGer 89 S0MD89:9
Steenkolen Utrecht BV Neth SHV Holding Neth 89 S0M089:9
Steenkolen Utrecht BV Neth Thyssen AG WGer 89 S0M089:9
Sterling Smokeless Coal Co USA 100 Eastern Associated Coal Corp USA 84 KCIM85:10
Stinnes AG WGer 99 Veba AG WGer 89 S0M089:12;Gas81
Stott Coal Co USA 100 Marmon Grove USA 85 KCIM86:678
Straight Creek Mining Co USA 100 Cyprus Coal Co USA 84 KCIM85:11
St.Joe Minerals Corp USA 100 84 Fluor Corp USA 84 BIE84:344
Sukunka lease Can 100 BP Canada Can 89 ICR226:14
Sumitomo Metal Can L Can 100 Sumitomo Metal Industries L Jap 87 CM88:277
Sun Coal Co Inc USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Sunedco Coal Co USA 100 Sun Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Sunland Mining Corp USA 100 Pyro Energy Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Surrey Properties PL Aus 59 WH.Soul Patterson 4 Co L Aus 84 BIE84:389
Tanoma Coal USA 100 85 Alco Standard Inc USA 85 KCIM86:677
Tanoma Coal USA 100 88 American Metals & Coal Inc USA 88 CWI918
Tanoma Coal USA 0 88 Pohang Iron & Steel Co S.Kor 88 CWI918
Tanoma Coal USA 100 85? Pohang Iron & Steel Co S.Kor 88 CWI918
Tarong Coal Aus 100 Pacific Coal PL Aus 85 QCB85:69
Tavistock Collieries SA 100 Johannesburg Consol Inv CoL SA 87 CM88:362
Taywood Coal, WV USA 100 84 Taylor Woodrow Group USA 84 KCIM85:41
Teck Corp Can 51 Copper Fields Mining Corp Can 87 CM88:305
Teck Corp Can 20 7? Metallgesellschaft Canada Can 87 CM88:305
Teck Corp Can 18 84 4 Metallgesellschaft Canada Can 87 CM88:305
Teck Corp Can 2 84 4 MIM Holdings L Aus 87 CM88:305
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Teck-Bullmoose Coal Inc Can 100 Teck Corp Can 87 CM88:456
Theodore jv Aus 40 80 Shell Australia L Aus 80 Par86:ll
Thiess Bros PL Aus 100 Thiess Holdings L Aus 84 BIE84:390
Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Aus 58 77 100 Dampier Coal (Qld) PL Aus 87 CM76:169;CM88:2
Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Aus 80 85 A140 Dampier Coal (Qld) PL Aus 87 CM88:245,444
Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Aus 13 81 Mitsui & Co L Jap 87 CM88:444
Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Aus 20 65 Mitsui & Co L Jap 87 CM76:169;CH88:2
Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Aus 7 81 Mitsui & Co (Aust) L Aus 87 CM88:444
Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Aus 22 66 Thiess Holdings L Aus 84 CM76:169;CM88:2
Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal PL Aus 0 85 A140 Thiess Holdings L Aus 87 CM88:245,444
Thiess Holdings Aus 100 79 CSR L Aus 87 CM88:440
Thiess Holdings Aus 0 77 MIM Holdings Aus 77 Fox81:74
Thiess Holdings Aus 17 7? MIM Holdings Aus 77 Fox81:74
Thiess Holdings Aus 17 77 Shell Australia L Aus 77 Par86:ll
Thiess Holdings Aus 0 79 Shell Australia L Aus 79 Par86;ll
Thiess Peabody Mitsui PL Aus 20 65 Mitsui & Co L Jap 75 CM76:157;McK76:
Thiess Peabody Mitsui PL Aus 58 65 Peabody Coal Co USA 75 CM76:157;McK76:
Thiess Peabody Mitsui PL Aus 0 76 A90 Peabody Coal Co USA 75 CM76;157
Thiess Peabody Mitsui PL Aus 22 65 Thiess Holdings L Aus 75 CM76:157:McK76:
Thunder Basin Coal Co USA 100 Anaconda Minerals Co USA 84 KCIM85:9
Thunder Basin Coal Co USA 100 Arco Coal Co USA 85 KCIM86:677
Total Exploration SA SA 100 Compagnie Français Petroles Fr CM88:423
Trace Fork Coal Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86;678
Trail Mountain Coal Co USA 100 Diamond Shamrock USA 84 KCIM85:11
Trans Natal Corp SA General Mining Union Corp SA 87 CM88:362
Trans Natal Corp L SA 100 General Mining Union Corp SA 87 CM88:458
Transvaal Consol Land & Expl CSA 100 Rand Mines L SA 87 CM88:362
Triton Coal Co USA 100 Shell Mining Co USA 84 KCIM85:11
Tug River Coal Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Tunnelton Mining Co USA 100 Pennsylvania Power & Light USA 85 KCIM86:678
Turris Coal Co USA 100 Shell Mining Co USA 84 KCIM85:11
Tuscaloosa Energy Corp USA 100 LTV Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Ube Industries Jap 0.4=2m 79 Howard Smith L Aus 87 CM88:426;CM85:4
Ulan Coal Mines L Aus 36 89 Exxon USA 89 ICR217:3
Ulan Coal Mines L Aus 76 0 HC Sleigh L Aus 76 CM76:145
Ulan Coal Mines L Aus 9 76 0 Mitsubishi Development PL Aus 80 ia5:12;CM76:14
Ulan Coal Mines L Aus 15 80 Mitsubishi Development PL Aus 80 ICR5:12
Ulan Coal Mines L Aus 49 8? Mitsubishi Development PL Aus 86 NSW86:220
Ulan Coal Mines L Aus 15 State Superannuation Board Aus 86 NSW86:220
Ulan Coal Mines L Aus 0 89 White Industries PL Aus 89 ICR217:3
Ulan Coal Mines L Aus 36 White Industries PL Aus 86 NSW86:220;NSW89
Union Oil Co of Canada Can 87 7? Union Oil USA 80 ICR15:12
United Collieries L Aus 25 8? Agip Australia PL Aus 86 MSW86:196
United Collieries L Aus 30 88 Agip Australia PL Aus 88 NSW89:190
United Collieries L Aus 57 89 Agip Australia PL Aus 89 ICR222;7
United Collieries L Aus 50 Aust Coal i Shale Empl Fed Aus 86 NSW86:220
United Collieries L Aus 5 89 Aust Coal & Shale Empl Fed Aus 89 ICR222:7
United Collieries L Aus 38 89 Exxon USA 89 ICR222:7
United Collieries L Aus 0 Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 88 NSW89:190
United Collieries L Aus 25 Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 86 NSW86:220
United Collieries L Aus 20 White Industries PL Aus 88 NSW89:190
United Collieries L Aus 38 89 White Industries PL Aus 89 ICR222:7
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United Collieries L Aus 0 89 White Industries PL Aus 89 ICR222:7
United States Fuel Co USA 100 Sharon Steel Corp USA 85 KCIM86:679
United States Steel Mining Co USA 100 United States Steel Corp USA 85 KCIM86:679
Upshur Coals Inc USA 100 84 Alco Standard Inc USA 85 KCIM86;677
Usutu Collieries SA 100 General Mining Union Corp SA 87 CM88:362
Utah Development Co Aus 100 6? Utah International Inc USA 75 CM76:159
Utah Development Co Aus 89 7? Utah International Inc USA 76 CM76:162;McK76:
Utah Development Co Aus 11 7 Utah Mining Australia L Aus 76 CM76:162;McK76:
Utah Fuel Co USA 100 84 Coastal States Energy Co USA 85 KCIM86:677
Utah International Inc USA 100 84 BHP Co PL Aus 84 KCIM85:41
Valley Camp Coal Co USA 100 Quaker State Oil Refining USA 85 KCIM86:678
Valley Camp of Utah Inc USA 100 Quaker State Oil Refining USA 85 KCIM86:678
Veba AG WGer 30 government WGer 89 S0M089:12
Veba Energy & Petrochemical 100 Deutsche BP WGer 82 CWI101;7
Veba International USA 50 Anker Neth 81 ICR
Veba International USA 50 81 35 Hamburgische Elektr W.Ger 85 ICB136:13
Veba Oil Ag WGer 100 Veba AG WGer 89 S0M089:12
Vickery Coal Aus 100 87 Coal Cliff Collieries PL Aus 87 CM88:233
Vickery Coal Aus 80 7 Coal Cliff Collieries PL Aus 87 CM88:233
Vickery Coal Aus 20 7 Vickery Coal PL Aus 87 CM88:233
Victoria Coal Co USA 100 Utah International Inc USA 84 KCIM85:9
Virginia Crews Coal Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Virginia Iron,Coal & Coke Co USA 100 AMR Coal Co USA 87 CM88:120
Virginia Mining Co Inc USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86;678
Volkswagen AG/Preag OHG WGer 95 Preussen-Elektra AG WGer 89 S0M089;12
VP-5 Mining USA 100 Occidental Petroleum Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Wallamaine Joint Venture Aus 38 89 Elders Resources HZFPL Aus 89 ICR217:13
Wallamaine Joint Venture Aus 25 Marubeni Corp Jap 86 NSW86:221
Wallamaine Joint Venture Aus 0 89 Peko Wallsend L Aus 89 ICR217:13
Wallamaine Joint Venture Aus 38 Peko Wallsend L Aus 86 NSW86:221
Wallamaine Joint Venture Aus 38 Wallamaine L Aus 86 NSW86:221
Wallerawang Collieries L Aus 80 Coalex PL Aus 86 NSW86:221
Wallerawang Collieries L Aus 5 79 Sumitomo Corp Jap 86 NSW86:221
Wallerawang Collieries L Aus 15 79 Sumitomo Metal Industries L Jap 86 NSW86:221
Walnut Coal Co Inc USA 100 85- Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 5 7? Austen & Butta L Aus 76 CM76:152
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 0 77 Austen & Butta L Aus 81 ICR13:6
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 0 77 Bendors Aus 81 ICR13:6
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 10 7? Bendors Aus 76 CM76:152
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 35 7? Challenger Mining Aus 76 CM76:152
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 0 77 Challenger Mining Aus 81 ICR13:6
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 25 77 Charbonnages de France Intnl Fr 81 ICR13;6
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 41 82 Charbonnages de France Intnl Fr 86 NSW86:221
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 17 88 Charbonnages de France Intnl Fr 88 NSW89:173
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 50 82 Govt Insurance Office NSW Aus 86 NSW86:221
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 17 88 Govt Insurance Office NSW Aus 88 NSW89;190
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 50 7? Hartogen Mining & Investment Aus 81 CM88:231
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 0 82 Hartogen Mining & Investment Aus 84 CM88:231
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 25 77 Imetal Fr 81 ICR13:6
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 0 88 Société Miniere&Met Penanoya Fr 88 NSW89:190
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 9 82 Société Miniere&Met Penanoya Fr 87 CM88;231
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 50 88 Sumitomo Coal Mining Jap 88 ICR207:6
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company name country equity year $m parent company name country year source
Wambo Mining Corp PL Aus 17 88 Total Holdings (Aust) PL Aus 88 NSW89:190
Warkworth Coal Sales L Aus 100 Warkworth Mining L Aus 86 NSW86:221
Warkworth Mining L Aus 10 76 Australian Resources Dev Bank Aus 76 CM76:134
Warkworth Mining L Aus 30 76 Costain Australia PL Aus 76 CM76:134
Warkworth Mining L Aus 25 7? Costain Australia PL Aus 86 NSW86:221;CM88:
Warkworth Mining L Aus 45 76 HC Sleigh Res L Aus 76 CM76:134
Warkworth Mining L Aus 15 7? HC Sleigh Res L Aus 86 NSW86:221;CM88:
Warkworth Mining L Aus 19 7? Mitsubishi Development PL Aus 86 NSW86:221;CM88:
Warkworth Mining L Aus 15 76 Mitsubishi Development PL Aus 76 CM76;134
Warkworth Mining L Aus 6 7? Mitsubishi Mining & Cement,AusAus 86 NSW86:221;CM88:
Warkworth Mining L Aus 20 7? TiG Mutual Life Society Ltd Aus 86 NSW86:221;CM88:
Warkworth Mining L Aus 15 7? Wales Resource Fund Aus 86 NSW86:221;CM88:
Welco Mining Co ÜSA 100 Island Creek Coal Co USA 85 KCIM86:678
Welge Dacht Expl CoL SA 100 Rand Mines L SA 87 CM88:362
West Elk Coal Co USA 100 Anaconda Minerals Co USA 84 KCIM85:9
West Elk Coal Co USA 100 Arco Coal Co USA 85 KCIM86:677
West Wallsend Aus 100 88 BHP Co PL Aus 89 ICR217:13
West Wallsend Aus 100 7? Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 89 ICR217:13
West Wallsend Aus 0 88 Coal & Allied Industries L Aus 89 ICR217;13
West Wallsend Aus 100 89 Macquarrie Collieries Aus 89 ICR217:13
Westar Mining Inti L Can 100 Westar Mining L Can 87 CM88:296
Westar Mining L Can 67 80 600 BC Resources Can 87 CM88:296
Westar Mining L Can 0 80 Godo Steel Jap 87 CM88:296
Westar Mining L Can 0 80 600 Kaiser Steel USA 87 CM88:296
Westar Mining L Can 2 80 Kawasaki Steel Corp Jap 87 CM88:296
Westar Mining L Can 1 80 Kobe Steel L Jap 87 CM88:296
Westar Mining L Can 1 80 Mitsubishi Chemical Ind L Jap 87 CM88:296
Westar Mining L Can 13 80 Mitsubishi Corp Jap 87 CM88:296
Westar Mining L Can 6 80 Nippon Kokan KK Jap 87 CM88:296
Westar Mining L Can 6 80 Nippon Steel Corp Jap 87 CM88:296
Westar Mining L Can 1 80 Nisshin Steel Co L Jap 87 CM88:296
Westar Mining L Can 4 80 Sumitomo Metal Industries L Jap 87 CM88:296
Westar Mining L Can 0 80 Toho Gas Jap 87 CM88:296
Westar Mining L Can 30 89 C150 Whitman Heffeman Rhein & Co USA 89 CWI1032:1
Western Associated Coal Corp USA 100 Eastern Associated Coal Corp USA 85 KCIM86:679
Western Collieries Aus 100 7? CSR Aus 89 CWI1026;3
Western Collieries Aus 0 89 A130 CSR Aus 89 CWI1026:3
Western Collieries Aus 100 89 A130 Rothwells L Aus 89 CWI1026:3
Western Collieries Aus 0 89 A130 Rothwells L Aus 89 CWI1026:3
Western Collieries Aus 100 89 A130 Wesfarmers Aus 89 CWI1026:3
Western Plains Mining Co USA 100 North American Coal Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Westfalen Colliery PL Aus 0 87 p3.2 Bundaberg Sugar Co L Aus 88 ICR194:7
Westfalen Colliery PL Aus 100 8? Bundaberg Sugar Co L Aus 84 BIE84:397
Westfalen Colliery PL Aus 87 p3.2 Endeavour Resources Aus 88 ICR194:7
Westfalen Colliery PL Aus 87 p3.2 Showa Shell Jap 88 ICR194:7
Westmoreland Coal Sales USA 100 84 Westmoreland Coal Co USA 84 CM88:120
Westmoreland Resources USA Morrison-Knudsen Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Westmoreland Resources USA Penn Virginia Corp USA 85 KCIM86:679
Westmoreland Resources USA 25 87 VEBA WGer 87 Gor87;79
Westmoreland Resources USA 15 82 33 VEBA WGer 82 ICR47:11
Westmoreland Resources USA 84 Westmoreland Coal Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Wheelwright Mining Co USA 100 Inspiration Coal Inc USA 84 KCIM85:14
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company name country equity year $m parent company name country year source
Whitaker Coal Co USA 100 Elk River Resources Inc USA 85 KCIM86:677
Windsor Power House Coal Co USA 100 Central Ohio Coal Co USA 84 KCIM85:10
Winston Coal Co USA 100 Robinson-Phillips Coal Co USA 85 KCIM86:679
Wishbone Alaska USA 50 87 Idemitsu Kosan Jap 88 CWI924:1
Wishbone Alaska USA 50 Rocky Mountain Energy USA 88 CWI924:!
Witbank Colliery SA 100 Rand Nines SA 89 ICR228:!
Witbank Colliery L SA 100 Rand Mines L SA 87 CM88:362
Wolf Creek Collieries Co USA 100 85 Fluor Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Wolverine Coal Co USA 100 Industrial Fuels Corp USA 85 KCIM86:678
Yarabee mine Aus 100 Thiess Bros PL Aus 85 QCB85:70
York Canyon USA 100 7? Kaiser Coal Corp USA 89 KNB7.1:6
York Canyon USA 0 89 24 Kaiser Coal Corp USA 89 KHB7.1:6
York Canyon USA 100 89 24 Pittsburg & Midway Mining USA 89 KNB7.1:6
note: À = Australian dollars, C = Canadian dollars, p = investment re part of total shown 
sources:
ÀCR = Australian Coal Report.
AFR830216 = Australian Financial Review. 16 Feb 1983.
AZ69:28 = The Australian's A to Z of Mining and Oil Companies. 1969. p28.
BIE84:363 = Bureau of Industry Economics, Aust. 1984. Major Manufacturing and Mining Inv Projects. p363. 
CM88:120 = Coal Manual. 1988. pl20.
CWI924:1 = Coal Week International, issue 924. pi.
DIC82:309 = Dept of Industry & Commerce, Aust. 1982. Major Manufacturing and Mining Projects. p309. 
Gas81 = Gaskin, Max. 1981. Market Aspects of an Expansion of Int Steam Coal Trade.
Gor87:87 = Gordon. 1987. World Coal: economics, policies and prospects. p87.
ICL8917:2 = International Coal Letter. 1989. Number 17. p2.
ICR47:11 = International Coal Report, issue 47. pll.
J89:39 = Jobson's Mining Year Book 1989/90. p39.
K590:3 = King's International Coal Trade, issue 590. p3.
KCIM85:11 = Keystone Coal Industry Manual. 1985. US Coal Production by Company, pll.
KCIM86:678 = Keystone Coal Industry Manual. 1986. p678.
KHB7.1:6 = Keystone News Bulletin, vol.7 no.l p6.
McK76:218 = McKern. 1976. Multinational Enterprise & Natural Resources. p218.
NSW89:190 = New South Wales, Dept of Minerals and Energy. Coal Industry Profile 1989. pl90.
0&G86:64 = Oil and Gas Yearbook 1986. p64.
Par86:ll = Parker. 1986. Rural to resource town. pll.
QCB85:70 = Queensland Coal Board. 1985. Annual Report. p70.
Rich83:74 = Richmond and Sharma. 1983. Mining and Australia. p74.
SSM89:12 = SSH Coal. 1987. Coal from anywhere to everywhere. Rotterdam. Neth.
S0M089:12 = SOMO. 1989b. Biljagen De keten gebroken. pl2.
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Appendix D: International coal trade survey
Officials in the following companies provided partial or 
complete data for the international coal trade survey. These 
data are not the official policies of the associated 
companies, but are valued as the opinions of prominent 
individuals active in the trade.
Agip Carbonne, Milan 
Anker Coal, Rotterdam
Association Technique de l'Importation Charboniere (ATIC)
BP Coal, London 
Caralec, Madrid 
Carboex, Spain 
Cembureau, Brussels
Ente Nazionale per I'Energia Electrica (ENEL), Rome
Electricité de France (EdF), Paris
Elkraft, Copenhagen
Elsam, Fredericia
Exxon Coal, Netherlands
Gemeenschappelijk Kolenbureau
Elecktricieitsproduktiebedrijven (GKE), Utrecht 
Idemitsu Kosan, Tokyo
Japan Coal Development Corporation, Tokyo
Japan Pulp and Paper Association members
Mitsubishi Corp, Tokyo
Mitsubishi Mining and Cement, Tokyo
Mitsui Mining, Tokyo
Nippon Kokan, Tokyo
Nippon Steel, Tokyo
Polkohle, Hamburg
Pool des Calories, Brussels
Scheepvaart en Steenkolen Maatschappij bv (SSM), Rotterdam 
Showa Shell Sekiyu, Tokyo 
Stinnes AG, Mulheim
Tokyo Electric Power Corporation, Tokyo
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À copy of the covering letter and questionnaire is attached, 
followed by the results of the survey. The questionnaire was 
translated into French, Italian and Japanese for use in 
those countries. Copies of the translations are available 
from the author.
INTERNATIONAL COAL TRADE IN EUROPE AND ASIA
Different import strategies (direct investment, long term 
contracts, loans, import policies, etc.) have been used by 
consumers to secure a stable and/or low cost supply of coal. 
This questionnaire forms part of a research project to 
evaluate the effectiveness of these arrangements by 
comparing the international coal trade in Europe and Asia. 
The results will be used to construct better coal trade 
models for use by consumers, suppliers, traders and 
researchers. To facilitate this research, please complete 
the attached questionnaire. Your responses will be treated 
in confidence as only aggregate responses will be reported 
in the research findings.
The project is being undertaken by Paul Parker at the London 
School of Economics, UK. Financial and/or advisory support 
has been provided by the Institute for Energy Economics, 
Japan; the National Institute for Environmental Studies, 
Japan; the Australia-Japan Research Centre, Australia; the 
Social Science and Humanitites Research Council of Canada 
and the London School of Economics, University of London.
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Coal Trade Questionnaire
Please assist this study by answering the following 
questions :
la. Has your company invested in any international coal 
projects?
(please circle) Yes No
If yes, could you please give the name(s) of the 
project(s), location(s), date(s) of investment, share(s) of 
equity and quantity of coal imported from the project(s)?
project name location date equity imports (OOOmt)
% 80 85 87
B
D
lb. In your opinion, do you expect your company to invest in 
overseas coal projects by 1995? Yes No
If yes, what equity share do you expect your company to 
have? %
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2. What share of your company's coal imports were (will be) 
received under the following types of contracts in 1980, 
1987 and 1995?
contract type 1980 1987 1995
% of trade
long term contracts (>5yr)
fixed volume & fixed or indexed price 
fixed volume & renegotiated price
medium term contracts (2-5yr)
fixed volume & fixed or indexed price 
fixed volume & renegotiated price
annual extension of old long term contracts, 
fixed volume & renegotiated price 
renegotiated volume & renegotiated price.
renewable annual contracts
fixed volume & renegotiated price 
renegotiated volume & renegotiated price.
new annual contracts (lyr)
spot contracts (<lyr)
total 100 100 100
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3. In your opinion what was (will be) the relative 
importance of the following objectives in purchasing coal in 
1980, 1987 and 1995? Please indicate by using the scale 
shown below.
1 2 3 4 5
very above average average below average not 
important importance importance importance important
1980 1987 1995
(indicate by number 1-5)
least cost 
diversity of supply 
ability to add new suppliers 
required domestic purchases
volume flexibility 
price flexibility
desirable qualities (combined) 
calorific value 
total ash 
total sulphur 
total moisture 
volatile matter 
Crucible Swelling Number 
fluidity
other __________
reliability of supply
likelihood of strikes 
accurate port deliveries
other (please specify) ______
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4a. In your opinion, what was (will be) the relative 
importance of the following characteristics in the selection 
of suppliers in 1980, 1987 and 1995? Please indicate by 
using the scale of numbers 1-5 as in question 3.
1980 1987 1995
(indicate by number 1-5)
low cost mine_________________ ____ ____ ____
large mine: economies of scale  ____ ____
established supplier__________ ____ ____ ____
proven reliability of company ____ ____ ____
proven coal quality control ____ ____ ____
low risk of strikes___________ ____ ____ ____
high reliability of delivery ____ ____ ____
limit supplier marketshare ____ ____ ____
4b. Please indicate the preferred limit (max % of total 
imports) to the marketshare of any single:
1980 1987 1995
max % of total imports
company ____ ____ ____
port/region ____ ____ ____
country ____ ____ ____
4c. Please indicate the preferred minimum number of 
suppliers.
1980 1987 1995
number
companies ____ ____ ____
ports/regions ____ ____ ____
countries ____ ____ ____
4d. Please indicate the increase in price (% above average 
price) willing to be paid to establish a new supplier.
1980 1987 1995
% above average price
company ____ ____ ____
port/region ____ ____ ____
country ____ ____ ____
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5. In your opinion, what arrangements were (will be) most 
suitable to establish new coal supplies? Please use the 
scale:
1 2 3 4 5
very above average average below average not 
suitable suitability suitability suitability suitable
1980 1987 1995
(indicate by number 1-5)
long term contract 
joint venture
other ______
no special arrangements
6. In your opinion, how was (will) the shipping of coal 
imports (be) arranged?
1980 1987 1995
% of total imports 
by your company (total) ____ ____ ____
in directly owned vessels_________ ____ ____
in long term charters (>lyr) ____ ____ ____
in short term charters ____ ____ ____
in spot charters (1 voyage) ____ ____ ____
by the supplier
by the trader
by an independent shipper
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7. In your opinion, what was (will be) the relative 
importance of other factors on coal purchases in 1980, 1987 
and 1995?
1 2 3 4 5
very above average average below average not
important importance importance importance important
1980 1987 1995 
(indicate by number 1-5)
loans from consumer to producer 
bilateral investment agreement
(ie. capital/technology for coal) 
bilateral trade relations (balance) 
access to product markets 
other ______________________
8. In your opinion, what guantity of coal is your company 
likely to import in 1990 and 1995?
1990 1995
thousand tonnes (1000 mt) ____ ____
Thank you for taking the time to fill out this 
questionnaire.
Please retain questionnaire for the interview with Paul 
Parker.
Paul Parker tel.(01) 405-7686 x2613 
International Resources Programme 
London School of Economics 
S504 Houghton St.
London WC2A 2ÀE UK
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Coal Trade Questionnaire
Answers by Japanese consumers and traders
la. Has your company invested in any international coal 
projects?
Yes 75% No 25%
If yes, could you please give the name(s) of the 
project(s), location(s), date(s) of investment, share(s) of 
equity and quantity of coal imported from the project(s)?
project name location date equity imports (OOOmt)
% 80 85 87
A see Appendix C ________  ____ _____ ____ ____ ____
B
D
lb. In your opinion, do you expect your company to invest in 
overseas coal projects by 1995? Yes 65% No 35%
If yes, what equity share do you expect your company to 
have? 10-75%
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2. What share of your company's coal imports were (will be) 
received under the following types of contracts in 1995?
1995
contract type % of trade
ss JSM min EPC oil oth
long term contracts (>5yr) 35 25 10 65 10 15
fixed volume & fixed or indexed price 10 4
fixed volume & renegotiated price 15 6 10 15
medium term contracts (2-5yr) 30 15 35 15 45 50
fixed volume & fixed or indexed price 15 10
fixed volune & renegotiated price 25 45 50
annual extensions of old long term contracts 60 10 20 7
fixed volume & renegotiated price 3 7
renegotiated volume & renegotiated price 60 10 17
renewable annual contracts 30 20 10 10 5
fixed volume & renegotiated price 5 2.5
renegotiated volume & renegotiated price 5 2.5
new annual contracts (lyr) 1 0 5 5 5
spot contracts (<1yr) 5 15 5 10 18
note: ss = sogo shosha, JSM = Japanese steel mills,
min = mining company, EPC = electric power company, 
oil = oil company, oth = other steam coal consumer
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3. In your opinion what was (will be) the relative 
importance of the following objectives in purchasing coal in 
1980, 1987 and 1995? Please indicate by using the scale 
shown below.
1 2  3
very above average average 
important importance importance
4 5
below average not
importance important
1980 1987 1995
ss JSM min ss JSM min ss JSM min
least cost 3 2 3.5 1 1 1.5 3 1 1.5
diversity of supply 3 1.5 2.5 4 2.5 2.5 1 2.5 2
ability to add new suppliers 3 1 2 4 4.5 3.5 1 3.5 3.5
required domestic purchases 2 3 2.5 4 4 4 5 5 5
volume flexibility 3 3.5 3.5 2 1 2.5 2 1 3
price flexibility 3 2.5 3.5 2 1 2.5 3 1 3
desirable qualities (comprehensive) 2 2 2.5 2 2 2 3 2 2
calorific value 3 4.5 2.5 3 4.5 2.5 3 4.5 2
total ash 3 1 2.5 3 1 2 2 1 2
total sulphur 3 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2
total moisture 4 3.5 3 4 2.5 3 4 2.5 3
volatile matter 3 3 3 3 2.5 3 3 2.5 3
Crucible Swelling Number 5 2.5 3.5 5 3.5 3 5 3.5 3
fluidity 5 2.5 3 5 1.5 3 5 1.5 2.5
other 3 3 3 3 2 2.5 3 2 2.5
reliability of supply
likelihood of strikes 1 1 3 3 2 3 1 4 3
accurate port deliveries 1 1 3 3 2 3 1 4 3
other (please specify)
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3. In your opinion what was (will be) the relative 
importance of the following objectives in purchasing coal in 
1980, 1987 and 1995? Please indicate by using the scale 
shown below.
1 2  3
very above average average 
important importance importance
4 5
below average not
importance important
1980 1987
EPC oil oth EPC oil oth
least cost 2 1.5 1 1 1 1
diversity of supply 2.5 3 3 2 3 2.5
ability to add new suppliers 3 2.5 3 3 2.5 3.5
required domestic purchases 2 3.5 5 2.5 3.5 5
1995
EPC oiI oth
1.5 1.5 1
1.5 2.5 2
3 2 3.5
4.5 5 5
volume flexibility 2 2 4 1.5 3 3 1.5 2.5 2.5
price flexibility 2 1.5 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2 1.5
desirable qualities (comprehensive) 2 3 3 1.5 2.5 3 1.5 2 3
calorific value 3 2 4 2 2.5 3.5 2 2.5 3
total ash 3 3 3.5 2 3 3.5 2 3 3.5
total sulphur 3 1.5 3 3 1.5 3 3 2 3
total moisture 3 3 3 2 2.5 3 2 2.5 3
volatile matter 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 2
Crucible Swelling Number 5 4.5 5 5 4.5 5 5 3.5 5
fluidity 5 4.5 4 5 4.5 4 5 3.5 4
other 3 3 3
reliability of supply
likelihood of strikes 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
accurate port deliveries 2 2.5 1.5 2 1.5 1.5 2 1 1.5
other (please specify) 1 1 1
7. In your opinion, what quantity of coal is your company likely to import in 1990 and 1995?
ss JSM mining EPC oil other
1990 (million tonnes) 4 13 3 2.2 4.5 1.4
1995 13 2.2 6.8 1.9
423
4a. In your opinion, what was (will be) the relative 
importance of the following characteristics in the selection 
of suppliers in 1980, 1987 and 1995? Please indicate by 
using the scale of numbers 1-5 as in question 3.
1980 1987 1995
ss JSM min ss JSM min ss JSM min
low cost mine 3 1.5 3.5 3 1 1.5 2 1 2
large mine - economies of scale 4 2.5 4 4 4.5 3.5 3 4.5 3.5
established supplier 3 4.5 3.5 3 3.5 3 4 3.5 3
proven reliability of company 2 1.5 3 2 1 3 2 1 3
proven quality control for coal 3 2 3 3 2 2 4 2 2
low risk of strikes 2 1 3.5 3 1.5 3 2 1.5 3
high reliability of delivery dates 2 1.5 3.5 3 2 3 2 2 3
limit marketshare of suppliers 4 1.5 3.5 4 2.5 3 3 2.5 2.5
4b. Please indicate the preferred limit (max % of total
imports) to the marketshare of any single;
1980 1987 1995
max % of total imports
company 10 10 15 15 10 10 10 10 10
port/region 55 10 25 45 10 20 20 10 20
country 70 45 40 60 45 40 45 45 40
4c. Please indicate the preferred minimum number of
suppliers.
1980 1987 1995
number
companies 30 40 20 35 45 25 45 45 30
ports/regions 7 15 10 9 15 15 12 15 15
countries 5 6-7 5 7 6-7 5 9 6 5
4d. Please indicate the increase in price (% above average 
price) willing to be paid to establish a new supplier.
1980 1987 1995
% above average price
company 0 10 10 0 0 0  0 0 5
port/region 0 15 10 0 2 0  0 2 5
country 0 0  10 0 0 0  0 0 5
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4a. In your opinion, what was (will be) the relative 
importance of the following characteristics in the selection 
of suppliers in 1980, 1987 and 1995? Please indicate by 
using the scale of numbers 1-5 as in question 3.
1980 1987 1995
EPC oil oth EPC oil oth EPC oil oth
low cost mine 1.5 2 3 1.5 1 2.5 1 1.5 2
large mine - economies of scale 2.5 2 3.5 2.5 1.5 3.5 2.5 1 3.5
established supplier 3 2.5 3 2.5 2 3 2.5 2 4
proven reliability of company 2.5 2 2.5 2 1 2.5 2 1 2.5
proven quality control for coal 1.5 2 3 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 2.5
low risk of strikes 2.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 1 2.5 1.5 1
high reliability of delivery dates 2 1.5 2 2 1.5 2 2 1.5 2
limit marketshare of suppliers 3.5 3 3.5 2 2.5 3 1.5 1.5 2.5
20 10 25
30 20 30
50 35 60
4b. Please indicate the preferred limit (max % of total 
imports) to the marketshare of any single:
1980 1987 1995
max % of total imports
company 20 30 25 20 20 25
port/region 30 35 40 30 30 35
country 50 45 65 50 45 65
4c. Please indicate the preferred minimum number of 
suppliers.
1980 1987 1995
number
companies 4-10 4-10 5-6 4-10 4-10 5-6 4-10 30 5-6
ports/regions 7-8 4-5 4 7-8 4-5 4 7-8 20 4
countries 5-6 2-3 2-3 5-6 2-43-4 5-6 10 3-4
4d. Please indicate the increase in price (% above average 
price) willing to be paid to establish a new supplier.
1980 1987 1995
% above average price
company 10 10 20 10 2 10 10 0 10
port/region 10 7 10 10 2 5 10 0 5
country 10 7 0 10 2 0 10 0 0
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5. In your opinion, what arrangements were (will be) most 
suitable to establish new coal supplies?
1 2 3 4 5
very above average average below average not
suitable suitability suitability suitability suitable
1980 1987 1995
ss JSM min ss JSM min ss JSM min
long term contract 2 1 3 4 3 3.5 2 3.5 3.5
joint venture 3 1.5 2.5 4 3.5 4 3 3.5 4
other
EPC oil oth EPC oil oth EPC oi I oth
long term contract 1.5 2 2 1.5 1.5 2 1.5 2.5 2
joint venture 3 3 3.5 4 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.5
other
6. In your opinion, what was (will be) the relative 
importance of other factors on coal purchases in 1980, 1987 
and 1995?
1 2 3 4 5
very above average average below average not
important importance importance importance important
1980 1987 1995
ss JSM min ss JSM min ss JSM min
loans from consumer to producer 5 3 3 5 4 4.5 5 4.5 3.5
bilateral investment agreement 5 4 3.5 5 4.5 3.5 5 4.5 3.5
(ie. capital/technology for coal) 5 4.5 4 5 4.5 3 5 4.5 3
bilateral trade relations (balance) 5 4.5 4 4 4 3.5 5 4 3.5
access to product markets 5 4 3 4 5 2 5 5 2
political boycott 5 4 4.5 4 3 3.5 5 3 4
EPC oil oth EPC oil oth EPC oi I oth
loans from consumer to producer 4 5 3.5 4 4.5 3.5 4 4 3.5
bilateral investment agreement 5 4 2 5 3 2 5 3 2
(ie. capitaI/technology for coal) 4 2 3 2 2 2
bilateral trade relations (balance) 4 4 3 4 3.5 3 4 3 3
access to product markets 5 3.5 4 5 3.5 4 5 3 4
political boycott 4.5 4 2 4.5 3 2 4.5 3 2
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Coal Trade Questionnaire
Answers by European consumers and traders
la. Has your company invested in any international coal 
projects?
Yes 15% No 85%
If yes, could you please give the name(s) of the 
project(s), location(s), date(s) of investment, share(s) of 
equity and quantity of coal imported from the project(s)?
project name location date equity imports (OOOmt)
% 80 85 87
A see Appendix C ________  ____ _____ ____ ____ ____
B
lb. In your opinion, do you expect your company to invest in 
overseas coal projects by 1995? Yes 0% No 100%
If yes, what equity share do you expect your company to 
have? %
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2. What share of your company's coal imports were (will be) 
received under the following types of contracts in 1980,
1987 and 1995?
1980 1987 1995
contract type % of trade
utilities utilities utilities
N.Eur cem trad S.Eur N.Eur cem trad S.Eur N.Eur cem trad
long term contracts (>5yr) 80 5 60 30
fixed volume & fixed or indexed price 5
fixed volume & renegotiated price 80 60 30
50 25
50 25
medium term contracts (2 5yr) 2 10
fixed volume & fixed or indexed price 2 3
fixed volume & renegotiated price 7
15 20 10 20
15 20 10 20
annual extensions of old long term contracts 
fixed volume & renegotiated price 
renegotiated volume & renegotiated price
renewable annual contracts 20 20 70
fixed volume & renegotiated price 
renegotiated volume & renegotiated price 20 20 70
10 15 70
10 15 70
20 30 80
20 30 80
new annual contracts (lyr) 10 5 5 10 10 10 15 10 10
spot contracts (<1yr) 68 10 25 35 75 10 20 40 55 10
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3. In your opinion what was (will be) the relative 
importance of the following objectives in purchasing coal in 
1980, 1987 and 1995? Please indicate by using the scale 
shown below.
1 2 3 4 5
very above average average below average not 
important importance importance importance important
1980
utilities
1987 1995
ut i l i t i es ut i l i t  i es
N.Eur cem trad S.Eur N.Eur cem trad S.Eur N.Eur cem trad
least cost 2.5 1 1 1 1.5 1 1 2 1.5 1 1.5
diversity of supply 1.5 5 2.5 3 2 5 2.5 1.5 2 5 2.5
ability to add new suppliers 4.5 3 1 3.5 3.5 3 2 2.5 3.5 3 1
required domestic purchases 5 3 2 5 4 3 5
volume flexibility 2.5 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2
price flexibility 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2
desirable qualities (comprehensive) 2 2 2 2
calorific value 2 2 3 2 2 3 1
total ash 1.5 1 3 2.5 1 3 2 1
total sulphur 2.5 2 1 1 1.5 1 1 1
total moisture 2 3 2 3.5 2 2 3.5 2
volatile matter 3.5 3 3 3 1 3 3 1
Crucible Swelling Number 3 1 4.5 5 1 4.5 5 1
fluidity 5 1 4 5 1 4 5 1
other 5 4 2 2.5 1.5 2.5
reliability of supply
likelihood of strikes 2 4 2 2 2.5 4 2 2 2.5 4 2
accurate port deliveries 2 4 2 1 3 4 2 1 3 4 2
other (please specify)
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4a. In your opinion, what was (will be) the relative 
importance of the following characteristics in the selection 
of suppliers in 1980, 1987 and 1995? Please indicate by 
using the scale of numbers 1-5 as in question 3.
1980 1987 1995
utilities utilities utilities
N.Eur cem trad S.Eur N.Eur cem trad S.Eur N.Eur cem trac
low cost mine 4 5 1 1 3.5 5 1.5 1.5 3 5 1
large mine - economies of scale 4 3 2 3 3.5 3 2 3 3.5 3 2
established supplier 1.5 4 2 2.5 2 4 3 2.5 2 4 2
proven reliability of company 1.5 4 1 1.5 1.5 4 1 1.5 1.5 4 1
proven quality control for coal 1.5 3 2 1.5 2 4 2 1.5 2 4 2
low risk of strikes 3.5 1 3 2 3.5 1 2 2 3.5 1 2
high reliability of delivery dates 2.5 2 2 1.5 3 3 1 1.5 2.5 4 1
limit marketshare of suppliers 3.5 1 2 3 3.5 1 2 3 3.5 1 1
4b. Please indicate the preferred limit (max % of total 
imports) to the marketshare of any single:
1980 1987 1995
max % of total imports
company 15 30 10 15 10
port/region 60 50 30 40 30
country 60 30 50 40 25 40 40 25
4c. Please indicate 
suppliers.
the preferred 
1980
minimum number
1987
number
of
1995
companies 5 5-10 10 5-10 10
ports/regions 6 3-5 6 5-10 6
countries 4-7 3-5 4-8 3-7 4
4d. Please indicate the increase in price (% above average 
price) willing to be paid to establish a new supplier.
1980 1987 1995
% above average price
company 0 - 5  -5 0 -5 -5
port/region 7 - 5  -5 7 -5 -5
country 7 - 5  -5 7 -5 -5
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5. In your opinion, what arrangements were (will be) most 
suitable to establish new coal supplies? Please use the 
scale:
1 2 3 4 5
very above average average below average not
suitable suitability suitability suitability suitable
1980 1987
utilities utilities
N.Eur cem trad S.Eur N.Eur cem trad
1995
ut i l i t  i es 
S.Eur N.Eur cem trad
long term contract 
joint venture
other ______
no special arrangements
1.5
3
6. In your opinion, how was (will) the shipping of coal 
imports (be) arranged?
1980 1987 1995
% of total imports
utilities
by your company (total) 
in directly owned vessels 
in long term charter vessels (>1yr) 
in short term charter vessels 
in spot charter vessels (1 voyage)
utilities
N.Eur cem trad S.Eur N.Eur cem trad 
0 0 100 40 0 0 100
25
50
25 40
5
65
30
utilities  
S.Eur N.Eur cem trad 
55 0 0 100
10
35
10
5
70
25
by the supplier 100 60
by the trader 30
by an independent shipping company 10
60 90 50
30 
10 20
45 50 40
30
50 30
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7. In your opinion, what was (will be) the relative 
importance of other factors on coal purchases in 1980, 1987 
and 1995?
1 2 3 4 5
very above average average below average not
important importance importance importance important
1980 1987
utilities utilities
N.Eur cem trad S.Eur N.Eur cem trad
loans from consumer to producer 5
bilateral investment agreement 5
(ie. capital/technology for coal) 
bilateral trade relations (balance) 5
access to product markets 5
other
5
5
3.5
1995
ut i l i t  i es 
S.Eur N.Eur cem trad
5
5
4.5
3
8. In your opinion, what quantity of coal is your company 
likely to import in 1990 and 1995?
1990 1995
ut i l i t  i es ut i l i t  i es
S.Eur N.Eur cem trad S.Eur N.Eur cem trad
mi 11i on tonnes 2 10 22 14 3 11 21 18
Thank you for taking the time to fill out this 
questionnaire.
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